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James R. Maxeiner ∗
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ABSTRACT
In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and American legal
lexicographer Bryan A. Garner challenge Americans to start over
in dealing with statutes in the Age of Statutes. They propose
∗ © 2013 James R. Maxeiner, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D. in Law (Dr. jur., under
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Fikentscher, Munich), Associate Professor of Law,
Associate Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, University of
Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Philip K. Howard and the
Common Good Institute for their support and the University of Baltimore for
providing a summer research stipend.
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“textualism,” i.e., “that the words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what
the text means.” Textualism is meant to remedy the American lack
of “a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal
texts.” That deficiency makes American law unpredictable,
unequal, undemocratic and political. In the book’s Foreword, Chief
Judge Frank Easterbrook calls the book “a great event in American
legal culture.” It is a remarkable book because it challenges
common law traditions. This review essay shows how Scalia and
Garner challenge common law and summarizes the content of their
challenge.
This article contrasts the methods of Reading Law with the
methods of the Continental civil law. It shows that textualism is
consistent with modern civil law methods. It also shows, however,
that pure textualism, which largely restricts interpretation to
grammatical and historical interpretation and excludes non-textual
interpretation such as equitable, pragmatic and purposive
approaches, is not consistent with modern civil law methods. In
modern civil law, textualism and non-textualism coexist. They
must, if law is to honor legal certainty, justice and policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 1 U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and American legal
lexicographer Bryan A. Garner challenge Americans to start over
in dealing with statutes in the Age of Statutes. 2 They propose
“textualism,” i.e., “that the words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what

1. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (West 2012). [Hereinafter SCALIA &
GARNER, READING LAW.]
2. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(Harvard Univ. Press 1982); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES
(Columbia Univ. Press 1982).
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the text means.” 3 Textualism is meant to remedy America’s lack of
“a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal
texts.” 4 That deficiency makes American law unpredictable,
unequal, undemocratic and political.
Reading Law is a how-to handbook for judges who want to
apply textualism in their daily work. It is not an academic
monograph that argues the merits of textualism and the demerits of
non-textualism. Scalia and Garner advise, “Our approach is
unapologetically normative, prescribing what, in our view, courts
ought to do with operative language.” 5 Reading Law consists of a
six-page foreword, a four-page preface, a forty-six page
introduction, seventy short chapters of two-to-ten pages each, a
four-page afterword, a ten-page appendix on the use of
dictionaries, a seventeen-page glossary of legal interpretation and a
sixty-four page bibliography of cases, books and articles. The
seventy short chapters address fifty-seven “Sound Principles of
Interpretation” (broken down into five “fundamental principles”
and fifty-two canons classified in various types) and a section of
“Thirteen Falsities Exposed.”
In the book’s Foreword, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook calls
the book “a great event in American legal culture. . . . [N]ot since
Justice Story has a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court written
about interpretation as comprehensively . . . .” 6 In the 1830s Story
described an approach to interpretation of legal texts much like that
which Scalia and Garner and propose today. 7 Story went further,
however, and addressed codification of law. 8
3. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 441.
4. Id. at xxvii.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW,
supra note 1, at xxvi.
7. Where Scalia and Garner provide fifty-seven “Sound Principles of
Interpretation,” Story offered his own non-exhaustive list of twenty-one
“fundamental maxims” for the interpretation of statutes. Appendix III (Law,
Legislation, Codes), in 7 ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA. A POPULAR DICTIONARY
OF ARTS, SCIENCE, LITERATURE, HISTORY, POLITICS AND BIOGRAPHY, BROUGHT
DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME; INCLUDING A COPIOUS COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL
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The affinity of Scalia and Garner’s work to Story’s is not
coincidental. The problem that Scalia and Garner address today
grows out of the failure of American law to adequately resolve the
codification controversy of more than a century ago. The
controversy arose out of the need of the nation for rational law to
support the ever increasing volume of commerce. It pitted
proponents of codes, on the one hand, who wanted systematic,
rational statements of rules along the lines of the French codes of

ARTICLES IN AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY; ON THE BASIS OF THE SEVENTH EDITION OF
THE GERMAN CONVERSATIONS-LEXICON 576, 585 (Francis Lieber ed., Carey
and Lea 1831) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA]. His work on the
principles of constitutional interpretation is better known. See 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 344-442
(Hilliard, Grey and Co. 1833); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 123-162 (abridged ed., Hilliard, Grey
and Co. 1833).
It is remarkable that Scalia and Garner did not note this work in their otherwise
exhaustive bibliography and that Easterbrook does not seem to be aware of it.
Story’s authorship was known in his lifetime, and the article has been reprinted
three times in modern works separately from the ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA.
See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
350-372 (1971; 2d ed. with an Introduction by Stephen Presser, 1990); JOSEPH
STORY AND THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA. WITH AN ORIGINAL
INTRODUCTION BY MORRIS L. COHEN (Valerie L. Horowitz ed., Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2006). The later volume reprints the seventeen other articles by
Story in the ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA.
8. As Chairman of the Codification Commission in Massachusetts,
compiler of federal laws, author of the leading treatise on constitutional law,
professor at Harvard Law School, and Supreme Court justice, he was a major
participant in the codification controversy that occupied much of American legal
discourse in the nineteenth century. See JOSEPH STORY ET AL., REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AND REPORT UPON THE
PRACTICABILITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING TO A WRITTEN AND SYSTEMATIC
CODE THE COMMON LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS, OR ANY PART THEREOF (Dutton &

Wentworth 1837), available at http://www.archive.org/details/Reportofcommissi
1837mass (last visited 4/19/13); THE PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTES PASSED
BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM 1789 TO 1827
INCLUSIVE. PUBLISHED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF JOSEPH STORY (Wells & Lilly
1827), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001625604 (last visited
4/19/13); JOSEPH STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION
OF THE AUTHOR, AS DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
(Willard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1829), available at http://www.archive.org/
details/discoursepronoun08stor (last visited 4/19/13); CHARLES SUMNER, THE
SCHOLAR, THE JURIST, THE ARTIST, THE PHILANTHROPIST (William D. Ticknor
& Co. 1846), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011212036 (last
visited 4/19/13).

2013]

SCALIA & GARNER’S READING LAW

5

1804, applied justly and predictably, against proponents of
common law rules and common law methods.
The conflict concluded at the end of the 19th century—
unresolved—with the deaths of proponents and opponents alike.
Inertia, and not conscious decision, determined America’s present
legal methods. Throughout the century, while proponents and
opponents debated the issues, legislatures churned out statutes and
judges produced precedents. The bar remained unmoved in
opposition to codes and unshaken in devotion to lawyer-controlled
common law methods. The newly-established law schools chose to
teach precedents and case law methods rather than to develop
codes and statutory methods. By century’s end, proponents of
codes had passed away, but legislative mills ground on and judges
kept deciding as they always had. Since 1900, the United States
has had uncodified statutory law combined with common law
methods: a remarkable and costly mismatch. 9
Scalia and Garner try to end this mismatch; they try to resurrect
interpretive methods last addressed, they say, a century ago. 10
They identify and try to kill the cause of American stagnation:
common law methods. Having cleared out the clutter of common
law methods, they propose textualism to move the United States
forward.
Reading Law presents one possible solution to the proliferation
of statutes. What makes it potentially a great event in American
legal culture is its attack on common law. Not since David Dudley
Field, Jr. has anyone of such stature in the American legal
community sought to push aside common law methods to deal with
statutes. Part II of this essay shows the attack of Scalia and Garner
9. See James R. Maxeiner, Costs of No Codes, 31 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV.
363 (2013).
10. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 9 (“We believe that
our effort is the first modern attempt, certainly in a century, [citing to Henry
Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws
(2d ed. 1911)] to collect and arrange only the valid canons (perhaps a third of
the possible candidates) and to show how and why they apply to proper legal
interpretation.”).
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on common law; Part III summarizes their textualism proposal for
those not already familiar with it.
Lawyers in the United States typically identify a world of
statutes with the Continental or civil law (e.g., French, German,
Japanese). Part IV of this essay asks whether Scalia and Garner
have created a civil law for the Age of Statutes. Part V shows how
civil law systems combine textual and non-textual methods. Part
VI shows how common law procedure is a barrier to such a
combination.
II. SCALIA & GARNER: COMMON LAW-TRADITION IS THE PROBLEM
Scalia and Garner rest Reading Law on recognition that in
today’s America the law consists of statutes. 11 America of the 21st
century is not England of the 19th century, where, in their view,
statutes were infrequent, the law was principally judge-made, and
judges took liberties with statutes that intruded on the common law
in order to put through their personal ideas of public policy. In
America of the 21st century we do not welcome such judicial
intrusions. “Such distortion of texts adopted by the people’s
11. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy
Gutmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“We live in an age of legislation,
and most new law is statutory law. . . . The lion’s share of the norms and rules
that actually govern… the country [come] out of Congress and the legislatures.”)
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System]; Antonin
Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 687,
689 (2006) [hereinafter Scalia, Review of Law’s Quandary]:
As interesting as Smith's analysis is, it essentially addresses a legal
system that is now barely extant, the system that Holmes wrote about:
the common law. That was a system in which there was little
legislation, and in which judges created the law of crimes, of torts, of
agency, of contracts, of property, of family and inheritance. And just as
theories such as the Divine Right of Kings were necessary to justify the
power of monarchs to make law through edicts, some theory was
necessary to justify the power of judges (as agents of the King) to make
law through common-law adjudication. That theory was the ‘brooding
omnipresence’ of an unwritten law that the judges merely ‘discovered.’
. . . [I]t is a rare case [today] that does not involve interpretation of an
enacted text.
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elected representatives is,” Scalia and Garner say,
“undemocratic.” 12
Yet some American judges refuse to abandon “the ancient
judicial prerogative of making the law.” They prefer to
“improvis[e] on the text to produce what they deem socially
desirable results. . . . [In their lawmaking these] judges are also
prodded by interpretative theorists. These are the legal realists,
who have “convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law”
and do not simply apply it.” 13
Scalia and Garner reject the claim of these “interpretative
theorists” that courts are “better able to discern and articulate basic
national ideals than are the people’s politically responsible
representatives.” 14 The result, they see, of judges straying from
their function of applying law—when judges “overreach” and
“fashion law” rather than fairly derive it from governing texts—is
that they make law uncertain, create inequality of application,
undermine democracy, and politicize themselves and their offices.
Scalia and Garner are bold to take on the common law
tradition; they did not have to. They could have attributed the
problems they discuss to “the desire for freedom from the text,
which enables judges to do what they want.” 15 Instead of timidity,
they show courage. They target as principal culprit the common
law mindset that the nation’s law professors teach. Perhaps they
12. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 3. See also Scalia,
Review of Law’s Quandary, supra note 11, at 687-689 (“[A democracy is] quite
incompatible with the making (or the ‘finding’) of law by judges . . .”).
13. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 4-5.
14. Id. at 4 (quoting THOMAS C. GREY, DO WE HAVE AN UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION, STANFORD LEGAL ESSAYS 179, 182 (1975)). The present poor
perception of Congress tends to support the conclusions of the theorists, at least
in practice, if not in theory. For current criticisms see, e.g., Symposium: The
Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century, 89
BOSTON U.L. REV. 331-870 (2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (Twelve 2011);
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (Oxford
Univ. Press 2006).
15. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 9.
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perceive that without disarming the common law tradition, their
proposal will suffer the same fate as the few codes that were
adopted in the United States in the 19th century: death by judicial
interpretation. 16
Scalia and Garner do not nip at the edges of the common law;
they attack it head on and try to root out its most important
manifestations. So even before they get to the canons of
construction, they lob a nuclear artillery shell on the whole idea:
American legal education has long been devoted to the
training of common-law lawyers, and hence common-law
judges. What aspiring lawyers learn in the first, formative
year of law school is how to discern the best (most socially
useful) answer to a legal problem, and how to distinguish
the prior cases that stand in the way of that solution.
Besides giving students the wrong impression about what
makes an excellent judge in a modern, democratic, textbased legal system, this training fails to inculcate the skills
of textual interpretation. 17
Can this be most conservatives’ favorite judge speaking? Is he
ready to toss into the dustbin of history common law thinking?
Yes, he is. Elsewhere, Scalia affirms that he objects to the common
law “mind-set that asks, ‘What is the most desirable resolution of
this case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that
result be evaded?’” 18
In an earlier essay Scalia colorfully explains how the American
image of the great judge works against good judging in a modern
state. So he writes:
[T]his system of making law by judicial opinion . . . is
what every American law student, every newborn
American lawyer, first sees when he opens his eyes. And
16. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11,
at 11 (“The nineteenth-century codification movement espoused by Rantoul and
Field was generally opposed by the bar, and hence did not achieve substantial
success, except in one field: civil procedure, the law governing the trial of civil
cases.”).
17. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 7.
18. Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11, at
13.
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the impression remains for life. His image of the great
judge—the Holmes, the Cardozo—is the man (or woman)
who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law for
the case at hand and then the skill to perform the brokenfield running through earlier cases that leaves him free to
impose that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left,
straight-arming another on the right, high-stepping away
from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear,
until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law. That image
of the great judge remains with the former law student
when he himself becomes a judge, and thus the commonlaw tradition is passed on. 19
This is not the image of a modest judge who applies statutes to
facts. 20
In a nutshell, Scalia and Garner object to the common law ideal
that judges should mold the law to fit the facts, rather than take the
law as a legislative given and apply it. 21 To undercut that ethos,
they challenge specific common law traditions in treating statutes.
Canons of strict construction of statutes. Scalia and Garner
take on the old common law prejudices against statutes
incorporated in the traditional canons that they mostly seek to
resuscitate. They expose the false “notion that words should be
strictly construed.” Instead, citing Justice Story, they identify that
what is needed is “reasonableness, not strictness, of
interpretation.” 22 They reject, as “a relic of the courts’ historical
hostility to the emergence of statutory law,” the old canon that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed. Instead, they say, “The better view is that statutes will
not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect
the change with clarity.” 23
19. Id. at 9.
20. See James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply the Law: How
They Might Do It, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 469 (2009).
21. See generally Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision, The
Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 87
(1998).
22. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 355.
23. Id. at 318. Story, too, felt the need to moderate rather than terminate the
canon. See ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 7, at 584 (“In all cases of a
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Statutory stare decisis. Scalia and Garner boldly challenge, as
inconsistent with textualism, the essential doctrine of the common
law, stare decisis, i.e., that common law courts follow their past
decisions and that inferior courts are bound to follow decisions of
superior courts. In the course of the 19th century, American courts
began to apply stare decisis, not only to decisions based on the
common law, but to decisions construing statutes (“statutory stare
decisis” or “statutory precedent”). Some appellate courts take that
principle further in order to use interpretation of statutes as
opportunity to make law; they create legal uncertainty that Scalia
and Garner decry. Lower courts, in following statutory precedents,
turn their attention away from the text that they are to apply, to the
appellate court’s interpretation of the text; they devalue the statute
itself. 24
Scalia and Garner reject statutory stare decisis. The text
controls. Thus, they say, “good judges dealing with statutes do not
make law. Judges deciding cases do not ‘give new content’ to the
statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along,
awaiting application to myriad factual scenarios.” 25 What they do
is considerably more modest than making law: “a court’s
application of a statute to a ‘new situation’ can be said to establish
the law applicable to that situation—that is, to pronounce
definitely whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But
establishing this retail application is [not] ‘creating law,’
‘adapt[ing] legal doctrines,’ and ‘giv[ing] them new content.’” 26

doubtful nature, the common law will prevail, and the statute not be construed to
repeal it.”).
24. On statutory stare decisis, see Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 70 COLO. L. REV. 225, 231, 244-245 (1999); James R. Maxeiner,
Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad: Putting Justice into Legal Reasoning, 11
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (2012) [hereinafter Maxeiner,
Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad].
25. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 5. [Emphasis in
original, quotation and citations omitted].
26. Id.
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As much as Scalia and Garner would like to throw out statutory
stare decisis altogether, they cannot quite bring themselves to do
so. They end their book condemning it, yet acknowledging
dependence on it:
Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an
exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of
interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity. Courts
cannot consider anew every previously decided question
that comes before them. Stare decisis has been a part of our
law from time immemorial, 27 and we must bow to it. All
we categorically propose here is that, when a governing
precedent deserving of stare decisis effect does not dictate
a contrary disposition, judges ought to use proper methods
of textual interpretation. If they will do that, then over time
the law will be more certain, and the rule of law will be
more secure. 28
If truth be told, here Scalia and Garner are bowing to a
different necessity than convenience. 29 It is a necessity of political
acceptance: their originalism-based proposals will be dead on
arrival if they are seen “to turn the clock back” to produce a
“‘radical purge’ of society’s settled practices and beliefs.” 30

27. The Supreme Court itself sometimes puts aside Holmes’ aphorism and
decides, because, that’s the way we always have done it. See, e.g., Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball exemption from antitrust law); Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (tag rule of civil procedure); Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (civil forfeiture of innocent
owner’s yacht).
28. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 413-414.
29. Civil law systems get along fine interpreting statutes without binding
precedents.
30. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 411. Accord, id. at
87:
A frequent line of attack against originalism consists in appeal to
popular Supreme Court decisions that are asserted based on a rejection
of original meaning. We do not propose overruling all those decisions.
Our prescriptions are for the future. For the past, we believe in the
doctrine of stare decisis, which will preserve most of the nonoriginalist
holdings on the books. Which ones will fall depends on several factors.
[FN 38. See infra at 411-14] Stare decisis is beyond the scope of our
discussion here, but it is germane to the present point that the relevant
factors include the degree of public acceptance.
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III. SCALIA & GARNER: [PURE] TEXTUALISM IS THE SOLUTION
Scalia and Garner propose textualism as the solution to the
problem of controlling judges who take liberties with texts. It is to
be the generally agreed on approach to the interpretation of legal
texts. Textualism will save Americans from politicized judges who
impair the predictability of judicial decisions, give unequal
treatment to similarly situated litigants, weaken our democratic
process and distort our governmental system of checks and
balances. It is not too late to restore a strong sense of judicial
fidelity to texts. 31
Textualism, Scalia and Garner say, is not a novel approach, but
“the oldest and most commonsensical interpretative principle.” 32
They define textualism to be “the doctrine that the words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in
their context is what the text means.” 33
Scalia and Garner assert that if one is not a textualist, one must
be a “non-textualist.” Non-textualists come in a variety of species,
the two most common of which are purposivists and pragmatists
(also called “consequentialists” by Scalia and Garner). Both
purposivism and pragmatism “liberate” judges from the constraints
of rules. Purposivism gives interpreters the opportunity to change
texts according to what they perceive to be the purposes of statutes.
Scalia and Garner pigeon-hole purposivism as a license to
manipulate. It produces uncertainty. Pragmatism allows
interpreters to give texts “sensible, desirable results.” The problem:
“people differ over what is sensible and what is desirable.”
According to Scalia and Garner, the people have given those
decisions to elected representatives. 34
Scalia and Garner are concerned with controlling judges; they
do not dwell on obvious benefits that textualism has for guiding
31.
32.
33.
34.

SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at xxvii.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 22.
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society generally. Most applications of law are self-applications.
Subjects consider what they know of the law and fit themselves
within it. If law is easily manipulated, or simply uncertain, those
who skirt the law have an invitation to do so: So sue me! Those
who scrupulously follow the law are dissuaded from taking action
they might otherwise take: It’s too risky! 35
The principal elements of textualism in its basic form are:
The words of the statute are paramount. A textualist extracts
the meaning of the text from the words of the text itself and
nothing more. 36
The statute is to be given a fair reading, neither strict, nor
liberal. A fair reading is: “The interpretation that would be given
to a text by a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language,
who seeks to understand what the text meant at its adoption, and
who considers the purpose of the text but derives purpose from the
words actually used.” 37
The statute is to be understood objectively. The interpreter is to
look to the words expressed in the text and not to the unexpressed
thoughts of legislators. Collective bodies have no intent. 38
If the plain meaning of a statute is clear, it should be followed,
unless absurd. An unambiguous text is to be applied by its terms
without recourse to policy, historical arguments or other matter
extraneous to the text. The legislature has stated what the law is; it
is not for law-appliers to overrule those decisions.
Where more than one interpretation is possible, only
permissible meanings are to be considered. Words and sentences
are not to be given meanings that they will not bear. 39

35. See generally James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in
America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO L. REV. 517
(2006).
36. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 441.
37. Id. at 428. Basic textualism does not seem to require, however, as pure
textualism does, that the meaning be fixed as that at the time of adoption.
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id. at 31.

14

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Where more than one interpretation is permissible, principles
of interpretation, many called “canons of construction”, guide
decision-makers. 40 These principles are not absolute; instead, they
interrelate. 41
It is at this point, when the meaning of the text is ambiguous, 42
that pure textualism diverges from basic textualism. In basic
textualism, the interpreter might resort to any number of
interpretative tools. In pure textualism, according to Scalia and
Garner, interpretation “begins and ends with what the text says and
fairly implies.” 43 It limits interpretation to principles based on
language and historical meaning (but not legislative history).
Scalia and Garner allow some systemic arguments. But they
exclude other interpretive arguments, including purposive,
pragmatic, and most equitable arguments.
Principal additional characteristics of pure textualism are:
Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was
adopted. 44 This is Scalia and Garner’s preferred meaning of
originalism. 45
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 59. This rejects the approach many common lawyers would like
to see, i.e., that canons of construction are like rules that are binding.
Presumably there would be a mandatory and therefore predictable construction,
which would facilitate presenting cases in court. See generally, Sydney Foster,
Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation Methodology as “Law”: Oregon’s Path-Breaking
Interpretive Framework and Its Lessons for the Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
539 (2011); Gary O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333 (2003); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). It is,
however, consistent with Supreme Court precedent. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“no more than rules of thumb that help
courts determine the meaning of legislation”); Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (canons of construction are not “mandatory rules”
but rather are “guides that need not be conclusive”).
42. Note that here Scalia and Garner are dealing with ambiguity in the
language of the text, and not ambiguity in how the text applies to a particular
case.
43. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 16.
44. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 78.
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Legislative history is not an acceptable argument in statutory
interpretation. Legislative bodies are collectives. Who is to say
that all of the legislators had the same understanding?
Doing justice is not an acceptable basis for statutory
interpretation. Judges must be faithful to the law. 46 Scalia and
Garner follow Blackstone: “law, without equity, though hard and
disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than
equity without law.” 47
The meaning of a statute is not to be found in the social,
political or economic objectives of the law. 48
Judges are not to supply law for omitted cases. Legislation is
for the legislature. For judges to correct the statute violates
principles of separation of powers. 49
This is the prescription of Scalia and Garner of a modern law
for the Age of Statutes.

45. Id. at 435.
46. Id. at 347. Id. at 348:
The problem is that although properly informed human minds may
agree on what a text means, human hearts often disagree on what is
right. That is why we vote (directly or through our representatives) on
what the law ought to be, but leave it to experts of interpretation called
judges to decide what an enacted law means. It is doubtless true, as a
descriptive matter, that judges will often strain to avoid what they
consider an unjust result. But we decline to elevate that human
tendency to an approved principle of interpretation.
The soundest, most defensible position is one that requires discipline
and self-abnegation. If judges think no further ahead than achieving
justice in the dispute now at hand, the law becomes subject to personal
preferences and hence shrouded in doubt. It is age-old wisdom among
mature, experienced legal thinkers that procedure matters most: how
things should be done, as opposed to what should be done. And for
judges the ‘how’ is fidelity to law. But it is a hard lesson to learn, and
harder to follow.
47. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at v (unnumbered in
book).
48. Id. at 438.
49. Id. at 349-350.
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IV. IS TEXTUALISM A CIVIL LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES?
Is textualism a civil law for the Age of Statues? Scalia and
Garner invite us to ask that question when they claim the mantel of
consistency with “the best legal thinkers” and when they invoke
Bentham and Continentals such as Gadamer, Kelsen, Locke,
Montesquieu and Thibaut. The title of an earlier essay by Scalia
practically begs us to ask it: Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws. 50 Is Scalia, who is better known for
opposing references to foreign law than promoting them, creating
his own civil law? In Reading Law, he and Garner peripherally pay
tribute to civil law methods when they quote Karl Llewellyn (albeit
in a footnote): “It is indeed both sobering and saddening to match
our boisterous ways with a statutory text against the watchmaker’s
delicacy and care of a . . . Continental legal craftsman.” 51
Textualism shares much with civil law approaches. Its basic
model is mainstream the world over. It has been used, as Scalia
and Garner say, for centuries. In textualism, the written law
governs. Pure textualism, however, has more in common with past
manifestations of civil law methods than with modern ones. In
Germany, for example, its closest cousin is the Prussian Code of
1794, and not any later code.
This observation is not condemnation, but constructive
criticism. Scalia and Garner are making up for a deficit of two
centuries in dealing with statutes. While Americans have made
little progress with written law since the path-breaking
Constitution,52 civil law countries have made much. 53 Scalia and
50.
51.

In SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at 3-47.
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 8, n.16 citing to
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 380
(1960).
52. Cf. Charles Abernathy, The Lost European Aspirations of US
Constitutional Law, in 24. FEBRUAR 1803, DIE ERFINDUNG DER
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND IHRE FOLGEN 37 (Werner Kremp, ed.
2003):
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Garner have released, what we might call, U.S. Textualism
Version 1.0.
Here in Part IV we consider what basic textualism shares with
civil law methods, and second, what sets pure textualism apart
from contemporary civil law methods. For practical reasons, we
limit our consideration to one of the world’s two leading civil law
jurisdictions, that of Germany, and mention only incidentally that
of the other, France. 54
A. Textualism is Civil
Basic textualism as stated by Scalia and Garner is consistent
with German approaches to statutes. In Germany, statutes are the

Despite its European origins, [the U.S.] legal constitutional tree has
grown into a very strange hybrid, a tree with continental European
roots but an increasingly common-law superstructure of branches,
trunks, and leaves. Despite repeated attempts by some Supreme Court
justices, the continental code-law tradition has been unable to win a
majority at the Supreme Court for many decades.
53. See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmermann, Statute Sunt Stricte Interpretanda?
Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Perspective, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
315, 315-316 (1997) [hereinafter Zimmermann, Statutes] (“An English
colleague has suggested that ‘civilian lawyers regard our case law with
admiration and our statute book with despair.’ It may therefore be appropriate to
remind ourselves that civilian lawyers once struggled with the same kind of
problem that is being addressed today.”); id. at 321 (in Germany, following
adoption of the 1949 constitution, in statutory interpretation there has been “a
considerable advance in legal culture.”).
54. For the convenience of readers who may not read German and yet wish
to follow the argument further, I largely cite English-language works by leading
German scholars. In particular, I cite the one standard work on German legal
methods which has been translated into English: REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS (Kirk W. Junker & P. Matthew
Roy trans., 10th ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2008) [hereinafter ZIPPELIUS]. The
first edition appeared under the title EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE JURISTISCHE
METHODENLEHRE (1st ed. 1971); the most recent is under the title
JURISTISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG (10th ed. 2006). The other
classic students’ text is KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE
DENKEN (1st ed. 1956; 10th ed., Thomas Würtenberger & Dirk Otto eds., 2005).
The classic academic text is KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1st ed. 1960; 6th ed. 1991; 4th condensed study ed. with
Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, 2009). The global comparative work is WOLFGANG
FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (5
vols., Mohr 1975–1977).
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principal form of law. If their application is clear, they must be
followed, unless they are invalid (e.g., unconstitutional).
Democracy and the rule of law demand no less. 55
The words of the text are paramount. In Germany, the words of
the text are of paramount concern; they convey what the text
means. The statute—das Gesetz—is the fundamental concept of all
law. When an American says, “we have a rule of law, not of men,”
a German says, “statutes, not men, govern.” 56
Statutes must be followed unless the result is irrational or
unjust. 57 No one—other than the Constitutional Court—is
permitted to put a valid law out-of-force. To allow a judge, a
government official or a subject of the law not to apply the law is
to deny that Germany is a democratic, rule-of-law state.
Statutes are interpreted objectively. Statutes should be
understood objectively, that is, according to “the intention of the
statute itself.” 58 An objective interpretation seeks an understanding
“familiar to the mindset of a wide number of people.” 59 There is no
attempt to recreate a subjective intent of those who took part in the
legislative process. 60 Their individual wills are difficult to
determine and are unlikely to be in harmony with one another. 61
Words have a range of meanings. Statutes and other legal rules
put ideas into words. Words are, however, ambiguous; they may
refer to more than one concept. Words that describe facts seldom
55. Winfried Brugger, Concretization of Law and Statutory Interpretation,
11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 207, 208 (1996) [hereinafter Brugger, Concretization
of Law].
56. WALTER LEISNER, KRISE DES GESETZES: DIE AUFLÖSUNG DES
NORMENSTAATES 5 (Duncker und Humblot 2001) (“Nicht Menschen
herrschen—Gesetze gelten.”). See also James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A
European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 541, 558 (2007) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Certainty].
57. Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and
Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMP. L.
395, 401 (1994) [hereinafter Brugger, Legal Interpretation]. See also Brugger,
Concretization of Law, supra note 55.
58. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 30.
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id. at 32.
61. Id. at 33.
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carry the same meaning for everyone. A given word has a “range
of meanings.” 62 To go outside the range of possible meanings
creates a legitimacy problem; 63 it is to take over the function
reserved to the legislature. 64
Where there is more than one meaning within a range,
principles of interpretation guide interpretation. Where the
principles of the common law, the canons, are numerous and
particular, the principles of German law are few and general. Four
approaches are dominant: 65 (1) grammatical, (2) historical, (3)
systemic, and (4) purposive (teleological). 66 The classical criteria
of interpretation, while they facilitate finding the correct
interpretation, do not give license to go outside the range of
possible meanings of a statute’s words. “All further efforts at
interpretation proceed on the basis of a word’s possible meaning.
These efforts are carried out within a range of meaning that is
permissible according to linguistic usage (possibly circumscribed
by legal definitions).” 67 Every approach must, however, “respect
the outer bounds of grammatical analysis.” 68

62. Id. at 62-66.
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id. at 72.
65. Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320.
66. Id. at 60. See also id. at 320 (“ (1) the literal meaning of the words or
the grammatical structure of a sentence, (2) the legislative history, (3) the
systematic context and (4) the design, or purpose, of a legal rule.” [citing 1
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS
206 (1840) (translated as SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN LAW (William Holloway
trans., 1979) (1867)]); Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 234
(listing in table form what four methods more fully described in the article, i.e.,
“I. textual interpretation ‘what is specifically said’; II. Contextual interpretation
‘what is said in context’; III. Historical interpretation ‘what was willed’; IV.
Teleological interpretation ‘what is the purpose’”); Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier,
Statutory Interpretation in Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 73, 82-89 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., Ashgate 1991) (giving a somewhat different breakdown of approaches).
67. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 60; (“feasible meanings” at 67).
68. Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 400; See also Brugger,
Concretization of Law, supra note 55.
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Of these four approaches, the most common is the purposive,
which includes an equitable approach. 69
Variations and additions are sometimes suggested, particularly
since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 (with respect to
fundamental rights and the structure of the state), and the accession
in 1958 to what is now the European Union (particularly with
respect to harmonization of law). Whether constitutional texts
should receive different treatment is debated, with no clear
resolution.
Which interpretation prevails is argumentative. There is no
hierarchy in applying the approaches. An interpreter may make use
of all approaches and choose the approach or approaches that seem
most convincing in a particular case. 70 It is said that “the decisive
point of reference is the interpreter’s notion of a result that,
according to the ‘independent function’ or value of the pertinent
legal provision, must be the correct one.” 71
B. Pure Textualism is Uncivil
Pure textualism was the approach of the Prussian Civil Code of
1794. Its section 46 of the Introductory Part prohibited judges from
going beyond the text. If the judge could not get the meaning from
the text, he was to refer the legal question to a special code
commission. 72 The approach was regarded as monstrous.
Pure textualism in Germany today would be anathema.
Zimmermann writes that “[o]n the Continent we have managed to
69. Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320; Reinhard Zimmermann,
Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION OF GERMAN
LAW 1, 24-25 (J. Zekoll & M. Reimann eds., 2d ed., Wolters Kluwer 2005).
70. Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 402.
71. Id. at 397.
72. “Bey Entscheidungen streitiger Rechtsfälle darf der Richter den
Gesetzen keinen andern Sinn beylegen, als welcher aus den Worten, und den
Zusammenhänge derselben, in Beziehung auf den streitigen Gegenstand, oder
aus den nächsten unzweifelhaften Gründe des Gesetzes, deutlich erhellt.”
ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794,
TEXTAUSGABE MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON HANS HATTEHAUER 58 (2d ed.,
Luchterhand 1994).
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shake off the self-imposed fetters of a literalist approach to
statutory interpretation.” 73 In Germany, the most practiced method
is said to be purposivism: 74 i.e., poison to Scalia and Garner. Their
panacea, the historical, it is said in Germany, “generally serves
only as a secondary, supplementary way of clarifying a rule’s
meaning.” 75
Some basic principles of modern German interpretation are
opposed to Scalia and Garner’s pure textualism. For example:
Statutes should be interpreted according to ideas of the present
(“living interpretation”). They are not to be limited ideas
controlling at the time they were adopted. 76 “The basis of
legitimacy of law to be applied today does not lie in the past; it lies
in the present. . . . For the present it does not matter under whose
authority the statute was enacted, but rather under whose authority
it lives on today.” 77
Certain legislative history is an acceptable argument in
statutory interpretation. German legislative procedures differ from
American. Most statutes are presented to the legislature in draft
form for debate. The debates themselves are not tools of
interpretation, but one may rely on the formal justifications
provided with the draft statutes to understanding the meaning of
the words used in the drafts.

73. Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320.
74. Id. at 320.
75. Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 401.
76. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 34.
77. Id. at 34-35. While considerations of legitimacy and of justice demand
a living interpretation, Zippelius teaches that considerations of separation of
powers (and we might add, of legal certainty), require that “a change in meaning
must not only keep itself within the possible meanings of the text of a legal
norm, but also, where possible, within that very range of meaning that the
purpose of the legislation leaves open for honing in on.” Id. at 36. German
ministries of justice are responsible for removing from the statute books
obsolete laws. Some newer German laws as adopted automatically expire. See
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BETTER
REGULATION IN EUROPE: GERMANY, 114-15 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_34141_45048895_1_1_1_1,
00.html (last visited 04/23/13).
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Doing justice is an acceptable basis for statutory
interpretation. The judge asks: “Which of the possible ‘justifiable’
interpretations, according to the rules of the art, lead to the most
just solution?”78
The meaning of a statute may be found in the social, political
or economic objectives of the law.
Judges may—exceptionally—supply law for omitted cases. 79 In
filling in gaps, it is appropriate to consider societal goals, system
consistency and justice. 80 Gap-filling to achieve material justice
raises the question as to whether supplementation should be done
politically, for the future by the legislature, or according to existing
law, by judges. 81
The German system poses a challenge to Scalia and Garner: it
practices textualism, but rejects its pure form and takes the poison
of purposivism. It seeks to do justice in individual cases or to
provide pragmatic solutions. One would expect that Germany
would be a cesspool of renegade judges imposing their individual
ideas of justice; yet the German system is not. To the contrary, it is
known for separating policy and law, and stressing legal certainty.
How are we to explain this enigma? That is the topic of Part V.

78. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54 at 86.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 97.
81. Id. at 91:
By supplementing the law, the judge is functioning in a manner
reserved for the legislature under a system of separation of powers. The
legislature is in a better position than a court to tackle questions of legal
supplementation—considerations that are often highly political in
nature—and it does so with more democratic legitimacy, particularly
with respect to the necessary debate and conversation with the public.
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V. IN MODERN CIVIL LAW TEXTUALISM AND NON-TEXTUALISM
COEXIST
Textualism and non-textualism coexist in modern civil law
systems. They must, if law is to do its job and balance justice,
policy and legal certainty. 82
A. Law in Time Requires that Textualism and Non-Textualism Must
Coexist
Legislatures enact rules that apply generally today and into the
future. The limits of our ability to know the present, and to foresee
the future, limit the ability of legislatures to prescribe legal
answers to future questions. 83 Often rules set outer limits of their
application without prescribing exact decisions. They leave precise
decisions to those who apply the law. They may provide criteria or
procedures for decisions.
Textualism defines the outer limits of decisions. Nontextualism determines how those rules are applied within the limits
set. The outer limits provide one level of legal certainty to those
subject to the law; 84 confidence in how those applying the law will
do so within those outer limits can add a second level of legal
certainty. The laws, written by the legislature, provide general
rules intended to achieve justice and policy goals. Those charged
with applying the law, within its limits, are responsible for
reaching decisions that not only comply with the letter of the law,
but that also fulfill the goal of law to achieve justice and good
policy.

82. Cf. JAMES R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12 (Praeger 1986)
[hereinafter MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAW]; Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 209-217.
83. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 56, at 554-55;
Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 224-30.
84. One might say that the law binds negatively. See MAXEINER, POLICY
AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 82.
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As we have seen, the drafters of the Prussian Code of 1794
sought to tie judges strictly to texts. If the text did not deliver the
answer, then judges were to refer questions to a legislative
commission. The drafters of the French Codes of 1804 charted a
better and more modern course. They sought to limit judges with
textualism, but to guide them with what Scalia and Garner call
non-textualism. So Portalis, the drafter of the Code Civil, wrote in
an essay introductory to his code: “When the law is clear, it must
be heeded; when it is unclear, the provisions must be further
elaborated. If there is no law, then custom or equity must be
consulted. Equity is the return to natural law when positive laws
are silent, contradictory or vague.” 85 In the modern civil law
world, textualism and non-textualism can and must coexist.
Portalis eloquently stated how the phenomenon of law in time
requires that texts cannot be unchanging:
Whatever one might do, positive laws could never entirely
replace the use of natural reason in life’s affairs. The needs
of society are so varied, the communication of men so
active, their interests so numerous, and their relationships
so far reaching, that the lawmaker cannot possibly foresee
all.
The very matters on which he fixes his attention involve a
host of particulars that escape him or are too contentious
and too volatile to be the subject of a statutory enactment.
Moreover, how does one bind the action of time? How to
go against the course of events, or the imperceptible
inclination of morals? How to know and calculate in
advance what experience alone can reveal? Can foresight
ever extend to things beyond the reach of thought?
A code, however complete it may seem, is no sooner
85. PRELIMINARY ADDRESS ON THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE CIVIL CODE
PRESENTED IN THE YEAR IX BY MESSRS. PORTALIS, TRONCHET, BIGOTPRÉAMENEU AND MALEVILLE, MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED
COMMISSION (1801), translated and available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi
/icg-gci/code/index.html (last visited 4/26/13); see the original French Portalis,
Tronchet, Bigot-Préameneu & Maleville, Discourse préliminaire, in 1 J. LOCRÉ,
LA LÉGISLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 251,
255-72 (1827) ; see also ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL
GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 54-55 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1977)
(translation of an extract).
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finished than thousands of unexpected questions present
themselves to the magistrate. For these laws, once drafted,
remain as written. Men, on the other hand, never rest. They
are always moving; and this movement, which never ceases
and whose effects are variously modified by circumstances,
continually produces some new fact, some new outcome. 86
How are Scalia and Garner and other proponents of pure
textualism and originalism to answer this wisdom? It is simplistic
for them to say that the legislature should amend the laws. It is
wishful thinking and reminiscent of the failed Prussian legislative
commission to think that we might, as some scholars have recently
suggested, add procedures to refer disputed questions back to
legislatures. 87
Civil law systems can read law combining textualism and nontextualism because civil law methods of writing and applying law
facilitate doing so. Statutes and procedures anticipate that appliers
will be making equity and policy decisions.
B. Reading Law is Doctrinal Rather than Authoritative
In civil law systems, most instances of statutory interpretation
are, in the words of Portalis which we adopt here, doctrinal and not
authoritative. 88 Doctrinal interpretation helps judges determine
whether the facts of a particular case fall within the bounds of a
statute. It consists of understanding the true meaning of statutes.
The interpretation binds no future courts. Authoritative
interpretation, on the other hand, settles issues and creates rules. It
does bind future decisions. Authoritative interpretation ideally
86. PORTALIS, supra note 85 [unpaginated].
87. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
88. So Portalis wrote:
Doctrinal interpretation consists in grasping the true meaning of laws,
in applying them judiciously and in supplementing them in cases where
they do not apply. Can one conceive of fulfilling the office of judge
without this type of interpretation?
Authoritative interpretation consists in settling issues and doubts by
means of rules or general provisions. This mode of interpretation is the
only one denied the judge.
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would be the exclusive prerogative of the legislature. But practical
realities preclude that. Today, courts of last resort in Germany and
other civil law countries issue authoritative interpretations. When
interpretation is doctrinal, the integrity of the text is maintained no
matter how a particular court decides in an individual case; when it
is authoritative, courts, by becoming interpreters, become
lawgivers. 89
Scalia and Garner, in seeking to curtail stare decisis, would
make statutory interpretation largely doctrinal. They too see
authoritative interpretation as lawmaking. They would limit
authoritative interpretations. They say that applying law in a
particular case is—at most—a “retail” making of law: “a court’s
application of a statute to a ‘new situation’ can be said to establish
the law applicable to that situation—that is, to pronounce
definitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation.
But establishing this retail application is [not] ‘creating law’. . .
.” 90
C. Writing Law in the Age of Statutes
Modern codes in civil law countries do not regulate
comprehensively. Portalis again well-captures their methods:
The function of the statute is to set down, in broad terms,
the general maxims of the law, to establish principles rich
in consequences, and not to deal with the particulars of the
questions that may arise on every subject.
89. John Chipman Grey in one of his books famously quoted Bishop
Hoadly, not one time, but three times: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all
intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.” JOHN
CHIPMAN GREY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 229, 276, 369 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1909).
90. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 5. In Germany,
where interpretations of statutes are not given binding effect, Professor
Fikentscher has proposed a limited binding effect in such applications, which he
calls a “case norm”. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, Eine Theorie der Fallnorm als
Grundlage von Kodex- und Fallrecht (code law and case law), 21 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG (ZfRV) 161 (1980).
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It is left to the magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to
the overall spirit of laws, to guide their application. 91
In how closely they deal with particulars, codes vary from
country to country, within each country, and even within
themselves. Nevertheless, they have in common that they do not
regulate every particular and that they do leave it to judges and
lawyers to guide their application.
Modern statutes serve two purposes: to the extent they can,
they prescribe rights and obligations. When they cannot do that,
they prescribe who can create or determine rights and obligations
and how they may do so. In other words, statutes structure
authority.
In Germany, it is said that organization of authority is the
“backbone” of a legal system’s rational structure. 92 “The law [not
only] . . . consists of obligations to do something or refrain from
doing something, [it consists] as well as rules regulating the
creation, modification and termination of behavioral norms or
individual rights.” 93 When we think of law, we think first of
obligations, such as stopping at a red light. But its authorizations
are no less important: e.g., a traffic officer may stop a motorist
who the officer observes is not complying with traffic rules.
Authorizations take over when rules cannot direct solutions.
Legislatures cannot anticipate all eventualities; they cannot
rationally pre-determine what all outcomes will be. What they can
do is to structure authority and its exercise. Then they do not try to
calibrate all choices in advance. They let government officials or
individuals subject to law make essential choices. Usually, when
legislatures give others leeway in deciding, they do not leave
decision-makers free to decide without limitation. Usually they
require specific criteria or specific procedures for those choices.
91.
92.
93.

Supra note 85 [unpaginated].
ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 6.
Id. at 11.
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They authorize law-appliers to make value decisions of justice or
policy. 94 Yet in all these instances, law structures decisions
without claiming to command particular decisions. Although law
cannot answer definitively what should be decided, it can answer
who should decide using which criteria, subject to which
process. 95 Among the techniques modern statutes use are indefinite
legal terms, general clauses and grants of discretion.
Indefinite legal concepts. Indefinite legal concepts allow for a
range of meanings; they deliberately give law flexibility. “This
range of meaning allows these general legal words to adapt to the
wide and diverse range of legal problems and circumstances of life
that the law seeks to regulate, as well as to the changing prevalent
social-ethical views.” 96 They permit a range of judgment to the law
appliers. 97 When indefinite concepts are used, there may be no
“one meaning to be made from general persuasive reasons.” There
thus becomes a range of “justifiable decisions,” although “some
interpretations are more justifiable than others.” 98
General clauses. A general clause is a provision that depends
on an indefinite legal concept as the operative provision. German
statutes use general clauses to take into account the many sides of
life that do not lend themselves to definition in clearly defined

94. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 82.
95. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at xii. “The interpretation and development
of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured; however, they are
not completely capable of being rationally determined.”
96. Id. at 66.
97. Zippelius gives as an example of room for judgment the term “forest.”
Is a “small, free-standing, natural pine woods with approximately 50 half-grown
trees” a forest?” Suppose the requisite element for a crime of arson is setting fire
to a forest. Classifying this stand of trees as a forest is for Zippelius
preeminently a question of interpreting the statute and not one of subsuming the
facts under the statute. In so doing, that interpretation then gives “meaning for
future cases.” In other words, the specific case “gives the impetus to weigh and
to make precise the range of the meaning of the norm—with regard to the
submitted facts of behavior.” (emphasis in the original) Id. at 132.
98. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 135.
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concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be
fragmentary, but can be gap free. 99
General clauses do not permit judges to decide what they think
is “fair” or in the “general welfare.” 100 Instead, case groups
develop in an almost common-law manner. 101 Only where there
are no prior decisions do judges have some freedom in reaching
new solutions. 102 Sometimes the legislature notes the development
of these case groups and enacts them into law or introduces its own
groups of cases.
Discretion. Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind
decision-makers to one correct decision, but grant them discretion
to reach their own decisions based on their own responsibility and
independent choice. It is used to permit a purposeful or just
decision in individual cases. 103 Administrative authorities are
allowed to make policy-oriented decisions upon their own
responsibility; they may choose on the basis of current and local
interests among several possibilities. This freedom is acceptable
99. KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN 124 (7th ed.,
Kohlhammer 1977). German indefinite legal concepts are best known in the
United States through two general clauses of the German Civil Code, sections
138 and 242, which have become parts of American law through adoption in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]
[Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, RGBL 195, as amended, §§ 138, 242. Section 138’s
U.C.C. counterpart is § 2-302, which permits nonenforcement of
“unconscionable” contracts or terms. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). Section 242
requires performance of contracts in “good faith,” BGB § 242; its U.C.C.
counterpart is § 1-304 (formerly § 1-203). U.C.C. § 1-304. For the origin of § 2302, see James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global
Electronic Age, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 116-117 (2003) [hereinafter Maxeiner,
Standard-Terms Contracting].
100. See Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242
BGB, in 2 AUSGEWÄHLTE SCHRIFTEN 195, 203 (Dieter Simon ed., Metzner
1983).
101. See Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting, supra note 99.
102. Wieacker, supra note 100, at 203. Wieacker also notes that § 242 looks
to issues of individual justice and not to general welfare (policy). Id. at 196.
103. A common view in Germany holds that discretion in choice of legal
consequences (e.g., five or ten years’ imprisonment) is appropriate, but not in
determination of the prerequisites for action (e.g., whether defendant committed
the crime of arson). This distinction marks a difference between indefinite legal
concepts and discretion: the former leaves room for judgment in the
prerequisites of action, while the latter provides for freedom of action.
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because administrative authorities are politically accountable.
Administrative authorities are nonetheless obligated to exercise
their freedom of choice in the public interest. Relaxation of
binding to statute for judicial decisions, on the other hand, is
preferably limited to situations, where necessary, that permit
judges to do justice in individual cases. Judges are not politically
accountable; they are guaranteed independence to permit them to
do justice.
D. Applying Law in the Age of Statutes
German procedure supports the coexistence of textualism and
non-textualism. Among the ways it does this are: (i) judges and
government officials know the law (iura novit curia) and are
responsible for applying it to facts provided by parties (da mihi
factum, dabo tibi ius); (ii) judges and government officials must
give reasoned explanations for their decisions; and (iii) judges of
the intermediate level of appeal are responsible for reviewing all
aspects of the decisions of courts of first instance, including the
application of law to facts.
i. Judges know the law and are responsible for applying it. In
the first and second instance, the focus of German judges is on
whether the facts in the case fulfill the requisite elements of any
legal rule. They need to know which statutes might apply and to
understand those statutes well enough to know what they require.
The judge is constitutionally bound to decide according to both
statute and justice. Procedurally the judge is bound to clarify cases.
A judge, troubled that a case may lead to a decision contrary to
justice or good policy, need not twist the law to reach a good
decision; he or she may better understand the facts. Intermediate
appellate courts have similar obligations. 104
104. See JAMES R. MAXEINER WITH ARMIN WEBER AND GYOOHO LEE,
FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) [hereinafter MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN
CIVIL JUSTICE].
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ii. Reasoned explanations. Judges and government officials are
required to give reasoned explanations for their findings of fact,
conclusions of law and application of law to facts. They must deal
in a prescribed form with all possible relevant laws and party
assertions. Reasoned opinions are said to help make up for
shortcomings of statutes. They enhance the quality of legal
decisions. They provide foundations for review of decisions made.
Just the knowledge that such a review is possible impels decisionmakers to self-control. It requires them to base their decisions, or
at least the justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons
(e.g., the statutory requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g.,
bias and prejudice). 105
VI. COMMON LAW PROCEDURE IS A PROBLEM
Scalia and Garner courageously confront common law
tradition. There is to be no more judicial law making; only
legislatures are to make law. Yet Scalia and Garner are haunted by
common law procedure and a heritage of neglect of legislation.
Their textualism is for litigation and not for life. It speaks to judges
and to litigating parties and not to people. Its idea of a statute has
more in common with the old writs of common law special
pleading than it does with modern codes. Its idea of the role of the
judge is that of an oracle who speaks law, not that of a workman
who applies law. They fear a text that might give way to
considerations of justice or policy, for then it would endanger the
rule of law and separation of powers.
Scalia and Garner are clear that their book is a how-to book for
judges, 106 especially appellate judges, who want to interpret law.

105. Id. at 202-03, 228-29.
106. If this were not clear enough from the book itself, Scalia says exactly
this in talking about the book. Interview with PBS NewsHour, broadcast August
9, 2012.
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They write “our basic presumption: legislators enact; judges
interpret.” 107
They do not address how legislators should enact laws. They
almost overlook that courts of first instance apply law. 108 They
begin their book: “You be the judge—the appellate judge—for a
moment.” 109 Yet both writing and applying law are integral to a
well-functioning reading of the law.
The poor quality of American legislation is well known. 110
Although Scalia and Garner do not directly address it in Reading
Law, Scalia has stressed the importance of good laws: garbage in,
garbage out. 111 He has berated Congress for “Fuzzy, leave-thedetails-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation.” 112 The United
States has laws that we call codes, but they do not integrate laws
the way true codes do. 113 We use indefinite concepts and general
clauses, and some are designed that way and do work, but many do

107. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at xxx (citations
omitted).
108. James Wilson wrote “every prudent and cautious judge . . . will
remember, that his duty and his business is not to make the law, but to interpret
and apply it.” [Emphasis added.] Part 2, Chapter V, Of the Constituent Parts of
Courts—Of the Judges, in LECTURES ON LAW DELIVERED IN THE COLLEGE OF
PHILADELPHIA, IN THE YEARS ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY,
AND ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY ONE, posthumously
published in 2 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, 299, 303
(Bird Wilson, 1804); 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 500, 502 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967); 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 950, 953
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
109. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 1.
110. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (OECD,
1999) (“At the heart of the most severe regulatory problems in the United States
is the [poor] quality of primary legislation.”); Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at 95 (our skills with
legislation are “primitive.”).
111. In a television interview he said: “But in this job, it’s garbage in,
garbage out. If it’s a foolish law, you are bound by oath to produce a foolish
result, because it’s not your job to decide what is foolish and what isn’t. It’s the
job of the people across the street.” C-Span Interview at 1:49:34 (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/7716-1 (last visited 04/26/13).
112. Sykes v. United States, 131 US 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
113. Maxeiner, Costs of No Codes, supra note 9, at 364-65.
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not. 114 We have discretion, but our granting and controlling of
discretion is flawed at best. 115
If our skills with statutes are poor, our common law procedures
may be worse in how they try to apply statutes.
No one knows the law and no one has responsibility for
applying it. We share the task of applying law among parties,
judges and jurors. In the old common law system of special
pleading, the plaintiff chose the form of action, and the parties
together, through pleading, identified the point in issue. If an issue
of law, the judge interpreted the writ, the statute, or the precedent.
No trial was necessary; the legal point decided the case. If an issue
of fact, jurors determined the decisive fact that fell under the point
of issue. Of course, the law was too complicated for special
pleading to work and the United States abandoned it—over
Supreme Court objection—in the 19th century. The outward
division of responsibilities, however, remains the same: the
selection of law is for the parties, the interpretation of law is for the
judges, and the findings of fact are for jurors. But the rational
application of law is more myth than reality. Either judges take
facts as given and decide motions for summary judgment, or they
hand the case over to jurors, give them quick, unfathomable
instructions on applying law, and pray that jurors do a good job. Of
course, this procedure—besides expense—is so unpredictable that
it is the rare case that ever ends up being decided by a jury. 116
Only exceptionally do courts give reasoned explanations for
decisions. Jurors are not jurists and they are not thought capable of
explaining their decisions. At best—and rarely—they may provide
special verdicts or answer special interrogatories. More commonly,
114. See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the
Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109 (2003).
115. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (LSU Press 1969); MORTIMER K. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH,
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL
RULES (Stanford Univ. Press 1973).
116. See MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note
104; James R. Maxeiner, Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad, supra note 24.
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they provide unreasoned general verdicts. Americans know that
there is better way. When judges decide alone without jurors they
are required to explain their decisions. But bench trials and a
judge’s reasoning are even rarer in many jurisdictions than are jury
trials and verdicts. 117
How is an appellate court supposed to review such decisions?
By American appellate procedure, judges must accept the
(unstated) findings of fact of jurors. So if they find the outcome
deficient, i.e., unjust or contrary to good public policy, they cannot
go back—as their civil law counterparts—and reexamine how law
and facts fit together. They are stuck with jiggering, with
“interpreting”, the law. No wonder they produce decisions that
Scalia and Garner find awful. 118
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a remarkable event that a sitting justice has called the
common law out in no uncertain terms. With textualism, Justice
Scalia and Mr. Garner have restored the playing field to its 1830
condition. But pure textualism will not bring us into the present.
Pure textualism takes us back, not to the America of 1789,
but to Blackstone of 1770 and a “law without equity.” 119 Has
America’s number one originalist forgotten the preamble of the
Constitution? “We the people of the United States, in order to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, to
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.” 120
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at v [unnumbered
introductory page].
120. U.S. Const. pmbl.; Scalia and Garner are not alone. According to
America’s number one proponent of rules, “rule-based and precedent based
decision making often require legal decision-makers to do something other than
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We deserve law that honors justice and policy as well as
order.
We deserve modern legal methods, not 18th century
methods of England or Prussia, but those of the modern civil law.
The United States desperately needs modern legal methods for the
Age of Statues. Those methods will encompass not only reading
law, but writing law, applying law and teaching law. Justice Story
was a master of all four. It will be a great event when the American
legal system—perhaps led by Justice Scalia—can do all four well.

the right thing . . . .” FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 212 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); see also
Maxeiner, Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad, supra note 24.
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ABSTRACT
Cyprus presents us with its own kind of a mixed legal system:
its private law is mostly common law, long codified in statutes. Its
public law derives from the continental tradition. Procedural law is
purely common law—a major factor in the mutation of the
“continental” elements of the legal system. The state of play is
affected by the split in the legal profession between continentaland English-educated lawyers (a split acquiring generational and
subject-matter dimensions). The bulk of legislation and legal
institutions have a distinctively colonial and/or post-colonial
flavor. However, the country and the legal elites identify with, and
are active participants in, European law and institutions. Last, but
not least, Cyprus law combines a traditionalist mentality with the
sense of perpetual temporariness (interimness) due to the decadeslong state of political emergency and the Turkish occupation of a
substantial part of the territory. All these factors, and
more, contribute to an amazingly complex picture of a unique legal
system, which has seldom been studied properly, either from the
inside or the outside. My paper attempts to use modern theories of
comparative law, especially with regard to mixed jurisdictions,
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legal influences and hybridity, to account for the complexities of
Cyprus law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mixed jurisdictions theory has come of age: it could even
assert today the status of a sub-genre of comparative law itself,
mixing traditional thinking about legal families with modern ideas
on the uniqueness of, and communication between, individual legal
systems. 1 Having begun as an exercise in understanding—and
drawing connections between—legal systems that combine strong
civilian and common-law elements, mixed jurisdictions theory is
moving forward. In the past few years, the focus appears to be on
bringing more legal systems into the mix; on drawing on “our” line
of work to challenge the traditional ways of thinking about both
the classification of legal systems and legal systems themselves.2
There have also been repeated pleas to examine—and possibly use

1. See MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY
(Vernon Palmer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)[hereinafter MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE]; Kenneth Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems,
78 TUL. L. REV. 5 (2003); MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA
(Reinhard Zimmerman et al. eds., Clarendon Press 2004); MIXED JURISDICTIONS
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND (Vernon Palmer ed.,
Edinburgh Univ. Press 2009); for studies of individual mixed legal systems, see
notably SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
(Reinhard Zimmerman & Daniel Visser eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996); A
HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN SCOTLAND I – II (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard
Zimmerman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000); LOUISIANA: A MICROCOSM OF A
MIXED JURISDICTION (Vernon Palmer ed., Carolina Academic Press 1999). For a
shorter introduction to the idea of mixed legal systems, see Vernon Palmer,
Mixed Jurisdictions in EDGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan
Smits ed., Edward Elgar 2006); Jacques Du Plessis, Comparative Law and the
Study of Mixed Legal Systems in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmmerman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
2. See, e.g., most of the essays included in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT
NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., Wildy Simmons & Hill 2010) (originally
presented in the Second Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists); COMPARATIVE
LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS (Eleanor Cashin Ritain et al. eds.,
Schulthess 2010); STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING (Esin
Örücü, Elspeth Attwool & Sean Coyle eds., Kluwer 1996).
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as models—mixed legal systems in the discussion about the
harmonization and future directions of European private law. 3
The present article is somewhat more modest in its ambition,
which is to present a comprehensive overview, in comparative-law
terms, of a mixed legal system in the traditional sense. Today,
Cyprus tends to be considered a mixed legal system. However,
with the exception of Dean Symeonides’s paper presented at the
First Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in 2003,4 it
has been neglected in most comparative law narratives, whether
because it was forgotten or because it was classified as yet another
member of the common law family. In fact, by the end of British
colonial rule in the early postwar years, Cyprus was exactly that—
a common law jurisdiction. Moreover, part of its legal
establishment has traditionally defined Cypriot legal identity in
common law terms. Today, Cyprus still more closely resembles a
common law jurisdiction than do legal systems habitually
classified as mixed. The civilian or continental tradition has
nonetheless considerably expanded its sphere of influence within
the legal system. The common law tradition has probably retained
its primacy and even managed to mutate some of the civilian
elements; but common law institutions have also mutated.
The legal system of Cyprus, in fact, both confirms and
challenges the basic premises of mixed jurisdiction theory. Like
the better known members of Vernon Palmer’s “third legal
family,” the law of Cyprus is built on the twin foundations of
common law and continental law, each in control of different legal
subjects. 5 It is also rather unique, in the sense that it is private law
3. See, e.g., THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW (Jan Smits ed., Intersentia 2001); JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARD A IUS COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED
LEGAL SYSTEM (Intersentia 2002).
4. See Symeon S. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of
Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 441 (2003).
5. See Vernon Palmer, Introduction in MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE, supra note 1, at 7-9. In a legal system classified as “mixed” under
Palmer’s definition, “[T]he presence of these dual elements will be obvious to
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(in most subjects) and criminal law that follow the English
common law, whereas public law has a continental orientation.
Procedural law is purely common law—a major factor in the
mutation of the “continental” elements of the legal system. Like all
major mixed legal systems, the bijurality of Cyprus law has been
founded upon a transfer of sovereignty: from British colonial rule
(1878-1960) to independence. 6 It has also been strengthened, and
challenged, by the bilingualism of the system and the power
politics of the legal elites. 7
Mixed jurisdictions theory can help both comparative law
scholars and the lawyers of Cyprus to better understand a legal
system that has been aptly characterized as “a colorful plurilegal
mosaic.” 8 In its turn, the in-depth study of Cyprus law will provide
material for the ongoing theoretical discussions about mixed
jurisdictions and the legal process in general.
This article is but a first installment in such a long-term
project. 9 Its principal aim is to provide an international—and, to
some extent, a Cypriot—audience with a comparative lawyer’s
introduction to Cyprus law. 10 It consists of three parts: Part II

an ordinary observer,” a condition which probably requires “a quantitative
threshold” (a condition met, e.g., by Louisiana, but not Texas and California,
despite their own civilian roots); id. at 8. Palmer also emphasizes the “structural
allocation of content”; id. at 8-9. Of course, in Palmer’s ideal type of a mixed
jurisdiction civil law is dominant but “cordoned off within the field of private
law.”
6. On the importance of such “defining moments” in the “foundation” of a
mixed jurisdiction see Vernon Palmer, A Descriptive and Comparative
Overview in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note 1, at 17-31.
7. See id., at 31-40 and 41-44 on the importance of the linguistic factor and
the roles of the local jurists in the maintenance of mixity.
8. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus, supra
note 4, at 442.
9. This project has involved, on the one hand, detailed studies of each of
the systemic aspects—legal profession, judiciary, sources of law, legal
discourse—and, on the other hand, case studies on individual legal fields which
showcase a different level of hybridity: contracts, family law and private
international law.
10. Apart from Symeonides’s article, the main English-language reference,
with chapters in all areas is ANDREAS NEOCLEOUS, INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS
LAW (Andreas Neocleous & Co LLC 2000). Symeon Symeonides & Erik
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presents a short historical overview; Part III addresses the
administration of the justice system (legal profession and court
structure); and Part IV examines the sources of Cyprus law.
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Republic of Cyprus is a former British colony. It is a
member of the Commonwealth and, since 2004, a member of the
European Union. It was under British colonial rule between 1878
and 1960; that is for considerably less time than Malta, and much
longer than Israel. Land- and population-wise, Cyprus is much
bigger than Malta, and considerably smaller than Israel. 11 In 1960,
the year of independence but also of the last island-wide official
census, the island’s native population was estimated at 550,000
people, composed of 81.14% Greek and 18.86% Turkish
Cypriots. 12 The ethnic proportion of roughly 4:1 is a sensitive
point and still adhered to, but the latest census, taking into account
the significant number of EU and third-country immigrants, results

Jayme, Zypern in INTERNATIONALES EHE- UND KINDSCHAFTSRECHT (Bergman
& Murad Ferid eds., Gmb H & Co. 1979) also provides useful material. Most of
the literature on Cyprus law is in Greek; the principal general reference remains
Symeon Symeonides, Introduction to Cyprus Law in COMPARATIVE LAW
(Dimitrios Evrigenis, Phocion Franceskakis & Symeon Symeonides eds.,
Sakkoulas Pubs. 1978), supplemented by EVANGELOS VASILAKAKIS & SAVVAS
PAPASAVVAS, ELEMENTS OF CYPRUS LAW (Sakkoulas Pubs. 2002). The
Republic’s legislation and appellate case law is published in official collections
and reports – the Official Journal (O.J.) and the Cyprus Law Reports (C.L.R—
this reference is used here for both the volumes published in English as C.L.R.
and the subsequent volumes entitled Apofaseis Anotatou Dikasteriou
(“Judgments of the Supreme Court”)). Current legislaton and appellate cases are
also
available
online
at
the
open-access
legal
database
http://www.cylaw.org/cpr.html. An annonated collection of basic legislation was
recently published: EGKOLPIO KYPRIAKON NOMON (Neocleous LLP & Nikitas
Hatzimihail eds., Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013). Doctrinal works on individual
subjects are cited below where appropriate.
11. Cyprus is the third-largest island in the Mediterranean, after Sicily and
Sardenia, with an area of 9251 km2; http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf
/glance_en/glance_en?OpenDocument (last visited Jul. 2, 2013).
12. CYPRUS: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1991), http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/21.htm (last visited Jul. 26,
2013).
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in a population of close to one million, where Greek and Turkish
Cypriots stand respectively at 71.5% and 9.5% of the total
population. 13 Despite the longstanding demographic predominance
of ethnic Greeks, who self-identify as deriving from Mycenaean
settlers who came from the Greek mainland over three thousand
years ago, geographically, the island is much closer to Turkey (to
its north) and the Middle East (to its east) than it is to the Greek
mainland (to its west). Its location has been a principal cause of
both its strategic importance and its misfortunes.
A. Early History
Cyprus law has been the tributary of several legal cultures
across time. Prior to 1164, ancient Greek and then RomanByzantine law was the law of the land. 14 Between 1164 and 1571,
the island formed part of the Western European world: the
Lusignan Kingdom of Jerusalem moved there following Saladin’s
reconquest of the Holy Land, with the Republic of Venice taking
over in 1489. Venice has left us Othello and impressive
fortifications; the Lusignans left the Assizes of Cyprus and
Jerusalem. 15
The Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571 led to the effective
termination of the Catholic presence, the immigration of Muslim
(and Christian) populations from Anatolia, and the emergence of
the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus as the
political leader of the Greek population under the millet system.
13. As of December 2011, the population comprised 681,000 Greek
Cypriots (including the 8,400 members of the three non-Greek Orthodox,
acknowledged Christian religious groups that opted to be regarded as part of the
Greek community under the 1960 Constitution: Maronite, Armenian, and Latin),
90,100 Turkish Cypriots and 181,000 foreign residents. This count does not
include the so-called “settlers” from mainland Turkey (estimated by some at
160,000), supra note 11.
14. See Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus,
supra note 4, at 443-445.
15. See Vol.1-2 of ASSISES DE JÉRUSALEM, OU RECUEIL DES OUVRAGES DE
JURISPRUDENCE COMPOSÉS PENDANT LE XIIIE SIÈCLE DANS LES ROYAUMES DE
JÉRUSALEM ET DE CHYPRE (Arthur Beugnot ed., Imprimerie Royale 1841-1843).
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According to this system, non-Muslim confessional communities
were treated as a “nation” (millet) and allowed to govern their own
affairs according to their own laws and customs; the religious head
was responsible for his millet’s administration and its good
behavior towards the “paramount power.” 16 The Church of Cyprus
has continued to claim this role of national leadership (Ethnarchy)
up to the present day.
The Greek Revolution of 1821, and the creation of an
independent Greek state, which quickly began orienting itself to
French-style codification and German Pandektenrecht and
abolishing ecclesiastical jurisdiction over civil and family matters,
marked a split between the Greeks in the new Kingdom, and those
remaining under Ottoman (and Church) control. In 1839, the
Tanzimat (“reorganization”) movement of Ottoman institutional
reform saw the introduction of large-scale legislative projects,
which basically introduced Western-style private and criminal law
legislation, such as the Commercial Code. Some of these laws
remained in force until the very end of the British colonial era. 17
B. British Colonial Rule (1878-1960)
In 1878, the British took possession of the island, with a view
to reinforcing the maritime route to India and denying the Russians
access to the Eastern Mediterranean. 18 With the Treaty of Berlin,
the Ottoman Empire leased the island to the British Empire, but
few, if any, thought this lease would expire. At first, the island’s
16. See, e.g., STEVEN RUNCIMAN, THE GREAT CHURCH IN CAPTIVITY 167
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1968).
17. The legal history of Ottoman Cyprus certainly merits a separate study.
Ironically, the first stage of the British colonial era (in which “Continental”
statutes of Ottoman provenance, regulating the basic legal subjects of private
and criminal law, remained in force in a legal system that had adopted a
common law system of administration of justice and an English language)
comes closer to the classic definition of a mixed jurisdiction. For a short
discussion, see infra Part IV. B(1). Again, this is the subject for a separate study
that I hope to present in the near future.
18. WILLIAM MALLINSON, CYPRUS: A MODERN HISTORY 10 (IB Tauris
2009).
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ethnic Greek majority rejoiced at the prospect of rule by their
fellow Christians and eventual union (Enosis) with the Greek
“motherland”; it was only in 1864, after all, that the British had
ceded their Ionian protectorate as a gift to the new King of Greece.
British policy remained ambivalent in that regard, but the outbreak
of World War I, which brought the British and Ottomans at war
with each other, led to the annexation of Cyprus and fired up hopes
of Enosis. A few overtures were indeed made, in the early stages of
the war, by London to Athens, with a view to luring Greece to the
side of the Entente, but the two years it took for the anglophile
faction to prevail in Greece and for the latter to join the war effort
allowed the British to shelve their offer, in the postwar negotiating
table. The end of World War I renewed Greek hopes of the
eventual fulfillment of the so-called “Grand Idea” of uniting all
territories primarily inhabited by ethnic Greeks into the Kingdom,
but the Greek military expedition into Anatolia ended in disaster
and death, or uprooting of the ethnic Greek populations there.19
The 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which entombed the Greek “Grand
Idea”, was also the international instrument with which Turkey
officially acknowledged British sovereignty over Cyprus. 20 In
1925, Cyprus officially became a British Colony. 21 It maintained
that status until Independence in 1960. 22
The institutions of British colonial rule included a small but
effective colonial bureaucracy, led by the Governor; a partially
elected Legislative Council; a King’s Advocate (the future
Attorney-General) who controlled all aspects of colonial
governance, originally including the courts; and a two-tier judicial
system of District Courts and a Supreme Court, with appeal to the
19. MICHAEL LLEWYELLYN SMITH, IONIAN VISION: GREECE IN ASIA MINOR,
1919-1922 (C. Hurst 1998)
20. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24, 1923, Article 16. Available at
www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.
21. See THE CYPRUS GAZETTE (EXTRAORDINARY NO. 1) No. 1691, May 1,
1925.
22. Independence was implemented by the Cyprus Act 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2,
c. 52, § 1 (1960) (U.K.).
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Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and no lay participation.23
British colonial officials dominated the judiciary throughout the
colonial period, especially in the upper echelons. 24 Only in 1927
were the first Cypriots, one Greek and one Muslim, appointed as
puisne judges to the Supreme Court, whereas the first Cypriot
President of a District Court was appointed in 1942. 25 Seats in the
Legislative Council were calibrated so as to deny the Greeks of the
island a deciding majority: the six (and, after 1925, nine) colonial
administrators could normally rely on the three Ottoman notables
who represented the Muslim community to balance off the nine
(after 1925, twelve) Greek delegates, letting the Governor cast a
deciding vote. 26 Even in cases where the delegates of the two
communities would side together, 27 the Governor could
circumvent the Council and promulgate his proposed legislation by
an Order-in-Council.
In October 1931, such government-by-decree ignited a major
uprising of Greek Cypriots demanding the Union (Enosis) of
Cyprus with Greece. 28 The ensuing crackdown on Greek
nationalism and the expressed desire for the “substitution of a

23. See the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order-in-Council, November 30, 1882
in THE IMPERIAL ORDERS IN CYPRUS APPLICABLE TO CYPRUS (1923).
24. See D.H. HADJIHAMBIS, THE SUPREME COURT OF CYPRUS AND ITS
JUDGES SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT IN 1883 at 39-101 (2010), which profiles all
judges who served on the Supreme Court between its establishment in 1883 and
independence in 1960.
25. The first two puisne (or junior) Judges were Vasilios Sertsios and
Mustafa Bey Fuad. Both had previously served as District Judges. See
HADJIHAMBIS, supra note 24, at 72-75. Criton Tornaritis (1902-1997), originally
named as District Judge to the Nicosia District Court in 1940, served as
President of the Famagusta District Court from 1942 until he was appointed to
the position of Solicitor-General of the Colony in 1944. In 1952, he became the
Attorney-General of the Colony, a position he maintained until 1984.
26. See supra note 23.
27. It is ironic that the first Turkish nationalist elected to the Council sided
with the Greeks, leading to the Governor’s overruling the Council majority,
which incited the 1931 Unionist insurrection.
28. See G. S. GEORGHALLIDES, CYPRUS AND THE GOVERNORSHIP OF SIR
RONALD STORRS: THE CAUSES OF THE 1931 CRISIS (Cyprus Research Centre
1985).
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British for a Greek atmosphere in the colony” 29 led to the
suspension of the Legislative Council, along with the elected
municipal councils and a number of political and cultural
associations. British authoritarian policies, and especially the
effective abolition of elected offices, may have had effects to this
day: a vibrant culture of associations and political representation
was interrupted, allowing, on the one hand, for the emergence of a
strong labor movement with Communist affiliation, and forcing, on
the other hand, the organization of the political mainstream
(including much of the labor movement) under the ideological
banner of Greek nationalism and the political leadership of the
Church. 30
A major consequence of the 1931 events for the development
of the Cyprus legal system, with repercussions to this day, was
making professional training in London and admission there as a
barrister or solicitor an absolute prerequisite for admission to the
Cyprus Bar. This effectively prohibited Cypriot graduates of the
two Greek law schools from entering legal practice in their
homeland (by 1931, Athens law graduates were constituting the
majority of the relatively small number of Cyprus lawyers); as a
result, United Kingdom-trained lawyers monopolized the legal
profession and especially the judiciary during the last decades of
colonial rule and continued to dominate both for decades after
independence. Another side effect, which affected the
administration of justice system but also had broader repercussions
for Cypriot society, was an intensified British effort to stir up
ethnic rivalries: Turkish Cypriots, who had been traditionally
29. Governor Sir Richmond Palmer, as quoted by JAMES MCHENRY, THE
UNEASY PARTNERSHIP ON CYPRUS, 1919-1939: THE POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC INTERACTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, TURKEY AND THE
TURKISH-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY 85 (Taylor & Francis 1987).
30. On how this complex polarization affected colonial governance and the
nationalist struggle, see ROBERT HOLLAND, BRITAIN AND THE REVOLT IN
CYPRUS 1954-1959 10-12, 15-19 (Clarendon Press 1998); and MARIA TSAMPIKA
LAMPITSI, COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM AND LABOR IN COLONIAL CYPRUS 19451960 (2010; on file with author).
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underrepresented in the liberal professions, including law, were
promoted beyond demographic proportion to the Bar, the courts
and colonial administration, including the police. This eventually
helped undermine the good relations between the two
communities, especially as the repressive task entrusted to the
colonial police were expanding.
The struggle for Enosis intensified in the 1950s, culminating in
the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) armed
rebellion (1955-1959). 31 In seeking to counter Greek nationalism,
the British colonial administration, both prior to and during the
rebellion, combined harsh reprisals and suppression of civil
liberties, with offering incentives for self-rule. They also
encouraged, notably in the 1950s, Turkish nationalist claims to
partition of the island, as a counterweight to the Greek Cypriot
demands for union with Greece, and despite the renunciation by
Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty of all claims to the former
Ottoman territories.
C. Independence
Independence of the Republic of Cyprus was imposed on a
reluctant people in 1960 with the Zurich-London Agreements, 32 to
which the Constitution of the Republic was attached. A joint
committee of Greek and Turkish Cypriot jurists supposedly drafted
the Constitution, with outside help, but its travaux pratiques
remain unpublished to this day.
In constitutional law terms, the Constitution of Cyprus is an
extremely rigid instrument: many provisions have been
characterized as “fundamental” and may never be amended
31. HOLLAND, supra note 30, provides the most complete, and generally
objective, treatment of the EOKA struggle and what led us to it.
32. The conferences which resulted in the Zurich-London Agreements took
place in February 1959, with the participation of Greece, Turkey, Great Britain,
and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;
http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_zurich.html (last visited Jul. 2,
2013).
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(putting in doubt, according to some, the very existence of the
principle of popular sovereignty). 33 For other provisions, a twothirds vote by the representatives of each community was required
for any amendment. 34 The Constitution divided all citizens of the
Republic into a Greek and a Turkish Community 35 and provided
for a binary or bi-communal government with presidential
characteristics. For the highest offices, a “Turkish” second-incommand to the “Greek” office holder was explicitly provided for:
President and Vice President of the Republic, 36 Speaker and
Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives. 37 The
independent officers of the Republic established in the Constitution
were also to be paired with a deputy who ought to belong to the
other Community: Attorney General and Assistant Attorney
General, 38 Auditor General and Assistant Auditor General, 39
Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, 40 Accountant
General and Deputy Accountant General. 41 The Constitution also
provided for relative parity in the two supreme courts of the land,
both of which were to be presided over by third-country nationals:
the Supreme Constitutional Court was to comprise one Greek and
one Turkish Cypriot as members, 42 and the High Court, two Greek
and one Turkish Cypriot. 43 Under the Constitution, Greek and
Turkish replaced English as the official languages of the Republic,
even though the presence of foreign presiding judges meant that
33. See CYPRUS CONST. art. 182(1), referring to Annex III. Of the
Constitution’s articles, fifteen have been declared as “fundamental” in their
entirety, along with provisions from thirty-three more.
34. Id. at art. 182(3).
35. Id. at art. 2. The three acknowledged religious groups (Armenian,
Maronite Catholic and Latin Catholic) have elected to join the Greek
Community pursuant to Art. 2(3).
36. Id. at art. 1.
37. Id. at art. 72(1).
38. Id. at art. 112(1).
39. Id. at art. 115(1).
40. Id. at art. 118(1).
41. Id. at art. 126(1).
42. Id. at art. 133(1).
43. Id. at art. 153(1).
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English was to remain, at the very least, the language of appellate
adjudication into the distant future.
Bi-communal governance was, unfortunately, short-lived.
Following the collapse of intercommunal talks on the governance
of municipalities, the President of the Republic, in consultation
with the British High Commissioner, submitted to the Turkish
Cypriot leadership a proposal to reform certain constitutional
arrangements in November 1963. 44 The proposals were rejected by
Turkey before the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President had the chance
to respond. A Turkish threat to invade and divide the island,
followed up by bombing raids by the Turkish Air Force and
paramilitary action on both sides, led to deployment of a United
Nations peace-keeping force and gave the impetus for the
departure of Turkish Cypriot officials from government and, most
pointedly, the segregation of the Turkish Cypriot community, with
the creation of enclaves policed by Turkish military and Turkish
Cypriot paramilitary forces. Under what came to be known as the
“law of necessity”, measures were introduced to allow the
Republic’s institutions to keep functioning in spite of Turkish
Cypriot non-participation. 45 At the same time, the separate
institutions of the Greek Community were absorbed into the
institutions of the Republic; Greek became the sole language of
new legislation and eventually displaced English completely as the
working language of civil service. The next decade saw small-scale
conflict between the communities, but the Turkish Cypriot stance
encouraged nationalist tendencies among the Greek Cypriots,
leading eventually to violence between their own political factions.
On July 15, 1974, a coup by army elements controlled by the
Athens dictatorship against the President of the Republic provided
the excuse for the Turkish threat of invasion from ten years earlier
44. See DIANA WESTON MARKIDES, CYPRUS 1957-1963: FROM COLONIAL
CONFLICT TO CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 129 (Univ. of Minnesota 2001).
45. See SAVVAS S. PAPASAVVAS, LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE À
CHYPRE 127-44 (Economica 1998).
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to finally materialize: the amphibious invasion in July 20, 1974,
established a beachhead at the north of the island; it was followed
by a massive land grab, in a combined armored and airborne
assault on August 15, 1974, in violation of the ceasefire and
despite ongoing negotiations with the restored democratic
government. 46 To this day, Turkey continues to hold 36% of the
island, with another 3% constituting a buffer zone under the
control of U.N. peacekeepers. The United Kingdom claims
sovereign status for its two military bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia,
which cover another 2.74% of the island.
Today, the Republic of Cyprus lives on as a bi-communal
polity, in which the Turkish Cypriot community is expected to
return, once set free from Turkey, and reclaim the seats allocated
to the Turkish Cypriots in government, parliament and the
judiciary. Turkish Cypriot property in the area controlled by the
Republic is held for them in trust by the government, pending
resolution of the Cyprus problem. 47
The two communities have long been engaged in negotiations
for a political settlement of the Cyprus problem. 48 In 1983, a
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” was proclaimed in the
occupied lands and recognized only by Turkey. 49 On the contrary,
the international community has insisted that the Republic of
Cyprus remains the sole legitimate government on the island, 50
with sovereignty over the entire territory. The Turkish Cypriot
administration in the occupied north has been referred to instead,
46. See PAULOS TZERMIAS, 2 GESCHICHTE DES REPUBLIKS ZYPERN 747-48
(3d ed., Franke 1998)
47. See the Turkish Cypriot Properties (Management and Other Topics)
Law, L. 139/91, as amended. The Minister of the Interior acts as Guardian of
Turkish Cypriot properties.
48. See CLAIRE PALLEY, AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEBACLE: THE
UN SECRETARY GENERAL’S GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS 1999-2004 (Hart 2005).
49. See
U.N.
Security
Council,
Resolution
541
(1983),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541%281983%29;
and Resolution 550 (1984), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=S/RES/550%281984%29 (both last visited Jul. 2, 2013).
50. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
146 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
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by the European Court of Human Rights, as a “subordinate local
administration”, 51 which “survives by virtue of Turkish military
and other support.” 52
Cyprus’ accession into the EU has posed its own problems:
Turkish Cypriot citizens of the Republic possess the privileges of
EU citizenship, but the Community acquis has been suspended in
the occupied North. 53 However, the European Court of Justice has
held that the courts and institutions of the Republic may validly
pass judgment over land situated in the areas not under its effective
control. 54
D. The Post-Colonial Legal Mind
The constitutional crisis of 1963-64, and the invasion of 1974,
created what has been considered the major contribution of Cyprus
to comparative constitutional law, i.e., the doctrine of necessity
(δίκαιο της ανάγκης). Moreover, the persistence of the so-called
“Cyprus problem” (Kypriakó) has, since the very beginning of the
new country, laid the foundations for what I would describe as the
two principal characteristics of Cypriot legal consciousness—and
public life.
On the one hand, the prevailing sense in Cyprus has long been
one of being in an interim stage, pending resolution of the
communal dispute—one could speak of “perpetual interimness”.
The general tendency has, therefore, been to postpone legal,
51. Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995 (GC), 310
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Appl. no. 15318/89).
52. Cyprus v. Turkey, Decision of 10 May 2001, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 at
par. 77 (Appl. no. 25781/94).
53. See Protocol No 10 on Cyprus in the Act concerning the conditions of
accession [to the European Union] of the Czech Republic, the Republic of
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of
Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to
the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, 2003 O.J. (L236), at 955.
For a detailed discussion, see NIKOS SKOUTARIS, THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS IN A MEMBER STATE UNDER SIEGE (Hart 2011).
54. Apostolides v. Orams, Case C-420/07, 2009 ECR I-3571.
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institutional and political reform indefinitely. Thus, it took thirty
years after independence for Greek to fully replace English as the
language of court proceedings and appellate judgments. The
translation, from English to Greek, of colonial laws still in force
took even more time. In fact, the main body of the Rules of Civil
Procedure has to this day not been officially translated. 55
Accession to the European Union—initially as a prospect and
subsequently as a fact—has changed this attitude only in part.
On the other hand, the Constitution has become the totem of the
Republic, the defining symbol of statehood and Cypriot identity.
Ironic as this might appear for a document that was originally
much derided as a “legal monstrosity,” or as “the outcome of a
dreadful dialogue between a mathematician and a lawyer,” 56 it is
also a political necessity. The Supreme Court was initially very
reluctant to allow the House of Representatives to amend nonfundamental provisions of the Constitution. 57 The first successful
amendment, which concerned the allocation of jurisdiction over
family law matters for members of the Greek Orthodox Church
(remarkably, a matter left to the institutions of the Greek
Community under the Constitution), was simply tolerated by an
evenly split Court. 58 A strong majority of the Supreme Court
would only expressly endorse the right of two-thirds of Greek
Cypriot Representatives to amend non-fundamental provisions of
the Constitution several years later. 59
It goes without saying that such delicate insistence on the status
quo has led to noticeable legal formalism. To use a recent example
near home, given that the Constitution holds “the office of a
55. For a discussion of the translation process (and the methodological
problems it incurred) see Nikitas Hatzimihail, Sources of Law and
Plurilingualism in FESTSCHRIFT IOANNIS SPYRIDAKIS (in Greek, forthcoming,
Ant.Sakkoulas Eds., 2013; English text on file with editors).
56. See S.A. DESMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONS 282-96 (Stephens 1964).
57. See President of Republic v. House of Representatives, (1986) 3 C.L.R.
1439.
58. Nicolaou v. Nicolaou, (1992) 1 C.L.R. 1338.
59. Kouloundis v. House of Representatives, (1997) 1 C.L.R. 1026.
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Minister . . . incompatible . . . with a public or municipal office,” 60
it was widely claimed (and would probably be thus held by the
Supreme Court) that a professor at the state-funded University of
Cyprus could not become a cabinet minister even if he suspended
his university affiliation. More often than not, constitutional
defense of the status quo has been used to protect the vested
interests of social and professional groups, especially among the
legal elite and most notably the judiciary. 61 A unanimous full
bench of the Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional the
legislative amendment of the statutory provision on locus standi
requirements for administrative litigation. 62 Calls to create an
intermediate appellate jurisdiction or a separate administrative
court, or even to return to the original constitutional arrangement
and separate High and Constitutional Court were until recently
commonly rejected by the judiciary as contrary to the Constitution.
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SYSTEM
Administration of justice in Cyprus would at first glance seem
to conform entirely to common law stereotypes. The present
judicial structure of Cyprus is principally a legacy of the late
colonial period, especially after the merger of the two supreme
courts provided for in the Constitution. The Cyprus judiciary
strongly identifies with the common law tradition—an attitude
shared by much, though by no means all, of the legal profession at
large—and uses common law tools in judicial reasoning.
Moreover, procedural law is probably the field of Cyprus law that
most fully adheres to the English common law. This holds true
even in areas where substantive law is modeled after, or even
transplanted from, continental law.
60. CYPRUS CONST. art. 59(2) (with reference to the expansive definition in
Article 41(1)).
61. See the criticism by Papasavvas, supra note 45, esp. at 219-20.
62. See President of Republic v. House of Representatives, (2009) 3 C.L.R.
23, 3 LYSIAS 44 (2010).
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A closer look, however, at the operation of Cyprus courts, as
well as the structure of the bar and especially of the judiciary, will
demonstrate considerable elements of hybridity and mutation.
A. The Legal Profession
In continental legal systems, reference is made to the legal
professions in the plural. 63 For example, in Greece, even though
Bar membership for a number of years is a prerequisite for a career
either as a notary or in the judicial branch, both are considered to
be distinct legal professions (νομικά επαγγέλματα). 64 On the
contrary, Cyprus follows the unitary conception of the legal
profession (νομικό επάγγελμα) prevailing in the common law.
1. A Unitary Bar
The Law regulating advocates is the second chapter in the
colonial collection of the Laws of Cyprus. 65 The Law’s description
of what constitutes “practicing as an advocate” includes both
litigation-related tasks and the basic forms of consultative
lawyering. 66 The traditional English split between barristers and
solicitors appears, therefore, alien to Cyprus. 67 In practice,
however, a Cypriot advocate will often present herself as a “lawyer

63. See, e.g., the presentation of legal professions across EU member states
at
the
European
Judicial
Network,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_prof/legal_prof_gen_en.htm.
64. See, e.g., IOANNA LAMPIRI-DIMAKI, LEGAL STUDIES AND LEGAL
PROFESSIONS IN GREECE 1960-2003 (3d ed., Sakkoulas Pubs. 2004, in Greek).
65. See the Advocates Law Cap. 2 (L. 58/55; “A Law to consolidate and
amend the law relating to advocates and to make provision for the establishment
of an Advocates’ Pension Fund,” as amended by L. 24/56). The Law has been
amended over thirty times in the fifty years since independence; [hereinafter
Advocates Law].
66. Advocates Law Cap. 2, art. 2(1), as amended gradually postindependence. Most consulting services enumerated were added in the early
1980s.
67. The original art. 2 provision of L. 58/55, supra note 6565, made
reference only to court-related tasks. See 1 STATUTE LAWS OF CYPRUS: IN
FORCE ON THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1959 (rev. ed., C.F. Roworth 1959).
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and legal consultant” in her business cards and storefront displays
of law firms.
Cypriot advocates are organized into the Cyprus Bar
Association, which constitutes the countrywide licensing body, 68
and a local Bar Association (one for each of the original District
Courts), which takes charge of day-to-day affairs. 69 Requirements
for admission include a law degree, pupilage for at least a year
with an advocate, and success in exams organized by the Law
Council—which consists of the leadership of the Cyprus Bar
Association, the Attorney General, and advocates selected by
them. 70 Once admitted to the Bar, Cypriot advocates are allowed to
present themselves before any court throughout the Republic. 71
The composition of the Cyprus Bar is representative of the
legal system’s evolution. Prior to independence, especially after
the 1931 revolt, members of the Bar—including government
lawyers and the judiciary—were trained in England and Wales
(often without university education in law). 72 After independence
in 1960, the majority of those entering the profession had obtained
university degrees from Greek law schools; the United Kingdom
remained the destination of choice for a minority, which included,
however, most of the sons (and, gradually, the daughters) of the
colonial-era Greek Cypriot barristers. Continental concepts and
terms were introduced into Cyprus law, but less than might be
expected in terms of the Bar’s demographics. Moreover, it took
more than three decades for English to be replaced by the
Republic’s official languages in courts (and colonial statutes to be
translated). Both these phenomena could be explained in terms of a

68. Advocates Law Cap. 2, arts. 21-25, supra note 6565.
69. Id. at arts. 19-20.
70. Id. at art. 3.
71. Id.
72. In fact, according to biographical data, the majority of native lawyers
admitted to the profession prior to 1931 held degrees from the University of
Athens Law School. Following the revolt, successful training in the United
Kingdom as a barrister (or a Scottish advocate) became the sole prerequisite.
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contest between the various generations and social groups
constituting the (Greek) Cypriot Bar.
The post-colonial character of the legal system as well as the
lack, until very recently, of a legal academia (its impact has yet to
be felt in practice) have also meant that the Bar has remained
deferential to the judiciary much more than might be the case in
other European countries. There exist relatively few publications
on Cypriot law, and most are limited to the uncritical presentation
of basic local case law.
The British colonial origins of the modern legal system are best
illustrated by the omnipresent office of the Attorney General of the
Republic (Γενικός Εισαγγελέας). During colonial rule, the Attorney
General acted as both the colonial government’s legal counsel and
the head of colonial lawyers (and, for a certain period, judges).
Upon independence, the Constitution established the Attorney
General as the first among the “independent officers” of the
Republic. The Constitution consecrated the Attorney General’s
role as both “the legal adviser of the Republic and of the President
and of the Vice President of the Republic and of the Council of
Ministers and of the Ministers” 73 and the officer vested with full
prosecutorial powers. 74 The Attorney-General is also legally
regarded as the first lawyer (advocate) of Cyprus: apart from being
the Honorary President of the Cyprus Bar Association, 75 he also
presides over the Disciplinary Council for advocates, 76 the
Advocates Pension Fund 77 and the Law Council. 78 The office of
73. CYPRUS CONST. art. 113(1).
74. CYPRUS CONST. art. 113(2). See also DESPINA KYPRIANOU, THE ROLE
OF THE CYPRUS ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN PROSECUTIONS: RHETORIC,
IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE (Springer 2009).
75. Advocates Law Cap. 2, arts. 23(1) and (4), supra note 65.
76. Id. at art. 16(2).
77. Id. at art. 26, which authorizes the Council of the Cyprus Bar
Association to issue Regulations, approved by the Council of Ministers, on the
creation and operation of the Advocates’ Pension Fund. Issued in 1966, the
Regulations name the Attorney-General as president of the Fund’s Board of
Directors.
78. Advocates Law Cap. 2, art. 3(1), supra note 65.
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the Attorney General also acts as legal counsel to the House of
Representatives, advises the Foreign Ministry, organizes the
participation of Cyprus in EU law-making and the implementation
of EU law in Cyprus, and represents Cyprus before European and
international courts.
2. A Judicial Career
To be a judge in Cyprus means embarking upon a judicial
career. According to the statute books of Cyprus, not unlike
common-law jurisdictions, judicial appointments come on the basis
of a successful career in the legal profession, with direct
appointment to the higher ranks of first-instance judges, or even
the Supreme Court, being possible. But the practice of judicial
appointments has placed strong emphasis on seniority. It moreover
comes close to continental models of a hierarchical, career-based
judiciary. Trial judges are dependent for their promotions and
transfers between districts on the thirteen Justices of the Supreme
Court, who act as the Supreme Judicial Council.
“High moral standards” and a minimum of six years in legal
practice are required for an entry-level appointment to the District
Court, with ten years required for appointment to the middle and
senior ranks of first instance. 79 The legal practice requirement can
be fulfilled by “service in any judicial position.” 80 It can also be
reduced to five years for appointees at the entry-level, on the
advice of two thirds of the Supreme Court Justices. 81 In fact, one
only needs to have been a registered member of the Bar for the
appropriate amount of time, without necessarily having
distinguished oneself at the Bar. The selection process—operated
by the Supreme Court Justices, in their capacity as the Supreme
Judicial Council—principally involves an interview. One might
say that neither the safety valves of continental systems (exams,
79. The Courts of Justice Law 1960, Art. 6(1) (L. 14/60).
80. Id.
81. Art. 6(2), supra note 79.

2013]

CYPRUS AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM

59

judicial training), nor those of common law systems (reputation
among the Bar and the legal profession) are in place. On the other
hand, the Cypriot legal profession is a small world and reputations
are easily confirmable. Getting qualified candidates to apply might
be a bigger problem than selecting the best suited among those
who do apply.
District Judges, once appointed, are scrutinized from the higher
judicial echelon, not unlike in continental systems. There are three
ranks of District Judges: District Judge, Senior District Judge, and
President of the District Court. 82 “Sorting out” takes place in the
first two ranks, and disciplinary proceedings are not unknown.
Each District Court is presided over by the senior President
(known in the colloquial legal language as the “administrative
President”).
Appointment to the Supreme Court—and even the selection of
the Supreme Court’s President—tends to be strictly a matter of
seniority between the Judge-Presidents of the District Court. The
Constitution, in fact, provides that appointment to the appellate
bench is made by the President “from amongst lawyers of high
professional and moral standard.” 83 However, only once was there
an appointment made from outside the ranks of senior judges. In
1997, heeding calls from the Bar for an advocate to sit on the
appellate bench, the President named a senior prosecutor to the
Court in one of the two openings. This prompted an especially
strong reaction by the judiciary. 84 Since 1991, Judges are also

82. Art. 4 of the Courts of Justice Law 1960, supra note 79. At present, the
maximum numbers of active District Court judges are set at thirty-nine, sixteen
and thirteen respectively for each rank, according to art. 6(3) of the Law.
83. CYPRUS CONST. art. 153(5).
84. The appointment was condemned by the Union of Judges in their
general meeting, with thirty-four (out of forty-four) Judges present tending their
resignation. See, e.g., Logos News from Cyprus, September 29, 1997 (in Greek),
available at http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/logosg/1997/97-09-29.logosg.html
(last visited Jul. 3, 2013).
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organized into a Union, whose President is usually a senior
President of the District Court. 85
The judiciary is supported by an administrative mechanism of
registrars and law clerks. The Court administrative personnel are
considered part of the civil service of Cyprus: appointments and
promotions are thus controlled by the Civil Service Commission.
At the head of court administration sits the Chief Registrar of the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court employs permanent law clerks
(“Legal Officers”), who assist the Justices with research and in
drafting their opinions, especially with regard to administrative law
cases. Originally modeled after the law clerks of common-law
appellate courts, these legal officers increasingly play a role similar
to—and certainly identify themselves with—the Assistant Judges
(εισηγητές; Auditeurs in French) of the Greek Council of State
(who constitute, however, junior members of the judiciary, and
tend to rise through the Court’s ranks). 86 At present—and
somewhat controversially—these, too, are considered as civil
servants, rather than judicial officers.
In his study of Louisiana judges, Symeon Symeonides, himself
a Cypriot, associates the characteristics of the judge being or acting
like “a law-maker, a policy-maker, a statesman, a politician” with
common law judges, as contrasted to their brethren in civil-law
jurisdictions. 87 In the case of Cyprus, partly by the power of law
and partly by the force of necessity, the judiciary has been
endowed with powers not unlike those of judges and justices in a
common law jurisdiction. Cyprus judges enjoy the respect of
Cyprus society; however they are often defensive of their status
85. Creation of the Union was enabled by art. 4 of L. 136/91, which also
added art. 10A to the Courts of Justice Law, supra note 79.
86. The Référendaires of the European Court of Justice are another model
alluded to; however, the legal officers of the Supreme Court have a very high
rate of permanent service. Very few have moved A few have been subsequently
appointed as Family Judges.
87. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Louisiana Judge: Judge, Statesman,
Politican, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION, supra note 1,
at 89.
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and do not tolerate challenges from either advocates or the public.
The notion of contempt of court was used expansively, 88 until the
European Court of Human Rights called Cyprus to task. 89
However, the judiciary has exercised notable self-restraint in
matters of political sensitivity. 90 Even in less political subjects, we
will search in vain for systematic efforts by the appellate bench to
reshape the law. In fact, the recent tendency in many landmark
cases appears to be to avoid expansive reasoning.
B. The Judicial System of Cyprus
Cyprus presently maintains a two-tier judicial system, one level
each of trial and appellate jurisdiction. 91 The appellate jurisdiction
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was abolished upon
independence. 92
1. The Trial Courts of Cyprus: General Jurisdiction and
Tribunals
The primary trial court, i.e. the court of general jurisdiction, is
the District Court (Επαρχιακό Δικαστήριο). 93 Its jurisdiction
extends over most civil and criminal matters. 94 All cases are
88. Contempt is regulated in art. 44 of the Courts of Justice Law 1960,
supra note 79, which effectively reprised art. 49 of the Colonial Courts of
Justice statute 1953 (L. 40/53, Cap. 8).
89. See Kyprianou v. Cyprus (G.C.), 2005-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (Appl. no.
73797/01). The Supreme Court of Cyprus, (2001) 2 C.L.R. 236, had upheld the
conviction of an advocate by the Assizes Court of Limassol for complaining that
the judges on the bench were exchanging “billets doux” during his speech.
90. See, e.g., Kettiros v. Koutsou, (2007) 1 C.L.R. 828, LYSIAS 71 (2008)
with editors’ note: even though the law on parliamentary elections effectively
penalizes coalitions of parties as opposed to single party lists, the Court
unanimously held that it is a matter for the electoral list itself to define its status.
91. The Constitution provides explicitly for the High Court (subsequently
renamed the Supreme Court of Cyprus) as the highest court of last resort
(“supreme second-instance court”) and allows lower courts to be established by
statute. See CYPRUS CONST. art. 152(1) explicitly provides art. 155(1).
92. Cyprus Act 1960, supra note 22, c. 52, §5.
93. Courts of Justice Law 1960, art. 22(1), supra note 79.
94. Id. at art. 22(1). The Supreme Court retained trial jurisdiction over
admiralty cases; see id. at art. 19. In 1986, an art. 22B was added by L. 96/1986,
which enables the District Court to hear certain kinds of admiralty cases referred
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judged by a single judge—with the exception of serious crimes
judged by the Assizes Court (Κακουργοδικείο), which sits in panels
of three rotating senior District Judges. 95 Specialized tribunals,
consisting of one professional and two lay judges (one
representative for each of the respective social groups), adjudicate
rent-control cases and employment disputes. 96 There are also the
Family Courts, which are discussed below.
The trial courts of Cyprus are staffed by professional judges
with tenure. With the exception of the representatives of the social
groups participating in the Employment and Rent Control
Tribunals, no lay participation is provided for anywhere in the
administration of the justice system. Also, no magistrates’ courts
exist, or other small-claims jurisdictions.
2. Family Courts
Family Courts were established in 1990, 97 when the Republic
begun reforming its family law in a unified, secular direction.98
Until then, family law had been a matter of personal law,
administered by community tribunals. 99 The British had removed
community jurisdiction over a range of matters, including
childcare and marital property, leaving ecclesiastical courts with

to it by the Supreme Court (whether on its own initiative or by application of a
litigant), These cases are listed in an Annex to the Law.
95. See id. at art. 5. The Assizes Court is presided over by a Judge-President
of the District Court, with two Senior Distict Judges (or District Judges) as
members. The Law does not dictate the duration of the term. Members of the
Assizes Court may also sit in regular District Court cases.
96. On the Employment Tribunal, see the Remunerated Annual Leave Law
1967 (L. 8/67, as amended by L. 5/1973, art. 3), arts. 12 and 12A; Termination
of Employment Law 1967 (L. 577/67), arts. 30-31. On the Rent Control
Tribunal, see the Rent Control Law 1983 (L. 23/83), art. 4. The Court-Martial is
usually regarded as a tribunal.
97. Family Courts Law 1990 (L. 23/90), as amended.
98. See Eliana Nicolaou, Recent Developments in Family Law in Cyprus, in
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 1996 at 121-34 (A.Bainham ed.,
Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 1998).
99. See GEORGE SERGHIDES, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
IN REGARD TO FAMILY RELATIONS IN CYPRUS (G.A.S. 1988).
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jurisdiction over the validity and dissolution of Greek Orthodox
marriages. 100 The Constitution maintained the application of
jurisdiction of Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical Courts. 101 The
Family Courts were originally intended to replace community
tribunals, especially with regard to Greek Orthodox Cypriots.
Separate Family Tribunals of Religious Groups were also set up to
deal with the divorces of members of the three religious groups
(Armenian, Maronite, Latin) recognized by the Constitution: these
tribunals are composed of one “President” judge, appointed by the
Supreme Court “from among members of the judicial service,” one
District Judge, and one representative of the respective group. 102
Over the past two decades, the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
has been expanded, by statute and via the case law of the Supreme
Court, both ratione materiae on every aspect of family law, and
ratione personae. 103 At the moment, the main exceptions concern
the validity and dissolution of marriage under the rules of the three
religious groups (which fall under the jurisdiction of the respective
Family Tribunal), and some cases involving Turkish Cypriots. 104 A
three-member panel of Supreme Court justices, rotating in twoyear terms, judge appeals. 105
The Family Courts are one of the most interesting examples of
Cyprus’ legal hybridity. In fact, the ongoing conflicts about the
status of Family Court judges and the delimitation of the Family
Courts’ jurisdiction vis-à-vis District Courts can tell a lot about the
legal profession in Cyprus—just as the insistence, until very
100. See art. 34 of the Courts of Justice Law 1953 (L. 40/53, Cap. 8). For
English-era family legislation see Caps. 274-280 in the 5 Statute Laws of
Cyprus, supra note 65.
101. See the original Art. 111 of the Constitution.
102. See the Family Courts (Religious Groups) Law 1994 (L. 87(I)/94),
especially art. 3.
103. See a full account of the evolution in MODERN ASPECTS OF GREEK AND
CYPRIOT CIVIL LAW (Nikitas Hatzimihail ed., 2013, in Greek).
104. See George A. Serghides, Reflections on Some Aspects of the Family
Law of the Turkish Community in Cyprus , in PECUNIARY RELATIONS OF
SPOUSES AND COHABITANTS 24-29 (G. A. Serghides ed., G.A.S. 2010)
105. Family Courts Law 1990, Art. 21(1), supra note 97.
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recently, of the Church of Cyprus, alone among Greek Orthodox
Churches in Europe, in maintaining some sort of divorce
proceedings before its own bodies in addition to the court-granted
divorce, might reveal something about the triggers of local
particularities. But it is the development of Cyprus family law
which makes it a fascinating case study.
What we have here is a legal field in which substantive law is,
on the face of it, purely continental—a case of the effective
transplantation of modern Greek family law. All but one of the ten
family court judges were educated in continental law schools
(more specifically, in Greece). This also holds true of most
attorneys appearing regularly before the Family Courts. Family
Court judges have been more prolific than their District Court
brethren in legal publishing—whether this could be attributed to
individual personalities, the limited subject matter they cover, the
continental nature of their field, or to the availability of original
material in Greek. But Cyprus family law is a true hybrid. Part of
its hybridity is a matter of procedure: procedural law is common
law and Family Judges use common law institutions, such as crossexamination of witnesses, alongside inquisitorial techniques.
Unlike Greece, there is no consensual divorce and a marital dispute
may involve four separate court cases—one each for divorce,
marital property, child support and family home. As far as judicial
reasoning is concerned, leading cases will cite Greek textbooks,
but references to Greek family case law are less common.
Today, the Family Courts of Cyprus appear not unlike the
Australian Family Court, or the Family Division of the High Court
in London. They are viewed as courts of specialized jurisdiction,
not as tribunals. 106 Family Court judges however tend to complain
that even though they hold the same qualifications as their brethren
at District Court, they are regarded as inferior. Their pay grade is
106. Sioukrou v. Ulrich, Judgment of March 10, 2011 (Kramvis, J.
apparently endorsing a statement to that effect by Nikitas Hatzimihail in 1
LYSIAS 47 (2008)).
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inferior: a President of the Family Court is equated to a Senior
District Judge and not entitled to certain financial benefits enjoyed
by their general-jurisdiction brethren. There can only be one
President in each Family Court and senior justices appear firmly
opposed to the idea of a President of a Family Court being eligible
for appointment to the Supreme Court.
3. The Supreme Court of Cyprus
At the apex of the administration of justice system sits a single
appellate court: the Supreme Court of Cyprus. The thirteen-strong
Supreme Court has the attitude, and powers, of a common-law
court of last resort. Its status and powers are determined in detail
by the Constitution.107 The Supreme Court sits on appeals and
supervises trial courts and tribunals. 108 The Justices of the Supreme
Court 109 act as the Supreme Judicial Council, which selects,
appoints, promotes, and moves trial judges around. 110 The
Supreme Court also writes the Rules of Procedure, which govern
most procedural matters. 111 It issues prerogative writs. 112 It is also

107. See CYPRUS CONST. arts. 152-163.
108. Id. at art. 155(1); Courts of Justice Act 1960, art. 25, supra note 79.
109. The same word (Δικαστής) exists in Greek for “Judge” and “Justice” (as
a person’s title). Given that the Constitution referred to the members of the High
Court as Judges, reference to them in English as Justices has been a very recent
phenomenon.
110. Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1964 (L.
33/64), art. 10, as amended by L. 3/87, art. 2). Between 1964 and 1987, Supreme
Court justices constituted only the plurality of the Council (which was
composed by the Attorney General, the President and two justices of the
Supreme Court, one President of a District Court, one District Judge, and one
experienced advocate). The Constitution provided that the High Court Judges
act as the Supreme Judicial Council; see CYPRUS CONST. art. 157. Supreme
Constitutional Court judges were to act as judicial council for matters pertaining
to the High Court Judges, and vice versa; id. at arts. 153(8) and 133(8).
111. CYPRUS CONST. art. 163.
112. Id. at art. 155.4. The writs include habeas corpus, certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. See the overview of case law in
PETROS ARTEMIS, PREROGATIVE WRITS: PRINCIPLES AND CASES (2004, in
Greek).
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the country’s constitutional court, with full power of judicial
review in full bench, 113 as well as the sole administrative court.
The Constitution had provided, in fact, for two supreme courts:
the Supreme Constitutional Court 114 and the High Court of
Justice, 115 the former with one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot
member, the latter with two Greek and one Turkish Cypriot
members. 116 In both, a “neutral judge” (i.e. not a national of
Cyprus, Greece or Turkey) was to preside—casting the deciding
vote in cases of disagreement. 117 Constitutional Court members
were supposed to act as a supreme judicial council overseeing the
High Court judges, and vice versa. 118 The High Court reprised the
first- and second-instance jurisdiction of the colonial Supreme
Court over civil and criminal cases. 119 The Constitutional Court
was, in addition to what is implied in its name, endowed with trialinstance jurisdiction over administrative-law cases. 120 Unlike his
High Court counterpart, the President of the Supreme
Constitutional Court could not be a “subject or citizen” of the
United Kingdom or one of its present-day or former colonies. 121
The German law professor Ernst Horsthoff was accordingly
appointed to that position, whereas the first High Court President
(1960-1961) was the Irish Barra O’Briain, and his successor the

113. Board for Registration of Architects v. Kyriakides, (1966) 3 C.L.R. 640.
114. See CYPRUS CONST. arts. 113-151.
115. See CYPRUS CONST. arts. 152-164.
116. See id. at arts. 133(1) and 153(1), respectively.
117. See id. at art. 133(1)(1) for the Supreme Constitutional Court; art. 153
for the High Court (whose President was to have “two votes,” in order to
balance off a two-judge plurality).
118. See id. at art. 153(8) and 133(8), respectively.
119. See CYPRUS CONST. arts. 155-156.
120. Article 146 of the Constitution establishes a general ground of
jurisdiction over petitions (the term “recourses” is being used, in the spirit of the
French recours en annulation) to annul or confirm administrative acts. The
provision has acquired great importance in actual practice. The Constitution also
empowered the Supreme Constitutional Court to make a final determination of
cases where the Public Service Commission is unable to muster the necessary
majorities for an appointments or promotion decision. See art. 125(3), in
conjunction with 151(1) .
121. Id. at art. 133(2)(3).

2013]

CYPRUS AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM

67

Canadian John Leonard Wilson (1962-1964) 122. In 1964, as the
constitutional crisis escalated and the threat of full-scale war
loomed over Cyprus, both foreign Presidents left the island and the
House of Representatives decided to merge the two high courts
into a single Supreme Court of Cyprus. 123 It must be noted that the
term in Greek (Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο), is the same for both High
Court of Justice and Supreme Court. The two Turkish Cypriot
incumbents continued to participate for a few more years, and
indeed the Turkish Cypriot High Court Judge Mehmet Zekia
(1903-1984) became the united Supreme Court’s first President, on
the basis of his seniority to the bench. 124 A side effect of the
merger was that the High Court, which represented the
continuation of the British colonial tradition and the English
common law, effectively absorbed the Constitutional Court, which
had embarked upon a process of transplantation and development
of Continental public-law doctrine. Even though the Continental
doctrinal influence over Cyprus administrative litigation persisted
(in fact, it was significantly expanded) since 1964, it is likely that it
would have had a more systematic, less haphazard character were
it emanating from a specialized appellate bench with a Continental
orientation, as opposed to a court with a strong, almost exclusively
common law identity. 125
Today, the Supreme Court constitutes a real super-court, which
has absorbed the powers of both Courts—and has more recently
extended its jurisdiction over family law matters, previously left to
122. See HADJIHAMBIS, supra note 24, at 112-13 (on Forsthoff), 114-15 (on
O’Briain), 120-21 (on Wilson).
123. See the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous provisions) Law 1964
(L.33/64), especially art. 3.
124. Administration of Justice Law 1964, art. 3(4). On President Zekia see
HADJIHAMBIS, supra note 24, at 94-97. Zekia became also the first Cypriot
judge at the European Court of Human Rights, from 1961 until his death.
125. A corollary speculation concerns the possible orientation of Cyprus
public law within the Continental legal tradition: the departure of Forsthoff led
to the monopolization of Continental public-law influences by the Greek
administrative law tradition, which at the time was strongly oriented towards the
French.
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confessional courts. The Supreme Court constitutes the veritable
final arbiter of constitutional questions, given that the Constitution
may only be modified with a procedure based on the doctrine of
necessity, in cases it is absolutely necessary to do so. 126
It is therefore evident that the Supreme Court of Cyprus is not
just your typical “patriarchal” common law highest appellate
court. 127 A noticeable difference with common law courts of last
resort is that the Supreme Court has no discretionary power to
select its own caseload: all civil—and criminal—judgments of trial
courts are subject to appeal. 128 It thus performs the function of a
common law intermediate appellate court. Moreover, the Supreme
Court may review facts and even rehear evidence. 129 This new rule
was introduced immediately upon Independence. 130 It could thus
be argued that the Court’s role is sometimes not unlike that of a
continental court of appeals, i.e. of a second-level “trial” court
(juridiction du fond).
What all this means, however, is that only a fraction of the
appeals pose real legal questions. The Justices are thus left with
little time on their hands for serious research. Some Justices, in
some cases, effectively tend to simply choose between arguments
presented by counsel.

126. See Papasavvas, supra note 45.
127. Cf. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (Harvard Univ.
Press 1997).
128. The Courts of Justice Law, art. 25(1) and (2), supra note 79.
129. Id. at art. 25(1)(3): “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal
Procedure Law or in any other Law or in any Rules of Court and in addition to
any powers conference thereby, the Supreme Court, on hearing and determining
any appeal either in a civil or a criminal case, shall not be bound by any
determinations on questions of fact made by the trial court and shall have power
to review the whole evidence, draw its own inferences, hear or receive further
evidence and, where the circumstances of the case so require, re-hear any
witnesses already heard by the trial court, and may give any judgment or make
any order which the circumstances of the case may justify. . .”
130. See Charalambous v. Demetriou, (1961) C.L.R. 14 (the last case decided
under the Courts of Justice Law Cap. 8). In the words of the Court’s reporter, the
opinions (“judgments”) of the three Cypriot High Court Judges contain “a
restatement of the powers of Appellate Courts in Cyprus under the old law in
disturbing findings of fact of trial courts.” Id. at 14.
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The strongest reason for both the day-to-day influence of the
Supreme Court and its overloaded docket, however, lies in its triallevel jurisdiction over administrative law cases under Article 146
of the Constitution. Such jurisdiction is only limited to annulment
of administrative acts, as opposed to administrative litigation au
fond. Be that as it may, there are a lot of administrative cases infinitely more than what the drafters of the Constitution had in
mind when they assigned them to the Constitutional Court. The
Supreme Court justices spend more than half of their time—and
almost all the time of the Court’s law clerks—judging
administrative cases individually (an arrangement colloquially
referred to as “single bench”). Whereas civil and criminal appeals
are examined by three-member panels, appeals against Supreme
Court trial judgments are considered by five (other) Justices (a
panel which is characteristically, if not confusingly, called a
“plenary bench” in the colloquial legal language of Cyprus). The
entire Supreme Court may be called upon in cases of great
interest. 131
Requiring a senior judge, who has spent decades to reach
appellate Olympus, to actually adjudicate en masse small triallevel cases would be hard on anyone from any legal system. But
here all Justices have spent the better part of two decades or more
sitting on anything but administrative cases. A lot of them have
never studied administrative law prior to ascending to the Supreme
Court bench. These circumstances have led to a stronger role for
the Court’s law clerks or legal officers, who hold permanent
positions as assistants to individual judges and tend to have studied
in Greek law schools.
131. Among instances of the full bench sitting in trial instance for
administrative litigation, see, e.g., Christodoulou v. Public Service Commission,
(2009) 3 C.L.R. 164, 3 LYSIAS 116 (2010). The case—in which the annulment
of the appointment of the Supreme Court’s Chief Registrar was at stake—set a
more formal rule regarding the extent to which the interview of candidates for
appointment or promotion to public service may be taken into account. The
President of the Court recused himself.
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IV. SOURCES OF LAW
In Cyprus law, statutory law and case law coexist in virtually
all legal fields. Written law could be said to be the principal source
of law, somehow unlike a stereotypical common law jurisdiction
(and even some notable mixed jurisdictions, such as South Africa
and Scotland). Even prior to accession to the European Union, one
could barely find a legal field without comprehensive statutory
treatment. 132 Cyprus judges are usually unequivocal in stating that
their mission is to interpret—and be bound by—statutory law. At
the same time, the existing legislation often shows its age, a factor
that has contributed to the importance of both English common law
and local case law, at least as much as the institutional dynamics
and common law mentality pervasive among the traditional legal
elites, and especially the judiciary.
A. Sources Superior to Legislation
Cyprus law follows a clear hierarchy of sources. The
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 133 The existential
challenges that the Republic has faced from its very beginning
have also made the Constitution the paramount factor in the
political, as well as the legal, discourse. 134 Given that the Republic
of Cyprus stakes its continued existence, and any hopes of
territorial restoration, on international legality and European
integration, it should come as no surprise that European and

132. Conflict of laws had constituted the principal exception, at least prior to
EU accession. The law of domicile was however treated in arts. 5-13 of the
Wills and Succession Law (Cap. 195) and a few specific provisions were found
in other statutes.
133. CYPRUS CONST. art. 169. See also art. 188(2), id.
134. See Pavlos Neophytou Kourtellos, Constitutional Law in NEOCLEOUS,
supra note 10, at 15-43; Papasavvas, supra note 45; ACHILLES EMILIANIDES,
RELIGION AND LAW IN CYPRUS (Wolters Kluwer 2011). Among literature in
Greek, most notable is the treatise by ANDREAS LOIZOU, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS (2001), designed as an article-by-article commentary;
ACHILLES EMILIANIDES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION OF CYPRUS (Sakkoulas
Pubs. 2006).
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international law also feature prominently in Cyprus law and
politics. 135 In fact, upon accession to the European Union, the
Constitution was modified so as to acknowledge the full
supremacy of all European Union law (primary as well as
derivative). 136 Constitutional provisions ought moreover to be
interpreted in conformity to EU law.
International law is also an important direct source of law.
Treaty law supersedes any legislative provision to the contrary. 137
Statutory provisions should be given, if possible, an interpretation
conforming to international treaties. 138 It is less clear whether
customary international law would be treated on a par with
common law or by analogy to the status of treaty law. 139
B. The Stromata of Cyprus Legislation
From a constitutional point of view, the statutory law of
Cyprus consists of legislation enacted during the colonial era and
maintained in force in accordance with Article 188(1) of the
Constitution140 and legislation enacted subsequent to independence
by the House of Representatives in accordance with Articles 61 et
135. On the role of international law in Cypriot appellate cases, see the cases
reported and commented by Aristotle Constantinides in the Oxford Reports on
International Law in Domestic Courts – Cyprus database, available at
www.oxfordlawreports.com/subscriber_articles_by_category2?module=ildc&ca
tegory=Cyprus (last visited Jul. 3, 2013). Among literature involving
international law, usually with regard to the Cyprus problem, see, e.g., Criton
Tornaritis, The Operation of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights in the Republic of Cyprus, 3 CYPRUS L. REV. 455 (1983); KYPROS
CHRYSOSTOMIDES, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Springer 2000). On European law, see Constantinos Kombos, Report on
European Public Law in Cyprus, 16(3) EUR. PUBL. L. 327-55 (2010); STUDIES
IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW at 101 (Constantinos Kombos ed., Sakkoulas Pubs.
2010).
136. See CYPRUS CONST. art. 1A (amended by L. 127(I)/2006).
137. CYPRUS CONST. art. 169(3).
138. See Larkos v. Attorney General, (1995) 1 C.L.R. 510, at 515; Aristidou
v. The Republic, (1967) 2 C.L.R. 43.
139. See Aristotle Constantinides, International Law in the Supreme Court of
Cyprus (2011, unpublished paper on file with author).
140. CYPRUS CONST. art. 188, and art. 29(1)(b) of the Administration of
Justice Law 1960, supra note 110.
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seq. of the Constitution. 141 The few elements of religious law that
survive in present-day Cyprus law—notably, the rules on the
inalienable religious endowments known as Vakf—do so by virtue
of their incorporation into statutory law. 142
A more useful approach would be to draw further distinctions
between existing legislation enacted in different stages of Cyprus
legal history. Identifying these stromata of legislation would allow
us to better understand the evolutionary process that led to the
present-day mixed or “hybrid” legal system and to perhaps predict
its future development. A more practical reason, however, lies in
the fact that the origins (and age) of legislative texts play an
important role in determining the methods used in their
interpretation. Legislation seen as a statement of common law
principles is handled differently than legislation “indigenous” in
origin or legislation deriving from continental legal systems.
We could accordingly discern five stromata, which correspond
to five periods of the modern history of the island. The Colonial
period could be subdivided into three stages: the first would range
from 1878 until the official establishment of a colony of the Crown
in 1925; the second from 1925 to World War Two; the third would
cover the postwar colonial period, during which the long-term
status of the island was continuously in question. The postindependence period could in its turn be subdivided by reference to
accession to the European Union.

141. Article 29(1) (a) of the Administration of Justice Law 1960, supra note
110, in combination with CYPRUS CONST. arts. 78 and 179.
142. See the Evcaf and Vaqfs Law (Cap. 337, enacted by L. 32/55). As to
divorce, modern statutory law provides a special statutory regime for members
of the three religious groups recognized in the Constitution (Armenian, Maronite
and Latin) which incorporates by reference the grounds provided in the
respective religious law but also lists a number of mandatory grounds. See art.
11 of the Family Tribunals (Religious Groups) Law 1994 (enacted as L.
87(I)/1994) and Annex I thereto. Religious ceremony under the rules of the
respective denomination constitutes valid form of marriage with no need for the
involvement of a civil authority: art. 9(2) of the Marriage Law (L. 104(I)/2003).
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1. Another Mixed Legal System Entirely: The Early Colonial
Period
The first half-century of British colonial rule did not see much
legislative reform of substantive law. The administration of the
justice system was redrawn from early on, with colonial courts
replacing Ottoman tribunals and chipping away at ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over succession and marital property. However,
Ottoman law (much of it in Westernized form, following the
Tanzimat law reforms of the mid-nineteenth century) survived as
the residual legal system, until the official introduction of the
common law by the 1935 Courts of Justice Law. It goes without
saying that the strong control of the courts of justice by British
colonial lawyers mitigated this regime from the very beginning. 143
Much of the procedural law reforms of this period were
significant, but most instruments were replaced by the interwar
efforts to create a proper common law regime. However, much of
the legislation on enforcement matters has survived, with little
change, since 1885: the so-called Civil Procedure Law (Cap. 6),
concerning precisely the enforcement of local judgments, is the
principal example. 144 Specific performance of land contracts
provided the other, until 2011. 145
2. Receiving the Common Law: The Interwar Period
In 1925, Cyprus became a formal Colony of the Crown and the
reform of substantive law began in earnest. Turning Cyprus into a
common-law jurisdiction would happen gradually: only in 1935
were “the common law and the doctrines of equity” officially made
the residual law; even then, they were to apply as in force on
143. See, e.g., Ismail v. Attorney-General, (1929) 16 C.L.R. 9, at 12 (“the
rule of English law as to the binding nature of the decisions of appellate
tribunals” must be followed “in the absence of a clear rule of Ottoman law in the
subject”).
144. Enacted as L. 10/1885.
145. Sale of Land (Specific Performance) Law (Cap. 232) (enacted as L.
11/1885 and replaced by its namesake L. 81(I)/2011).
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November 8, 1914 (the day Cyprus was annexed to the Crown,
following the declaration of war between the British and
Ottomans). An interesting example of the conservative attitudes of
British colonial lawmaking from this period concerns the Evidence
Law (Cap. 9): the colony’s evidence rules were reformed into a
consolidated statute in 1946; Cyprus courts were nonetheless to
apply “in any civil or criminal proceeding . . . so far as
circumstances permit, the law the statutes in question and rules of
evidence as in force in England on the 5th day of November,
1914.” 146 The fact that this provision is still in place (even though
the Evidence Law was amended a few years ago) is also indicative
of the traditionalist mentality of the country’s legal elites to this
day.
The interwar era’s lasting contribution has been the
transplantation, mostly from other colonies, of important
legislation on the basic fields of substantive law. Commercial law
statutes dating from that period and still in force today are the Bills
of Exchange Law (Cap. 262) 147 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Law (Cap. 263), 148 the Partnerships Law (Cap. 116) 149 and the
Bankruptcy Law (Cap. 5). 150 The most notable interwar statutes
are the three “codes” of Cyprus: the Criminal Code (Cap. 154), 151
the Contract Law (Cap. 149) 152 and the Civil Wrongs Law (Cap.
148). 153 Such legislation constituted an effective codification of
common-law principles in their respective fields; the statutes in
question are still in force today, often with little modification.
The lineage of these “codes” is worth a separate study. It is
generally accepted that the Criminal Code and the Contract Law
146. Article 3. The full title of L. 14/46 was “A law to amend and
consolidate certain provisions relating to the law of Evidence.”
147. Enacted as L. 20/28. The Law was identical to the English Bills of
Exchange Act 1882. Its provisions on cheques were reformed in 1997.
148. Enacted as L. 8/27.
149. Enacted as L. 18/28.
150. Enacted as L. 8/30.
151. Enacted in 1928, by an Order in Council.
152. Enacted as L. 24/30.
153. Enacted as L. 35/32.
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are effective transplantations of the respective nineteenth-century
Indian statutes, whereas the provenance of the Civil Wrongs Law
is more of a mystery. However, the full lineage of colonial statutes
is more complicated: it has for example been documented that the
Cyprus Criminal Code traces its immediate ancestry to the
Nigerian code, which is turn is a descendant of the Queensland
Code. 154 As to the Civil Wrongs Law, the 1932 Cyprus statute
appears to follow the 1927 draft of a Civil Wrongs Ordinance for
Palestine, which in turn was based on the Civil Wrongs Bill
prepared for India by Frederick Pollock. 155
But what does transplantation mean in this case? Let us use the
example of the Contract Law, which appears almost a copy of the
Indian Contract Act of 1872. 156 The primary differences between
the two texts are technical. Certain of the Indian legislator’s
explanatory notes (“Explanations”) have been moved into the main
text, whereas the examples (“Illustrations”) have been removed;
the chapter on the sale of goods came last and was subsequently
abolished. Specific performance is moreover provided for—in a
single provision—in the Cyprus statute. 157 The principal
154. The Cyprus Criminal Code provided the original for the Palestinian
Criminal Code Ordinance. See Norman Abrams, Interpreting the Criminal Code
Ordinance, 1936: the Untapped Well, 7 ISRAEL L. REV. 25, 26-28 (1972), with a
discussion of the origins of the Cyprus Criminal Code at 28-31.
155. On Pollock’s influence, see Daniel Friedmann, Infusion of the Common
Law Into the Legal System of Israel, 10 ISRAEL L. REV. 324, at 342 n.104
(1975). The Mandatory Civil Wrongs Ordinance, finally enacted in 1944,
“reflects independent thinking and in many important points differs from both
the Cyprus Ordinance and English law.” Id.
156. On the history of the Indian Contract Act, see Stelios Tofaris, A
Historical Study of the Indian Contract Act 1872 (D.Phil. thesis, Cambridge
University, 2010). The principal reference work on the Act is occasionally cited
in Cyprus appellate cases to this day: NILIMA BHADBHADE, POLLOCK AND
MULLA, INDIAN CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC RELIEF ACTS (14th ed., Lexis-Nexis
2012).
157. Article 76(1) of the Contract Law (Cap. 149): “A contract shall be
capable of being specifically enforced by the Court if it is not a void contract
under this or any other Law; and (b) it is expressed in writing; and (c) it is
signed at the end thereof by the party to be charged herewith; and (d) the Court
considers, having regard to all circumstances, that the enforcement of specific
performance of the contract would not be unreasonable or otherwise inequitable
or impracticable.” A separate law, Sale of Land (Specific Performance) Law
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substantive difference lies in the fact that the Cypriot statute
provides explicitly that it be interpreted in accordance with English
law, 158 even though in at least one occasion (namely the rule on
past consideration), Cypriot, unlike Indian, courts have read the
same text as deviating from the common law. 159
The sole substantive deviation of the Cyprus statute from the
Indian prototype concerns the capacity of minors. Until 1970,
English common law considered minors (“infants”) as all persons
not having attained twenty-one years of age; capacity of minors
was, and still is, governed by a series of intricate rules. 160 The
Indian Contract Act espoused a clear-cut rule: capacity to contract
depended upon the person reaching the age of majority according
to his or her personal law (“the law to which he is subject”). 161 The
Cyprus Contract Law followed the Indian rule as to the noncapacity of minors, but avoided a similar reference to personal
laws, simply fixing the age of majority at eighteen. In 1955,
following a case in which incapacity was used as a defense by a
minor against an action for breach of a promise to marry, 162 article
11 was amended to include a reference to the English rules on
capacity. 163

(Cap. 232), promulgated in 1885, governs specific performance over the sale of
land. In contrast, specific performance in India is now governed by the Specific
Relief Act 1963.
158. Article 2(1) of the Contract Law (Cap. 149), supra note 152.
159. Raif v. Dervish, (1971) 1 C.L.R. 158; and Romanos v. Chrysanthou,
(1991) 1 C.L.R. 1991. The issue is discussed in Etaireia Diatheseon Tsimentou
Vasilikou Apollon Ltd v. Kathidjioti, (1998) 1 C.L.R. 687 (notably in the dissent
of Nicolaou, J.).
160. See e.g. JACK BEATSON ET AL., ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 232-46
(29th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). The age was lowered as of 1 January 1970
with the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (U.K.), §1.
161. Indian Contract Act 1872, art. 11.
162. See Myrianthousis v. Petrou, (1956) 21 C.L.R. 32.
163. Article 11(2) of the Contract Law (Cap. 149, as amended by L. 7/56):
“The law in force in England for the time being relating to contracts to which an
infant is a party shall apply to contracts in which a person who has not attained
the age of eighteen years of age is a party.” The second sentence of art. 11(2),
conferring capacity to contract on a married person who has not yet attained the
age of eighteen years was maintained.
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The merits of the new rule have been debatable: it may be
superior in the fairness of the result in individual cases and weaker
in predictability (at least, in contrast to the general rule on modern
British legislation, the provision allows Cyprus courts to take into
account British statutory reform of the common law regime under
the Minors Contract Act 1987). It certainly perplexes law students,
but then again, the whole issue of minors’ contracts has lost most
of its significance in the real world. But the story is indicative of
the strong orientation of late colonial (and even post-colonial)
Cyprus towards the English common law–and its rules.
3. A Common Law Jurisdiction: The Postwar Period
In the years following World War II and leading up to
independence, the Colonial government sought to consolidate the
British position in Cyprus and to promote law reform in subjects
that had previously been left to the status quo ante. Legislation on
the administration of justice was thoroughly reformed; the new
Courts of Justice Law made applicable in Cyprus the common law
(and equity) as currently in force; and legislation was imported
from England and Wales. Leaving aside labor and administrative
reform, the main area of such legislative activity was business and
commercial law. The principal examples of statutes surviving from
this period are the Companies Law (Cap. 113) 164 and the Trustee
Law (Cap. 193). 165 To these we must add the Trade Marks Law
(Cap. 268) of 1951, which replaced an earlier statute dating from
1910. 166 A new Sale of Goods Law (Cap. 267) was enacted in
1953, modeled after the English Sale of Goods Act 1893, and
repealing the Contract Law chapter on the sale of goods (modeled
164. Enacted by L. 7/1951.
165. Enacted as L. 46/1955, as a transplantation of the English Trustee Act
1925.
166. Enacted as L. 2/51. The Law was subjected to several, relatively small
amendments since 1962; it was seriously revised more recently, especially by L.
176(I)/2000 and 121(I)/2006, in the process of implementation of the EU
directives on intellectual property). The Appellation (Cyprus Wines) Protection
Law (Cap. 127; enacted by L. 2/50) still remains in force.
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after the Indian Contract Act); 167 That statute has been itself
recently repealed, just like most colonial-era legislation on
intellectual property. 168
The increased participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot
lawyers in the colonial justice system also allowed, to a limited
degree, the incorporation of continental legal institutions into
Cyprus law: intestate succession follows the Roman-Byzantine
norms, 169 whereas Turkish Cypriots are governed by the secular
family law of Turkey, which has been transplanted in replacement
of Islamic legal institutions of personal law. 170
4. A Post-colonial Legal System: First Decades of
Independence
Following the consolidation of the Republic, and under the
reign of the doctrine of necessity, the House of Representatives
pushed “indigenous” legislation seeking to deal with local
concerns and political issues. A second wave of such “indigenous”
legislation followed the 1974 invasions. The needs of a modern
bureaucratic state have also led to a lot of normative administrative
acts derivative of statutory legislation.
Transplantation of English and Greek law also took place to a
considerable degree. English legal transplants have notably
dominated commercial and business law reform in this period. In
1963, shipping legislation (which had been left unreformed under

167. L. 25/1953.
168. See notably the Copyright Law (Cap. 264; enacted by Ordinance of
April 25th, 1919, it arranged for the application in Cyprus of the (Imperial)
Copyright Act 1911), repealed in 1976; the Merchandise Marks Law (Cap. 265;
enacted as L.35/58), repealed in 1987; and the Patents Law (Cap. 266; enacted
as L. 40/1957), repealed in 1998.
169. See the Wills and Succession Law (Cap. 195; enacted by L. 25/1945 and
modified between 1951 and 1955); the law was subjected to minor amendments
by L. 75/70 and L. 100/89 regarding forced heirship rules).
170. See the Turkish Family (Marriage and Divorce) Law (Cap. 339; enacted
as L. 4/1951, amended by L. 63/54) and the Turkish Family Courts Law (Cap.
338; enacted by L. 43/1954, in replacement of L. 3/51).
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British rule) was adopted in the mold of English law. 171 Other
transplants eventually replaced (or actually updated) previous
English transplants: the Sale of Goods Act 1994 has effectively
copied the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, 172 the Trade
Descriptions Law 1987 replicates its 1968 English namesake, 173
whereas the Copyright Law 1979 is inspired by the English
Copyright Act 1956. 174 Other jurisdictions were used as models in
matters of offshore finance: for example, the International Trusts
Law 1992 reproduces much of the wording and concepts found in
Caribbean common law jurisdictions. 175
Greek law claims a strong influence in public law and in noncommercial civil matters. As to the former, the General Principles
of Administrative Law 1999, which was meant to codify the case
law of the Supreme Court of Cyprus (itself strongly influenced by
Greek academic writings and case law), relied heavily on Greek
doctrinal works. 176 With regard to private law, two examples from
different moments might give an idea of both influence and
mutation. The Associations and Foundations Law 1972, which
governs many, but by no means all, non-profit institutions, since it
coexists with Colonial legislation on charitable companies, trusts
and clubs is one example. 177 The Law effectively reprised Articles
61-120 of the Greek Civil Code, with one key difference, which is
indicative of the strong role of the Cyprus civil service: in Greece,

171. L. 45/63, known as the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales
and Mortgages) Law 1963.
172. L. 10(I)/94, replacing Cap. 267.
173. L. 2/87, as subsequently amended between 1987 and 2002.
174. L. 59/76 (as subsequently amended), replacing Cap. 264.
175. L. 69(I)/92, as amended by L. 20(I)/2012. An English translation of the
original statute (prior to its 2012 amendment), with notes is found on the web
site of the Central Bank of Cyprus, http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/
ITLWE_ITCSLAW.pdf (last visited Jul. 3, 2013).
176. L. 158(I)/1999: “Law codifying the general principles of administrative
law that ought to govern the actions of the civil service.” The treatises of Athens
professor Prodromos Dagtoglou on administrative law and procedure
supposedly provided most of the definitions used.
177. L. 57/72.
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registration is a matter for District Courts, whereas in Cyprus it is
dealt with by a specialized governmental official (Registrar).
But the primary field of Greek influence over private law has
been family law. Originally, the law of marriage and divorce had
been left to the personal law of Cypriots. In the 1990s, following
the establishment of state-run Family Courts, the family law of
Cyprus was rewritten in a series of statutes modeled after the
1982/1983 reform of Greek family law; application of the new
family law was gradually extended to all Cyprus residents. Greek
law was the direct influence for the law of marriage, divorce
(including marital property), children and parenthood. 178 The
principal exception concerned adoption, which had traditionally
been dealt with in accordance with English law. 179 The primary
reason was the fact that the reform of adoption law in Greece was
still not completed at the time, but another reason may well have
been the orientation of the committee member who was entrusted
with producing a draft statute (the strong role in adoption matters
of administrative services under the Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare may have also played its part). Another exception
concerns the protection of adults, which had been left outside
family jurisdiction.
5. A European Legal System: Accession to the E.U.
In 2004, after fifteen years of internal debates and international
negotiations, Cyprus became a member of the European Union.
Cyprus did not adopt the practice of some other EU Member
States, where framework legislation authorizes the executive
178. The following statutes (as amended) constitute the corpus of Cyprus
family law: the Family Courts Law 1990 (L. 23/90); the Relations Between
Parents and Children Law 1990 (L. 216/90); the Pecuniary Relations Between
Spouses Law 1990 (L. 232/91); Children (Relation and Legal Status) Law 1996
(L. 187/96); and the recast Marriage Law 2003 (L. 104(I)/2003). A draft Law on
personal relations between spouses, again modeled after Greek law, died in
parliamentary committee. See also Nicolaou, supra note 9898, at 125-33 (as of
1996).
179. L. 19(Ι)/95.
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power to implement EU directives by presidential decrees. As a
result, the implementation of European secondary law has come to
constitute the principal task of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, a constellation of independent regulatory authorities
(Commissioners) was established in Cyprus: their impact is being
felt rather slowly, but surely. 180
Most legislation adopted since the mid-1990s and especially
the early 2000s appears to have been oriented towards preparing
the country for European integration and implementing the
community acquis. For example, the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts 1996 constituted an early implementation—at the time,
perhaps more of a transplantation—of Directive 93/13/EEC. 181
The accession in 2004 by Cyprus to the Vienna Convention on
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) could also be seen in the
light of European integration. 182 The United Kingdom has not to
this day adopted the CISG, so by implication much of the sale of
goods in Cyprus has been separated from English law. The fact
that Cyprus adopted as official text the translation prepared by
Greece a few years prior has led to some degree of mutation of
what had up to that point been a purely common-law subject:

180. Independent authorities include a Commissioner for Administration
(Ombudsman); a Commissioner for Personal Data Protection; the Commission
for the Protection of Competition; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the
Cyprus Radio Television Authority; the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority;
the Commissioner for Electronic Communication and Postal Regulation; and a
Commissioner for Children’s Rights (a position held by the Commissioner for
Legislation: officially translated into English as “Law Commissioner”, the
office’s powers are but a shadow of what similar institutions do in other
common-law or even continental jurisdictions. This list does not include other
“Commissioners,” who hold in essence positions of junior cabinet members
without portfolio.
Of these authorities, the Commissioner for Administration is frequently in the
news; the market regulation commissions are fully functional, if understaffed.
The authorities for energy and telecoms regulation have only recently begun to
flex their muscle against the state-owned public utility companies, such as the
Electricity Authority of Cyprus and the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority,
which possess much stronger legal representation.
181. L. 93(I)/96.
182. L. 55(ΙΙΙ)/2004.

82

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

moreover, Cyprus law may now claim, in several cases, two words
in Greek for the same concept of the law of sales.
Cyprus’ implementation of legislation has tended to follow
prototypes from Greece and the United Kingdom. On certain
occasions, however, implementation legislation has asserted a
distinctive local touch. 183 The most common practice, however,
has been to transpose the text of the directive into statute, with
little attempt to consolidate EU derivative law. Consumer Sale of
Goods is thus treated in a statute distinct from the Sale of Goods
Law 1994; 184 two separate laws were enacted on the same day to
implement the directives on contracts negotiated away from
business premises and on distance contracts. 185
6. A Note on Statutory Interpretion
Statutory interpretation reflects the key characteristics of the
legal system. Were we to give a one-sentence summary, we could
say that legislation of common law origin is interpreted in
accordance with common law cases and authorities, whereas in
interpreting legislation of continental provenance, continental
authorities—usually Greek—will be used. Upon closer inspection,
however, it appears that the terms, concepts and authorities used
will, to a considerable extent, vary depending upon the individual
case and the actors involved (both counsel and judges). In a
contract case, for example, counsel may or may not present helpful
English (or Indian) authorities. The judge sitting on the case will
certainly take note of authorities mentioned by counsel; on
occasion, the judge in question will do further research on his own,
but we can hardly expect this to happen very often.
183. For a case study on the implementation process, see CONSTANTINOS P.
ILIOPOULOS, THE EU-MEMBERSHIP OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS: THE
HARMONIZATION OF THE COMPANY LAW AND THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Ant Sakkoulas, 2006, in Greek).
184. L. 7(I)/2000.
185. L. 13(I)/2000 in implementation of Directive 85/EEC; L. 14(I)/2000 in
implementation of Directive 97/7/EC.
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This raises the question of determining what influences
judicial—and legal—reasoning. Undoubtedly, the common law
nature of Cyprus court procedure and the common law mentality of
most judges, as well as many legal practitioners, constitute a very
important factor–perhaps the primary one. The system of the
adversarial process helps maintain the common law attitude, even
in fields of continental influence, such as family litigation. We
must not underestimate, however, the impact of the quantity—and
quality—of the caseload. An important factor has to do with
numbers. On the one hand, the little variety in factual patterns
incumbent upon a small jurisdiction means fewer complex issues
for judicial decision-making; as a result, local authorities are very
few compared to what is readily available from abroad. On the
other hand, the lack of an intermediate appellate jurisdiction,
which would act as a filter of cases on appeal, and thus allow
Supreme Court justices more time for reasoning in depth, affects
both mode and quality of judicial reasoning. It must be
remembered that, unlike many of their brethren at the English High
Court, few, if any, judges of the District Courts had a specialist
legal practice prior to joining the judiciary—and they are certainly
unable to specialize once on the bench. In their turn, Supreme
Court justices, who spend a considerable amount of their time
judging administrative cases at first instance, have effectively
learned administrative law while on the Supreme Court bench. In
short, Cypriot appellate judges deal with too many “easy” cases
and too few guiding or landmark ones.
We must then consider the language factor: English was the
original language of the system – in fact, until recently it had been
the principal language. English terms and materials are still used—
translated or not—in everyday practice. In certain legal
proceedings, counsel appear to not have even read the statute,
working instead straight out of the textbook used in their British
law school studies. For example, in discussing the formation of
contracts, the Contract Law speaks of proposal and acceptance.
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The term proposal is regarded in Indian law as the equivalent of
offer; it has been officially translated into Greek as πρόταση—a
word that is both the exact linguistic equivalent of proposal and
the established term used in Greek for offer. 186 The word
προσφορά, used in colloquial Greek too as the equivalent of offer,
is also used in correspondence to terms such as tender, or even
bargain. All this has never been a matter of contention in Cyprus.
Nonetheless, every once in a while an appellate judgment makes
reference to “προσφορά (offer)” as the statutory term. 187
At the same time, for the past three or four decades, the
majority of practitioners have been educated in Greece. Greek
terms, concepts and authorities have also made their way into
judicial reasoning. Modern Greek legal thinking has insisted on
looking for the purpose and meaning of the statute: teleological
interpretation often prevails over grammatical interpretation. In
Cyprus, lawyers and judges are much fonder of invoking the letter
of the law—which has the additional advantage of not having to
rely on external authorities. In fact, they appear more likely to
consult and cite a dictionary of Modern Greek than their brethren
in Greece. 188 But Cyprus judges also frequently employ the
teleological method—certainly more than their English brethren
traditionally have. 189 This does not hold as true, of course, when
dealing with statutory provisions seen as stating a common-law
rule: such provisions are usually interpreted in the light of English
186. See, respectively, MICHAEL STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW IN HELLAS
(Kluwer Law International 1995).
187. See, e.g., Georgiou v. Cyprus Airways, (1998) 1 C.L.R. 1794; Aresti v.
LOEL, (2008) 1 C.L.R. 1305; 3 LYSIAS 47 (2010) (with a critical note by N.
Hatzimihail, at 48-50).
188. See, e.g., Pericleous v. Latsia Municipality, (2002) 2 C.L.R. 459
(looking into two dictionaries for the “common and natural meaning” of the
word “store” in a criminal appeal). A quick search at the CyLaw legal database
reveals (as of February 20, 2013) a total of sixty-six Supreme Court judgments
in the past fourteen years, with judge or counsel citing GEORGIOS BAMBINIOTIS,
DICTIONARY OF MODERN GREEK (Lexicoloy Centre, 1998) or subsequent
editions.
189. English law has somewhat moved towards purposive interpretation
since Pepper v. Hart, AC 593 (1993).
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cases and legal literature. 190 Even there, however, we observe
interesting examples of mutation, such as Cypriot contracts cases
where “teleological interpretation” is invoked as the method of
interpretation of a contract, 191 even though the term—certainly not
used in the applicable English common law—is not really used in
Greek law, either, with regard to contract interpretation.
B. Case Law is Paramount
If written law provides the Cyprus legal system with its
foundations and building structures, it owes its actual shape to case
law. The influence of English common law in Cyprus is such that
the country is frequently regarded as a common law jurisdiction;
local case law is important in all legal fields, especially those
inspired by continental substantive law; and the European Union
courts have been increasingly influential across the board.
A distinction should in principle be drawn between those legal
fields which are regarded as falling under the English common
law—notably procedural law, as well as most private law and
criminal law—and fields where English common law is not
regarded as applicable, granting its place to local case law and
other authorities. The Supreme Court, however, has extended the
doctrines on judicial precedent even with regard to the latter. 192
1. On the Legal and Political Foundations of Case Law
According to the Supreme Court, rule by judicial precedent is
grounded on the principle of judicial hierarchy—and the need for

190. See, e.g., Seamark Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Lasalle, (2007) 1
C.L.R. 162, reversing previous cases on the interpretation of art. 32 of the
Courts of Justice Law 1960, supra note 79, with regard to worldwide effect of
freezing orders, on the basis of new developments in English case law under the
identical §45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925.
191. Club “Anorthosis” of Famagusta v. Apollon Athletic Football Club of
Limassol (2002) 1 C.L.R. 518, at 525.
192. See notably, Republic of Cyprus v. Demetriades, (1977) 3 C.L.R. 213;
Elefetheriou-Kanga v. The Republic, (1989) 3 C.L.R. 262.
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predictability. 193 We will on the contrary search in vain the
Constitution for an express legal basis for a case-law system, or
even for the maintenance of English common law. This
constitutional omission contrasts with the explicit constitutional
provisions regarding the transitional maintenance in force of
colonial statutes, 194 as well as the continued use of prerogative
writs as a remedy granted by the High Court. 195 The colonial status
quo was instead confirmed by the new Courts of Justice Law
1960, 196 which repeated most of the provisions of the colonial
Court of Justice Law (Cap. 8) enacted in 1953. 197 Article 29 of L.
14/1960 has reprised Article 33 of L. 40/53 in stating the “law to
be applied” by “every Court in the exercise of its civil or criminal
jurisdiction.” According to article 29(1)(c) such law includes
“common law and the principles of equity save in so far as other
provision has been or shall be made by any Law and so far as not
inconsistent with the Constitution.” With the exception of adding a
reference to the new Constitution, the new provision is but the
translation of Art. 33(1)(c) of L. 40/1953, with the original
“doctrines of equity” translated into Greek as “principles of
equity,” absent a more exact word. 198
The provision has been vividly criticized; in the words of
Symeon Symeonides, it “went much further than the letter and
193. See Republic of Cyprus v. Demetriades, (1977) 3 C.L.R. 213.
194. CYPRUS CONST. art. 188(1).
195. CYPRUS CONST. art. 155(4).
196. L. 14/1960.
197. L. 40/1953.
198. It is worth noting that the numbering of section (1)(c) has been
maintained by a conscious effort: the Colonial provision named “the Laws of the
Colony;” the Ottoman laws still in force (namely the law on Vakfs and the
Maritime Code); common law and equity; and the “Statutes of Her Imperial
Parliament and Orders of Her Majesty in Council, applicable either to the
colonies generally or to the Colony save in so far as the same may validly be
modifed or other provision made by any Law of the Colony.” The new postindependence provision names: first, the Constitution and laws produced by the
Republic; second, the colonial legislation maintained under Art. 188 of the
Constitution; third, common law and equity; fourth, the laws and principles on
Wakf (ahkamul evkhaf); and fifth, British laws applicable in Cyprus
immediately before independence.
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spirit of the Constitution, and sought to tie the legal system of
Cyprus surreptitiously and permanently to the English common
law.” 199 There was no temporal limitation, and it meant that “a
post-1960 decision of the House of Lords would be binding on the
courts of Cyprus, and, what is more, even if a subsequent statute of
the British Parliament had superseded that decision.” 200
Symeonides notes that the whole statute was “drafted by a
well-known former servant of Her Majesty’s government” and
promulgated by an “inexperienced House of Representatives.” 201
In their defense, the Representatives took the easy way out in
repeating the pre-existing provision. The Republic begun its life in
an uneasy truce between realities and aspirations; its constituent
communities were locked in an opposition that soon came to
hinder the state’s very operation. Moreover, the various social
groups, including the newly formed legal and political elites, were
still trying to find their footing into the postcolonial era. It could be
argued that neither the consensus nor the massive intellectual
power needed to engage in large-scale law reform was there in
1960; on the contrary, maintaining the status quo would leave all
options open for the future—and the status quo was a common law
regime, with the probable exception of administrative law. It must
be noted that, even though the right of appeal to the Privy Council
was abolished upon independence, the new High Court was but the
continuation of the colonial Supreme Court in law and in spirit: its
foreign President had to be a Commonwealth national and its
Cypriot members boasted of long service in the colonial judiciary.
Symeonides is nonetheless correct in pointing to personal
biases, as well as what was to become a key conflict within the
Greek Cypriot Bar. For the last thirty years of British colonial rule,
membership to the Cyprus Bar had been effectively preserved for
199. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus, supra
note 4, at 450.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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people trained in England as barristers (many without a law
degree). 202 Following independence, bar membership began
expanding significantly. An increasing majority of the new lawyers
came from non-legal families, and the vast majority of new
entrants to the profession were holders of university degrees from
Greek law schools (aided by scholarship policies, entrance exams,
and especially the lack of university tuition). This resulted in a
generational, as well as a “class”, conflict, whose traces are still
visible today. Maintenance of the English common law thus
became a vehicle for the dominance of the established group of
colonial advocates, and their children, in the emerging legal
profession of Cyprus. This internal conflict is best illustrated in the
use of the English language: it took three decades after
independence for the legal system to complete the transition from
English to the Republic’s official languages (ironically, it took as
much time for a graduate of a Greek law school to become an
appellate judge); the basic colonial statutes were only translated in
the 1990s. To this day, there has been no official translation of the
principal instrument of civil litigation, the Civil Procedure
Rules. 203
2. The Common Law in Practice
Case law might rule Cyprus law in its entirety, but the sources
used and the level of discretion permitted to judges depends on the
subject at hand. We have already noted that colonial statutes seen
as having codified the common law in the respective subject are to
202. See the original Advocates Law (Cap. 2), art. 3 (1955). Admission to
practice as an advocate was reserved to those “entitled to practice” as a barristerat-law or “admitted to practice” as a solicitor in England or Northern Ireland or
as an advocate in Scotland.
203. Civil Procedure Rules, available at http://www.cylaw.org/cpr.html (last
visited Jul. 3, 2013). All amendments since 1960 have been in the official
languages (notably Greek), but the main body of the Rules has remained
unchanged (and untranslated) since British rule. Legal practitioners make use of
unofficial translations into Greek, notably by a former Registrar, which are not
well regarded by many.
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be interpreted in accordance with present-day English common
law. 204 Occasionally, the statutory provision is seen as simply the
starting point for a discussion of more modern English authorities.
Such legislation is certainly not “gapless.” Lacunae are directly
filled by the common law: a number of common-law torts thus
today co-exist with those expressly sanctioned in the Civil Wrongs
Law. 205 But we can also witness the contrary case, where the letter
of a law normally seen as codifying the common law is applied in
a manner such as to invent derogation from the common law. 206
British legislation enacted after 1960 is regarded as not having
any authority in Cyprus. Coupled with the reluctance of lawyers
and legislators to reform basic laws, this actually means that
English common law rules superseded by statute in the United
Kingdom are still valid in Cyprus; an example that comes to mind
concerns the common law doctrine of privity of contract and thirdparty rights. It might be possible, however, to “cheat” the court,
using reference works and subsequent case law, into accepting that
English law as modified by statute constitutes in effect English
common law. 207
The common law case law of other Commonwealth
jurisdictions (notably Australia, New Zealand and Canada), and at
times the United States of America, has persuasive authority.208
204. See, e.g., Stylianou v. The Police, (1962) 2 C.L.R. 152 (notably
Josephides, J., at 171: “[I] am of the view that, as a general rule, our Court
should as a matter of judicial comity follow decisions of the English Courts of
Appeal on the construction of a statute, unless we are convinced that those
decisions are wrong.”).
205. See Universal Adver. and Publ’g Agency v. Vouros, (1952) 19 C.L.R.
87 (Civil Wrongs Law does not preclude an action for passing-off of a business).
206. For example, the case of past consideration. See Raif v. Dervish, (1971)
1 C.L.R. 158; and Romanos v. Chrysanthou, (1991) 1 C.L.R. 1991. The issue is
discussed in Etaireia Diatheseon Tsimentou Vasilikou Apollon Ltd. v.
Kathidjioti, (1998) 1 C.L.R. 687 (notably in the dissent of Nicolaou, J.).
207. See, e.g., VASILAKAKIS & PAPASAVVAS, supra note 10, at 50.
208. See e.g. Republic v. Alan Ford et al., (1995) 2 C.L.R. 232 (referring to
“Canadian and American cases” regarding criminal procedure); Jirkotis &
Achilleos Co. Ltd. v. Paneuropean Ins. Co. Ltd., (2000) 1 C.L.R. 537, citing Τhe
Esmeralda I, (1988) 1 Ll.R. 206 (Aus.), as well as English treatises (among
ordinary civil appeals (three-justice panel)); Standard Fruit Co. (Berm.) Ltd. v.
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Especially in the early life of the Republic, U.S. case law was
invoked in constitutional law matters. 209 Given that Privy Council
jurisdiction was abolished upon independence, Cyprus law should
arguably follow the English approach, which regards decisions
issued by the Judicial Committee (“Board”) of the Privy Council as
of persuasive, and not of binding, authority. 210 “Authoritative”
textbooks and other works on English law also have persuasive
authority. 211
3. Precedent into Continental Law?
Contrary to traditional stereotypes and despite pronouncements
to the contrary, case law does form a source of law throughout the
Western legal tradition, especially when actual legal practice is
concerned. One might, in fact, speak of a neo-formalist streak in
present-day continental legal tradition, where legal writers are
reluctant to deviate or criticize established case law solutions. The
case law of the European Court of Justice is especially
authoritative and the anonymous long reasoning of its judgments is
quoted as if stating the law, with little regard to fine concepts such
as obiter dicta and distinguishing precedents. If common law
judgments produce legal norms auctoritate rationis, continental

Gold Seal Shipping Co. Ltd., (1997) 1 C.L.R. 464) (citing U.S. and Canadian
cases).
209. See, e.g., Khadar v. The Republic, (1978) 2 C.L.R. 130, at 230-33
(discussing Furman v. Georgia, 33 L.Ed.2d 349).
210. See, e.g., R v. Blastland, AC 41, at 58 (1986) (Privy Council decision in
Ratten’s case, All ER 801 (1971)) (“Not technically binding” but “of the highest
persuasive authority” in view of the Board’s “constitution”). See also Simon
Whittaker, Precedent in English Law: A View from the Citadel, 14 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 705, 721 (2006).
211. See Standard Fruit Co. (Berm.) Ltd. v. Gold Seal Shipping Co. Ltd.,
(1997) 1 C.L.R. 464. The Court, in this admiralty case, uses English treatises on
international trade and carriage of goods as primary authority, excerpting at
length from THOMAS GILBERT CARVER & RAOUL P. COLINVAUX, CARRIAGE BY
SEA (12th ed., 1971) and CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF & JOHN ADAMS,.
SCHMITTHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (9th ed., Stevens 1990) (publication dates are not mentioned in the
decision); cases are only cited in an incidental fashion.
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case law produces norms ratione auctoritatis. The case law of
superior courts is binding because of the hierarchical control they
exercise over lower courts. Superior courts tend to affirm their own
rules out of respect for legal certainty, but especially to economize
judicial time.
The administrative law of Cyprus is a case in point. British
colonial rule left behind a well-functioning civil service, at least in
certain areas, and a lot of ad hoc legislation. With the exception of
prerogative writs, however, it left little in terms of either judicial
review of administrative action, or, more generally, administrative
law doctrine. This can be easily explained in light of the
development of administrative law in the United Kingdom: only in
1958 did British administrative tribunals begin to be regarded as
judicial (“external”) rather than administrative (“internal”) bodies
and only in 1959 was a theory of judicial review of administrative
acts elaborated as a doctrine, with the appearance first of S.A. De
Smith and then William Wade’s books. 212
The Constitution had provided for a separate Supreme
Constitutional Court, with jurisdiction to hear, apart from
constitutional cases, petitions for the annulment of administrative
acts. 213 In the meantime, all traditional, “common law” subjects
were left with the High Court. As a result, the Supreme
Constitutional Court, finding itself more and more drawn towards
administrative litigation, soon oriented itself, under the leadership
of German professor Ernst Forsthoff, towards the “continental
administrative system” and the “principles enunciated” in
continental administrative courts. 214 The tenure of Forsthoff,
whose judicial writings bear an unmistakably-German touch, was
short-lived. In 1964, the Supreme Constitutional Court was merged
with the High Court. The continental legacy of Cyprus
212. S.A. DESMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (Stevens
& Son, Ltd. 1959); H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Clarendon Press
1961).
213. CYPRUS CONST. art. 146.
214. Ioannides v. The Republic, (1979) 3 C.L.R. 295.
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administrative law continued, however, albeit with a decisive turn
towards Greek administrative law. At the time, Greek
administrative law was modeled after the French administrative
law and essentially judge-made, with the Council of State
elaborating “general principles” of administrative law. 215 The case
law of the Greek Council of State thus became the predominant
authority in the early years of the Republic, supported by Greek
academic writings.
The Supreme Court still makes frequent reference to the
Council of State case law (and occasionally, guiding cases from
the Greek administrative appeals courts). Over time, however, it
has developed its own corpus of landmark cases that decide many
important questions. Under Greek administrative law, the basis for
treating such case law as a source of law would be to consider the
case law as embodying “general principles” of administrative law;
moreover, the values of legal certainty and predictability, and
especially the principle of judicial hierarchy, constitute convincing
arguments in favor of adherence to precedent. 216 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the stare decisis principle does
apply to administrative law cases, precisely on the basis of the
principle of judicial hierarchy and predictability. 217
Where does this lead us? The decisions of the five-member
Supreme Court panels sitting on administrative litigation appeals
(erroneously called “plenary benches” in colloquial legal jargon)
are clearly binding on individual Supreme Court justices sitting on
215. See EPAMINONDAS SPILIOTOPOULOS, GREEK ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Sakkoulas Pubs. 2004). Under the 1975 Constitution, German influence over
Greek administrative law has expanded, even though the French influence
remains stronger to this day. Since 1977, two “trial” instances of regular
Administrative Courts were created (replacing specialized jurisdictions such as
Tax Courts), supervised by the Council of State, which, however, still retains
much of its first-instance jurisdiction. After decades of rule by case law, a Code
of Administrative Process (along with a Code of Administrative Litigation
Procedure) was enacted in 1999.
216. Amanuel v. Alexandros Shipping Co. Ltd., 1 All E.R. 278, at 282
(1986).
217. Demetriades v. The Republic, (1977) 3 C.L.R. 213, notably at 320 ;
Elefetheriou-Kanga v. The Republic, (1989) 3 C.L.R. 262.
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first instance. 218 The same rule certainly applies to judgments by
the entire Supreme Court (which sits in full bench on cases
involving constitutional questions, as well as on cases deemed of
fundamental importance). The Supreme Court has adopted the
English rules of stare decisis, as contrasted to the more liberal U.S.
approach. 219 It has moreover reserved its right to reverse its own
judgments—a judicial policy grounded on English judgments and
dicta, but asserted more vigorously in Cyprus. 220 A single Supreme
Court justice sitting at first instance is not considered as an
“inferior court,” but he is bound by the decisions of an appeals
bench. 221 The full bench, however, may reverse its own case law.
An appellate panel should accordingly be able to explicitly reject
(or reverse) the rule created by another appellate panel.
Consistency is usually sought after, but there are several examples
where a line of precedent has been disregarded in some cases,
leading to a contrary line of precedent co-existing with the
established one. 222 It is moreover not always easy for practitioners
and judges alike to draw a sharp distinction as to the binding
authority of Supreme Court judgments in administrative first
instance and appeals judgments. For example, in holding that the
Advocates’ Pension Fund constituted a private-law rather than a
public-law entity a civil appeals panel led by the Chief Justice
referred to Supreme Court judgments in administrative first
218. Elefetheriou-Kanga v. The Republic, (1989) 3 C.L.R. 262. See, e.g.,
KEO Ltd. v. The Republic, (1998) 4 C.L.R. 1023 (Nikitas, J. sitting at first
instance, holding “the stare decisis principle” made “absolutely binding” on him
an appellate ruling on the point in question, citing Republic v. Costas Tymvios
Ltd., (1994) 3 C.L.R. 553. In the case cited as authority, the appellate panel
reversed the first-instance judgment of Nikitas, J.).
219. See e.g. Republic v. Demetriades, (1977) 3 C.L.R. 213 at 259-264
(Loizou, J.), and especially 296-320 (Triantafyllides, P.).
220. See an early case, Papageorgiou v. Komodromou, (1963) 2 C.L.R. 221;
Mavrogenis v. House of Representatives, (1996) 1 C.L.R. 315.
221. Republic v. Demetriades, (1977) 3 C.L.R. 213, at 320. See also KEO
Ltd. v. The Republic, (1998) 4 C.L.R. 1023.
222. See, e.g., a note by Laris Vrahimis in 1 LYSIAS 56 (2008), on the
conflicting case law regarding the possibility of changing the legal ground on
which applications may be filed under Order 48 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
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instance settling the issue. 223 The practical result has a direct
impact on the workload of Supreme Court Justices: in a civil case,
the District Court would have first instance jurisdiction, with a
three-justice panel on appeal, whereas in an administrative case,
six justices would have been employed, one on first instance and
five on appeal.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In his “Third Legal Family” project, Vernon Palmer set as the
“lowest common denominator” of a mixed jurisdiction three
characteristics. 224 The legal system must be built upon “dual
foundations” of common-law and civil-law materials. 225 This
duality must be “obvious to an ordinary observer”—a condition
which probably requires “a quantitative threshold.” 226 Palmer also
emphasizes the structural “allocation of content”—that the civil
and common laws dominate their respective spheres. 227 In the case
of Cyprus, civil law has made sufficient inroads since
independence so that we can honestly speak of dual foundations;
mutations and hybrid elements cannot hide the predominance of
each legal tradition in the respective sphere.
In that same project, jurists from seven emblematic mixed
jurisdictions 228 were asked to respond to a detailed questionnaire
divided into ten subjects: the founding of the system; the role of
223. Raphael v. Advocates’ Pension Fund, (2008) 1 C.L.R. 300, 1 LYSIAS 95
(2008) (Artemides, C.J., cited as previous authority); Raphael and
Hadjiprodromou v. Advocates Pension Fund, (2000) 4 C.L.R. 1212 (Kronides,
J., which cited Koumas v. Advocates Pension Fund, (2000) 4 C.L.R. 1167,
where Artemides, J. referred to Nicolaou v. The Republic, (2000) 3 C.L.R. 221:
that case actually concerned the government-controlled Surplus Personnel Fund,
which dealt with redundant private sector employees, citing Greek authorities
more than two decades old).
224. Palmer, Introduction to MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note
1, at 10.
225. Id. at 7.
226. Id. at 8.
227. Id. at 8-9.
228. Two more jurisdictions—Botswana and Malta—were added in a second
(2012) edition to the book.
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magistrates and the courts; judicial methodology; statutory
interpretation; the shape of mercantile law; the role of procedure
and evidence; judicial reception of common law; emergence of
new legal creations; the internal opposition between “purists,”
“pollutionists” and “pragmatists;” and the linguistic factor. 229 This
article has provided a first opportunity to explore these subjects.
Cyprus belongs to a small group of legal systems that were
once part of the common law world, but have moved somewhat
away from that legal family, since independence in 1960.
European integration is further challenging the colonial status quo,
but it may still be too early to assess its impact.
Yet Cyprus is still more of a common law jurisdiction than not.
Most of private and criminal law clearly remain common law
subjects; as far as mercantile law (the subject most easily taken
over by the common law in mixed jurisdictions with private law of
continental origin) is concerned, Cyprus law has seen new
legislative transplants from England even decades after
independence. Compared to the more populous—and popular—
mixed jurisdictions with centuries of history, tiny Cyprus can claim
less juristic innovation (except, of course, for the necessity
doctrine in constitutional law); but it can also offer interesting case
studies of hybridity and mutation of both common law and
continental legal institutions.
The judiciary has been perhaps the singular most important
factor in determining the fate or the exact “mix” of the legal
system. Appellate courts have remained strongly attached to
common-law notions: this has resulted in the use of common law
judicial techniques, and especially the English doctrine of stare
decisis, even in “continental” legal fields. 230 At the same time,
229. See the Questionnaire, id. at 471-478.
230. In this article, I have avoided applying the conceptual map of purists,
pollutionists and pragmatists on Cyprus jurists, even though I have personally
found it illuminating in the study of historical mixed legal systems. Cyprus legal
consciousness has traditionally identified a division, which is not absolute,
between lawyers educated in Britain and those educated in Greece. “Purists” in
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those same courts are responsible for the wholesale reception of
continental administrative law. Continental notions and techniques
have also been integrated into the system, notably with regard to
statutory interpretation. The abundance of written law (even before
accession to the European Union) and the clear hierarchy of legal
sources have been crucial factors in this respect.
The linguistic factor constitutes the other pillar of legal mixity.
English has maintained enough of its influence so that the common
law elements of Cyprus law are in no danger of disappearing; at
the same time, the expanding use of the Greek language has been
the pivot of—direct and indirect—continental influence.
These thoughts are certainly more of a working hypothesis than
a conclusion properly speaking. This very article, after all,
constitutes an early effort at understanding a unique legal system.
Yet this is not a simple academic exercise. Comparative law theory
is a valuable tool to those of us dedicated to the understanding,
doctrinal development and elaboration of Cyprus law. Perhaps we
could in time offer our own small contribution in consideration.

historical mixed jurisdictions tend to defend local uniqueness against the global
model of the common law; “pollutionists” have the support of an imperial,
colonial or federal institutional machinery, as well as sheer numbers. In the case
of Cyprus, the originally existing (common law) tradition has not been
traditionally linked with the ethnic/national identity of the population at large; it
is “pollution” that allows Cypriots to claim a local identity and, occasionally,
assert their ethnic identity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question regarding the legal status of the embryo hinges
around a more conceptual —or, rather, more fundamental— legal
distinction, namely, the distinction between “things” and
“persons.” What is involved here is determining whether
embryonic human life is personal life and, thus, whether the
embryo has rights, or whether is it just the object of somebody
else´s rights.
This radical discussion becomes apparent in other more
technical and concrete debates about the relationship between the
value of human life and its stage of biological development, or its
viability perspectives. 1 The claim that the legal value of embryonic
life depends upon its stage of development and its viability
perspectives is, as shall be discussed later, one of the main
1. In statutory law, this claim has been performed by means of the much
discussed conceptual distinction between embryos and “pre-embryos” as can be
seen, for example, in Spanish legislation concerning the donation and use of
embryos (Ley No. 42, 1988) for therapeutic or scientific research use, and the
Law concerning assisted reproduction (Ley No. 35, 1988). For a critical review
of the ethical and legal implications of this conceptual distinction in American
Constitutional Law, see, e.g., Joshua S. Vincinguerra, Showing “Special
Respect” – Permitting the Gestation of Abandoned Preembryos, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 399, 405 (1999); and more recently, Robert Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses
and Babies: Treated as Persons and Treated with Respect, 2 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 33, 33 (2006).

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

99

arguments in favor of the right to abortion in American
constitutional case law and, extensively, in favor of the right–and
sometimes duty–to discard embryos. This claim is grounded, at
least, on two normative propositions. According to the first one,
constitutional norms would admit the existence of legal
personhood only after birth, and/or would make the legal value of
non-personal unborn life depend on its viability. The second
proposition states that, in the light of the un-personhood of the
embryo, the constitutional principle of equality would not be
applicable to them.
As shall be described, Argentine constitutional case law
rejects—with some exceptions—those distinctions based upon the
contrary normative premises, according to which constitutional
principles admit the personal quality in each and every human
being from the time of conception, which is, in turn, set at the
moment of fertilization. On this basis, it is understood that these
same norms would recognize equal dignity in every person and
would proscribe making the legal value of human life–which is
always the life of a person–depend on the stage of development or
on the (chances of) viability inside or outside the mother´s womb.
Two mutually complementary analyses will be examined in the
next paragraphs. An Argentine and U.S. case law review will be
carried out in order to infer the arguments that have been posed in
both constitutional practices regarding the acceptance or rejection
of those conceptual distinctions (sections II & III).
This comparative approach is justified by the fact that, as it has
been insistently pointed out by various ius-philosophical schools of
thought, the abstract nature of constitutional language is an open
door to political, ethical, and philosophical assessments or, in
Rawlsian terms, to the “comprehensive conceptions” of those who
interpret and adjudicate law. In this light, although the arguments
for legal protection of embryonic life and the counterarguments for
a lack of legal protection of embryonic life arise in different
normative contexts, the creative nature of constitutional
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interpretation justifies the comparative approach propounded in
this review.
However, there is more to constitutional interpretation than
mere creativity. In order to be framed within a particular legal
practice, legal interpretation should confine itself to two kinds of
requirements. On the one hand, it should be coherent with the
values, goods or ends that should be common to all legal practices
in order to distinguish themselves from sheer violence. 2 On the
other hand, legal interpretation should conform to the way that the
particular legal practice within which it finds itself determines
those common values, goods or ends which are common to all
legal practices. This means that it should take into account the
semantic and syntactic rules that apply to the legal statements
under interpretation.
Creativity in interpretation operates, accordingly, within the
framework of two margins: the teleological one and the linguistic
or, more generally, the semantic one. These restrictions to
interpretative creativity also set logical limits to the transposition
of arguments from one constitutional practice, such as that of the
2. See PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD 65 (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2009; no. 142
in the ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS series) [hereinafter ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE
CREATIVIDAD]. Among the many authors who agree on the description of
interpretation as a comprehensive task which includes a creative dimension, not
to be confused with unrestricted discretion, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at Ch. I-IV (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); RONALD DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE at Ch. I-VI (Clarendon Press 1985; RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 65-68, 411-413 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW. THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 18-21
(Harvard Univ. Press 2006). For a critical review in Spanish language of
Dworkin´s proposal, see Pilar Zambrano, Objetividad en la interpretacion
judicial y objetividad en el Derecho. Una reflexion a partir de las luces y
sombras en la propuesta de Ronald Dworkin, 56 PERSONA Y DERECHO 281
(2007), and ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD 37-53. The most relevant
author insisting on the possible synthesis of creativity and objectivity in
interpretation, outside the English language field, is perhaps ROBERT ALEXY, A
THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 17 (Ruther Adler & Neil MacCormick trans.,
Clarendon Press 1989).
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U.S., to another, such as that of Argentina. Therefore, the benefit
of the proposed comparative analysis will depend upon the
adequacy of the questions that are posed. With these restrictions in
mind, the questions that this comparative study aims to answer are:
Which is the justificatory or teleological perspective of
interpretation assumed or postulated in each of these case law
practices? (Section IV B(1))
Which is the semantic theory underlining the whole
interpretative process in each of these case law practices? (Section
IV B(2))
Which of these teleological and semantic postulates best fit the
final aims or values of constitutional law? (Section V)
In the end, we aim to reflect upon the reciprocal influence
between these two margins of interpretation. Particularly, we
intend to test the coherence between, on the one side, the claim that
fundamental rights are deontological and, on the other, the
assumption of a constructive or criterial semantic theory of
language in the interpretation of the concept of legal personhood
(section V).
II. THE EMBRYO IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
Although the status of the embryo is not regulated by federal
statutory law, it may be induced from the federal Supreme Court
decisions concerning the issue of abortion that, as a whole,
establish the legal status of the unborn in its various gestational
stages. The leading cases in this line are the well-known Roe v.
Wade 3 and Casey. 4
A. The Value of the Embryo´s Life under Roe v.Wade
The famous case of Roe v. Wade, argued before the United
States Supreme Court, challenged a Texas criminal abortion statute
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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which penalized abortions in all cases, except when pregnancy
meant a risk to the life of the mother.
The District Court found the Texas Act unconstitutional in the
light of the 9th Amendment, which admits implicit rights stemming
from the U.S. Constitution, but denied the injunction that would
have allowed Roe to benefit from this unconstitutionality. Roe
filed for an appeal to have the original decision upheld, and to
obtain the injunction. 5
The Supreme Court analyzed Roe’s claim in the light of the
fundamental right to privacy, a right that, even if not explicitly
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, had been recognized by the
Court in previous cases as a necessary dimension of other liberty
rights that were explicitly recognized. 6 The Court, then, had to
decide whether the choice to abort was one of the dimensions of
that fundamental right or preferred freedom, what its extent was,
and to which constitutional clause it was related. These decisions
called for a previous determination as to the moment in which the
U.S. Constitution admits the existence of personhood in law. In
this sense, the Court asserted that:
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a
“person” within the language and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course,
collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. 7
The majority solved this interpretative question by denying the
fetus´s personhood on the basis of semantic, syntactic and
historical arguments. From both the semantic and the syntactic
points of view, it was argued that none of the constitutional clauses
define the meaning of the word “person,” and that each time such
word is used, it is with reference to human beings that have already

5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 122.
6. Id. at 153-55.
7. Id. at 157.
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been born. 8 From the historical point of view, it was stated that at
the time that the 14th Amendment was passed, and during most of
the nineteenth century, state legislation relating to abortion was
much more permissive than it currently was. This historical fact,
combined with the presumption that the authors of the Texas
legislation under review knew about this legal context, would
indicate that the constitutional drafters had no intention to include
the unborn as subject to the rights established in that Amendment. 9
Relying on these arguments, the Court concluded that the term
“person,” as used in the Constitution, does not apply to the
unborn. 10
Out of conceptual necessity, the denial of the personhood of
the unborn became the denial of the right to life before birth. But
this denial did not prevent the United States Supreme Court from
recognizing a legitimate state interest in the protection of
embryonic and fetal life, which was called “potential human life.”
Nevertheless, as the right to abortion had been recognized as a
“preferred freedom” or “fundamental right,” the constitutionality
of the rules regulating abortion in view of this interest depended on
whether or not they passed the strict scrutiny test: that is, the
requirement that the states justify both the compelling nature of the
interests at stake and the norms they are seeking to promote – i.e.,
that a compelling state interest exists, as well as the necessary
relationship between them. 11
Based on this, the Court recognized the already renowned
three-stage balancing of rights that is comprised of the right of the
mother to abort, and the two state interests that have been deemed
legitimate. 12 According to this three-stage concept, the Court
understood that it is only during the third trimester that the state

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 163-64.
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interest in the protection of the “potential human life” acquires
enough relevance so as to justify the criminalization of abortion.
B. Balancing the Right to Abortion and State Interest in Potential
Human Life
Regarding our object of interest, Roe’s conceptual inheritance
is that legal personhood is not recognized by constitutional text and
practice until birth, but, nevertheless, there is a legitimate state
interest in “potential human life” from the moment of conception.
Taking Casey 13 as a landmark case in post-Roe case law, the
balancing standards between the right of the mother to abort and
the state interest in potential human life were constructed around
the following issues: (a) whether states were or were not enabled to
set forth a legal duty that women perform fetal viability tests prior
to the abortive proceedings that were carried out during the second
trimester; (b) what was the constitutionally admissible content of
informed consent prior to abortive proceedings, and who had to
provide it; and (c) whether or not the states were enabled to
promote their interest in potential human life by means other than
prohibiting abortion during the first two trimesters.
Regarding the issue of compulsory fetal viability exams, the
Court issued contradictory statements, first banishing them and
then opening the way to them. 14 With varied grounds and a
crucially tight majority, the Court cleared the way in Webster,
affirming that state regulations could establish compulsory preprocedure medical viability tests independent from the trimester in
which the tests were ordered, under the sole condition that viability

13. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
14. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65
(1976), banishing State intrusion, and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97
(1979), allowing it.
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was possible according to ordinary medical criteria and the exams
did not pose a risk to the mother’s health. 15
As to the content of informed consent, the Court found that any
state regulations aimed at deterring the mother from her decision to
abort rather than informing her about the risks involved in an
abortion proceeding were contrary to the Constitution. These
regulations were deemed to ignore the trimester scheme involved
in Roe, and were therefore deemed unconstitutional. 16
Finally, regarding the non-coercive use of the sovereign power,
the Court held, invariably—although on a tight majority―that the
states were not under an obligation to assign public funds to
provide abortions nor were they under an obligation to perform
abortive proceedings in public health institutions, even when either
of those choices implicitly promoted childbirth over abortion. 17
Along this line of thought, it was also held that a state could
lawfully establish that human life starts at conception in so far as
such statement did not have the practical effect of casting aside the
balancing trimester schema. 18
To sum up, as it was pointed out in the plurality opinion in
Webster, the Court had progressively become a kind of medical
committee, assisted by legislative powers, regarding the most
varied implications of abortive proceedings: establishing how long
of a waiting period prior to abortion procedures the law should set;
what issues had to be included in the informed consent and which
were to be excluded; who could provide the informed consent;
when was it legitimate to conclude that the fetus was viable and

15. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515-21
(opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., White, J. and Kennedy, J.); 526 (concurring opinion
of O´Connor, J.); and 538 (concurring opinion of Scalia, J.) (1989).
16. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. (1983),
443-45; later confirmed in Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn.,
476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986).
17. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-79 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
18. Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. at 513.
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when was it legitimate to conclude it was not viable; what the
consequences were; etc. 19
Along this process, the function of the Roe tripartite schema
became blurred and increasingly murky. It was expected that it
would provide clear and precise criteria regarding the way in
which the state’s interests and the case law-based rights of the
mother to abort were to be balanced; however, only case law
dealing with informed consent stands as a seamless application of
the schema. The remainder of the questions posed before the Court
only succeeded in stretching the strings to the breaking point, as
was highlighted particularly in Webster, in which four judges
issued a dissenting opinion, 20 but no explicit majority was reached
because there were not five judges reaffirming or holding the
constitutional validity of Roe.
In addition to all this, the decisions of the Court were almost
always made, as in Roe, with an extremely narrow majority that
remained united at the level of the judgment, but at variance when
it came to providing the reasoning for the decisions. Disparate
grounds and miniscule majorities resulted in an unsurprisingly
complex set of rules that offered, to the law community in general,
and the states’ highest courts in particular, confusion instead of
clarity. This state of confusion was specifically acknowledged by
the majority in Casey, 21 and this is why it could be affirmed that
the cards were, in a way, reshuffled.
Indeed, in Casey, the Court revised both the tripartite temporal
schema and the rights and interests balancing criteria. Regarding
the schema, it was decided that the viability of the fetus outside the
mother´s womb, and not the length of the pregnancy (i.e., the third
trimester) is what established the point at which the state interest in
protecting “potential human life” becomes compelling enough to
19. Id. at 517-18.
20. Blackmun, J. and Stevens, J. issued dissenting opinions, and Brennan, J.
and Marshall, J. joined Blackmun, J.´s opinion.
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944-51.
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legitimize a ban on abortion. Regarding the balancing criteria, it
was admitted that, even prior to viability, the state interest in
protecting and promoting potential human life is important enough
to enable the states to legitimately promote said potential human
life in an active manner, provided that this promotion did not
presuppose an obstacle or an undue burden on the exercise of the
right to abort. On these grounds, and contrary to prior decisions, it
declared that state measures aimed at discouraging the mother
from the decision to abort were constitutionally valid. 22
C. Some Conclusions
According to this review, it can be gathered that the value of
human life is not uniform according to the United States Supreme
Court case law regarding abortion, for it varies according to the
development stage that the fetus may have reached. Three different
stages can be individualized. The first would correspond to “nonviable potential human life,” which starts at conception and lasts
until the moment when the fetus is viable outside the mother´s
womb, with or without artificial assistance. The second stage
would correspond to “viable potential human life,” and it would
start at the beginning of viability outside the mother´s womb, until
birth. The third stage is personal human life, which starts at birth
and ends with natural death.
Embryos would fit into the first stage, “non-viable potential
human life,” and this is why they could be classified as an object of
a state interest, characterized by the United States Supreme Court
in the following manner:
It is optional for states to promote state or local interests in
potential human life.
As a state interest, it is not compelling enough so as to justify
the limitation of the mother´s right to obtain an abortion, but it is

22. Id. at 874-76.
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strong enough so as to justify compulsory measures aiming at
deterring the decision to abort.
The states can overtly favor the promotion of embryonic life,
as long as this does not pose an undue burden on the mother´s right
to abort prior to the moment of fetal viability outside the mother´s
womb.
D. The States’ Case Law on Embryos
The optional status of both the promotion and the
determination of the weight of the state interest in non-viable
potential human life—within the limits established by the Court—
becomes legally active, at both the federal and state levels, in a
fabric that is woven with the most diverse criteria regarding the
legal status of the embryo.
That status is defined by the states only on an exceptional
basis, as would be the case in the state of Louisiana. In the case of
the other states, as well as at the federal level, the status may be
inferred from the regulation of different activities that are directly
or indirectly related to the use or destination given to embryos
conceived in vitro. The most relevant of these activities are those
that have to do with assisted reproduction, and with the scientific
and technological research that requires using, and possibly
discarding, embryos. The embryo’s status will depend, essentially,
on the existence, or lack thereof, of limitations to embryo discard.
Only the legislation of the state of Louisiana and that of New
Mexico establish a ban on the sale, destruction or any other process
that does not involve embryo implantation for later development.
This establishes a duty of care and custody on those clinics in
which the embryos were created. 23 On the opposite side, states
such as California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and
23. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126; N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-[1][g]. For a comparative
study of these two statutes, see Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine is Mine but What’s
Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the
Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587 (2002).
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New Jersey expressly establish the duty of medical service
providers to inform the patient of the possibility of discarding
embryos that were not implanted. However, these same statutes
prohibit the sale or commercialization of the embryos, whatever
the final aim. 24 Other states, such as Oklahoma, take up an
ambiguous attitude: even if they only allow for heterologous
conception when performed with a reproductive aim, they omit
establishing the same limitation in the field of homologous
conception, and also fail to clarify what will be the final use of
those embryos that, even if conceived for a reproductive purpose,
were never implanted. 25
At the federal level, ever since the Clinton presidency, a ban
has been in place on the use of federal funds for the creation of
human embryos for research purposes or for research in which the
human embryos were destroyed, discarded or intentionally
subjected to a risk of damage or death greater than the risk allowed
in research involving fetuses inside the uterus (commonly known
as the “Dickey Amendment”). 26 This limitation was not extended
to include privately funded or state funded, research. However, in
March 2009, President Obama issued executive order 13505,

24. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125305; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a,
32d-32g; MD. CODE ECON. DEV. § 5-2B-10; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111L; N.J.
STAT. § 26:2 Z-2.
25. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 555. For a comparative synthesis of states’
legislation concerning assisted fertilization, see http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Jul. 12, 2013).
26. This prohibition was not included in a specific statute concerning
scientific research on embryos, but was instead included, at the initiative of
Senator Jay Dickey, in the Balanced Budget Down Payment Act, I, Pub. L. No.
104-99, § 128(2), 1.10 Stat. 26, 34 (1996), and reapproved each year until 2009.
For a detailed and complete description of the federal politics concerning the
funding of the use of embryos in scientific research, see Monitoring Stem Cell
Research. A Report of the President´s Council on Bioethics, Washington D.C.,
January 2004, available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/
stemcell/ (last visited Jul. 17, 2013). A chronologic synthesis of American state
law concerning stem cell research can be found at http://ltiblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/lifting-ban-or-obfuscating-truth-bob.html (a pro-life
blog, last visited Jul. 12, 2013).
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which removed limitations on the use of federal funds for research
on new embryonic stem-cell lines. 27
Against this backdrop of complex, intertwined criteria,
constitutional case law at the state level has basically hinged
around the issue of who has the right to decide what the use of the
non-implanted embryos or pre-embryos will be, and with what
requirements, when there is no agreement between the parents in
this respect.
1. Davis v. Davis and Kass v. Kass
The leading case in this matter was Davis v. Davis, 28 a famous
case settled by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992. It involved
the fate of seven embryos that had been conceived by in vitro
fertilization. At the time when the progenitors divorced, the
embryos were kept under cryopreservation in the clinic in which
the progenitors had been given the corresponding treatment.
Initially, and contrary to the wishes of Mary Sue Davis, one of
the progenitors, that the embryos be implanted in her uterus, Junior
Lewis Davis, the other progenitor, wanted them to remain under
cryopreservation until he came to a decision regarding their use.
By the time the case reached the state Supreme Court, both parties
had changed their claims. Mary Sue wanted the embryos to be
donated to any couple that was willing to undergo fertility
treatment, insisting on the personal nature (personhood) of the
embryos. Junior Lewis wanted them to be discarded. Mary Sue´s
contention of embryonic personhood was accepted at the trial court
level, explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals, and, eventually,
by the state Supreme Court.
Apart from denying the personal nature of the embryos on the
basis of the Roe v. Wade ruling, the state Supreme Court also
denied that the state interest in “potential human life,”
27. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
28. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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acknowledged as legitimate and optional for states in Roe v. Wade
and reaffirmed in Webster, was compelling enough as to settle the
issue in favor of the implantation of the embryos. Relying on state
precedents, and on civil and criminal law regulations regarding the
fetus’ status when it is inside the mother´s womb, the Court
concluded that the State of Tennessee had no adopted interest
whatsoever in the “potential human life” of the un-implanted
embryos.
Therefore, the un-implanted embryos were not the object of
any state interest in potential human life, let alone persons. Even
so, the Court conceptualized a new category for embryos that
placed them in between property and personhood, to which a
special respect was owed given its potential to become a person. In
reality, this intermediate category was closer to property than to
personhood, for the progenitors´ rights on un-implanted embryos
were deemed “in the nature of a property interest,” and included
the right to decide on their disposal. 29
On these grounds, the Court set forth a principle of
interpretation, whereby whenever there is no agreement between
the parties, the courts should decide the matter by balancing the
opposing interests. Applying this principle to the case, the Court
set forth the rule in which the interest of one of the parties in
obviating fatherhood or motherhood (in this case, the father) is
stronger or greater than the interest of the opposing party (in this
case, the mother) in donating the embryos for future implantation.
Kass v. Kass 30 continued the development of state common law
in the matter of determining the use of un-implanted embryos
whenever there is disagreement between the progenitors. Unlike
Davis, here there was a prior written agreement that established
that if the parties became unable to agree on the use of the unimplanted embryos, they would be donated to be used in assisted
reproduction scientific research.
29. Id. at 596.
30. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).

112

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Although this agreement between the clinic and the parties was
later ratified in the divorce decree, the woman asked that the
embryos be implanted in her, against the husband`s wish that the
agreement be executed. In all of the judicial proceedings, the
debate hinged on the correct interpretation of the agreement signed
between the parties and the clinic.
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court that the agreement was clear that in event of
disagreement between the parties, the un-implanted embryos had
to be used for scientific research, and so decreed that the embryos
(described as pre-zygotes) be given for that use. 31
2. Will as the Ultimate Determinant of the Embryo´s Life Value
The binding nature of the common will of the couple, as
expressed in the covenants written by them or as agreed upon
between themselves and the clinic, was reaffirmed in Litowitz, 32
even when the parties subsequently agree to deviate from the
agreement.
In this case, what was at stake was the use of embryos that had
been conceived with the husband’s reproductive material, and an
ovule donated to the couple by a female third party. The agreement
between the Litowitzes and the clinic prescribed that, if the
embryos were not implanted within five years’ time after their
conception, the clinic should thaw them; in effect, destroy them.
Within a divorce context, and after the five-year deadline had
expired, both parties communicated their decision that the embryos
that were still frozen be implanted. The issue between the
divorcing parties was not whether or not they should be implanted,
but rather, in whom. Mrs. Litowitz wanted the embryos to be
implanted in her, and the ex-husband wanted the embryos to be
donated to another woman. The Washington state court did not
31. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
32. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
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provide a solution for this problem, for no proof had been
produced during the trial to show that the embryos were still alive.
Even so, the Court ventured to say that, even if their existence
were proven, their use should be regulated by the terms of the
agreement; i.e., they should be thawed (destroyed). 33
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the
female progenitor’s contention that the agreement signed by the
clinic and both of the progenitors, according to which, in case of
divorce, the embryos would be implanted at any of the parties’
request, be enforced. This Court relied, among other grounds, on
the theory that to compel a person to become a father or a mother
against his or her will was contrary to public policy, even if they
had contractually bound themselves to procreate. 34 This holding
was later reapplied by the Iowa Supreme Court In re Marriage of
Witten 35 and, by way of obitur dictum, by a Texas Court of
Appeals, in Roman v. Roman. 36
3. Some Conclusions
a. Un-implanted embryos are not conceptually persons, either
under federal or state constitutional case law. Nevertheless, they
are considered the object of “special respect” because of their
potential to become persons, which, although different from the
respect owed to personal dignity, must be differentiated from the
treatment that is owed to objects of interest or property rights.
b. The exclusive right of the mother to dispose of the embryo’s
life, acknowledged in Roe as a privacy right, only refers to
embryos that are already implanted in the mother’s womb. It
excludes un-implanted embryos, and therefore, the mother has no
right to obviate the father’s interests to implant or discard embryos
that are cryogenically stored.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 271.
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.2006).
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c. The use of un-implanted embryos is regulated, as a rule, by
the progenitors´ unanimous decision.
d. In case of disagreement, the written agreement prior to their
conception is binding, provided that it is unambiguous.
e. However, the agreement lacks binding force regarding
embryo implantation. In this respect, the present and concomitant
meeting of minds of both progenitors is required, both concerning
the fact of implantation and the body into which they should be
implanted. Therefore, either progenitor has “veto power” regarding
embryo implantation, be it in the womb of the mother or in that of
a third party.
f. “Special respect” does not mitigate in any way the meeting
of minds of the progenitors. It is only a relevant interpretative
criterion to be used whenever the use of the embryos must be
judicially settled, given a disagreement between the progenitors,
and in the face of a lack of a previous written agreement settling
the issue.
g. The “special respect” principle does not have enough weight
in the “counterbalancing” of interests as to make the embryo
implantation compulsory. On the contrary, in this
counterbalancing, the interest of one party in not producing a child
is heavier than the interest of the opposing party in gestating the
embryo or donating the embryo for implantation.
III. THE EMBRYO IN ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
The Argentine case law on embryos offers a rich range of
interpretations that seem to be firmly established. Young as this
judicial experience may be, this short time is not an obstacle to
reviewing the decisions issued by the Argentine Supreme Court,
which is the highest national court in the federal order, as well as
those issued by other Argentine courts.
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A. The Argentine Supreme Court (2001-2012): Tanus, Portal de
Belén and Sánchez 37
In Tanus 38 and Portal de Belén, 39 the Argentine Supreme Court
determined the sense and scope of the constitutional principle of
the fundamental right to life in relation to embryonic life. Both
judicial decisions, considered as a whole, give rise to the following
interpretative rule: this principle is binding in the case of embryos
with the same scope, as if it were the case of an already-born
person, and no differences based on its development stage or its
viability prospects shall be established.
In Tanus, the majority of the Court affirmed the appealed
decision, which had authorized the induction of labor of an
anencephalic fetus in a public hospital. When providing the
grounds for the decision, the Court pointed out that, even though
the authorization to induce labor had been requested in the 20th
week of pregnancy, by the time the case was to be decided by the
Supreme Court, the mother had reached the 8th month of
pregnancy. According to the Court, this temporal difference
allowed for the differentiation of childbirth by induction of labor,
on the one hand, and abortion on the other. It was argued that the
death of an anencephalic fetus outside the mother’s womb, when
the stage of extra-uterine viability is reached, is not to be attributed
37. On Mar. 13, 2012, in the leading case F.,A.L (CSJN, “F., A.L. s/ medida
autosatisfactiva,” Fallos 259: XLVI (2012)), the Argentine Supreme Court
issued a decision concerning women´s legal right to abort in case of rape.
Although this decision did not openly reject the assertions stated in Portal and
Tanus concerning the legal personhood of the embryos, it did put in question its
practical legal effects. It is therefore very likely that the case law era which
started with Tanus has come to an end with F.,A.L. The purpose of this study
being to compare the Argentine and the American case laws from the point of
view of their respective coherence with the conceptual features of fundamental
rights, this comparison only takes into account the era in which the former is
relevantly different from the latter. That is, the era which ended in F.,A.L and
goes from Tanus to Sanchez.
38. CSJN, “Tanus, Silvia c/ Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/
amparo,” Fallos 324: 5 (2001).
39. CSJN, “Portal de Belén - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro c/
Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social de la Nación s/amparo,” Fallos 325: 292
(2002).
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to the anticipated labor induction, but to the congenital condition
of the fetus.
Therefore, according to the Court, the case didn´t concern the
constitutional validity of abortion, but the way in which two rights
were to be counterbalanced: the mother’s right to health, and the
anencephalic fetus’s exercise of its right to life and to health.
Considering that in the eighth month, premature birth would not
alter the unavoidable death of the child, the Court understood that
inducing labor did not alter the essential content of the fetus’s right
to life or to health.
Leaving aside for the moment its logical validity, it should be
noticed that the Court´s reasoning asserted that the fundamental
right to life is in force from the moment of conception under the
American Convention for Human Rights, Law 23054, article 4.1.,
and under article 2, Law 23849, which affirms the Children’s
Rights Convention. 40
In Portal de Belén, the Court reaffirmed this normative
interpretation, further specifying that conception takes place at the
moment of fertilization. In stating this, the Court relied on the
opinion of different geneticists and biologists that “it is a scientific
fact that the ‘genetic construction' of the person is there [at the

40. “Tanus,” supra note 38, at cons. 11°. Art. 4 of the American Convention
for Human Rights states: “Right to life. 1. Every person has a right to her life
being respected. This right shall be granted by Law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. Nobody shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (the
translation is ours). In Spanish: “Derecho a la vida. 1. Toda persona tiene
derecho a que se respete su vida. Este derecho estará protegido por la ley y, en
general, a partir del momento de la concepción. Nadie puede ser privado de la
vida arbitrariamente” (Ley No. 23054, B.O. del 27/2/1984). Article 2 of Law
23849 states: “When ratifying the Convention, the following reserves and
declarations shall be stated: (…) In relation to article 1 of the Convention, the
Argentine Republic declares that it shall be interpreted in the sense that the term
“child” is understood to refer to all human being from the moment of conception
and until eighteen years old” (The translation is ours). In Spanish: “Al ratificar
la Convención, deberán formularse las siguientes reservas y declaraciones: (…)
Con relación al artículo 1º de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, la
República Argentina declara que el mismo debe interpretarse en el sentido que
se entiende por niño todo ser humano desde el moment de su concepción y hasta
los 18 años de edad” (Ley No. 23849, B.O. del 22/11/1990).

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

117

time of conception], all set and ready to be biologically aimed,
because ‘the egg’s’ (zygote’s) DNA contains the anticipated
description of all the ontogenesis in its tiniest details.” 41
From a factual point of view, the Court considered it proven
that a contraceptive, the marketing and distribution of which had
been authorized by the national Ministry of Health and Social
Action, could operate under three subsidiary mechanisms.
Contraception could: (i) prevent ovulation, or (ii) operate as a
spermicide. Neither of these mechanisms posed a constitutional
objection from the point of view of the embryo’s right to life. In a
subsidiary manner, for the cases in which these two mechanisms
had not been successfully activated, the contraceptive challenged
in Portal would operate by (iii) modifying the endometrial tissue
and preventing embryo implantation. The Court found that this
subsidiary mechanism violated the embryo´s right to life. 42
Therefore, on the basis of these normative and factual
premises, the Supreme Court revoked the appellate court’s
decision, which considered it lawful for the National Ministry of
Health and Social Action to authorize the marketing and
distribution of the contraceptive under challenge.
After these decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
personhood of the nasciturus in Sánchez, 43 leaving aside any
considerations related to a hypothetical abortion. When
acknowledging the personhood, the Supreme Court qualified the
unborn involved in the case as “a person ‘to be born’, this is to say,
41. “Portal de Belén,” supra note 39, at cons. 7°.
42. Id. at cons. 9° and 10°.
43. CSJN, “Sánchez, Elvira Berta c/ M° JyDDHH – art. 6° L. 24411 (resol.
409/01),” Fallos 330: 2304 (2007), in which the Court provided a reminder that
article 30 of the Argentine Civil Code defines as “persons” all beings capable of
acquiring rights and contracting debts, and art. 63 extends the concept of person
to all unborn human beings who are conceived in the mother´s womb. Literally:
“[E]l art. 30 del Código Civil define como personas a todos los entes
susceptibles de adquirir derechos, o contraer obligaciones; mientras que el art.
63 señala como especie del género "persona" a las "personas por nacer,”
definiéndolas como aquellas que, no habiendo nacido, están concebidas en el
seno materno.” (cons. 9°).
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one of the juridical species of the ‘person genus’ under our civil
law . . . .” 44
B. Some Conclusions
The principles and rules acknowledged and established in both
rulings regarding the legal status of the embryo could be
summarized as follows:
1. Legal personhood is acknowledged, under Argentine
constitutional law, from the moment of conception.
2. Conception is deemed to happen at the moment of
fertilization.
3. Any action aimed at interrupting embryotic development
after the moment fertilization occurs should be banned, even when
this interruption is merely eventual or probable.
4. Therefore, the scientific debate regarding the distinction
between pre-embryos and embryos, or between viable embryos
and non-viable embryos, lacks legal significance.
C. Other Courts of Law and the Embryo
The case law of other courts regarding the legal status of the
embryo has primarily hinged on the debate over two different
series of issues: one is whether local birth control policies were
constitutional, and the other on establishing the use that should be
assigned to frozen embryos created during fertilization procedures.
The legal context on which both debates are centered involves,
primarily, local and federal statutes regulating sex and
reproductive health. Let us review that debate.
1. Birth Control Questions
The trend to regulate the fundamental or constitutional right to
health, especially as related to sexual and reproductive health, at
44. Id. cons. 11°.
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the local or provincial (state) level started in the 1990s and has
continued to grow ever since. Therefore, it is a process that started
some years before the 1994 constitutional amendment, and at least
a decade before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Portal
de Belén case regarding whether the birth control policies allowing
the disruption of implantation, or abortive methods in general,
were constitutional.
Nevertheless, all statutes issued before and after the 1994
constitutional amendment made the medical prescription and
provision of contraceptives dependent on the condition of their
non-abortive effect. The same condition is set forth in national
Law 25673, promulgated in 2002. 45 Although this law is
automatically applicable to health services subject to the federal
jurisdiction of the National Ministry of Health, it also empowers
the provinces to join the health program created by it. Thus, be it
effected directly or indirectly, local regulation of sexual and
reproductive health includes a general ban on abortive methods of
family planning.
Notwithstanding this ban, some of these norms, or the
regulations issued under them, allow contraceptive methods
regardless of the distinction between those which operate by
inhibiting fertilization and those which potentially inhibit the
implantation of the fertilized egg.
This lack of normative precision was subject to judicial debate
on different occasions after Portal de Belén. A conclusion that can
be drawn from this limited, and young, case law corpus, is that the
debate, at the local or provincial level, does not revolve around
embryonic personhood―an aspect that is never challenged―but
rather on the details regarding how to adequately weigh it against
the mother’s right to reproductive health. Primarily, the debate is
centered around the normative consequences of the scientific
debate regarding the anti-implantation mechanism assigned to
45. Ley No. 25673, art. 6°, B.O. 30032 (Oct. 22, 2002).
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emergency contraception and to the intra-uterine device, or to any
contraceptive that happened to operate, or could operate, by
obstructing the embryo’s development. Regarding this issue, the
different opinions are detailed in the following paragraphs.
2. A First Look at Portal: All “Emergency” Contraceptives are
Held Abortive
In Asociación Civil Familia y Vida, 46 a provincial court of San
Luis held that articles 1 and 2(c) of provincial Law No. 5344
regulating sexual and reproductive health, and article 4 of its
regulatory decree 127/2003, were contrary to the Constitution. The
first norm states that “the province of San Luis, by means of the
Ministry of Health, shall provide to the inhabitants who apply for
it, information, assistance and guidance for responsible
parenthood, in order to secure and guarantee the human right to
decide freely and responsibly about reproductive patterns and
family planning”. 47 The second establishes that medical providers
in public health assistance institutions should prescribe and provide
contraceptive methods. 48
The local Court understood that this normative plexus was
contrary to the Constitution because it failed to expressly exclude
the specific contraceptives that forestall implantation from the
generic provincial duty of prescribing, providing and inserting
contraceptives at public health facilities. 49 As grounds for this
argument, the local Court relied on the rule, ostensibly established
in Portal de Belén, in which any post-coital or emergency
contraceptive method is to be deemed abortive. 50

46. Cámara Civil, Comercial, Minas y Laboral Nº 2 de San Luis, “Familia y
Vida Asociación Civil c/ Estado Provincial s/ amparo,” Expte No. 18-F-2002,
del 21/3/2005.
47. Ley No. 5344, art. 1° (Prov. de San Luis, Oct. 30, 2002).
48. Dto. 127/03, art. 4° (Prov. de San Luis, Jan. 21, 2003).
49. “Familia y Vida Asociación Civil,” supra note 46, at cons. 3.3.
50. Id.
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3. A Second Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle
in Favor of the Embryo´s Right to Life
Similar to San Luis Law 5344, Córdoba Law 9073 establishes
and regulates the so-called “Responsible Motherhood and
Fatherhood Program,” 51 generically making the prescription and
delivery of contraceptives at health assistance centers depend on
their non-abortive effect. However, Law 9073 differs from Law
5344 because the former excludes from the compulsory list of
allowed contraceptives both emergency contraceptives and the
intra-uterine device. 52 And even if article 7 of Law 9073 allows
enforcement officers to add new methods of contraception, it
expressively states that these methods should coincide with those
previously approved of by competent national authorities.
It was thus not the local statute, but the way in which it was
enforced by the Executive Power, which included the free delivery
of the so-called emergency contraceptives at public health
assistance centers, that posed a constitutional problem. 53 The local
Court found this enforcement illegal and unconstitutional. Its
illegality was grounded precisely on the inconsistency between the
de facto application and Law 9073, article 6. Its unconstitutionality
was based almost exclusively on the principles and rules
established by the Argentine Supreme Court in Portal de Belén,
showing a partially different interpretation from that of the San
Luis Court of appeals.
The main difference between the two holdings lies on the
reasons for and the scope given to the rule by which emergency
contraception should be prohibited due to its abortive effect. As
51. “Programa de maternidad y paternidad responsables,” Ley No. 9073
(Prov. de Córdoba, Dec. 18, 2002).
52. Id. at art. 6°.
53. Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de 1a. Nominación,
sentencia no. 93, “Mujeres por la Vida - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro —
filial Córdoba— c/ Superior Gobierno de la Provincia de Córdoba s/ amparo ―
Recurso de apelación,” Expte No. 1270503/36, del 7/8/2008 (Majority: Justices
Mario Sarsfield Novillo and Mario R. Lescano. Minority (denying the
injunction): Justice Julio C. Sánchez Torres).
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stated above, according to the San Luis Court of Appeals, the
federal Supreme Court was said to have established, in Portal de
Belén, a kind of iure et de iure presumption that every post-coital
contraceptive operates via an anti-implantation mechanism. The
Córdoba court, on the other hand, is slightly more cautious. It does
not deny the scientific debate regarding the moment of
implantation, nor does it consider that Portal de Belén has
definitively solved its legal relevance. Rather, it establishes that the
existence of scientific doubt over the moment of fertilization is a
sufficient reason to justify the ban on emergency contraception,
and it does so by applying the pro homine principle. 54
4. A Third Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle in
Favor of the Woman´s Right to Reproductive Health
Holding a contrary view, other Justices have interpreted that
the pro homine principle should be applied in favor of the
woman´s right to reproductive health, and, therefore, it should be
unequivocally determined that an emergency contraceptive method
has an abortive or anti-implantation nature in order to justify its
prohibition. 55 Some other Justices have only required “sufficient
proof” that the method’s operation obstructs implantation in the
specific case in which it is prescribed, which does not necessarily
amount to certainty. 56
54. See opinion of Justice Sarsfield Novillo, who confirmed the majority’s
opinion, id. at cons. 11°.
55. Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial de 5ta. nominación de
Rosario, “Mayoraz, Nicolás Fernando c/ Municipalidad de Rosario,” Expte. No.
1455/02 del 18/06/08, cons. V.
56. See opinion of Justice Sánchez Torres in “Mujeres por la Vida,” supra
note 53, at cons. 15°. Some Courts dismissed on formal grounds challenges to
the constitutionality of decisions regarding sexual health and reproduction from
the point of view of the embryo´s right to life. See CSJN, “Morales, Rosa Nélida
s/ aborto en Moreno” Causa no. 2785, Fallos 319: 3010 (1996); CSJN, “P., F. V.
s/ amparo,” Fallos 328: 339 (2005) (authorization to induce the labor of an
anencephalic fetus). In another case it was ordered that an intra-uterine device
be inserted in a minor child, absolutely regardless of the question of its antiimplantation or abortive effects. See Cámara de Apelación en lo Civil y
Comercial–Sala I- La Matanza, “P. C. S. y C., L. A. s/ fuga del hogar,” Expte.
No. 167 / 1 Res. Def. No. 4/1, del 18/12/2001.
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D. Embryo Status in the Debate Regarding in vitro Fertilization
Techniques
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme
Court has not yet delivered an opinion on whether assisted human
reproduction techniques which, directly or indirectly, lead to
embryo discard―i.e., embryo destruction―are constitutional.
Even though many bills 57 have been proposed, the issue has not, to
date, been regulated by statutory Law. Nevertheless, the issue has
been debated and resolved in the judicial realm in different
instances.
1. Rabinovich
The first, and most well-known, judicial decision was issued in
Rabinovich 58 by the Civil Court of Appeals located in the city of
Buenos Aires. The case involved a series of measures aiming at
enforcing the right to life and health of embryos which, up to the
moment the judicial decision was issued, were held under
cryopreservation by public or private health institutions in the
aforementioned city. The judicial decision, issued unanimously,
was grounded in reasoning that was analogous, though not
identical, to that adopted two years later by the federal Supreme
Court in Tanus and Portal de Belén.
First, it was found that, from the point of view of Argentine
law, personal life starts at conception; this determination was based
on a systematic reading of all of the International Human Rights
Treaties and Conventions that take constitutional precedence under
article 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution. It was also found that

57. As an example, see file No. 4423-D-2010, Trámite Parlamentario 080
(22/06/2010), Régimen de Reproducción Humana Asistida y de Crio
conservación (Assisted Human Reproduction and Cryopreservation Regime),
registered by Silvana M. Giudici, Silvia Storni, Agustín A. Portela and Juan P.
Tunessi.
58. CNAC, Sala I, “Rabinovich, Ricardo David s/ medidas precautorias,”
Expte No. 45882/93, del 3/12/1999.
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the principle set forth in article 51 of the Argentine Civil Code, 59
according to which a person is every entity that may show
characteristic human features, has constitutional value.
But even though anyone may be considered a person for
constitutional purposes, the acknowledgement of the legal status of
the embryo requires determining the precise moment when the
lawful existence of every person starts. In order to resolve this
issue, the Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires applied article 4.1 of
the American Convention of Human Rights, 60 as the federal
Supreme Court would later do in Portal de Belén. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals, unlike the Supreme Court, paid heed to the
devaluation of the protection of the no nato that could be seen in
the expression “in general”, used in this norm. It decided this
particular semantic incidence by means of a systematic
interpretation that integrated this norm with the interpretative
declaration by Argentina on the occasion of the ratification of
Children´s Rights Convention, according to which, “child” is
defined as any human being as of the moment of conception. 61
The Court of Appeals, once again unlike the federal Supreme
Court in Portal, considered the logical possibility that the
declarations and reservations contained in international treaties
may not have the same hierarchical legal status as the treaty itself.
This possibility was neutralized by the phrase contained in article
75.22, Argentine Constitution, under which the treaties have
constitutional value “under their actual enforcement conditions”
(“en las condiciones de su vigencia”). Under the federal Supreme
Court precedents, this expression ought to refer to the conditions

59. Art. 51, Cod. Civ. states that “[A]ll beings who show signs
characteristic of human beings, without any distinction as to qualities or
accidents, are persons of visible existence.” In Spanish: “Todos los entes que
presentasen signos característicos de humanidad, sin distinción de cualidades o
accidentes, son personas de existencia visible.”
60. Cited in supra note 40.
61. Supra note 40.
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that effectively regulate the State’s obligations at the international
level. 62
As in Portal, it was asserted that conception takes place with
fertilization. Nevertheless, while in Portal the federal Supreme
Court grounded this interpretation almost exclusively on the
authority of embryonic science, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Rabinovich was based upon a sort of normative slippery
slope argument. It stated that all arguments which link legal
personhood to the emergence of a particular event, such as the
moment of implantation, or the appearance of the nervous system,
or even birth, imply that the law doesn´t recognize an equal value
to all human life. 63
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the embryo and,
eventually, the monozygotic twins that emerge from the splitting of
the embryo, possess individual personhood. The Court also
decided the issue of the humanity and the legal personhood of the
pronuclear oocyte (i.e., an embryo at the stage that precedes the
fusion of the female and male gametes’ nuclei) in the following
way: the oocyte had to be dealt with, by law, in the same way as a
person, “not by virtue of asserting its personhood . . . but in the
light of the doubt that arises from the impossibility to exclude it
with certainty. [This doubt] . . . at the factual level, compels us to
respect its life and integrity, as if it were a person, a subject of law
enjoying those rights.” 64
2. Subsequent Cases
In three cases that arose after Rabinovich, the debate regarding
the embryonic legal status involved the parents´ claim that the

62. See “Rabinovich,” supra note 58, at cons. VI, citing CSJN, “Giroldi,
Horacio D. y otro s/ recurso de casación - causa n° 32/93,” Fallos, 318: 514
(1995).
63. Supra note 58, at cons. VI and VII.
64. Id. at cons. VII.
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social care institution (“obra social”) 65 they belonged to should
cover the costs involved in assisted fertilization treatment.66
Opinions delivered in these cases can be ranked incrementally
regarding the legal value of the embryo´s life, as follows:
a. The parents´ right to have in vitro fertilization procedures
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, fully bypassing the
problem of the use of un-implanted embryos; 67 or explicitly
eluding a decision on embryotic personhood on the basis that it
would be a religious question, alien to the scope of intervention by
the State; 68 or else rejecting the abortive nature of any fertilization
treatment, on the ground that, out of a conceptual necessity, it
cannot be considered abortive. None of these opinions referred
either to the Supreme Court precedent in Portal, or to
Rabinovich. 69
b. The parents’ ‘right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, and there is a proposal,
but without binding force, regarding the possibility of donating the
supernumerary or surplus embryos for their later implantation, or
alternatively, for their therapeutic use or experimentation. 70
c. The parents’ right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure
covered by medical care insurance is affirmed, but it is
65. Obras Sociales are health insurance/health care programs that are
primarily administered by trade unions for the benefit of the union members and
their families (although there are other types of obras sociales, such as those
administered by each Argentine province for workers in the public sector). They
are funded by compulsory payroll contributions by employees and employers.
66. Juzg. CAyT N°6 de la C.A.B.A., “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social de la
Ciudad de Buenos Aires,” 20/11/07, LL 2008-A, 148, El Dial AA439C
(reaffirmed by the CCAyT de la C.A.B.A.); Cámara de Apelaciones en lo
Contencioso Administrativo de San Nicolás, “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,”
15/12/08, LL 2009-A, 408; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata,
“Loo, Hernán Alejandro y otra c/ IOMA y otra,” 29/12/08, available at
http://www.cij.gov.ar (last visited Jul. 15, 2013).
67. See “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice
P. López Vergara).
68. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c. IOMA,” supra note 66, opinion of Justice
Schreginger, cons. 5°, joined by Justice Cebey.
69. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,” supra note 66, at cons. 5° (opinion of
Justice Schreginger, joined by Justice Cebey).
70. See “Loo c/ IOMA,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice Ferro).
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simultaneously held that legal personhood is recognized from the
moment of fertilization, and it is ordered that a guardian be
appointed to safeguard their physical integrity, considering the
precedent in Portal as valid and binding, and joining the opinion
delivered by the Court in Rabinovich, but not finding that decision
binding given the different jurisdictions involved, i.e., national and
provincial. 71
d. The parents´ claim that the infertility treatment be covered
by the social care plan is rejected on the basis that it represents a
clear threat to the supernumerary or surplus un-implanted
embryos´ right to life, as interpreted after the Portal decision. 72
IV. A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS FROM THE TELEOLOGICAL AND
SEMANTIC POINT OF VIEW
If there is any value in the orderly review of judicial decisions
and the grounds for them, this doesn´t rely either on their
thoroughness or on their unattainable definitive nature. It relies,
instead, on the possibility of drawing comparisons and contrasts of
both legal practices regarding processes of conceptual construction
and determination, in the light of the claim that fundamental rights
are deontological, absolute and/or unconditional.
A. The “Practical” Legal Value of the Embryo´s Life Compared
1. It should be pointed out that U.S. constitutional judicial law
in the field of embryonic legal status is much older than the
Argentine one. It was only in 2001 that the first judicial decision
was issued in Argentina, while the first U.S. precedent, which set

71. Id. (opinion of Justices Tazza and Comparato).
72. See opinion of Justice Valdez, id. at cons. X and XI, especially cons. XI
in fine. After these cases were decided, the province of Buenos Aires’ legislature
passed Statute 14208, B.O. 26507 (Jan. 3, 2011), regulated by Dto. 2080/2011,
which classified human infertility as a disease, and therefore included in vitro
fertilization in the so-called “compulsory medical assistance plan”, according to
which both private and public health insurance plans should include the
treatment as a free service.
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forth the position of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the value of
unborn (“potential”) human life, was issued in 1973.
2. Under the American case law reviewed, the legal value of
human life is not uniform; it varies according to the stage of
development that an unborn human being has reached. Such stages
do not exist in the Argentine Supreme Court case law, which
considers that there is a genre (“persons”) that embraces the one
“to be born” from the moment of conception, and conception
occurs on the occasion of fertilization. Not distinguishing stages
implies that there is a ban on any action knowingly aimed at
interrupting, either in an eventual or probable way, the
development of the embryo after fertilization.
3. Embryos and pre-embryos in American case law fit in the
first stage (“non-viable potential human life”) and are subject to
state interest, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. This state
interest in the protection of human life is independent from the
interest that the holder of the right to life may have over his or her
own life. 73 This independence is particularly relevant in order to
73. This principle was applied forty-four years later as grounds for denying
a fundamental right to assisted suicide, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). The grounds for state
interest in human life are discussed in depth, both by those who approve of Roe
and those who oppose it. Among many others, see Alec Walen, The
Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 161, 178 (2005), who highlights the way in which this claimed
interest would threaten the rights stated in Roe for women. See also James Bopp
& Richard Coleson, Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, 15 AM. J. L. &
MED. 211, 216 (1989). The idea that states hold an interest in human life which
is not conceptually linked to personhood was particularly developed by Ronald
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,
59 CHICAGO L. REV. 381 (1992). This idea was then picked up by Justice
Stevens in Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 n.2; and in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 747. This same conceptual distinction is also present in other
constitutional practices, as is shown in the famous leading Spanish case decriminalizing abortion, T.C., s. no. 53/1985 at FJ5, B.O.E. no. 119, May 18,
1985. For an academic discussion of the plausibility of this distinction see
certain commentaries on DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, such as Gerard V.
Bradley, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329
(1993); Alexander Morgan Capron, Philosophy and Theory: Life’s Sacred Value
- Common Ground or Battleground?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1994); Abner S.
Green, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994); Frances M.
Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

129

protect the life of citizens that have not, as of yet, acquired the
ability to express their own interests.
4. The state interest in non-viable potential human life is
compelling enough as to justify the binding nature of certain
measures aimed at discouraging the decision to abort, but no other
practical effect is attached to it. For, although under U.S. case law,
un-implanted embryos are said to not be included among property
rights, there is no restriction governing the progenitors´ will over
embryos where even the will of only one of the parties is sufficient
to legally justify their discard.
5. It is unarguable that judicial decisions issued in Argentina
recognize more legal value in embryonic life than those in the
U.S., which considers that legal value arises only once the time of
non-viability is passed. In Argentina, however, even if the limited
case law corpus in existence shows a generalized acceptance of the
general principle that embryonic life is personal life before and
after implantation, this uniformity disappears when it comes to
determining the constitutionality of rules and courses of action
which imply the potential or actual discarding of embryos.
6. In Argentina, the debate over the treatment owed to embryos
is primarily focused on the legal effects of fertilization methods
that could involve discarding embryos, and on the normative
consequences of the scientific debate regarding the antiimplantation mechanism of the emergency contraceptive and the
intrauterine device, or any other contraceptive that might operate to
prevent embryotic implantation.
7. The discussion over contraceptive and fertilization methods
in Argentina assumes—with or without reason, which is not
evaluated here—the normative premise that women have a right of

COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995) (book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of
Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049 (1994) (book review); Tom Stacy, Reconciling
Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and Religious Freedom, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1994); and more extensively, Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A
Critique of his Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997).

130

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

access to them. Courts differ in the way in which they weigh this
perceived women´s right with the embryo´s right to life, as
recognized in Portal de Belén, Tanus and Rabinovich. The
contraceptive methods debate is centered upon the weight and
sense of the pro-homine principle. In particular, it concerns how
much certainty this principle requires regarding the antiimplantation element of these methods. Alternatively, this
discussion does not arise from the U.S. case law, which, by
acknowledging the concept of “non-viable potential human life”
and by allowing for the disposal of the embryo itself, undermines
the primary assertion of that principle.
B. The Justificatory and Semantic Postulates Compared
Judicial debates regarding the legal status of the embryo will
continue unfolding and getting richer and richer, both on the U.S.
and Argentine scenes, as long as the social factors that trigger it are
present. Still, even at this early stage of development, this
comparative synthesis makes evident the unfolding of a semanticanthropological debate relating to the most radical conceptual
distinction in the world of law: that which separates things on the
one hand, and persons on the other.
The question at hand is to whom do we give the distinction of
person or subject of law, and why. But this question cannot be
resolved if there is no previously adopted viewpoint in relation to a
more abstract and thus more fundamental, semantic debate: how
are things classified in general in the world and, in particular, in
the legal world? Are conceptual classifications the result of a
reflexive, yet somehow explicit, social debate that the law is
destined to adopt, at least as long as there prior consent exists? Are
they an interested imposition of a social group that is picked up by
the law and clothed with its coactive force? Or are they something
similar to a representation of reality, which emerges before us
already classified, if not thoroughly, at least partially?
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Regarding the embryo´s legal personhood, these questions
could be restated in the following way: Do the constitutional
judicial practices here reviewed find the personal or un-personal
nature of the embryo as the product of some sort of social
construction, or do they view it as something already given to
understanding, as an ob-jectum? Which is the semantic theory
implied in the interpretative arguments used in both of the
practices here reviewed?
In what follows, we will address these issues by considering
three consecutive and intertwined levels of approach: (a) the
relation of interpretive arguments to moral and anthropological
justificatory stances of interpretation (section 1); (b) the semantics
grounding these anthropological and moral stances of
interpretation (section 2); and (c) an evaluation of the coherence
between the categorical nature of fundamental principles and these
semantic approaches to the concept of legal personhood (title V).
1. The Justificatory Perspective of Interpretation Compared
The main interpretative argument sustaining the denial of legal
personhood to the unborn in Roe was the contrario sensu
argument: if the constitutional text does not entitle the unborn to
legal personhood, then it should be excluded from this legal
concept´s system of reference. 74 But as it has frequently been
noted, this same constitutional text does not mention either the
right to abort, or even the right to privacy—of which abortion is
considered to be a concrete application. Facing the silence of the
constitutional text, there was space, at least from a logical point of
view, both to recognize and to deny legal personhood to the
unborn. 75 As was noted above, this interpretative argument
74. See supra notes 8-10.
75. Regarding the logical ambivalence of the contrario sensu argument see
GEORGE KALINOWSKI, INTRODUCCIÓN A LA LÓGICA JURÍDICA 177-79 (J.A.
Causabón trans., Eudeba 1973), and LUIGI LOMBARDI VALLAURI, CORSO DI
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 95-100 (CEDAM 1981). Regarding the feeble legal
grounds for neglecting constitutional personhood for the unborn, see, e.g.,
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advanced in Roe vs. Wade against the acknowledgement of the
legal personhood of the unborn was never revisited. All later cases
assume, as part of Roe´s holding, that all unborn life is not to be
considered “personal life” (and not even human life, but “potential
human life”). 76
The logical ambivalence of the interpretative argument shows
that the actual reason sustaining the majority´s decision in Roe—
and in the subsequent cases which assume without discussion that
the unborn is not a person according to the Constitution—is a
moral and anthropological conception of the person, which is
assumed as the obvious, and thus not explicitly stated, justificatory
point of constitutional practices. A moral conception according to
which the faculty for autonomy grounds the right to be treated with
“equal respect and consideration,” as assumed in the constitutional
concept of “privacy.” 77 And an anthropological concept of person,
by which it is this same faculty (autonomy) that distinguishes
human beings from other species.
Although the Argentine Supreme Court in Tanus and Portal
had to deal with much more explicit texts regarding the legal status
of the unborn (recognizing its legal personhood and a right to life
from the moment of conception), none of these texts explicitly
states the moment when conception takes place, nor which kind of
legal protection is due to the unborn. Perhaps aiming to profit from
the credibility of scientific discourse, the Argentine Supreme Court

Charles Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human
Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in the Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, at 361 (2006/2007); or Martin
Ronheimmer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in
a Constitutional Democracy: A Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical
Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 158-59 (1998). In any case, even some
of those who approve of the decision in Roe notice that neglecting the
constitutional personhood of the unborn is a main dimension of the case´s
holding. See Jack M. Balkin, How Genetic Technologies will Transform Roe vs.
Wade, 56 EMORY L. J. 843-64, at 845 (2007).
76. See supra notes 13-22, 28-36.
77. This teleological assumption was explicitly stated in Casey, 505 U.S. at
852.
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in Portal based its interpretation concerning the moment of
conception almost exclusively on geneticists´ findings. 78
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the American Supreme Court
in Roe—and all the other Courts which relied upon this decision—
utilized the same scientific concepts and findings, and still
attributed to them different practical (moral and legal)
consequences.
The availability of these scientific findings for all of the
Courts—Argentine and North-American—dealing with the
embryo´s status shows the Argentine Supreme Court decision in
Portal was not only grounded in the scientific description of
human life, but also in the moral concept of “person,” from which
this scientific data was interpreted. For the main question being
posed to all of the Courts was not, “when does genetics situate the
appearance of a new human being?”, but rather the anthropological
and moral question, “when should dignity, and thus legal
personhood, be recognized in a new human being?” The
underlying reason sustaining the majority interpretative conclusion
in Portal is thus the concrete answer to this question: the reference
of the concept of dignity is co-extensive with the reference of the
concept of human nature, independent of the factual possibilities of
it being actualized.
2. Implied Semantics Theories Compared
The different legal status granted to the embryo in one
constitutional case law practice or the other is due not only, nor
primarily, to textual differences, but also to the use of different
moral conceptions of the person as teleological or justificatory
stances of interpretation. Stated in this way, it should be considered
if and how the Courts link this justificatory stance of interpretation
to the semantic meaning of the texts, and which are the epistemic

78. See supra notes 13-22, 28-36.
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and semantic theories implied in the use of these justificatory
stances. In fact, both questions are closely related.
Scientific, moral and anthropological approaches to the nature
and value of human embryos are explicitly passed over in
American case law concerning the legal status of the embryo. It is
as if Wittgenstein´s theory of “language games” had been radically
interpreted and the “legal game” had been taken to be completely
alien to other “language games” where the concept of personhood
was also the object of discussion, and particularly, where an insight
into an “outside” world seemed to be allowed.
This aspiration for the autonomy of legal language from other
fields of language, be it morals or science, discloses at least two
semantic assumptions. First, that the justificatory viewpoint of
interpretation is internal to the legal practice, and second, that the
frame of reference of legal concepts is absolutely determined by
their use within the practice. In effect, if the legal concept of
personhood bears no relation to the moral concept of the person, or
even to scientific findings about human life, it seems that the legal
concept is nothing more than a product of legal decisions. It is not
surprising, then, that arguments determining the legal value of the
embryo were always grounded on the way the Constitution “uses”
the concept of person; or on the presumed intention of the
Constitutional authors when using constitutional concepts; and on
the absence of precedents recognizing legal personhood in unborn
life, and thus, on the fact that the concept of legal personhood has
not yet been used in reference to the embryo. 79
This semantic assumption, by which the use of legal concepts
within the legal community is the only criteria for determining its
frame of reference, also seems applicable to the concept of “special
respect” that is owed to embryos as an intermediate category
between things and persons. In effect, this concept, introduced to
legal practice in Davis v. Davis, is not founded upon any insight
79. See supra notes 8-10.
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into the value of human life as considered from a natural,
metaphysical, or even a conventionally moral point of view. It is,
instead, exclusively grounded on a kind of extension of other legal
concepts, which have been used for a longer time. It is like a mix
of the concepts of “property,” “born human life,” and “unborn but
viable human life.” 80 And being a mix of all three, it has neither
the same significance nor, of course, the same legal force, as the
third of the three. That is why this “special respect” amounts to
less than nothing from a practical point of view, for if there is a
rule concerning the destiny of embryos, it is that they should be
discarded in case of disagreement between the progenitors.
Argentine case law is not as uniform as the American one in
the degree to which the connection is acknowledged between
different “language games,” and the semantic theory implied
therein. The metaphysical and moral perspectives of interpretation
do not seem clearly acknowledged in Portal and Tanus, where the
legal status of the embryo is asserted as a necessary conclusion
based on scientific and legal statements. 81 It is plainly stated in
Rabinovich, where, in the face of both the textual indeterminacy
concerning the embryo´s legal status and the fact of scientific
discussions concerning the moment when a new human being
appears, the Court of Appeals based its interpretation of the
embryo as a legal person on the moral and legal pro homine
principle. 82
In any case, this more or less open recognition that the legal
“language game” is connected to the scientific and moral ones
expresses both the conviction that legal concepts are not purely
constructed from the inside of the legal practice, and that
something exists prior to human social practices and language
which claims respect.

80. See supra note 30.
81. See supra notes 38-41.
82. See supra notes 58-64.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is also clear that all of
the Argentine Courts complemented this attention to the biological
and moral nature of a human person with the actual use of the
concept itself within the legal practice, when interpreting the
concept of legal personhood. The role of use within the legal
practice was particularly relevant when the question was not to
determine the definition of legal personhood, but rather what the
legal consequences of recognizing the entitlement to legal
personhood are; or how the law should deal with scientific doubts
concerning the moment when fecundation takes place; 83 or the way
contraceptives operate. These questions were, in all cases,
approached with interpretative rules internal to the Argentine legal
practice, such as the principle of pro homine.
As mentioned above, not all Argentine Courts enforced this
principle with the same consequences. Some of them applied it in
favor of the mother´s assumed right to conceive children, and
others in favor of the life of the embryo. Two related explanations
can be advanced for this disagreement. In the first place, the
proposition referred to by the legal statement “pro homine” is not
at all evident or manifest. It is not evident if the principle is an
appropriate ground for determining who is entitled to its
protection, nor is it clear who should benefit when its enforcement
postpones another person´s claimed rights.
Second, precisely because of this lack of manifestation, its
practical significance differs according to the concept of justice
from which each interpreter determines the global and final
justificatory point of law. The more this concept of justice is
attached to privacy and moral autonomy, the less value is
attributed to the life of an embryo, which corresponds to less
entitlement to legal protection. On the contrary, the more the
concept of justice is attached to dignity as a universal and nonvariable claim of respect—related to the concept of moral
83. See “Rabinovich,” supra note 58.
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autonomy, but not to be confused with it—the more value is
attributed to embryotic life, resulting in a greater entitlement to
legal protection.
V. WHICH SEMANTIC THEORY SHOULD GOVERN LEGAL PRACTICE?
Two semantic strategies and conceptions underlie the two legal
practices compared here: a traditional, or “criterial,” semantics on
one side, and a sort of “light”—with ample space for social
construction—realist semantics on the other. The last question to
be posed is: which of these is more coherent with the categorical
and universal nature of fundamental rights?
The discussions regarding which is the semantic praxis that
better fits these features of fundamental rights are too ample to be
reviewed in this article. However, it seems appropriate, at least, to
point out that they lead us back to the basic choice that was stated
above, i.e., either the fundamental rights principles are social
constructions that precede and determine their own frame of
reference; or else their reference—some basic human good—
precedes and determines its meaning. 84

84. As is well known, the alternative between giving priority to reference
over meaning when determining the sense of concepts was stated and developed
in the field of Philosophy of Language by SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECESSITY (Blackwell 1980), and Hillary Putnam, Meaning and Reference, 70
J. OF PHIL. 699 (1973). These theories were applied to the problem of legal
interpretation by Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2001), among
other works; and, with some differences, by NICOS STAVROPOULOS,
OBJECTIVITY IN LAW (Clarendon Press 1996), and David O. Brink, Legal
Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS
12-65 (Brian Leiter ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). For a critical revision of
these theories see Brian H. Bix, Can Theories of Reference and Meaning Solve
the Problem of Legal Determinacy?, 16 RATIO JURIS 281-95 (2003). Regarding
the limitative role of semantics in interpretation out of the English language
field, see, e.g., JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI, SENTIDO Y HECHO EN EL DERECHO 108
(Francisco Javier Ezquiaga Ganuzas & Juan Igartua Salaverría trans., Fontamara
2001; vol. 9 in the DOCTRINA JURÍDICA CONTEMPORÁNEA series), and Pilar
Zambrano, Los derechos ius-fundamentales como alternativa a la violencia.
Entre una teoría lingüística objetiva y una teoría objetiva de la justicia, 60
PERSONA Y DERECHO 131-152 (2009).
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If the meaning or concept of fundamental rights is exclusively
the product of a more or less controlled social construction, and
more importantly, if a construed meaning determines its own field
of reference, it would be extremely hard to predicate the
universality and absoluteness of fundamental rights principles. By
contrast, their extension as its categorical or absolute nature would
depend upon the will for a social construction of meaning to lead.
Some political philosophers supporting this constructive approach
to fundamental rights principles have openly admitted that it is
irreconcilable with their categorical and universal nature,
particularly when applied to the legal concept of personhood. 85
Others are much more reticent to admit this openly. Thus,
Ronald Dworkin has expressly rejected what he deems to be a
criterial semantic approach to law, according to which all legal
concepts—including the concept of law itself—are constructed
from inside the practice, with no other basis than the sheer fact of a
convergence of their criteria in use within the practice. Against this
claim, Dworkin contends that legal concepts are interpretative and
thus there is no need of fundamental convergence in their use. 86
Additionally, he has pointed out that legal and political concepts
are the product of a collective constructive practice in the light of
moral and political values and, in the end, in the light of a
substantive conception of what qualifies as a good life. In this
sense, he aims to distinguish himself not only from classical
positivistic approaches to law, which claim the neutral nature of
the constructive process of legal concepts, but also from Rawls’
Theory of Justice, which aspires to exclude “comprehensive
conceptions” from the constructive process of political values. 87
Ronald Dworkin’s answer to them both is that all interpretative
concepts are the product of a holistic constructive practice that
85. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 20 (expanded ed.,
Columbia Univ. Press 2005).
86. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 46; DWORKIN, JUSTICE
IN ROBES, supra note 2, at 12, 151.
87. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 2, at 160-61, 225-26.

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

139

synthesizes natural, moral, legal, and political concepts. This
holistic account seems much more faithful to legal practice than
the “criterial one.” In effect, as has been shown above, both the
Argentine and the American Courts rely on a holistic approach to
the concept of legal personhood, no matter how much they both try
to disguise this fact.
Now, as we have previously mentioned, it is obvious that
criterial semantics implies a negative answer to the question of
deference to reality. But the opposite is not obvious. For the
question is not only to what degree are legal concepts related to
moral, political or natural concepts, but also, if anything exists
prior to the whole conceptual constructive process itself. To this
Ronald Dworkin would answer “no,” or better, “it doesn´t matter”:
the only basis for the whole constructive process is a “reflective
equilibrium” between coherence and conviction. 88 But this mix of
conviction and coherence is all that Dworkin claims for moral
objectivism.
There is no place in his theory—nor any need, according to
him—for self-evident or self-justified practical propositions, or for
the claim that these propositions bear any relationship with human
nature. 89 And it should be noted that although self-justified,
practical propositions are generally the object of moral and
political convictions, this is not always the case or, much more
importantly, their epistemic justification.
Now, without reference to self-justified practical propositions,
there is no critical instance with which to confront the whole
conceptual constructive process. 90 Instead, if reference leads the
88. Id. at 162.
89. Id. at 226-27, and Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better
Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 118 (1996).
90. Both the possibility of grounding moral and legal objectivity in selfevident practical principles, and the possibility of acknowledging a connection
between these principles and natural human ends, has constantly been defended
by the New Natural Law school of thought and, especially in the field of law, by
John Finnis. See, among many other works, JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS Ch. 23-24 (Clarendon Press 2011); and John Finnis,
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abstraction of meaning, when legal authorities construe intricate
and obscure meanings (as, in fact, they have already done in
relation to the legal concepts of “person” and “special respect”),
the reality referred to by these legal and moral concepts would
make clear that there is abuse in the use of language. For no matter
how much imperium courts may have to construct and reconstruct
concepts in the social sphere in general, and in the world of law in
particular, they lack the power to transform, and least of all to
deny, the referential frame of this construction. In other words, if
reference precedes meaning, then human or fundamental rights
principles and their characteristic universality—for each and every
one—and absoluteness, in all cases, would be invulnerable to the
abuses of language. 91
Having reached this stage of the discussion, it is worthwhile to
ask, one last time: which semantic practice better fits the
conceptual, and therefore the necessary, characteristics of human
rights? A practice that construes concepts from a vacuum, or a
practice that construes them from a grasp of reality? In this latter
case, how does the reality referred to by the concept of human
rights narrow the construction of the legal concept of person? Is it
not by imposing the only condition that its admittance be universal
for every man, and absolute in each and every situation?

Introduction to 1 NATURAL LAW at xi (John Finnis & Carolyn Dever eds.,
Dartmouth Press 1991; published as part of THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF
ESSAYS IN LAW & LEGAL THEORY series).
91. For an approach to the constructivist semantics that underlies the line of
cases following Roe, see John M. Breen & Michael A. Scaperlanda, Never Get
Out the Boat. Stenberg vs. Carhart and the Future of American Law, 39 CONN.
L. REV. 297, 304 (2006).
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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to analyse the norms pertaining to the transfer
and publicity of property rights from an economic perspective. It is
a characteristic of this analysis that it puts the rules that regulate
these rights in relation with their associated negotiation costs. This
offers a new approach to the examination of the definition, content,
and transfer of these rights. Legal norms that minimize the
problem of conflicts of ownership increase the value of property in
the hands of its owners. One of the instruments oriented to reduce
uncertainties of this type is the Land Register, which promotes the
exchange of rights, and acts in areas that are fundamental to the
economic system, such as the delimitation, attribution, and
protection of property rights. In Europe, different models for the
regulation of the transfer of property rights coexist, along with
different models for the registration of property, so although the
underlying conflicts of interest are similar throughout Europe, the
way in which each legal system attempts to achieve the greatest
degree of efficiency possible varies.
I. GENERAL QUESTIONS: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF ECONOMIC THEORY
The regulation of private property provides a legal framework
for the distribution of wealth in each State. This article will attempt
to analyse these rules from an economic perspective, an analysis
that, in the words of Posner, is fundamentally a common-sense
approach to the question. 1
The classic theorem of Coase 2 is well known in the field of
economic-juridical science. According to this theory, if property
1. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).
2. This thesis is expounded in his well-known works, Ronald H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON 1 (1959); Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON 1 (1960).
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rights are well defined and there are no transaction costs, then the
market will be in a perfect, efficient state of equilibrium. By welldefined property rights, Coase was referring to a hypothetical
situation in which all goods and resources would have a titled
owner, and the title would clearly specify the limits to ownership
and the steps that would be necessary to remove these limits. By
the absence of transaction costs, Coase meant that there would be
no costs attached to an agreement that transferred a right from one
holder to another. The costs that derive from transfer agreements
can be grouped into three different types: (1) costs associated with
the search made by those interested in acquiring property rights, or
made to find a subject interested in acquiring property rights; (2)
negotiation costs, or costs that derive from the design of the
content of the transaction; and (3) execution costs, in case the
agreement has not been complied with and needs to be enforced.
According to Coase, the law can facilitate negotiation by
reducing the costs of transactions, and reduced transaction costs
encourage the transmission of property, which in turn allows for
the growth of a nation’s wealth. The voluntary exchange of goods
redistributes property, as it changes hands from those who attribute
to it one value, to those who attribute to it another, higher value.
Therefore, the rules that govern the exchange of property
maximize wealth by protecting and encouraging the voluntary
exchange of goods. The same rules also maximize wealth by
permitting owners to claim the benefits derived from the use of a
resource. 3
The economic analysis of property rights is an interesting
approach to their study, because it places property rights in relation
with the costs associated with their transfer. This offers a different
perspective from the traditional approach to their analysis that
normally centres on the definition, content, delimitation, and forms
of transmission of property rights, and it is also recognition of the
3. Concerning this question see R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 113 (4th ed., Pearson Education 2004).
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fact that these elements are not independent from the costs and the
practicalities of their commercial transfer. 4
Property rights have a fundamental effect on decision making
processes concerning the use of resources, and therefore have a
profound impact on economic activity. They determine the identity
of economic agents and define the distribution of wealth in a
society. There are, therefore, clear advantages to having a secure
system of property rights within a legal system. States pursue this
objective of economic efficiency by regulating the transmission of
property and by establishing mechanisms which provide publicity
of property rights, both of which favour property transfer.
In economic theory, ownership is defined as the freedom or the
capacity to adopt decisions over goods and these decisions may
affect how goods are used, to whom their benefits should belong,
and whether to effect changes in their form or substance. 5 It is
these same faculties that are conferred on a subject by the right of
ownership according to the traditional definition given by article
348 of the Spanish Civil Code. There are essentially three
characteristics that property rights need to have in order to be
efficient:
1) They need to be universal. All goods and resources should
be owned, with the exception of those that are so abundant that
they can be freely consumed without becoming scarce.
2) They need to be exclusive. This means that it must be
legally possible to exclude others from using or consuming them.

4. Fernando Pomar Gómez, Derechos de propiedad y costs de
transacción: ¿qué puede enseñar Coase a los juristas?, 51 ANUARIO DE
DERECHO CIVIL [ADC] 1035, 1067 (1998). In the Common Law tradition, see
YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (1st ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1989), who makes a connection between the
concept of property rights and transaction costs.
5. O.E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION OF CAPITALISM 27
(The Free Press 1985).
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3) They need to be transferable. This allows goods and
resources to be passed on to users that are more efficient. 6
A. Transaction Costs
Coase was one of the first economists to draw attention to the
importance of the role played by transaction costs. Transaction
costs may be defined as “the cost of transferring property rights.” 7
Property rights always entail a cost, as our freedom to use goods
and resources is always limited. Economic transactions are
transfers of property rights. Transactions require a series of
mechanisms to protect the agents that participate in them from the
risks inherent in the exchange. The function of contracts is to plan
an agreed response to future events that might affect the object of
the transaction. All transactions involve costs. These costs often
stem from the search for information. This search for information
may relate to the object of the transaction, it may be a search for
the best purchaser, or it may be a search for information about the
purchaser’s circumstances and conduct. Negotiating an agreement
to determine the positions of the parties and the price of the
transfer results in costs, and so does drawing up a contract. Once
the precise content of the agreement has been clearly defined, there
is still the possibility that further costs will be incurred if one of the
parties does not comply with its terms voluntarily and it is
necessary to enforce the agreement.
When subjects agree to exchange goods, they do so because
they believe that what they will obtain from the exchange is worth
more than what they offer in return. The exchange of goods would
have no costs if each party knew exactly what it wanted from the
exchange (that is the use expected to be obtained from the goods to
be exchanged) and to what extent these goods had the qualities that

6. Cándido Paz-Ares, La economía politica como jurisprudencia racional
(Aproximación a la teoría economic del derecho), 34 ADC 601, 645 (1981).
7. Coase, supra note 2, at 18.
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each sought to acquire. 8 In the opinion of Barzel, in order for
property rights to be clearly defined, it is necessary that both their
owner, and any other party interested in their acquisition, should
have access to information detailing the properties of the goods in
question. 9 This is more difficult in the case of goods that are
unique (such as immovable goods) than in the case of standardized
goods, and therefore negotiations over unique goods are more
complex than negotiations over fungible goods. Cooter and Ulen
comment that the negotiations over the sale of a melon are quite
simple as there is very little that one needs to know about the
melon. 10 However, the negotiations necessary for the acquisition of
a house are much more complex as they often include looking for
finance, compiling information about the state of the property and
settling on a price. The seller of a property is obviously far better
informed about its condition than the purchaser is, and the
purchaser is in a far better position to assess the likelihood that he
will obtain the necessary finance for the purchase. It is for this
reason that the rules on property rights create instruments that
publicly state the ownership of goods, such as Land Registers.
These are legal mechanisms that reduce the costs of the transfer of
property rights.
B. The Faculty of Disposition and Acquisition a non domino
One of the faculties conferred on the owner of a property is the
power of disposition over it. The definitions of the right of
ownership provided by the Spanish, Italian and French Civil Codes
all refer to this power of disposition over property. These Codes
devote a great deal of attention to resolving the problems
associated with the transmission of property from one subject to
8. On this subject in Spanish legal doctrine see Jesùs Alfaro Águila-Real,
Los costs de transacción in ESTUDIES JURÍDICOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESSOR
AURELIO MENÉNDEZ 131, 143 (Juan Luis Iglesias Prada 1996).
9. BARZEL, supra note 4, at 77.
10. R. Cooter & T. Ulen, DERECHO Y ECONOMÍA 411 (E. Suarez trans.,
Fondo de Cultura Económica 2008).
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another. When a subject has the right of ownership, he wants to be
certain that he effectively has the power of disposition over the
property and have some guarantee that no other subject will appear
who claims to have acquired the same right. The owner of the right
requires that his title to the property be superior to the rights of the
subject that transmitted it to him and any rights that a third party
might claim to have over the same property. The information one
receives concerning a property can never be fully guaranteed to be
accurate, 11 and the legal system cannot always protect the interests
of both the previous and the present owner of a property at the
same time. A rule that prevents individuals from obtaining
ownership of a property if there is a non-owner in the chain of
transmission will protect the interests of the present owners to the
detriment of potential future owners. However, this type of rule
also places a burden on the present owners of the property, as it
lays the onus on them to demonstrate to any potential buyers that
they are in fact the genuine owners. Alternatively, the law can
protect the subject that acquires a property from the risk that third
parties have a prior legal claim to it (article 34 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law is an example of this type of legislation). A law of
this kind saves future purchasers the trouble of investigating the
authenticity of the chain of transmissions, but the current owner
cannot be sure that the property will not be taken away from him
without his consent.
Regulation on these matters has to evaluate these risks and
must try to minimize them for both parties as much as possible. 12
The law itself influences the quantity and quality of the
11. BENITO ARRUÑADA, LA CONTRACTIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE
PROPIEDAD: UN ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO 690 (Centro de Estudios Registrales
2004), who argues that:
The supposition that the information available is incomplete is
essential. The registry of rights is designed to provide full and accurate
information to protect both the previous and the present owner; and, if
it is not able to protect the owners in a significant number of cases then
its chances of survival are very limited.
12. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Information, Uncertainty and
the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 301 (1984).
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information available and therefore affects the distribution of risks.
For example, in some States there is a Register in which all past
holders of a legal title to a property have had to inscribe their right
to the property. A law of this nature reduces the risk that a nonowner appears in the chain of transmissions. However, it also
generates costs derived from the upkeep of the register. The law
has to determine the information that is necessary for property
rights to be delimited perfectly and for the risks to be distributed
efficiently between the current owners and future buyers. It also
has to strike a balance between providing incentives to increase the
amount of information available about a property and the costs that
these measures entail. In this way, the law can minimize the
problem of conflicts between those who claim a valid title to the
property, and increase the value of the property in the hands of the
legally guaranteed title holders.
C. Legal Security and Security in the Commercial Transfer of
Property
The problem just discussed could be considered part of what
has been traditionally perceived as the dichotomy between the
principle of legal security and trade security in commercial
exchange. Ehrenberg, however, argues that this dichotomy does
not really exist, as both principles seek to protect similar
interests. 13 The general idea is that legal security protects the
holder of the legal title to a right (the subject that has this right)
while the principle of trade security protects the subject that
acquires this right (the subject that wishes to have the right). Both
principles seek to protect the legitimate owner of a right.
In relation with the right to ownership, the notion of security
refers to the ability of the title holder of the property right to
exploit the economic value of the resource in question exclusively,
13. Victor Ehrenberg, Rechtssicherheit und Verkehrssicherheit mit
besondere Rücksicht auf das Handelsregister, JHERINGS JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE
DOGMATIK DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS 273-338 (1903).
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without being exposed to the constant risk that a third-party might
dispossess or disturb him in the pacific possession of that right.
Obviously, if this protection were only available from the private
sector, then individuals would be forced to contract security firms,
and the expense would be enormous and, in most cases,
prohibitive. It makes sense, therefore, that this protection is
provided more cheaply and in a simple manner by the legal system.
Article 348 of the Spanish Civil Code grants legal actions to
owners to enable them to reclaim property from third parties that
have it in their possession and also to declare the absence or
inexistence of encumbrances over their ownership rights. In this
way, the Spanish legal system reduces the costs implicit in the
determination and safeguard of property rights. 14
Legal security tries to guarantee that the title holder to a right
has the effective possession of that thing. This means that the title
holder can appropriate the value of the use of that right and the
value of the exchange of that right. Title holders therefore have the
certainty that they alone may use or exchange the goods and
resources over which their rights operate. Legal security also aims
to prevent title holders from losing or being perturbed in their
rights without their consent. The principle of legal security in this
case can be equated with the prohibition of expropriation, as the
aim is to ensure that the desired transmission takes place and is not
frustrated by circumstances that are unknown to the subject
wishing to acquire the rights to be exchanged. This is achieved
when there are no market failures caused by inaccurate information
that elevates transaction costs. When the information available is
inaccurate, it results in economic inefficiency.
The price of resources is calculated as a function of the utility
that can be obtained from them. If the holder of an ownership title
14. In the opinion of Cándido Paz Ares, Seguridad juridical y seguridad del
tráfico, 175 REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL [RDM] 7, 12 (1985), “the
creation of legal security allows for economies of scale, because as the volume
of production increases there is a notable depreciation in the average cost of
production.”
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does not consent to its transfer then it is because the offer he
receives is less than the benefit he obtains from keeping it under
his ownership. If he were to consent to this transfer then this would
lead to what Pareto describes as a sub-optimal distribution of
resources. 15 However, it might well be the case that an ownership
title that has the value of 400 for its title holder X does not pass
into the hands of Y, who assigns it a value of 500, because the
transaction costs are greater than 100. The aim of the legal system,
according to the thesis of Coase, is to reduce transaction costs and,
in order to do this, it might sometimes be convenient to expropriate
the title from X and assign it to Y, under whose ownership it has a
greater value. X would be offered in exchange a price between 400
and 500, the market value. This is the logic behind the rules that
govern trade security.
An alternative approach to the rules governing trade security is
to make their objective that of avoiding the situation by which the
rights of the subject that acquires ownership are negatively
affected by circumstances that he could not have known about, due
to a lack of information in the market. 16 In this case, the rules of
trade security are rules that limit the information necessary to
acquire a right. These regulations attempt to reduce transaction
costs that could interfere with efficient exchanges. An example of
this is article 34 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. This article limits
the information considered relevant to a transaction to that
published in the Land Register. However, these types of
regulations increase the costs incurred by the original ownership
title holders in order to reduce the risk that their goods are
transmitted without their consent. These regulations can therefore
only be considered efficient when they generate greater savings
than costs.

15. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 202 (Greenwood Press 2000).
16. See Paz Ares, supra note 14, at 19.
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For an acquisition to be considered valid, the principle of legal
security obliges the subject that acquires a title to establish that the
subject from whom he acquires it is the genuine title holder, and
that his acquisition forms part of a chain of legal acquisitions.
However, the principle of trade security limits the information
relevant for the valid acquisition of a right, and permits
acquisitions a non domino. The first rule encourages the subject
that acquires a right to verify that the transmitter is the real owner
of the title in question, whilst the second rule provides a strong
incentive for owners to protect themselves against the threat of
dispossession. 17
Four rules of Roman origin have proved to be efficient from
the perspective of an economic analysis of the question under
consideration. Ubi rem meam invenio ibi vindico (the goods may
be claimed in the place they are located): this expression means
that the legal action to reclaim property may be exercised against
third parties in possession of those goods. Id quod nostrum est,
sine facto nostro ad alium tranferri non potest means literally “our
goods may not be transferred to another except by virtue of our
acts. Res inter alios acta, aliis nec nocet nec prodest: a contract
cannot affect the rights of those who are not party to it. Nemo plus
iuris ad alium tranferre potest, quam ipse haberet: nobody is able
to transmit more rights than those he possesses. These rules are
efficient from an economic perspective because they enforce the
idea that an economic resource should remain in the hands of its
original owner 18 except when special circumstances arise that
necessitate a different course of action.
Under exceptional circumstances, it may be possible to permit
the temporary expropriation of the goods of a title holder when
conditions arise that allow one to suppose that it would be in the
interests of the title holder for this temporary expropriation to take
place. This can only be the case when the protection afforded by
17. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 151.
18. Concerning this topic see Paz-Ares, supra note 14, at 22-23.
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trade security allows the subject the disposal of the right and when
the benefit obtained from the change of ownership is greater than
the value of the use of the right in question.
The rules relating to trade security are rules that transform the
normal protection that the legal system gives to the title holder of a
right: instead of protecting the subjective value that the right holds
for its owner, these rules protect the objective market value of the
right. 19
II. INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PUBLICITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
When agreements concerning the transmission of rights are
made, it is very important for the parties to be sure of the premises
on which these agreements are to be based. Among these premises
are those relating to the properties of the goods to be transmitted,
and the authenticity of the title of ownership of the transmitter of
the goods.
Any uncertainty surrounding the authenticity of an ownership
title makes the sale of the goods difficult and reduces their value.
As a necessary condition for economic efficiency in the
transmission of goods, all doubts concerning ownership titles must
be eliminated. To this end, the law creates instruments of publicity.
A system of publicity can prevent the conclusion of fraudulent
agreements.

19. With reference to this subject, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972). In the opinion of these
authors, the legal system can protect the property rights of a subject in two
ways: by way of property rules or by the use of liability rules. The decision to
implement one system or another will depend on the associated transaction
costs. If the market functions without any appreciable transaction costs then it is
preferable to protect the rights of the subject through property rules, whereas if
there are externalities that affect the function of the market then it is preferable
to use a system of liability rules.
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A. Publicity of Possession
Taking possession of an immovable thing can sometimes be a
necessary condition for the acquirer of a property to ascertain the
superiority of his right over that of third parties. In some legal
systems, as in the Spanish legal system, the handing over of the
possession of a property is an integral part of the legal process of
transmission. There is no doubt that the handing over of possession
constitutes an instrument of publicity for property rights, as it is by
this means that the title holder proclaims his legal ownership of the
goods in question.
When the transmission of a property takes place but the subject
that transmitted ownership retains the possession of the property,
then this situation may generate a high degree of uncertainty
among third parties as to the genuine owner of the property.
Establishing property rights by means of the possession of
things can result in significant costs, for example, the costs
occasioned by the need to investigate the chain of ownership. This
type of investigation is often difficult to carry out further back than
a generation, and this in turn increases the risk that a subject will
appear with a legitimate claim and dispossess the purchaser.
Another legal function of possession is that it allows for the
acquisition of property rights by acquisitive prescription
(usucapion). The foundation for this mode of acquiring rights is
the inactivity of the title holders: “If the owner sleeps on his rights,
allowing trespass to age, the trespasser may acquire ownership of
the property.” 20
The advantages of acquisitive prescription from an economic
perspective are that it eliminates doubts over the true title holder of
things and allows ownership to be conferred on those that are
really using things. The use of this mechanism eliminates the risk
of legal actions to reclaim property based on titles held in the
distant past. Another economic justification for acquisitive
20. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 154.
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prescription is that it prevents the situation in which valuable
economic resources are left unused over long periods of time. This
is because it gives the “productive” user a means of acquiring the
title to a property to the detriment of the “unproductive” user.
There is however, a cost to acquisitive prescription, as property
owners have to be certain to safeguard their properties from the
risk of losing it and expel any potential usurpers.
B. The Land Register
Given the deficiencies of the publicity mechanism based on
possession, land registry systems have developed as the principal
alternative to them.
One of the functions of the legal system is to regulate the
institutions by which rights are exchanged so that these
transactions are secure and foreseeable. One of these institutions is
the land register, which collects information on the ownership,
content, reliability, and expected revenue associated with rights
over immovable property. 21 The land register therefore operates
over a fundamental element of the economic system, the
delimitation, attribution, and protection of property rights.
By offering information on property rights, the land register
reduces the costs associated with exchanges and favours the
circulation of commodities, and it can therefore be described as an
instrument in the creation of wealth. This view is endorsed in a
report published by the World Bank, in the World Development
Report. 22

21. See Gómez-Pomar, supra note 4, at 1067; Fernando P. Méndez
González, La function económica de los sistemas registrales, 671 REVISTA
CRITICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO [RCDI] 857, 881 (2002).
22. World Bank, World Development Report 79-84 (2005). See also FROM
PLAN TO MARKET. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996, at 89 (Oxford
University Press 1996): “For pledging to work, lenders need a cheap and easy
way to determine whether a prior security interest exists against the property.
Some advanced legal systems do this by maintaining a publicly accessible
registry.”
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This same argument had been put forward many years before
in the explanatory preamble to the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1861:
Our laws on mortgages are condemned both by science and
by reason as they neither guarantee property sufficiently
nor exercise a healthy influence on public property.
Furthermore, they do not establish firm bases for credit
secured by real estate, they do not encourage the circulation
of wealth, they do not moderate interest on money, they do
not facilitate the acquisition of immovable property and
they do not provide sufficient assurance to those who lend
money on the basis of this guarantee. Given this situation
the need for reform is pressing and indispensable for the
creation of mortgage banks, to create certainty regarding
ownership and other property rights, to combat the effects
of bad faith and to free owners from the yoke of merciless
usurers. 23
The land register publishes information on the chain of
transmissions of a property and reduces the risk of transfers being
carried out without the agreement of the title holder. It also offers
security to potential acquirers of a property by providing them with
information concerning the temporal validity and the legitimacy of
the transmitter’s title to the property.
To summarize, the land register lowers the risk that the
acquirer will obtain an invalid title without increasing the threat to
the transmitter that he may lose his title to the property without his
consent.
As we shall see a little later in this article, there are several
different types of land registers (register of deeds, title register,
etc.). Some of them attest to the ownership of a property whilst
others offer mechanisms to protect property rights while leaving
the question of establishing ownership to the rules governing
possession. In some legal systems the land register is the exclusive
source of information about the title holders of immovable

23. Spanish Mortgage Law (February 8, 1861), published in LEYES
HIPOTECARIAS Y REGISTRALES DE ESPAGÑA. FUENTES Y EVOLUCIÓN. I. LEYES DE
1861 Y 1869, at 223-395 (1974).
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property, while in others the land register functions alongside a
system of publicity based on possession.
From the perspective of an economic analysis, the publicity
afforded by the land registry is of greater functional value than the
publicity given by the mere possession of commodities when these
are costly. For other types of commodities, the maintenance costs
of this system of publicity exceed the benefits obtained from the
reduction of the types of risk we have mentioned. Property
registers are also more efficient when the registered items are not
subject to frequent transmissions, when they have a long economic
life, and when the registered properties are susceptible to economic
exploitation by several persons at the same time (for example when
it is possible to constitute limited real rights over the properties—
such as a mortgage).
A property register is also efficient when the descriptions of the
registered property it provides gives more information about it than
mere possession can.
III. THE RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AS A RISK
SHARING INSTRUMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
As a result of plural legal traditions, several types of systems
are currently in use in Europe for the transmission of immovables.
These rules are important as they provide an answer to a series
of fundamental questions that arise from the circulation of property
rights. Some of the most important are: (1) who has the effective
power of disposition over the property sold? (2) Who is
responsible for damage caused to third parties by the property? (3)
Does the property constitute a guarantee for the creditors of the
transmitter or the acquirer of the property? (4) Who supports the
risk in case the sold thing perishes? (5) Who has the right to obtain
the benefits produced by the property sold?
Broadly speaking, the main systems of ownership transmission
in Europe can be divided into the following categories:
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1) Legal systems, such as the French and those that developed
under its influence (e.g. the Italian, the Portuguese, and the Belgian
legal systems), link the transfer of ownership to a contract,
meaning that the agreement between the parties actually transfers
ownership.
2) Legal systems such as the German and those it has exerted
an influence on (e.g., the Austrian, the Swiss, and the Greek legal
systems), where the conclusion of a contract must be accompanied
by a contract on the actual transfer of ownership and the
recordation of the transfer in the land registry.
In most legal systems influenced by the German model, the
contract on the actual transfer of ownership has been substituted by
recordation.
A characteristic of German law is that the contract on the
actual transfer of ownership is disconnected causally from the
contract that details the obligations of the parties, in such a way
that nullity of the contract detailing the contractual obligations
does not affect the validity of the transfer of ownership.
3) The Spanish legal system shares some of the characteristics
of both systems previously cited. The Spanish system requires the
conclusion of a contract (a title) and the traditio (the delivery of
possession with the intention of passing ownership, which is the
modo or correct form). These requirements are an example of how
some aspects of the Spanish legal tradition have asserted
themselves over the strong influence of the French.
A distinctive characteristic of the Spanish system is the causal
relation between the contract and the transfer of title. If the
contract is invalid, the transmission of ownership cannot be said to
have taken place.
4) The common law system uses a complicated process known
as “conveyance” to transfer ownership. This process consists of
various stages, and in some countries (such as England and Wales)
the acquisition process is only achieved with the inscription of the
title in the land registry.

158

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

From an economic perspective, 24 the optimal system of transfer
of title would be that in which a single subject could be said to
have: (1) an interest in safeguarding and conserving the physical
condition of the property; (2) the legal means to protect the
property; and (3) physical contact with the property, so that the
title holder would be in a position to see whatever steps might be
necessary to take in order to safeguard and conserve it. However, it
is not within the power of the legislator to condition the
transmission of the property and the actions associated with the
transfer in such a way as to ensure that these three conditions
always coincide. The legislator is forced to choose between
conflicting interests and distribute risk between the parties in one
way or another.
The three conditions stated are not met in the solution provided
by the French legal system. Sacco describes the French solution as
“pseudo consensual” 25 and attributes it to an intense dislike on the
part of its creators of the obligation to give. 26 This obligation is
substituted by the automatic effect of the transmission of the
property. The obligation to give is characterized by the fact that the
creditor, who has an effective interest in the condition of the
property, does not have any legal action at his disposal to protect it.
The authority to do so is held by the owner, who has a number of
legal actions available to him to protect the property (such as the
action to recover the property from third parties in possession and
the actio negativa).
As a consequence, the French legislature considered it
advantageous to convert the buyer automatically into the owner
rather than the creditor of an obligation to give. However, this
consensual system has a weakness. While it transfers the authority
24. See Rodolfo Sacco, Relazione di sintesi, in VENDITA E TRASFERIMENTO
DELLA PROPRIETÀ NELLA PROSPETTIVA STORICO-COMPARATISTICA ATTI DEL
CONGRESSO INTERNAZIONALE PISA-VIAREGGIO-LUCCA, April 17-21, 1990, at
900 (Letizia Vacca ed., Giuffrè 1991).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 901.
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to protect the property into the hands of the buyer, who is naturally
the subject interested in preserving the property in good condition,
it means that the ability to protect the property is conceded to a
subject that does not have it at his disposal. This subject, who does
not have the possession of the property in question, is therefore not
in a position to detect potential threats to it. 27
A part of German legal doctrine has criticised the German
model of property transfer. These authors feel that in the sale of
immovable property, ownership should be transmitted on the
payment of the price stipulated and the handover of the property. 28
This is the thesis held by members of the school of Karl Schimdt,
who do not favour the current model of property transfer in the
German Civil Code. They dispute the necessity to distinguish
between obligational contracts and contracts on the actual transfer
of property.
The critics of this model draw on a wide range of historical
sources to support their critique, including Roman Law, ancient

27. Spanish legal doctrine has come to the same conclusion; see, e.g.,
MARIANO ALONSO PÉREZ, EL RIESGO EN EL CONTRATO DE COMPRAVENTA 254
(Montecorvo 1972). This author considers the rule res perit domino to be a
deviation from the original periculum est emptoris applied in Roman law, and
claims it was a creation of the natural law school of rationalists. This school of
thought maintained that it was against the laws of nature and therefore wrong for
the buyer to have to assume all the risk of a transaction, as it had traditionally
been believed was the case in Roman law, and that in fact Roman law had not
actually imposed this burden on the buyer. Hugo Grotius drew attention to
several passages from the Roman period that he felt clearly showed that
ownership was able to be transmitted, even without the act of placing the
property in the possession of the buyer (the traditio), by the mere consent of the
parties. However, even the consecration of the maxim res perit domino does not
eliminate the injustice of the rule periculum est emptoris, because making the
buyer the owner of a property without handing over to him the possession and
the use of it is effectively the same as making him a creditor of the right to the
property. In both cases the property perishes to the detriment of the subject who
has to pay the price.
28. This is the opinion of Hans Brandt, Eigentumserwerb und
Austauschgeschäft, der abstrakte dingliche Vertrag und das System des
deutschen Umsatzrechts im Licht der Rechtswirklicheit, 120 LEIPZIGER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN 322 (Th. Weicher 1940) which has been
criticised by, Heinrich Lange, Rechtswirklichkeit und Abstraktion, 148 ARCHIV
FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [Acp] 188 (1943).
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Germanic Law, natural law philosophy and nineteenth century
Prussian Law.
Another controversial issue in the German system of property
transfer is the principle of abstraction. This principle states that
contracts on the transfer of property are independent from their
cause, which means that they produce effects even if the
accompanying obligational contract proves to be invalid. The
decision to incorporate the principle of abstraction in the legal
system is a political decision taken by the legislator in an attempt
to balance the conflict of interests generated between the
transmitter of the property, the acquirer and his creditors, the
successors of both parties and the interests of commerce. 29
The principle of causality and the principle of abstraction are
techniques used to distribute risk between the parties to a contract.
The principle of causality better protects the interests of the
creditors of both parties, because only the patrimony of their
debtor is placed at their disposition and it does not protect the good
faith of the acquirer’s creditor based on the appearance of the
situation created. In this way, a subject that has commodities at his
disposal is able to retrieve them from the patrimony of a third
party, without his interests being secondary to those of the
acquirer’s creditors.
The principle of abstraction guarantees equality between the
parties, because both the subject that transmits the property and the
subject that acquires it, and only them, have legal actions based on
their contractual obligations. According to the principle of
causality this would not be the case, as there exists a danger that
the seller might stake a claim to the property by means of the
revendicatory action (reivindicativo) (which is used to defend a
property right), while the purchaser of the property would only
29. This principle was included in the German Civil Code due to the
influence of Savigny. The celebrated German jurist considered just cause to be
the agreement that the parties reach over the transmission of property whilst the
property agreement itself (Einigung) is a separate legal act that does not depend
on a contract outlining the obligations of the parties.
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have legal actions based on the other party’s contractual
obligations.
In the opinion of Lange, the best property transfer system
would be that which combined the principle of causality with a
system of acquisition of property a non domino. 30 This would
afford the parties protection against any possible defects in the
underlying legal agreement and would also protect the interests of
commerce. 31 This is the solution that Spanish legislators have
opted for. While the Spanish system of property transfer is causal it
also protects those that acquired their right from a subject that
appeared in the land register as the title holder of the property by
maintaining the validity of their acquisition, even when the
transmitter was not really the legitimate owner. It also protects the
acquirer from any other resolution or revocation of rights that did
not figure in the land registry at the time of transfer (Article 34 of
the Spanish Mortgage Law).
IV. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND REGISTER: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT LAND REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS
A. Systems of Land Registration in Europe
The legal systems of Europe differ not only in the rules they
employ to regulate property transfer but also in the organization
and efficiency of their respective land registries.
In Germanic systems, the land registry is designed as a register
of title. The land register has a fundamental role to play in
transactions over immovable goods, as inscription in the registry

30. Lange, supra note 28, at 188.
31. In the words of Lange, supra note 28, at 226: Ich habe deshalb stets
gegen das Abstraktionsprinzip gekämpft und halte diesen Kampf auch heute
noch aufrecht, obwohl ich die Begründung aus der Unvollstümlichkeit dieses
gebildes heraus nicht mehr für zuttreffend halte (“That is why I have always
fought against the abstraction principle and I maintain this fight even today,
although I do not longer consider right the justification of the elimination of this
institution”).
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has replaced the traditio or the act of handing over the physical
possession of the property. In Germany, inscription in the land
registry has to be preceded by an agreement over the act of
transferring the property (abstracted from the separate agreement
over the obligations of the parties). In Switzerland, however, the
law requires a causal contract that has the specific aim of
transferring ownership. 32 In both systems inscription is necessary,
as without inscription neither the agreement to transfer property
nor the causal contract produce the effect of transmission.
In other European countries the land register is organized as a
register of deeds. There are several types of registers of deeds;
some of them are simple, rudimentary collections of unorganized
deeds like the ones that exist in many parts of the U.S.
Nevertheless other are well organized, improved like the French,
the Scottish or the Dutch registers. 33
1. The Scottish Land Register
Registration has been mandatory in Scotland since 1617, in the
sense that it is the final and essential step in the transfer of
ownership of land. 34 As a result, virtually all land is registered, and
the register is (and always has been) open to the public without
restriction. The original register of 1617, known as the “Register of
Sasines”, was a register of deeds, but it is now being phased out
and replaced by a new register, the Land Register of Scotland,
which operates as a system of registration of title. 35 Today, when
32. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE], arts. 657 (1)
and 665 (1) (Switz.).
33. ROWTON SIMPSON would also consider them as “Title Registration”.
STANHOPE ROWTON SIMPSON, LAND LAW AND REGISTRATION 22 (Cambridge
University Press 1976).
34. Registration (Scotland) Act, 1617, c. 16.
35. The relevant legislation is the Land Registration (Scotland) Act, 1979,
c.33. The 1979 Act is itself under review by the Scottish Law Commission, and
there are likely to be major changes. See the Commission's Final Report on Land
Registration (Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration, report nr.
222
(February
2010,
2
v.),
available
at
www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download_file/view/186/
(vol.
1),
and
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land is sold, the transaction must be registered in the new register.
As a result, the title to some 50% of properties is held in the Land
Register, and the numbers are rising rapidly. Both registers are
administered by Registers of Scotland, a government agency. 36
The Land Register is held in electronic form. For each
property, there is a separate title sheet which shows the boundaries,
the name of the owner, and the other real rights (such as rights in
security “mortgages”) to which the property is subject. As a matter
of law, the person named as owner on the title sheet is the owner. 37
So if the house in which A is interested is already on the Land
Register, all A has to do is to consult the relevant title sheet. This
can be done in person, by using an internet-based inquiry service, 38
or by employing a firm of professional searchers. 39
2. The English Land Register: The Journey to Title
Registration
In England, in the early eighteenth century, systems of deed
registration were introduced for some very limited areas of
England. Title was based on the production of deeds, showing the
owner’s and his predecessors’ entitlement to the land. A register of
deeds made ownership more secure by removing the risk of lost

www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download_file/view/187/ (vol. 2 )), which contained a
draft Bill that, if enacted, would repeal and replace the Land Registration
(Scotland) Act 1979. The Land Registration (Scotland) Bill was introduced in
the Scottish Parliament on 1 December 2011. The main objectives of the Bill are
to reform and restate the law on the registration of rights to land in the land
register; to enable electronic conveyancing and registration of electronic
documents in the land register; to provide for the closure of the Register of
Sasines in due course; to allow electronic documents to be used for certain
contracts, unilateral obligations and trusts that must be constituted by writing; to
provide about the formal validity of electronic documents and for their
registration and for connected purposes.
36. See www.ros.gov.uk (last visited Apr.12, 2013).
37. Land Registration (Scotland) Act, 1979, c.33, s.3(1)(a).
38. Known as Registers Direct. See www.ros.gov.uk/registersdirect (last
visited Apr. 12, 2013).
39. See Kenneth Reid, Report for Scottish Legal System, TRANSFER OF
IMMOVABLES. THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (pending
publication).
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deeds, and the deeds registration statutes provided that
unregistered deeds would have no effect upon a purchaser of the
land (while remaining valid against the parties to them).
In the first half of the nineteenth century one of the reforms
that were called for was the introduction of title registration. Title
registration is an independent record of ownership wherein the
state of the title can be consulted without the necessity for further
investigation.
In 1862, a title registration statute, the Land Transfer Act, was
enacted. The system failed, however, in part because the
registration was not made compulsory: once a title was registered,
off-register dispositions were allowed, preventing the register from
remaining up to date.
Later, in 1925, the Land Registration Act configured a
workable and efficient land registration system, which was
modified by a 2002 statute. The act of inscription is currently a
constitutive act in England and Wales, since the Land Registration
Act 2002 came into force.
3. The French Land Register
In the so called “Latin” legal systems (such as the French, the
Italian and the Belgian) inscription in the land registry does not
form part of the mechanism of transmission, and the function of
the land registry in these countries is primarily to give publicity to
titles over property. The inscription of a right over an immovable is
therefore only useful when a subject wishes to invoke that right
against third parties.
In France as in the Netherlands, the registries of properties,
which technically have the same function as a title register, are part
of the cadastre. Both of them, for historic and fiscal reasons, are
connected with the Ministry of Finance. The control of the
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formalities is thus restricted, consequently limiting the legal impact
of the land registration and of the cadastre. 40
The land registration is organized by a decree of January 4,
1955. 41 It organizes the publicity of the diverse acts and facts that
modify the legal status of an immovable property, in order to
improve the information available to third parties. The core of this
system consists in the obligation to publish acts, judicial
resolutions and legal facts (such as the death of a person) which
create or transfer any real right on an immovable. The act must be
filed at a local office called “land registry”, under the
responsibility of a Ministry of Finance officer, called a “land
registrar”, who also collects taxes. The land registrar records acts
on a logbook on a chronological basis, which allows establishing
the order of publication of acts. He has to draw a record listing
excerpts of the registered acts, by owners (personal index cards)
and by properties (real index cards). This mixed system thus
allows obtaining information either on the real rights of a given
person, or on the rights and charges that pertain to a given
property. To allow the establishment of the real index cards, the
decree of January 4, 1955, created a correlation between the land
registration and the cadastre, even if they are managed by two
different services.
French law has no system of perfect proof of ownership, except
by way of acquisitive prescription. Proof can be established by any
means (title, possession, etc.), left to the sovereign estimation of
the courts. The French land registration system (publicité foncière),
40. See Frédéric Planckeel, Report for French Legal System, in TRANSFER
IMMOVABLES. THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
(forthcoming, Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
41. Décret 55-22 du 4 janvier 1955 portant réforme de la publicité foncière
[Decree nr. 55-22, of January 4, 1955, regarding the reform of land registration],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], January 7, 1955, p. 346; and by Décret 55-1350 du 14 octobre 1955
pris pour l'application du décret n° 55-22 du 4 janvier 1955 portant réforme de la
publicité foncière [Decree nr. 55-1350, of October 14, 1955, applying the
Decree nr. 55-22, of January 4, 1955, regarding the reform of land registration],
J.O., October 15, 1955, p. 10125.
OF
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contrary to the German land register, is not attributive of
ownership. According to French law, land registration is limited to
proving against third parties that B acquired his right from A
(opposabilité du titre), not to prove that A was himself the owner.
The land registrar does not verify the content of the transferring
contract: those who want to deal with B must know that his title
can be challenged in an action in nullity, which may invalidate the
act of disposition concluded with B. 42
Compulsory land registration has an incidental impact on the
effects of contracts transferring immovable property. On the one
hand, the contract must be certified by an authentic act for its
publication, making the intervention of a notary necessary, often to
reiterate a transfer already agreed on in a contract. On the other
hand, the publication conditions the possibility of making the
transfer effective as against interested third parties: the particular
assignees of the same assignor, or of a common assignor, who
would claim to have on the property a competing real right. 43 For
example, A sells to B, then A sells again to C. B can make his
transfer effective against C only if he publishes first. C will prevail
over B if he publishes first, at a moment when A still appeared in
the register as being the owner.
This rule offers limited protection. For instance, land
registration does not protect the purchaser against a competitor
who claims to have acquired his right from a third party having
sought no registration of his title: it protects him only against the
existence of occult transfers by his assignor. Furthermore, the
Court of Cassation introduced an important adjustment based
initially on fraud, and later extended to civil liability: 44 if C
42. Art. 28 of the decree of January 4, 1955, supra note 41, mitigates this
inconvenience by imposing the publication of claims in nullity or termination of
contract or act of disposition.
43. The heirs are not considered as third parties and are compared to their
assignor.
44. Cass. 3e civ., January 30, 1974, D. 1974, 427 (note J. Penneau); Cass.
3e civ., January 30, 1974, JCP 1975, II, 18001 (note M. Dagot).
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registers first a right that he has acquired from A knowing that A
had already transferred it to B, C’s fault deprives him of the benefit
of land registration. However, if C resells to D, and D registers
before B, D loses the benefit of land registration if he bought with
full knowledge of the facts. 45 This application of civil liability thus
restrains the automatic character of publicity.
Although its extent is thus limited, it is admitted that land
registration provides sufficient security, because the conflicts
settled by the decree of January 4, 1955 are the most common in
practice. 46
The French reform of 1955 aimed at making registration an
efficient instrument to help guarantee commercial security. The
reform made it obligatory to register the creation or transfer of real
rights in the land register but stopped short of making registration a
constitutive act. 47
4. The Spanish Land Register
Spanish law differs from the French model in various ways as
it incorporates a number of aspects of the German property transfer
system. As in the French system, inscription is not a constitutive
act, it is a declarative act. Transmission of property requires a
45. Cass. 3e civ., June 11, 1992, D. 1993, 528 (note A. Fournier).
46. MAZEAUD ET AL., III LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, at 534 et seq. (2d.,
Montchrestien 1963); GABRIEL MARTY ET. AL., DROIT CIVIL LES SÛRETÉS LA
PUBLICITÉ FONCIÈRE 324 (2d ed., Sirey 1987); PHILIPPE THÉRY, SÛRETÉS ET
PUBLICITÉ FONCIÈRE 401 (PUF 1988); JEAN-PIERRE CHENU, DE LA
TRANSCRIPTION À LA PUBLICITÉ FONCIÈRE 72 (Bordeaux Imprimeries Delmas
1960); PIERRE LECHÊNE & PATRICK STEINMANN, PUBLICITÉ FONCIÈRE:
CONSERVATION DES HYPOTHÈQUES: SIÈGES ET RESSORTS DES BUREAUX,
FORMALITÉS D'ENREGISTREMENT, TARIF ET SALAIRE DU CONSERVATEUR DES
HYPOTHÈQUES 5 (2007).
47. The same obligation exists in Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, and Sweden,
where notaries and other public officials have to file for registration within a
three month period starting from the date on which the document was presented.
In France, this obligation appears in art. 33, decree of January 4th, 1955, supra
note 41. In Sweden the same obligation is contained in Jordabalk [JB][Land
Law Code] 20:3 (Swed.); in the Swedish system, if the required documents are
not presented to the Registar within three months, the party responsible may be
fined, but the sale is valid and the effects of the transmission will have been
consolidated.
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contract to transfer ownership (or another type of valid title) and
the act of handing over possession of the property (known in
Spanish Law as the theory of title and mode). The effect of
registration is threefold: 48
a) First, like in France, a person recording an act in the land
registry cannot see his right opposed or adversely affected by any
act of the transmitter that creates another, incompatible right.
b) Second, and this goes one step beyond the French model,
when a right has been registered for at least two years (articles 28
and 207 Spanish Mortgage Law), the title holder is empowered, by
virtue of registration, to exercise and enforce the registered right
erga omnes.
c) Third, according to the principle of public good faith in the
register, when a person registered a right acquired from an
apparent title holder, his title will be upheld even if the transmitter
was not the genuine title holder. This principle also protects the
holder of the registered title if his title is threatened by a cause of
termination that does not appear in the registry (article 34 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law).
B. Systems of Land Register in the United States
In the U.S., the Land Registration systems vary widely from
state to state regarding what has to be recorded, the way it is
recorded and the legal consequences of it.
Some attempts to introduce more uniformity failed, such as
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfer Act of 1976.
Due to the archaic and incomplete character of many
official recordation institutions, the private insurance sector
developed title insurance, providing purchasers with
additional certainty in return for compensation. The
introduction of the so-called “Torrens system” provided an
48. Regarding this matter, see Antonio Gordillo Cañas, La inscripción en el
Registro de la Propiedad (su contenido causal, su carácter voluntario y su
función publicadora de la realidad jurídico-inmobiliaria o generadora de su
apariencia jurídica) in 1 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 11 (Boletín Oficial del
Estado 2001).
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alternative to this combination of an official recording
system with title insurance. The “Torrens system” became
popular in the United States during the late nineteen
century. More than 20 states passed enabling acts for a
Torrens system during the period 1895-1915. Prompted by
the failure of three of four insurance companies in the state
of New York during the 1930s, the New York Society
engaged R. Powell of Columbia University in order to
study an eventual introduction of the Torrens system in the
state of New York. His report was highly critical about
such an introduction stating that the recordation system,
then prevailing in the state of New York and in 16 other
states operated at lower cost than the Torrens system. His
report gave a fatal blow to the hopes that the Torrens
system would be generally accepted in the U.S. Many
states which had adopted the system repealed the statutes.
The discussion about the effectiveness and efficiency of
both systems still looms in legal literature. 49
In the majority of U.S. legal systems, transfers of ownership of
real property are not effected by contract, but by the execution and
delivery of a deed. Deeds are formal documents that must contain
specified information and declarations, and are often recorded or
filed with a local land records office.
Most transfers of real property are preceded by a contract of
sale, in which the seller agrees to transfer title at a later date in
exchange for a payment by the buyer. Because they concern the
transfer of real property, such contracts are subject to the writing
requirement, according to the Statute of Frauds in force in some
states. 50
49. BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT, PROPERTY LAW AND ECONOMICS 193
(Edward Elgar 2010) (on the other side, there is still discussion about the
effectiveness of each system). See Matthew Baker et al., Property Rights By
Squatting: Land Ownership Risk And Adverse Possession Statutes in 77 LAND
ECONOMICS 360 (University of Wisconsin Press 2001) (who developed research
on the optimal title search under recording system in the U.S. Although the
focus of their research is not on an efficiency comparison between recording and
registration systems, the result of their research strengthens the efficiency
argument in favour of the recording system).
50. GREGORY KLASS, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USA 91 (Kluwer Law Int’l
2010). Contracts for the sale of land are to be distinguished from conveyances of
land—that is, transactions in which tittle or ownership passes. Conveyances are
governed by additional statutes, and are generally considered subject to property
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Contracts for the sale of real property generally precede the
buyer’s investigation of title and often also his securing of
financing for the purchase.
The buyer’s obligations under such a contract of sale are
therefore typically conditional first, on a satisfactory title report by
a third party and second, on the buyer being able to obtain
financing.
In the majority of states, the chain of title review is usually
performed by a professional title abstractor or attorney, and the
clear title is guaranteed either by a title insurance company or by
an attorney, subject to some exclusions, which may be quite
significant.
In many states, deeds or related documents are being recorded
in land registration offices (which have different names: office of
the recorder, country vault, recording office, land office). In these
offices, track of transfers of property can be established by
inspecting the land records. The offices are governmental
organizations at the lowest governmental level, the county. Almost
all U.S.-counties have two main complementing registrations: for
property, the warranty deeds (for conveyances) and the deeds of
trust (for mortgages). Cadastral mapping is carried out in a basic
way or sometimes not at all. Project developers sometimes prepare
maps of large tracts of land to be split up in parcels that are
individually sold and these maps can be used in the land offices as
a kind of geographical description of the newly formed individual
lots.

law, as distinguished from the law of contract. The Statutes of Frauds applies to
the transfer of any interest in land, which section 127 of the Second Restatement
of contracts defines as “any right, privilege, power or immunity, or combination
thereof, which is an interest in land under the law of property.” This capacious
definition includes not only the simple ownership (or a fee simple estate) of real
property, but also options to purchase or sell . . . . The wording of some states’
Statutes of Frauds makes it unclear whether the requirement applies only to
promises to transfer an interest in land, or also to promises to buy such an
interest. Most courts have held that it applies to both, which is the position
adopted by the section 125 of the Second Restatement.
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The fact that the public in general has to present documents for
registration is one of the weak points in any land registration
system. A land registration that is not updated by a constant flow
of data to renew existing records will fail. To ensure that
documents regarding conveyances are actually presented at the
offices to be recorded as soon as possible, recorded facts get
priority over unrecorded ones. This incentive to register is
expressed in the recording statutes of the various states in the U.S.
There are three types of statutes: race, notice, and race-notice
statutes. In race statutes priority depends on the order in which
documents and other instruments are registered. The winner of the
race to registry gains priority even if he or she knew of a prior
unregistered conveyance. Knowing this could lead to fraudulent
practices, some states in the U.S. adopted the notice statute, in
which case no premium is placed on the race to the registration
office. The focus here is on whether the purchaser had notice of a
prior conveyance or not. A bona fide purchaser will always win as
long as he or she is without notice. The “race-notice” statute is
composed of elements of both “race” and “notice” statutes. A
purchaser can purchase without actual or constructive notice of an
earlier claim and he or she must register first. 51
In the United States, there is no nationwide or uniform system
for the identification of properties.
For references to location of parcels the majority of states
use the Federal Rectangular System (FRS). After the
declaration of independence the federal state found itself
with vast tracts of undeveloped and hardly inhabited land.
There were few monuments suitable for the usual surveys
and it was determined to devise a system that would
facilitate location of land parcels. A commission headed by
Thomas Jefferson evolved a plan for dividing the land is a
series of rectangles which Continental Congress approved
in April 1785. In this system a chosen baseline and a
principal meridian form the basis of the reference system.
The initial point, varying from state to state to avoid too
51. Simpson, supra note 33, at 96.
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complicated referencing, is the point where these lines
cross. Along the baseline the reference is made to 6-mile
intervals known as ranges and along the meridian these 6mile intervals are known as townships. The way in which
references are made to these various base lines and
meridians and the further division of the “squares” in
sections that are formed on the bases of the baseline and
meridians is similar and unique all over the U.S.
The FRS was a useful tool in granting land to settlers.
Newly “discovered” conquered, or traded lands were
divided in ranges and townships on the basis of the initial
point. After the size of a parcel of land, suitable to feed a
family was determined, each applicant could buy a
“square” parcel of land of that size, of which the location
would be uniquely identified in the FRS. Additional
surveys were not necessary. It is remarkable that even
today the reference to the FRS is often made in the
registration, although, most of its initial usefulness is lost.
With the increasing urbanization the FRS system becomes
often too coarse to serve as a good indicator for the small
parcels of land that are common in urban areas.
Nevertheless, references to the FRS system are maintained
as much as possible as reference to the location of the
parcels.
The FRS system is in use in 30 of the 50 states of the U.S.
(and in provinces in Canada). There are 32 base lines and
35 meridians in the U.S. The original colonial states
(mainly on the East coast and New England), Hawaii,
Virginia, Kentucky and Texas do not use the FRS system
(Florida is the only Atlantic coast state using the FRS). 52
Taking into account the technology available nowadays for
computerizing registration and mapping, after analyzing this
system of registration of rights to land in the U.S., it seems to be
complex and somewhat unsophisticated. One of the reasons that
explain this situation is without doubt the existence of title
insurance provided by private insurance companies. For sure, this
has reduced the urgency to modernize the land registration system.

52. HENRI A.L. DEKKER, THE INVISIBLE LINE: LAND REFORM, LAND
TENURE SECURITY AND LAND REGISTRATION 182 (Ashgate Publ’g ltd. 2003).
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Title insurance in the United States is indemnity insurance
against financial loss from defects in title to real property and from
the invalidity or unenforceability of mortgage liens. This type of
insurance is meant to protect the financial interest of owners or
lenders against losses due to title defects, liens or other matters. It
will protect against a lawsuit attacking the title as it is insured, or
reimburse the insured for the actual monetary loss incurred, up to
the amount of insurance provided by the policy.
C. The Demand for Title Registration: An Economic Approach
According to the way in which registers are organized and the
degree of effectiveness attributed to them, it is possible to divide
them into two main categories.
1) The registration of deeds system. This type of system is also
termed the “opposability system” and is currently used in France,
Belgium, Portugal and Italy. The defining characteristic of this
system is that documents are registered without the identification
of the latest genuine title holder, that is to say the documents are
not examined beforehand as part of a process to establish the
identity of the title holder, but merely have to comply with certain
formal requisites. The content of the register, therefore, only
defines a group of possible title holders, and holds a complete set
of all the documents pertaining to a property, which may be
inspected on request.
Given the resulting lack of certainty of this system in some
countries, like in the U.S., it is quite common to contract “title
insurance” to provide holders with an indemnity should they be
dispossessed of their title. The negative aspect of this measure is
that while the indemnity provides economic security, an insurance
contract obviously does not provide any degree of legal security, as
the acquirer of the property may lose his title to it. Also, the
measure of economic security provided is limited, as the title
security does not cover the full value of the property, but only the
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purchase price (or a percentage of the purchase price) and not other
related costs of the purchase. In addition, the payment of any
indemnity is subject to the exceptions and conditions stipulated in
the insurance policy.
2) The registration of titles system, which is also referred to as
the “the presumption of correctness system.” This system is
currently in place in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain and
England. In this system, rights are inscribed in the registry, and it
does not consist of a collection of original documentation
pertaining to the property, as does the registration of deeds system.
The registrar is responsible for carrying out a check on the legality
of the claims presented and will not permit any inscription that
contradicts a right already inscribed in the registry without the
prior authorization of its title holder. In this system, the principles
of exactness (the content of the Registry is presumed to be a true
reflection of the legal situation) and priority (by which a posterior
but registered act prevails over a previous but unregistered act)
both apply.
Under the registration of deeds system, courts resolve disputes
by adjudicating property rights according to the moment in which
the deeds were recorded in the register. This creates a strong
incentive for people to record the deeds to a property as soon as
possible and for the parties or their intermediaries to gain the
consent of the title holders of the rights affected in order to do so.
In this way, the parties can voluntarily avoid possible future
conflicts over the ownership of titles.
In the registration of titles system, private contracts are also
accorded priority when recorded. However, the registrar is granted
authority that is almost akin to that of a judge and will not inscribe
a right if it negatively affects one previously inscribed, unless
previously authorized by the title holder to do so. This eliminates a
potential weakness of the registry and means that those legal
systems that have this type of registry treat inscription as
conclusive proof of the existence of the right, and establish a
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system of responsibility for those exceptional cases in which there
is an error in the register. As a consequence, those who acquire a
property in good faith, trusting in the accuracy of the registry, will
not be stripped of their rights over the property even if the genuine
title holder subsequently appears.
The two registry systems incur different types of expenses and
provide different kinds of benefits in terms of reducing the costs
derived from the uncertainty and the risk of losing property rights.
The registration of deeds system is certainly cheaper than the
registration of titles system, but it is generally considered less
effective. The lower cost of the registration of deeds system is due
to the fact that the examination of the deeds to establish the legality
of the rights contained in them is purely voluntary and, under these
systems, services to assess and insure the parties are provided by
private companies. This has sometimes been cited as a benefit,
because, as this system favours the intervention of the private
sector, the resulting competition to provide services tends to
minimize the cost of the services they provide.
However, in the opinion of Arruñada, 53 these advantages are
more illusory then real. The cost of voluntarily insuring a right can
be as much as and sometimes even higher than the cost occasioned
by the inscription of the right in the public registry. The
organization of this type of service by the private sector may also
be inefficient in economic terms as they are often provided by
monopolies and are normally tightly controlled by state
regulations. The fees of a French notary are fixed by the state, and
both the notary and the insurance company are subject to
legislation that limits entrance to their profession and specifies the
“products” they can offer and the procedures they must follow. As
a consequence, this duplication of institutions (private companies
and the deeds registry) to provide guarantees to the parties in a
property transfer is not economically efficient.
53. Arruñada, supra note 11, at 70.
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The registration of titles system requires a prior examination of
the legality of the rights to be inscribed to be carried out by a
public official. This requisite obviously increases the costs of the
transaction. However, by organizing the property registry in a
professional manner along the same lines as the organization of the
judiciary, a high level of productivity can be achieved. This level
of productivity is even higher when the registrar earns the benefits
produced by the registry office (as is the case in Spain).
The costs of the registration of titles system are offset by the
greater security it provides, 54 as it protects those who acquire
property in good faith through rules that govern the responsibility
for errors in the registry, by which subjects are compensated for
losses caused by errors. 55

54. According to Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights in
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967) this improvement in the definition of the
rights in question is only efficient when the benefits associated with it are
greater than the costs it generates.
55. Benito Arruñada, Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of Titling System in Land,
available at www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/607.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2013).
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ABSTRACT
The famed Slaughterhouse Cases were the first cases to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Those cases arose from a
Louisiana controversy. This essay suggests that Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, including Substantive Due Process, is
rooted in the civilian private law tradition as received in Louisiana
and as argued by the butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases. The
essay explores the civil law roots of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, beginning with the Twelve Tables and the Code of
Justinian. The essay explores how those early codes were
appreciated by subsequent Louisiana jurists, and how the civil law
approach became an integral part of subsequent Supreme Court
rulings involving the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout this
process, both the factual matters at issue in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, and also the philosophical underpinnings that created the
framework for the butchers’ complaint will be examined. The
essay uses French and Roman legal texts, as well as Louisiana’s
own legal history, to show that the Act that established the
centralized slaughterhouse and stock yards was an affront to the ius
commune and ius cogens of the era, but that the dissents that agree
with that interpretation, and not the majority opinion, served as
precedent in many subsequent Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Finally, the essay shows that while the civilian approach reached
its zenith with the Lochner era, it remains relevant, and indeed
central, to an understanding of modern Substantive Due Process
case-law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If it be said that the civil law and not the common law is the
basis of the jurisprudence of Louisiana, I answer that the
decree of Louis XVI, in 1776, abolished all monopolies of
trades and all special privileges of corporations, guilds, and
trading companies, and authorized every person to exercise,
without restraint, his art, trade, or profession, and such has
been the law of France and of her colonies ever since, and
that law prevailed in Louisiana at the time of her cession to
the United States. Since then, notwithstanding the existence
in that State of the civil law as the basis of her
jurisprudence, freedom of pursuit has been always
recognized as the common right of her citizens. 1
There exists among the members of the bar of most states a
popular though misguided perception of Louisiana and her legal
customs. Amongst these misconceptions is that while the rest of
the country developed a common law based upon the AngloAmerican legal tradition, Louisianans continued to adhere to some
strange legal form known as the Napoleonic Code, 2 causing the
two systems to develop separately and having little bearing upon
one another. 3 In fact, Louisiana’s rich history has contributed a
great deal to the common-law of the United States. There is
perhaps no better illustration of this than the civil-rights
jurisprudence that issued from the Supreme Court following the
infamous Slaughterhouse Cases.
1. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 105 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
2. The term “Napoleonic Code” is a common misnomer used by some to
characterize the source of the Louisiana Civil Code. In fact, the “Code
Napoléon,” or French Civil Code, was never applied in Louisiana, as it was
enacted in 1804, after the Louisiana Purchase (1803). When codification took
place in Louisiana (Digest of 1808), Spanish law was in force. The Digest of
1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code, which codified Spanish law, borrowed the
form of the French Civil Code, and its substance wherever it appeared to be
identical to Spanish law.
3. The idea that the Louisiana Civil Code is a simple continuation of the
Code Napoléon is a misconception. Louisiana had been a Spanish colony for
several years before its brief cession to Napoleon and subsequent cession to the
Americans, in 1804. See Symeon Symeonides, An Introduction to “The
Romanist Tradition of Louisiana”: One Day in the Life of Louisiana Law, 56
LA. L. REV. 249 (1995).

180

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate three points: that the
civil law of Louisiana embodies a certain conception of civil rights
and individual liberties, received from the ius commune and ius
cogens of its civilian forebears; that the argument undertaken on
behalf of the butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases represents that
conception of privileges and immunities; and that while the
butchers lost their case, the arguments advanced on their behalf
have had significant impact on federal civil rights jurisprudence,
reaching a zenith during the Lochner era. 4 In going through this
process, it is my hope that the reader will gain a greater
understanding of the evolution of the American conception of
liberty. I hope that this will in turn raise awareness among
members of the bar about the degree to which civilian legal
thought has shaped that evolution. The purpose of this article is not
to advocate for or against any conception of rights or liberties,
Lochnerian or otherwise. That intriguing debate has produced a
great deal of able research already. 5
II. THE CIVILIAN CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY: IUS COGENS, IUS
COMMUNE
A. Economic Liberty as a Feature of Ius Cogens, and Ius Cogens
as a Feature of Domestic Law
Underlying many codified legal systems are the concepts of ius
cogens and ius commune. Ius cogens may be best translated as
peremptory norms, so normative as to be not susceptible to
derogation. 6 Although the term is generally thought to apply to the
4. The term “Lochner era” refers to a period during which substantive due
process jurisprudence was characterized by an emphasis on economic rights,
such as liberty of contract. The era is so named because of the landmark
decision in Lochner v. New York, infra note 124, which typified the period. The
Lochner era will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.
5. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chicago Press
2011).
6. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331:
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sphere of international law, is more correctly understood as a
secular, civilian iteration of natural law. 7 Although the subject of
this paper is not specifically international, the law as received in
Louisiana is the product of many centuries of dialogue between the
nations who had adopted and refined a codified system of law, and
those early Romanist thinkers and jurists from whom that law was
received. The development of these civilian jurisdictions must
therefore reflect the character of those several nations involved in
these epochal dialogues. Louisiana was first the colony of a distant
kingdom and, as a result, its jurisprudence is steeped in a tradition
of international dealing. Specifically, the colony of Louisiana dealt
extensively with its colonial masters in France and Spain
respectively, but also with its common-law neighbor, the United
States. Until the southern part of Louisiana became a territory
(Territory of Orleans) and then finally a state (Louisiana), relations
between Louisiana and her neighbors and various colonizers were
necessarily international in nature. In order to have a peremptory
norm as understood in the international context, that norm must be
viewed as not susceptible to derogation in each individual country.
Ius cogens can only apply internationally so long as each of the
several countries upon whom it is to apply share a normative sense
of the importance of the rights enshrined. For this reason there is
no logic to barring ius cogens from the lexicon of the domestic
civilian jurist.
With that in mind, our first task is to discern the nature of the
civilian conception of liberty and rights. Noted contemporary

For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.
7. James S. Gifford, Jus Cogens Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 481, 485 (1999) (arguing that jus
cogens is “essentially a secular articulation of natural law”).
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French intellectual Alexandre Kojève posits that human
phenomenon generally, and droit specifically, arose from
anthropogenic desires and the acts that accomplished the aim of
those desires. 8 Kojève states that this process is expressed as either
war or economics. The duality is the result of the “risk of the
master in the struggle [on the one hand] and on the other hand, the
work of the slave which results from it.” 9 To Kojève, justice as
achieved by droit is a human phenomenon, and in order for a
human to be fully realized, he must be a citizen who is neither a
slave nor a master, “being one and the other simultaneously.” 10
Through this discussion, we begin to see that the idea of liberty of
labor, as expressed through work, is inseparable from a certain
conception of the free citizen. To Kojève, a man who has no
freedom of labor cannot be a fully realized human being and is
therefore denied his humanity per se. 11 Personal and economic
liberty are therefore features of a legal system that cannot be
abrogated if the system is to retain its legitimacy. Although
Kojève’s analysis is more recent, echoes of those same concerns
are seen in many early civilian texts.
That certain rights of a man are not susceptible to derogation as
a proper function of legitimate law is a known feature of ius
cogens. By applying Kojève’s conception of the actualized human,
8. ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RIGHT 215
(Bryan-Paul Frost ed., Bryan-Paul Frost & Robert Howse trans., 2000) (dialectic
concerning the source of droit) (“In other words, all human phenomena have as
their basis War and Economics, based upon Work. It is economics and war
which constitute the actuality of human reality, of the historical existence of
humanity”).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 216 (“And if he is man, and not animal, as warrior, worker, or
citizen, it is not only as such that he is so. He is just as human as a ‘religious
subject’ or a ‘moral subject’ and so on, or finally as a ‘subject of droit’”).
11. See id. at 231:
Just as the Slave can only free himself by synthesizing mastery with his
servitude, his Droit can only be actualized by being synthesized with
the Droit of his master. And just as the freed slave (by resumption of
the struggle and an acceptance of the risk) is neither Master or Slave,
but Citizen, actualized slavish Droit is neither slavish nor aristocratic: it
is the synthetic Droit of the Citizen based upon the Justice of equity.
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we are shown that the nature of those fundamental rights requires
that freedom of labor run to the citizens governed by valid law. In
the French legal tradition, liberty and equality are both necessary
to the proper operation of justice. It is the emphasis on equality
that requires a high degree of economic liberty, as liberty and
equality are seen as inseparable features of a just legal system. 12
Indeed, amongst the French, whose Civil Code served as the model
for the Louisiana Civil Code, inequality is an “infringement” of
common rights that results from unjust distinctions between the
rich and poor. 13 In the French tradition, the absence of privileges
granted to a given caste is an imperative feature of a just civilian
society and was a feature of the ius cogens which formed the
opinions of the early Louisiana codifiers.
B. Ius Commune, Private Law, and the Presumptions of the
Louisiana Civil Code
As rights and liberties belong to people, codification of private
law places people on equal footing with respect to those rights.
These rights, connected to peremptory norms within the ius
cogens, are given force within the ius commune by way of the
codified private law. That private law should be seen as a
protection for the equal status of all citizens subject to the ius
commune was so central to early French codifiers that in the case
of the Code Napoléon, the general grant of rights to all French
citizens falls under Title I, Chapter I. 14 That the recognition of civil
rights as a birthright for all Frenchmen precedes a code that is
largely concerned with how those citizens structure their dealings
under private law is relevant in two ways. Structurally, the
12. ALFRED FOUILLÉE ET AL., Vol.VII MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES:
MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 37 (Committee of the Association of
American Law Schools ed., Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P. Camberlain trans.,
1916) (“Yet for the French this is only the first foundation-stone of law; they do
not comprehend liberty apart from equality. . . .”).
13. Id. (“To the French, what is inequality, if not privilege for one man and
servitude for another, and consequently a lack of liberty?”).
14. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.], Title 1, chapter 1 (Fr.).
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placement of these provisions reveals that the codifiers intended to
place civil rights at the fore of any discussion of private law.
Substantively, the Code Napoléon was promulgated in order to
cement the legitimacy of the law. 15 By placing these rights so
prominently, the codifiers put the people of France on notice that
the rights so enshrined should be expected and respected in their
private dealings, allowing the citizen to take an individualized
possession of, and responsibility for, his own rights. The
promulgation of these early codes served to place all French
citizens on equal footing with respect to the exercise of their rights,
and in so doing secured those rights from abuse. An individualized
realization of the protection of economic liberty is necessary to
ensure the citizens’ sense of security in their economic rights.16
Security is necessary to the development of wealth and democratic
character, and that security is in turn protected as a function of the
private law within the ius commune. 17 The ius commune as
expressed in the civil code, running from the Twelve Tables,
through France and Spain, and ultimately to Louisiana, acts to
promulgate these private rights, and serves to publicize the fact
that each citizen has been put on equivalent footing with respect to
rights against third parties. 18
C. The Civil Law as Received in Louisiana
In 1806, the Louisiana Territorial Legislature attempted to pass
an Act declaring the continued applicability of the civilian
authorities, until such time as “the Legislature may form a civil
15. Id. at art. 1.
16. FOUILLÉE ET AL., supra note 12, at 420 (“neither wealth nor character
can develop where the feeling of [moral and economic] security do not exist”).
17. Id. at 423–25 (discussing the features of private law “necessary to
assure the validity of a right as against a third person”).
18. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Of Promulgation of the Laws and
Promulgation of the Reasons Thereof, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIS EXECUTOR, JOHN BOWRING
157, 157–58 (Simpkin, Marshal & Co. 1893) (discussing the importance of
promulgating law in order to teach men how to live together without causing
one another injury).
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code for the territory.” 19 The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was a
direct rebuke to the American President, Thomas Jefferson, who
had installed Governor C.C. Claiborne with direct instructions to
implement the common law. 20 Although this Act was eventually
repealed, it is useful as it specifies the authorities and customs that
formed the Louisiana ius commune. Among those authorities
mentioned explicitly within this Act were: (1) the “Roman Civil
Code [sic], as being the foundation of the Spanish law,” described
as being composed of the Code of Justinian, the work of the
commentators and particularly Domat’s treatise on the civil law;
(2) the Spanish law, consisting of recompilations and books listed
in the Act. 21 Louisianans of the period feared that the common
law’s instability would result in a usurpation of property rights. 22
The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was born out of a fear of the
perceived uncertainty of the common law, and offers insight into
precisely what civil law was received by the people of Louisiana. 23
The Corpus Iuris Civilis and the Twelve Tables upon which it was
built, do describe a conception of the privileges and immunities
19. An Act declaring the laws which continue to be in force in the Territory
of Orleans, and authors which may be recurred to as authorities within the same
(1806), reprinted in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE at xxv (A.N. Yiannopolous ed.,
2013) [hereinafter “The Act to Preserve the Civil Law” or “this Act”).
20. Edward F. Haas, Louisiana’s Legal Heritage: An Introduction, to
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 3 (Edward F. Haas ed., Perdido Bay Press 1983)
(describing Gov. Claiborne and Pres. Jefferson’s stated goal as “assimilation” of
the Louisiana Territory).
21. See The Act to Preserve the Civil Law, supra note 19, at 6.
22. The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was passed by the House of
Representatives and the Legislative Council, but was vetoed by Governor
William C.C. Claiborne. John A. Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in
the Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing
Act and Beyond, 63 LA. L. REV. 1397, 1403 (2003).
23. See id. at 1408:
Because the authors of the Manifesto linked the survival of their land
titles, and their closely interrelated property rights in the slaves who
exploited those lands, to the survival of pre-cession Spanish (and
French) law governing those property rights, it is hardly surprising that
the Manifesto spoke with such intensity about the consequences of
‘overthrowing received [civil law].’
(quoting 9 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERRITORY
OF ORLEANS 1803-1812 652–53 (Clarence E. Carter ed., U.S. Gov’t Printing
Office 1940)).
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afforded to a Roman of that period. That conception is rooted in
the language of equality before the law. Using characteristically
direct language, Law I of Table IX tells us that in ancient Rome,
“[N]o privileges, or statutes, shall be enacted in favor of private
persons, to the injury of others, contrary to the law common to all
citizens, and which all individuals, no matter of what rank, have a
right to use.” 24 The civilian tradition of enshrining those rights as a
function of private law seems to have origins in the Roman
characterization of law as being either public or private. It borders
on the tautological to point out that in order for a right to run to an
individual, it must have an individualized expression. Under the
Roman approach, this could only be accomplished through the use
of private law, as public law was only concerned with the welfare
of the state. 25
This fundamental truth would have been understood by the
drafters of the Code Napoléon and the subsequent Digest of the
Civil Laws drafted by attorneys Louis Casimir Moreau Lislet and
John Brown. 26 Whether the drafters of the “Old Code” (as the
Digest was later called) intended to adopt a French or Spanish
conception of the ius commune was the topic of a rollicking
academic debate between two noted professors of law at Tulane
University and Louisiana State University. 27 Professor Robert
Pascal of Louisiana State University, and Professor Rodolfo Batiza
24. SAMUEL PARSONS SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 73 (AMS Press 1973).
25. See J. INST. 1.1.4 (INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (John Baron Moyle trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press, 7th prtg. 1967)):
The study of law consists of two branches, law public, and law private.
The former relates to the welfare of the Roman State; the latter to the
advantage of the individual citizen. Of private law then we may say that
it is of threefold origin, being collected from the precepts of nature,
from those of the law of nations, or from those of the civil law of
Rome.
26. See Haas, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that the Digest of 1808 was
divided into three books dealing separately with persons, with estates and things,
and with the acquisition of property, and describing the code’s drafters).
27. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical
Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 20, at
87.
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of Tulane University locked horns in 1972, with Professor Batiza
arguing that the sources of the Louisiana Code were largely
French; 28 both Professors contributed a great deal to the literature
on this matter. Some within the academy did concur with Professor
Batiza’s approach for a time. 29 More recently, the view that the
Louisiana Civil Code was inspired primarily by French law has
faded from prominence as a result of further research and
discovery. 30 Either approach is sufficient to establish that the
drafters, and the Louisiana Digest of 1808, were rooted in the
civilian notion of private law. The fact that the Digest is not
illustrative of the French revolutionary ideas did not prevent
French legal culture from being pervasive in Louisiana: the French
notion of liberty through equality under the law would later
prosper in doctrinal and court arguments.
D. The Constitution & Civil Code of Louisiana, circa 1870
Confusion about which earlier laws were to survive, as only
those contradicted by the Digest had been abrogated, made clear
the need for Louisiana’s Digest to be re-codified. 31 The redactors
included Lislet, Edward Livingston, and others, who went about
the task of crafting a coherent and complete civil code, this time
28. Id. at 98 (citing Batiza for the proposition that 70% of the provisions of
the Louisiana Civil code of 1808 were derived from the Projet du Gouvernement
and the Code Napoléon, and another 15% was Spanish and Roman and doctrinal
works) (“Thus 1,837 of 2,160 articles (or about 85% of the whole) were derived
from French sources while most of the remaining sources were derived from
Spanish sources”) (internal quotes omitted).
29. Id. at 101–2.
30. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code
in Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 37 (2012)
(discussing the evidence that the substance of the Louisiana Civil Code was not
derived primarily from French law); see also Thomas J. Semmes, History of the
Laws of Louisiana and of the Civil Law, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 313 (2012) (first
published as a book in 1873; Semmes discusses the largely-Spanish sources for
the Louisiana Civil Code).
31. See A.N. Yiannopoloulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L.
COMMENT. 1, 11 (2008) (citing Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817) as
representative of the problems that had thrown the system into an unworkable
state of tumult).

188

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

abrogating the ancient laws on points addressed in the code. 32
Many of those involved with the re-codification were in fact the
same individuals who had clashed with President Jefferson over
the original Act. Although the code was distinctly Louisianan, in
that Roman and Spanish sources were used, these drafters brought
a distinctly French conception of the civil law to their task,
allowing us to infer the continued application of the principles
discussed supra, 33 in doctrinal and court arguments. The Code was
revised yet again after the Civil War. The Code of 1870 is largely
the same as the Code of 1825, but for the removal of those parts
dealing with slavery and the incorporation of other statutes passed
subsequent to the 1825 Code. 34 This Code of 1870 is, in turn,
applicable to the facts of the Slaughterhouse Cases.
E. Public and Private Law as Expressed in the Louisiana
Constitution
Economic rights do not appear in any of the many revisions of
Louisiana’s Constitution until the most recent iteration, which was
adopted in 1974. 35 The statement of economic rights appears in the
preamble, which is an addition to the otherwise-similar preamble

32. Id.
33. Id. at 12:
The redactors of the 1825 Code followed the French Civil Code closely
and relied heavily on French doctrine and jurisprudence . . . . They
drew freely from the treatises of Domat, Pothier, and Toullier, but, at
the same time, paid attention to the Digest of Justinian, the Siete
Partidas, Febrero, and other Spanish materials. Even so, the Code of
1825 contains for the most part provisions that have an exact equivalent
in the French Civil Code.
34. Id. at 14:
The Civil Code of 1870 is substantially the Code of 1825. The changes
made relate merely to the elimination of provisions concerning slavery,
the incorporation of amendments made since 1825, and the integration
of acts passed since 1825, which dealt with matters regulated in the
Code without officially amending it. These changes necessitated
renumbering the articles of the Code, but they did not affect its
structure, underlying theory, or the substance of most of its provisions.
35. LA. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to Almighty
God for the civil, political, economic, and religious liberties we enjoy. . . .”).
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to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.36 Instead, the early
constitutions appear to have followed the Justinian approach,
treating the constitution as an instrument of public law and
eschewing any mention of private rights or liberties. 37 The marked
shift in approach coincides with the end of the Civil War and the
beginning of the Radical Republican and carpetbagger 38 rule,
which held sway over the State of Louisiana during the early
reconstruction period. 39 With the influx of carpetbaggers and with
minority suffrage militarily ensured, the Louisiana Constitution of
1868 reflects the Radical Republican ideals and echoes language
found in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.40 This 1868 document sees the first use of the
Louisiana Constitution to enumerate individual rights and liberties,
thereby blurring the once neat distinction between public and
private law. 41 Even though Louisiana had been weakened by a
civil war and subjected to the importation of northern political
actors, only some of the assimilation intended by Thomas Jefferson
nearly seventy years prior was possible. It is a testament to the
depth of the civil law importance to the Louisianans of the day that
36. LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1972) (“We, the people of Louisiana,
grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberties we
enjoy….”).
37. See, e.g., LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1861) (“We the people of
Louisiana, do ordain and establish this Constitution”).
38. “Carpetbagger” is a derogatory term used by Southerners for those
Northerners who moved south after the Civil War. They were viewed as
outsiders and opportunists in search of personal financial gain at the expense of
the local population.
39. See e.g., LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION 11–12
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011). The post-Civil War Reconstruction period in the
former Confederate (southern) states lasted from 1863-1877. By 1876, only
three of the eleven states subject to Reconstruction were still occupied by the
federal military: Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina; see ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (Harper &
Row 1988).
40. LA. CONST. Title I Art. 3 (repealed 1879) (“There shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment
of a crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted”).
41. LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1879) (“We the people of Louisiana, in
order to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . . .”).
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the civilian distinction between public and private law persisted as
long as it did. It follows that, because the constitutions drafted
under self-rule reflect the Roman distinction between public and
private law, those pre-war instruments were a more true reflection
of the civilian approach and, as a result, they are a more accurate
reflection of the deeply held convictions of butchers of the era and
their lawyers.
To those tradesmen and their attorneys, the right of self
directed labor and economic liberty was so rooted in the civil law,
and eventually in the Louisiana Civil Code, that there was no need
to specify that right, as any act in contravention of those liberties
would be repugnant to legitimate governance, and in derogation of
the ius cogens and ius commune. There was no bill of rights in the
original Louisiana Constitutions, not because the civilians had not
considered rights at all, but because their approach was
fundamentally different. A bill of rights was familiar to common
law jurisdictions and would have been familiar to jurists in
Louisiana. That such an enumeration was absent from the
Louisiana Constitution until its addition by a reconstruction
government, shows that is was previously omitted by choice; a fact
that further supports the contention that the Civil Code, while
private in nature, was intended to secure the liberties of the
governed by way of equality before the law.
At this stage, it bears explicitly mentioning that thus far we
have followed a clearly delineated path from the Twelve Tables
and the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the foundational texts of civilian
jurisprudence, to the French civil law, and now to the Louisiana
law and custom, which would have been the custom and law
governing those involved in the Slaughterhouse litigation.
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III. THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES
A. Historical Context: A Brief Detour through Corruption, a
Monopoly and Reconstruction Politics
On March 8, 1869 the Louisiana legislature passed a bill
prohibiting the slaughter of livestock within what are now known
as Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes. 42 The ability to
maintain livestock and butchering facilities was instead assigned to
the seventeen-person Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company. 43 The Act, entitled “An act to protect
the health of the city of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings
and slaughter-houses and to incorporate the Crescent City LiveStock Landing and Slaughter-House Company” served to divest
over 1000 local butchers and related workmen from their
livelihoods. 44 While slaughtering operations in New Orleans had at
one time been limited to a spit of land, now known as Algiers, on
the opposite bank of the Mississippi river, the practice of
boucherie spread quickly as the city grew. 45 This fast, unrestricted
growth in a manifestly unsanitary trade led to some obvious risks
and waste disposal issues. So acute was this problem, that not only
was slaughtering sometimes done in the city streets, but improperly
discarded livestock waste and butchering offal was left to fester in
the streets and on the banks of the river. 46 The descriptions of
those present at the time are predictable but shocking, as they
describe a situation so putrid and unhealthy as to be unimaginable

42. JULIUS J. MARKE, VIGNETTES OF LEGAL HISTORY 170 (Fred B. Rothman
& Co. 1965).
43. Referred to hereinafter as “the Company.”
44. Act of Mar. 8, 1869, No. 117, 1869 La. Acts 170 [hereinafter “the
Act”]; MARKE, supra note 42, at 170.
45. RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 38 (Univ.
Press of Kansas 2003) (“Early in the century, slaughtering in New Orleans had
been confined to a small area located directly across the Mississippi from the
city and known as ‘Slaughterhouse Point’”).
46. Id. at 40.
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and ultimately raising the question: why was the Act so
vociferously opposed? 47
1. Bribery
The Slaughterhouse Act was not a new endeavor. The idea that
the city ought to return to a centralized butcher model had been
brought before the legislature, and was rejected and derided. The
butchers had become a genuine political force, both organized and
numerous. 48 To that end, it was difficult to pass effective
regulation. Soon after the passage of the Act, it became clear that
the various political roadblocks to regulatory reform had been
cleared by the use of a well-established tactic: bribery. The
legislators responsible for the passage of the Act had been given
the opportunity to buy significant stock holdings in the new
monopoly. 49 That pecuniary interest was sufficient to secure the
passage of the Act. The question of the validity of an Act secured
through bribery was central to the butcher’s arguments at the state
level. 50 Although the butchers argued that the Act was the result of
a conspiracy to enrich private citizens, secured through deceit,
fraud and bribery, an unfriendly Louisiana bench refused to rule on
that issue. 51 The butchers argued that as “an act for the emolument

47. Id. at 61:
The amount of filth thrown into the river above the source from which
the city is supplied water, and coming from the slaughterhouses, is
incredible. Barrels filled with entrails, livers, blood, urine, dung, and
other refuse portions in an advanced stage of decomposition, are
constantly being thrown into the river, but a short distance from the
banks, poisoning the air with offensive smells and necessarily
contaminating the water near the banks for miles.
(quoting testimony of a health officer of the third district, Louisiana House of
Representatives Special Committee on the Removal of the Slaughterhouses,
Minute Book (1867)).
48. Id. at 40–41 (discussing the butchers’ considerable political influence,
and explaining this as the cause for why reform failed).
49. MARKE, supra note 42, at 170.
50. See, e.g., State ex rel. Belden v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 547–48 (La.
1870).
51. Id.
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of private individuals,” the Act was a private statute. 52 As the
Court saw it, the Act was a valid exercise of police powers, and as
such was a matter of public law, not private, as the butcher’s had
urged. 53 While there have been attempts by some more recent
scholars to rescue the reputation of the legislators and the Courts
who ruled that the exclusion of the evidence was proper, bribery in
the legislature generally, and with respect to the Act specifically,
was common knowledge at the time. 54
2. “[A] monopoly of a very odious character” 55
The public resentment generated by the Act also grew from the
nature of the power granted to the Company. Because the
monopoly was seen as a benefit granted to a cabal of corrupt
profiteers, and secured through graft, the monopoly lacked the
intrinsic fairness apparent in other exceptions to the rules against
monopolies. 56 Justice Bradley, riding circuit in Louisiana at the
time, wrote in his decision that it seemed difficult “to conceive of a
more flagrant case of violation of the fundamental rights of labor
than” the monopoly granted to the Company. 57 This “odious”58
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly:
An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1306 (1984)
(describing the evidence of bribery as the result of southern obsession with
corruption and as having little evidentiary basis) contra LABBÉ & LURIE, supra
note 45, at 97–99 (citing litigation records of the stockholders in the company
for numerous clear examples of specific occasions of bribery connected to the
passage of the Act).
55. Live-Stock Dealer’s & Butcher’s Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) rev’d
sub nom. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
56. Michael Conant, Anti-Monopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J.
785, 823–24 (1982) (discussing Live-Stock Dealer’s Ass’n, 15 F.Cas. 649
(1870)).
57. Live-Stock Dealer’s Ass’n, 15 F.Cas. at 653:
So far as the act of the legislature of Louisiana is a police regulation, it
is, of course, entirely within its power to enact it. It is claimed to be
nothing more. But this pretense is too bald for a moment's
consideration. It certainly does confer on the defendant corporation a
monopoly of a very odious character. . . . But it is not sufficient to
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monopoly would have been seen as especially egregious to citizens
in a civil law jurisdiction, where the preferential treatment granted
to the members of certain social castes resulted in the strong
protection of those rights within the ambit of private law.
In a brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court, lead
attorney for the butchers, John Campbell argues this same point.59
Citing Thierry and De Tocqueville, Campbell points out that it was
precisely the eradication of preferential privileges in labor that was
credited with the rise, and indeed the very existence, of civil liberty
for all. 60 Campbell’s brief makes clear that the monopoly granted
to the company was a privilege that was expressly forbidden in the
French civil law as received by Louisianans a generation earlier. 61
The brief casts the monopoly as offensive to French and
international history and human nature, arguing that what is now
called ius cogens forbade unlawful servitude and restriction on the
free practice of labor, and that the Constitution of the United States
had adopted this peremptory norm through the ratification of the

show that it is a monopoly and void at common law, for the legislature
may alter the common law, and may establish a monopoly, unless that
monopoly be one which contravenes the fundamental rights of the
citizen protected by the constitution. . . . [T]he fourteenth amendment
of the constitution was intended to protect the citizens of the United
States in some fundamental privileges and immunities of an absolute
and not merely of a relative character. And it seems to us that it would
be difficult to conceive of a more flagrant case of violation of the
fundamental rights of labor than the one before us.
58. Id.
59. Plaintiffs’ Brief upon the Re-argument at 5 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872) (Nos. 470, 476, 480), 1872 WL 15118.
60. Id. (tracing unjust labor privileges from ancient times to banalités
(payments from peasants to lords) paid to the French lords, and the eradication
of banalité by the French legislative assembly in 1791):
These rights of Banalite (sic) were all suppressed in the 23d section of
the decree of 1791 of the legislative assembly. It declares that all rights
of Banalite (sic) of the oven, mill, winepress, slaughter house, forge,
and the like, whether founded on custom, prescription, or recognized by
judicial sentence, should be abolished without indemnity. Historical
writers attribute to this legislature,(sic) the suppression of castes in
France, and the existence of civil liberty for all.
61. Id.
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Thirteenth Amendment. 62 In an earlier supplemental brief to the
Supreme Court, Campbell points out that much like the ius cogens,
the assumptions that a worker could not be deprived of a right to
apply their labor or craft to their own benefit “were recognized in
the American customs and habitudes, and were assumed as valid in
written law and judicial decisions, and in all the intercourse of
society.” 63
Campbell uses that historical background to argue that the
monopoly granted to the Company was an affront to the butchers
and was no different than the hated banalité, or the involuntary
servitude, prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment. 64 Although
there is a clear irony, as detailed below, in Campbell making these
arguments, they do indeed reflect an understanding of the
Louisianan civilian tradition. This is evidenced by the swift repeal
of all monopolies in Louisiana, including the Company’s
monopoly, by the new Louisiana Constitution of 1879. 65 This new
Louisiana Constitution passed as the reconstruction influence in
the south dwindled, allowing the civilian impulse to again assert
itself. Notably, the Company sued the State, and again found itself
in front of Justice Miller’s Supreme Court. 66 There, the Company
argued that articles 248 and 258 of the new Constitution of
62. Id. at 6–8.
63. Supplemental Brief and Points of Plaintiffs in Error at 3 Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), 1871 WL 14607.
64. Plaintiffs Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 59, at 8–9.
65. See LA. CONST. art. 248 (repealed 1898):
The police juries of the several parishes, and the constituted authorities
of all incorporated municipalities of the state, shall alone have the
power of regulating the slaughtering of cattle and other live-stock
within their respective limits: Provided, no monopoly or exclusive
privilege shall exist in this state, nor such business be restricted to the
land or houses of any individual or corporation: provided, the
ordinances designating places for slaughtering shall obtain the
concurrent approval of the board of health or other sanitary
organization.
See also LA. CONST. art. 258 (repealed 1898) (“[T]he monopoly features in the
charter of any corporation now existing in the state, save such as may be
contained in the charters of railroad companies, are hereby abolished”).
66. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co., v.
Crescent City Live-stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
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Louisiana were void as an impermissible infringement of their
contract with an earlier legislature. 67 In that case, Justice Miller,
again writing for the majority, deferred to the State and allowed the
articles in question to stand. 68
3. The Politics of Reconstruction: Attorneys and Justices in the
Slaughterhouse Cases
All of the foregoing discussion appears to be a principled
debate over sound legal principles. Had the Slaughterhouse Cases
arisen in a vacuum, this certainly would have been the case.
Instead, the litigation arose while the dust of the American Civil
War still hung in the air. The case featured some of the keenest and
most influential legal minds of the day. Even more than today, the
bar of the reconstruction era was an exclusive guild, and,
especially at such a high level, its members could be expected to
have interacted frequently. In the years surrounding the Civil War,
this familiarity understandably bred some personal acrimony
among the members of the bar. These pre-eminent legal minds
were quick to involve themselves in the cause not out of a sincere
interest in the appropriate setting for live-stock slaughter, but out
of deep and divisive disagreements about the role of the federal
government in the Deep South following the Civil War.
The chief attorney for the butchers, John Campbell, was a son
of the South and had served as a United States Supreme Court
Justice for several years before resigning upon Alabama’s
secession from the Union. 69 After a return to the practice of law in
his adopted home of New Orleans, Campbell became
disenchanted, even bitter, at the state of affairs in the
67. Id. at 749–50 (discussing the Company’s argument that the Louisiana
Constitution of 1879 included articles that were an impermissible infringement
of a contractual obligation under U.S. CONST. Art. 1 § 10).
68. Id. at 754.
69. Jonathan Lurie, Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller & the
Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 355,
359–60 (2005) [hereinafter Lurie, Reflections on Justice Miller].
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reconstruction South. 70 Campbell’s ire eventually led him into the
ironic position of arguing that federal law, in the form of a
Constitutional Amendment passed for the benefit of blacks and
former slaves, precluded the legislature of the State of Louisiana
from enacting certain laws. 71 Chief Justice Miller, author of the
Slaughterhouse decision, had joined the Court the year after
Campbell’s resignation. In his correspondence, Miller had initially
offered faint praise in support of Campbell. 72 He had apparently
changed his opinion of the man when he wrote of Campbell: “I
have neither seen nor heard of any action of Judge Campbell’s
since the rebellion . . . which was aimed at healing the breach he
contributed so much to make.” 73 In addition, there was significant
concern that the argument forwarded by Campbell would dilute the
protections granted to the freed-men under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 74 Miller’s skepticism grew in part from the very real
debates concerning federalism. 75 It was into this environment of

70. Id. at 360–61 (recounting Campbell’s path from the Supreme Court, to
Assistant Secretary of the War for the Confederacy, to prison and ultimately to
New Orleans, as well as describing Campbell as bitter at the state corruption and
racial integration in the South).
71. Id. at 361 (“Here the ex-Confederate official who had glorified states'
rights now repudiated the idea ‘that the Legislatures of the States have powers ...
limited only by the express prohibitions of the [state and federal constitutions],
or by necessary implication’”) (citing LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 45) (alteration
in original).
72. LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 45, at 108–09. (“I esteem him very highly
and look upon him as a man of honor and an unfortunate one”) (citing CHARLES
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER & THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890 at 113
(Harvard Univ. Press 1939).
73. Id. (calling Campbell a partisan and a leader of “the worst branch” of
New Orleans politics).
74. Lurie, Reflections on Justice Miller, supra note 69, at 367.
75. See e.g., James W. Fox Jr., Re-Readings & Misreadings: SlaughterHouse, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY.
L.J. 67, 86 (2002/2003):
For Miller, the only option other than his restrictive view of the Clause
was one that destroyed federalism and dangerously empowered the
Court. The very starkness of the alternatives, argued Miller, enabled
him to accept what he considered an otherwise weak (‘not always the
most conclusive’) argument: the parade of anti-federalism horribles. He
saw no middle ground.
(quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872)).
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war, graft, and personal strife that Campbell brought his arguments
on behalf of the butchers.
B. The Arguments Advanced
1. By the Company
The Company maintained its simple yet effective argument at
each level of appeal. First, they argued that the butcher’s assertion
that the legislature was bribed was unsupported by evidence. 76 The
Company and the State maintained that the Act was a fair and legal
application of the State’s police power over the area of public
health. 77 Lastly, these defendants also argued that the Privileges
and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to extend only to the protection of rights received as the result of
national citizenship, such as voting, habeas corpus, and other
rights explicitly spelled-out in the Constitution. 78 This simple yet
effective three part argument, while ultimately successful, finds
little support in Louisiana’s civilian jurisprudence. The continental
understanding of the term “privileges and immunities” may even
be couched in the Twelve Tables and its abolition of the

76. Transcript of Record at 18–19, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(No. 466), 1870 WL 12597 (“That the allegations of said petition are
impertenent (sic), scandalous, & criminous (sic); that it contains general, loose,
& railing accusations against these defendants, without certainty, specification,
or detail . . . .”).
77. Brief of Counsel of Defendant in Error at 6–7, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872) (No. 479), 1871 WL 14608:
In order to promote the health and comfort of the people, the State of
Louisiana possesses all the power of sovereignty; the legislature might
direct State officers to be appointed to inspect and superintend stock
landings and slaughter-houses, as well as direct where such should be
established. Laws of this character have been respected by Congress
from the earliest period of the Government.
78. Brief of Counsel of Defendant in Error, supra note 77, at 5:
This amendment seeks to protect two classes of individuals: First,
citizens of the United States; second, all persons whatever, whether
citizens or aliens. The first portion plainly refers to political privileges,
and shields only such privileges and immunities as individuals may
have in their peculiar character as citizens of the United States . . . .
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privilegium and immunitas granted by royal edict. 79 This
understanding was known in French law, and was reflected in the
fact that the civil code, as a system of private law, understood
rights and privileges to belong in first instance to the people. 80 The
offense to that understanding is therefore two-fold: First, it is
repugnant to the civilian jurist that the law would only protect
those privileges granted by a sovereign, instead of those naturally
belonging to the citizen as a matter of ius cogens. Second, that a
private company consisting of seventeen private citizens, and not
the government itself, would exercise privileges and recognize
profits that rightfully belonged equally to the citizens of Louisiana.
To this point, the state asserted that the right to engage in the
profession of butchering was not infringed, but simply its place
and manner was restricted. 81 This ignores the fact that, properly
read, the butchers’ argument was not simply that their physical
labor rights were infringed, but that the very granting of the
privilege of operating a slaughterhouse to the Company was a
violation of the equality of men before the civil code.

79. See Eberhard P. Deutsch, Civil Liberties Under the Civil Law, 12 TUL.
L. REV. 331 (1938) (arguing that the foundation for American civil liberties is
found in the civilian traditions of French and Roman law).
80. Id. at 335:
In Great Britain, in other words, privileges vested in the crown in the
first instance, and the demand, never questioning the royal prerogative,
sought simply a grant or concession. In France, however, the
declaration was boldly made that rights and liberties belong in the first
instance to the people; that privileges and immunities are attributes of
citizenship, not of nobility.
81. Brief of Counsel of State of Louisiana, and of Crescent City Live Stock
Landing & Slaughter House Co., Defendants in Error at 4, Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (Nos. 60, 61, 62), 1872 WL 15119:
The owner of the animal passed by the health inspector may then
slaughter it for the market; he may do this either with his own hands, or
by those of his own servants. The act of the legislature does not compel
the owner of the animal to employ any State agent or corporation
servant to slaughter the animal. All the act does is to say where it must
be slaughtered.
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2. By the Butchers
John Campbell had argued initially in the lower courts that the
Act should be rescinded on the basis of it having been secured
through graft, and improperly passed for not having been signed by
the governor within the required time period. These arguments,
while important, have been discussed above to the necessary
extent, and will be, perhaps unfairly, de-prioritized so that the
focus may be on the arguments before the Supreme Court. In
arguments regarded by all of his contemporaries as masterful,
Campbell retained his arguments that the Act was the product of
bribery, but he also shifted his focus to what he saw as a violation
of the civil rights of the butchers; rights that, as it happened, were
now protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
In his oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Campbell
invoked the Thirteenth Amendment and argued that the butchers
were being compelled into specific performance on behalf of the
company. 82 He drew parallels between the newly-freed slaves, the
butchers, and examples from French history. French history, he
said, included “a number of instances of persons [whose servitude
consisted of] their performance of ludicrous and debasing acts on
particular days of the year for the entertainment of their masters.”83
He posited that if “a legislature of a state were to pass a law that
the emancipated slaves should appear before their masters, sing
some of their native songs, or dance their country [sic] dances, it
would at once be pronounced as a restoration of some remnant of
their ancient servitude.” 84 This illustration highlights a key
distinction. In the civilian tradition, involuntary servitude had been
abolished by the civil code, and the protections of the private law
82. Transcript of the Oral Argument at 3, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1872), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 733, 736 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ. Pubs. of America 1975).
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
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were thought to extend to any unjustly compelled act, especially
those required by an edict of the sovereign. Campbell sought to
cement this notion in the Court’s understanding, when he argues
that there are several forms of servitude that have little to do with
any requirement of labor or production. 85 He supports his
argument that the prohibition of involuntary servitude should be
applied broadly, with a direct appeal to civilian tradition, saying
that, upon the abolition of the feudal system at the time of the
French Revolution, such honorific acts intended to assert the
superiority of the lords over the inferior vassals had been
abolished. 86 In this we see the clear parallel between an act
imposed by an illegitimate feudal government, and an offense
prescribed by an illegitimate corrupt legislature.
To the civilian it was not simply a matter of being required to
undertake butchering in some particular manner, but that he was
being compelled to engage in an act, by a sovereign using
tyrannical means, which caused the act to become involuntary
servitude. Campbell urged the Court to consider that the civilian
tradition of the idea of servitude sounds in property law. 87
According to Campbell, the very use of the term servitude carries
with it an invitation to consider property rights in oneself and one’s
85. Id. at 6 (stating that the conditions of caste are a form of servitude;
describing the servitude inherent in the Hindu caste system).
86. Id. at 15 (quoting Phillippe-Antoine Merlin de Douai).
87. Plaintiffs Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 59, at 4–5:
What was involuntary servitude? The servitude (servitus) of the Roman
law, and the continental law founded on it are relations of property. A
right of one [sic], to deal with [sic], or to use the property of another, as
an incident or accessory to his ownership of another property is a
servitude. In strictness, the relations are those of immoveable property.
The estate owing the servitude is Servient. The estate benefitted and the
creditor is Dominant. When slaves become immoveable [sic], by
destination and bound to the soil (coloni, adscriptitii) the servitude lost
something of its strict character, and acts and duties were imposed upon
the estate. Tythes are spoken of [sic], as a servitude combined with an
obligation. There was a right to a part of the produce adversus
quemcunque [sic], with a charge on the owner to set it apart, so in
Scotland the teind. So the Thirlage which is classed as a servitude, and
imposes the specific duty upon the inhabitant of the thirl to carry his
grain to the mill to be ground.
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labors. These were, he argued, liberties protected by the
Constitution. In so doing, Campbell engages in an argument
similar to that argued years later by Kojève. 88 Campbell argued
that the butcher, bound to the soil of the Company, was no longer
free as a result of the violation of his privileges of citizenship.
Kojève would argue that the unequal status with respect to rights in
labor denied the butcher his humanity.
The butchers’ position was that the Fourteenth Amendment
barred any state from passing any law abridging any privilege or
immunity of a citizen. 89 They include in these privileges and
immunities those protected by the civil code, including “life,
liberty, property, or title of the plaintiffs to equal protection.” 90 In
his supplemental brief, Campbell, writing to the Court, points out
that according to Turgot, privileges to rights of labor ran to every
Frenchmen, and privileges to the contrary were abolished as far
back as 1776. 91 In the more expansive application of the
Fourteenth Amendment urged by Campbell:
The State is commanded neither to make nor to enforce any
law that deprives, or even abridges, any citizen of his
enjoy-joyment [sic] of his privileges or immunities. To
limit him in the choice of a trade, to deprive him of a
business he has pursued, and to give to others the sole and
exclusive right to follow that trade or to prosecute that
business, violates this Constitution.92
Throughout this brief there is the suggestion that the
“enslaving” act of the Louisiana legislature was not just an affront
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. Supplemental Brief and Points of Plaintiffs in Error, supra note 63, at 2:
The Constitution of the United States speaks to the State in the
imperative. The State shall not make or enforce a law, nor pass a law,
that shall work evil to any in the manner and in the particulars set
forth…. The Government of the United States necessarily acquires a
dominion over the State corresponding to the duty it has to perform.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4 (“Therefore, every person was authorized to exercise his art,
trade, or profession; and the privileges of corporations, guilds, and trading
companies, to the contrary, were abolished”).
92. Id.
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to the Constitution, but to the centuries of civil law jurisprudence
that had come together to protect the equality of men through an
individually applicable code of private law. 93 Campbell even goes
so far as to cite the Recueil Dalloz, a French law review in
circulation at the time, for specific regulations pertaining to the
slaughter of livestock. 94 He argues that these regulations, unlike
the Act, accomplish the appropriate health protections without
creating a monopoly and without infringing on the right of men to
employ their services as a butcher. 95
Campbell goes on to cast the meaning of privileges and
immunities as growing from the Roman tradition, as discussed
above. 96 He argues that in Louisiana’s cession to the United States,
Louisianans were guaranteed the privileges and immunities
inherently belonging to the citizens of the United States. These, he
argued, are civil, not merely political rights. 97 To Campbell, and
therefore to the butchers, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to secure in every citizen all natural rights implied by the history of
the civilian conception of liberty. Campbell’s argument was, in
essence, an appeal to the ius cogens of the era. His reliance on the
civilian basis of privileges and immunities may be best understood
93. See id.:
The emancipating edict of Turgot, and the enslaving act of the
Louisiana Legislature, in different ways, manifest the aim of the
amendment to the Constitution. The spirit of the edict pervades the
amendment, and it was framed to suppress all institutions of the kind.
The Louisiana statute creates a corporation having all the odious
features of those suppressed by the edict.
94. Id. at 4–5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6–7 (describing the genesis of the term “privileges and
immunities” as a Roman reference to benefits or exemptions, and asserting that
this remained the correct interpretation).
97. Id. at 7:
The terms are found in the fourth of the Articles of Confederation, and
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United
States; and evidently apply not to political, but civil rights. These rights
are protection to life, personal freedom, property, religion, reputation;
and, in the Treaty of Paris of 1803, providing for the cession of
Louisiana, the United States promise to grant the natives of that
territory the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens.
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as an attempt to point out that the peremptory norms in operation at
the time of the formation of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have presumed those liberties recognized by the continental
approach; namely, the liberty of labor, property, and self-direction.
C. The Decisions
1. The Majority Opinion
Unfortunately for Campbell, he was not arguing in a French
court, and Justice Miller’s opinion reflected this in no uncertain
terms. The opinion holds that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were intended to secure the rights and freedoms of
newly-freed slaves. 98 Miller’s opinion, as any first year law student
will attest, quickly and assuredly limits the application of the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
granting the newly freed slave the right of citizenship and those
other rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 99 Central to
this limitation is Miller’s contention that the privileges and
immunities of the United States are distinguishable from those
granted by operation of state citizenship. To Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only the former, and not the latter. 100 It is
98. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71-72 (1872):
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too
recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the
most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one
can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is
true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by
speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of
the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 75:
If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities
belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging
to the citizen of the State as such the latter must rest for their security
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unnecessary to undertake a full criticism of the opinion of the
majority in this case. Such criticism is nearly universal, and was at
the time as well. 101 What is more important is to discern what the
effect of that criticism has been on subsequent civil rights
jurisprudence. This paper adopts and aims to support that body of
scholarship which suggests that the rejection of the majority
opinion invited subsequent courts to adhere to the reasoning of the
dissenting opinions by Justices Field and Bradley. 102
2. The Dissenting Opinions
Three of the four Justices in the minority wrote dissenting
opinions. Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne each adopted and
added upon the dissents of the other. Space is given here to the
dissents of Justices Field and Bradley, while the dissent of Justice
Swayne is respectfully omitted. 103
a. Justice Field’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Field’s dissent is notable in that it adopts a great deal of
the arguments forwarded by Campbell. To Field, the question at
hand was nothing less than whether the Fourteenth Amendment
protected the citizens of the several states from state legislation

and protection where they have heretofore rested; for they are not
embraced by this paragraph of the amendment.
101. David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views on the Case, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 333, 336 (2003) (stating that distaste for the opinion is shared by
a range of jurists, including Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Lawrence
Tribe).
102. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 1292 (crediting Justice Field’s
dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases as championing the view that developed
into substantive due process); see also Wendy Parmet, From Slaughter-House to
Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 481 (1996) (calling the majority opinion in the
Slaughterhouse Cases a “trivialization” of the privileges and immunities clause,
and crediting the dissent with “enunciating” the theory of substantive due
process).
103. While all three dissents should be read together, only the first two are
directly relevant to the purpose at hand.
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that curtailed their rights. 104 While Field was not willing to apply
the Thirteenth Amendment as broadly as the butchers had hoped,
he adopted and indeed embellished the argument that privileges
and immunities extended to those rights seen as innate. 105 Justice
Field began his dissent by agreeing that the state police power does
indisputably extend to regulations of health and safety. 106
According to Field however, there were only two provisions of the
Act that pertained to an exercise of police power. 107 Under his
reading, only the pronouncements that the animals be inspected
and that the slaughtering must occur below the City of New
Orleans were proper exercises of police power. 108 What is notable
about Justice Field’s dissent is his extensive reliance, not just upon
case law, but on the history of the common law of England, and on
the civil law of France. Engaging in a sort of comparativism,
Justice Field argues that monopolies of the sort granted in the Act
were long held to be repugnant to the rights and privileges of a
citizen. 109 In a lengthy discussion of the English Case of
Monopolies that arose during the rule of Queen Elizabeth I, Field
asserts that the courts of England would have invalidated the Act
as being “void at common law as destroying the freedom of
104. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 91 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 87 (“That power undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting
the health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and is exercised on a
great variety of subjects, and in almost numberless ways”).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 87–88:
The health of the city might require the removal from its limits and
suburbs of all buildings for keeping and slaughtering cattle, but no such
object could possibly justify legislation removing such buildings from a
large part of the State for the benefit of a single corporation. The
pretense of sanitary regulations for the grant of the exclusive privileges
is a shallow one, which merits only this passing notice.
109. See id. at 104:
The common law of England, as is thus seen, condemned all
monopolies in any known trade or manufacture, and declared void all
grants of special privileges whereby others could be deprived of any
liberty which they previously had, or be hindered in their lawful trade.
The statute of James I, to which I have referred, only embodied the law
as it had been previously declared by the courts of England, although
frequently disregarded by the sovereigns of that country.
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trade….” 110 Field points out that the rights in question were seen as
fundamental, inalienable rights under both the common law and
civil law. 111 According to Field, the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to give operation to those inalienable rights recognized by
the Constitution, but in fact conferred by “the Creator.” 112 What
should be immediately apparent is that Field’s analysis did not
only adopt the civilian view of economic rights and privileges; he
argued that those rights were properly understood to be a
peremptory norm in the English and French legal systems, and
were therefore part of the ius cogens informing the creation of the
American common law. 113
b. Justice Bradley’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Bradley not only adopts the dissent of Justice Field, but
writes to dissent separately, saying that the rights in question are
among the most inherent, fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution.114 In making this argument, Justice Bradley engages
in an analysis that looks a great deal like an early iteration of what
will become substantive due process analysis. He argues that
preservation of the rights to labor, property and self-determination
are so fundamental that they are necessary to the operation of the
liberty protected by the Constitution.115 That analysis asks the
110. Id. at 102.
111. Id. at 105.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 106:
So fundamental has this privilege of every citizen to be free from
disparaging and unequal enactments, in the pursuit of the ordinary
avocations of life, been regarded, that few instances have arisen where
the principle has been so far violated as to call for the interposition of
the courts. But whenever this has occurred, with the exception of the
present cases from Louisiana, which are the most barefaced and
flagrant of all, the enactment interfering with the privilege of the citizen
has been pronounced illegal and void.
114. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 112–14 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 116:
Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the
rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights
which can only be taken away by due process of law, and which can
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reader to understand that without the power to exercise dominion
over one’s own labor, one cannot be free. 116 This sounds like
nothing if not the argument, advanced by Campbell, that where one
man or company has been granted a privilege, to the detriment of
another, the party who holds the privilege becomes dominant,
resulting in the servient party’s inability to exercise their own
freedom. According to Campbell, and now to Justices Bradley and
Field, this was repugnant to the idea of equality before the civil
code, and also to the Constitution of the United States. 117 Notably,
both Justice Field’s and Justice Bradley’s dissents display a
marked sense of incredulity. The reader notices a sense of either
shock or surprise, as well as a modicum of indignation, that such
foundational concepts are being challenged. Put another way, the
dissents evince an understanding of the law that sees individual
rights to labor as being indistinguishable from any other
fundamental individual rights. They view these rights as
peremptory norms, fundamentally presumed in the laws of the day.
The depth of this belief stands out in greater relief upon reading
Justice Bradley’s opinion below. In his opinion, Justice Bradley
regards the Act as being antithetical to a republican form of

only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be
modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual
good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every
free government.
116. Id.:
For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these rights the
individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such calling,
profession, or trade as may seem to him most conducive to that end.
Without this right he cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one’s
calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of
government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property
and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are
arbitrarily assailed.
117. See id. at 119 (Bradley, J., writing that the right to follow the profession
of one’s choosing is the most fundamental of the privileges and immunities); see
also, Plaintiff’s Brief Upon Re-argument, supra note 59, at 1,10, 49 (calling
liberty of profession, including that of boucherie, a fundamental principle of
law).
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government. 118 These dissents, as well as the opinion below,
display an adoption of the civilian sense of equality and economic
liberty, as reflected in the ius cogens and ius commune. They
supplement that understanding with support from natural law
theory, and find that both systems require respect for economic
liberty as being necessary for the law to operate in fidelity with fair
and democratic governance.
IV. ALLGEYER, LOCHNER, AND THE DISTINCTLY CIVILIAN FLAVOR
OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
If the majority opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases gave a
coup de grâce to the privileges and immunities clause, the dissents
articulated a clear path for the legion of jurists who would have
decided the case differently. That path led plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate their economic rights to assert them under the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 119 This in turn led to
the almost immediate development of substantive due process
jurisprudence. 120 The opinion in Allgeyer is dually notable: first
118. Live-Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Ass’n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) rev’d
sub nom., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872):
These privileges cannot be invaded without sapping the very
foundations of republican government [a republican government is a
free government]. Without being free, it is republican only in name,
and not republican in truth, and any government which deprives its
citizens of the right to engage in any lawful pursuit, subject only to
reasonable restrictions . . . is tyrannical and unrepublican. And if to
enforce arbitrary restrictions made for the benefit of a favored few, it
takes away and destroys the citizen’s property without trial or
condemnation, it is guilty of violating all the fundamental privileges to
which I have referred, and one of the fundamental principles of free
government. There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right
to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is
nothing more nor less than the sacred right of labor.
119. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1876) (applying the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulations promulgated by the State of
Illinois, and upholding those regulations as constitutional).
120. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (citing Justice
Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock
Landing Co., v. Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746,
for the proposition that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to
include economic liberty).
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because it is authored by Justice Peckham, who would go on to
write the controversial Lochner opinion, and second, because it
adopts Justice Bradley’s civil law inflected privileges and
immunities analysis from the Slaughterhouse Cases and applies
them to the due process clause instead. This judicial sleight of hand
is responsible for what would come to be known as “liberty of
contract.” 121 Justice Peckham’s reliance on Justice Bradley’s
description of economic liberty is deft in citing to the more recent
case as good law, while relying on the concurring opinion which
had essentially recapitulated the dissent from the original
Slaughterhouse Cases. Lochner, in turn, cites Allgeyer for the
proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” 122
This broader understanding of the scope of rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment has its basis in the arguments
submitted to the Court by John Campbell. His analysis of the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment protections grew from his
knowledge of the civilian tradition, and was adopted by Justice
Bradley. Bradley’s re-affirmation had in turn allowed Justice
Peckham to author an opinion that, while based in the same
jurisprudential tradition, accomplished those aims by way of the
Due Process clause, all while avoiding the fatally hobbled
privileges and immunities clause. Peckham’s decisions in Allgeyer
and Lochner are responsible for injecting the civil law and its
approach to private law into American constitutional law. It seems
at least worth mentioning that much of the subsequent debate over
Lochner and laissez faire economic jurisprudence stems in part
from the application of this distinct portion of the civilian private
law, absent the context that served as a limiting principle to the
121. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 41 (calling Allgeyer the first case to invoke
liberty of contract while invalidating a state law for violating the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
122. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
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economic interests of the individual. Seen in this light, there seems
to be support for plaudits and the criticisms leveled against the
Lochner decision, and those that followed it during the so-called
Lochner era. Justice Peckham’s approach in Lochner vindicated
the full throated defense of the civil code offered by John
Campbell and recognized that the liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were the full range of rights represented in
the ius cogens.
However well supported the Lochner decision was, it arose in a
system vastly different than the one the butchers belonged to. In
the absence of a unifying civil code, the opinion served to
exacerbate inequalities laid bare by the growth of corporate
interests in a newly industrialized economy. Where the Louisiana
Civil Code had served to equalize dealings between individuals
given equal standing through other parts of the code, Lochnerian
jurisprudence would lack an equivalent leash until at least 1937. 123
The use of the Due Process clause to protect economic rights
had begun its decline with the decisions in West Coast Hotel, and
Carolene Products. 124 Perhaps fearing that laws protecting
individual and civil rights would become vulnerable as a result of
their decision, the Court in Carolene included the much discussed
“Footnote Four” which bifurcated the standards of review for
economic regulations from the more stringent review that is
undertaken when a regulation may be an infringement on rights.125
123. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); see also
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (both cases upheld
regulatory limitations on liberty of contract as permissible under the Due
Process clause, in order to protect public health and welfare).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, & Judicial Review, 61
WASH. L. REV. 293, 301 (1986):
Having clothed economic legislation with so strong a presumption of
constitutionality, Justice Stone recognized that he might be diluting the
constitutional protection afforded individual rights. In the now-famous
footnote four, he conceded that ‘[t]here may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality’ when legislation (1)
‘appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution,’ or (2) ‘restricts those political processes which can
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That footnote helped to ensure that the substantive due process
analysis that Campbell and the Slaughterhouse butchers helped
elucidate would continue to be brought to bear on cases relating to
individual rights. With the exceptionally consequential decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court laid out its now controversial
“penumbral” understanding of the rights ensured by the
Constitution. 126 This expansive understanding of individual rights
was central to the laudable decisions in Roe v. Wade 127 and
Lawrence v. Texas, 128 all but guaranteeing that substantive due
process will continue to feature heavily in the Court and in the
culture wars.
V. CONCLUSION
Lochner has long been presumed dead, given the rise of the
deferential rational basis review and the New Deal legislation that
it permitted, but this does not mean that the civilian tradition that
served as its incubator has been equally shunted aside. The rhetoric
of Campbell, Bradley, and Peckham has become thoroughly
enmeshed in any debate over the scope of governmental power.
While the flood of cases governing the ebb and flow of economic
due process have slowed, the past century has born witness to the
renewed influence of the civilian tradition in the form of increased
codification at the federal level, and with it, a new-found place for
the doctrine of judicial restraint. The development of substantive
due process remains central in the protection of individual civil

ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,’
or (3) discriminates against minorities, since ‘prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities.’ Thus the Court's dual standard of
review was born.
126. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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rights. 129 That such a formidable body of jurisprudence, on such
important issues, is founded on ideas rooted in civilian legal
thought is a testament to the salience of those ideas.
The close relationship between substantive due process and the
butchers’ arguments under the privileges and immunities clause
continues to be relevant. The arguments advanced in support of
substantive civil rights under the due process clause were just as
comfortably made by John Campbell in support of economic rights
under the privileges and immunities clause. Indeed, the operation
of the Due Process clause and the Privileges and Immunities clause
are now seen as effectively synonymous within the world of legal
academia. 130 The rulings in Lochner v. New York, Griswold v.
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas all rely on the
doctrine of substantive due process, which in turn owes its
existence to the civilian butchers and the ius commune and ius
cogens as reflected in the Louisiana Civil Code. It is impossible to
know how Campbell would feel about the current iteration of his
argument. One might think that he would feel vindicated but
perplexed. To a civilian scholar like Campbell, the distinction
made in “Footnote Four” 131 would seem tortured and unnecessary.
Then again, maybe that distinction lends us the context necessary
to employ civilian privileges and immunities analysis, absent the
context of the ius commune. In either case, it is clear that
substantive due process is an appeal to the peremptory norms of
our time, and that the civil law tradition of Louisiana has played a
significant role in informing how those norms, in the form of
individual rights, are protected.

129. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965)
(discussing the importance of penumbral rights protected by the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
130. Kermit Roosevelt III, What if Slaughter-House Had Been Decided
Differently?, 45 IND. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (describing the academic consensus that
the Slaughter-House Cases were wrongly decided but that “overruling it would
not change much about the current state of constitutional law”).
131. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the American legal regime, criminal sanctions may
only be imposed where expressly allowed by law. However, there
are gaps in the law. Circumstances often arise which are not
covered by criminal statute, but merit some level of punishment.
Consider this scenario: a seventy-seven year old patient suffering
from advanced Alzheimer’s disease is placed in a nursing home
after being hospitalized with pneumonia. 1 “The patient is
bedridden, incontinent, and his limbs [are] contracted.” 2 Upon his
admission, the nursing home staff observes a very large, dark red
area around his buttocks that is identified as a Stage I or II
bedsore. 3 The staff fails to take the appropriate action to treat the
sore and, as a result, the condition worsens to a Stage III bedsore,
which broke open after eleven days. 4 The patient is finally
removed from the care facility and hospitalized. By the time a
doctor examines the patient, the bedsore has deteriorated to Stage
IV, which means that the man’s bones are exposed. 5 The patient
files suit, alleging that the caregivers were grossly negligent in
their failure to properly treat the bedsore. 6 The caregivers’ grossly
negligent conduct is unlikely to result in criminal sanction. It falls
within a gap in the legal regime; a gray area in which punishment
1. See Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz, 921 S.W.2d 731, 733–34
(Tex. App. 14th. Dist. 1996) (This factual hypothetical was taken from a case
heard by a Texas court, in which the court held the defendants grossly
negligent).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (when a bedsore has progressed to this point, the skin breaks open
and the sore becomes an open wound).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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and deterrence is merited, but not provided for by law. Allowing
the recovery of punitive damages for grossly negligent behavior
allows for courts to fill these gaps in the law.
The concept of gross negligence is a highly malleable, illdefined legal concept that falls somewhere on a scale between
negligent and intentional conduct. 7 It is generally defined as
conduct that can be considered more blameworthy than simple
negligence, but less blameworthy than intent. 8 While it’s generally
accepted that gross negligence, willful, wanton and reckless
conduct is an aggravated form of negligence, courts and scholars
have had difficulty giving any firm definition to the concept. 9
Prosser and Keeton have discussed gross negligence, and the
difficulties associated therewith, at length. According to them, the
terms “willful, wanton and reckless” have been applied to that
degree of fault which lies “between intent to do harm . . . and the
mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence”: 10
They apply to conduct, which is still merely negligent
rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many
respects as if harm was intended . . . . The usual meaning
assigned to [these terms] . . . is that the actor has
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which
thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to
the consequences. 11
7. FRANK L. M ARAIST & T HOMAS C. G ALLIGAN, J R., LOUISIANA T ORT
LAW § 1.06 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2009).
8. Id.
9. P ROSSER & KEETON, ON THE LAW O F T ORTS 209–11 (5th ed., W.
Page Keeton et all. eds., West 1984) (Some scholars have tried to place gross
negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless conduct at separate points on the scale
of negligence and create a scheme in which each term describes a different form
of conduct with varying degrees of liability. However, because this is such an
unworkable scheme, most courts and scholars consider these phrases
synonymous; all describing the same general type of conduct that can be
considered more blameworthy than simple negligence, but less blameworthy
than intent).
10. Id. at 212.
11. Id. at 212-13.
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Louisiana courts have joined the collective cry and lamented
the lack of clarity surrounding gross negligence. 12 In Rosenblath’s,
Inc. v. Bakers Industries, Inc., the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeals sought to distill a workable definition of gross
negligence. 13 The court discussed a number of Louisiana statutes
that provide varying definitions of gross negligence. 14 From its
statutory consideration the court concluded that the legislature
intended to define gross negligence as a reckless disregard, or
carless indifference, which may involve a gross or substantial
deviation from an expected standard of care. 15 The court then
moved on to judicial interpretations that yielded an even more
muddled definition than that distilled from statute. 16 From previous
interpretations, the court found that gross negligence falls
generally between negligence and intent. 17 The court went on to
conclude that Louisiana, through statutes and jurisprudence,
generally defines gross negligence as conduct that falls below what
is expected of a reasonably careful person under like
circumstances, or less diligence than even a careless man is
accustomed to exercise. 18
Both the Louisiana bijural system and the majority of common
law jurisdictions have arrived at a working theory of gross
negligence as an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care, which even a careless man would exercise, with complete
disregard for the consequences of those actions. 19 Although their
definitions are similar, Louisiana’s application of the gross
negligence standard is remarkably different from that applied in
12. Rosenblath’s, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 634 So. 2d 969, 972 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1994).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 973 (The court went further to say that gross negligence is a
reckless disregard or careless indifference and may involve a gross or substantial
deviation from an expected or defined standard of care).
19. See id. at 972–3; KEETON, supra note 9, at 211–12.
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her sister states. The common law employs gross negligence in a
more aggressive fashion, allowing its use as an offensive weapon
to create greater liability and allow recovery of punitive
damages. 20 In Louisiana, gross negligence is primarily used in the
context of the defense of immunity, when legislation promotes
public policy by limiting liability for certain actors.
This article focuses on the traditional areas of development of
gross negligence in tort law (immunities, contributory negligence,
and punitive damages) 21 and compares the practical application of
the concept in Louisiana with its application in other common law
jurisdictions. Although in many respects gross negligence operates
in the same fashion regardless of the jurisdiction, there is one
major point of distinction: Louisiana has chosen to limit the
offensive utility of gross negligence by severely curtailing the
availability of punitive damages. In so doing, Louisiana has chosen
to focus on the use of gross negligence in the context of
immunities, in order to raise the threshold of liability for certain
actors.
Section II of this essay considers the historical development of
gross negligence and its arrival into American and, more
specifically, Louisiana law. Sections III and IV consider the
application of gross negligence, in both common law jurisdictions
and in Louisiana. Finally, after an examination of the distinctions
in application in Louisiana and other common law jurisdictions,
this essay argues that Louisiana should incorporate the common
law application of gross negligence and punitive damages into its
legal system to fill the gap between criminal and civil law.
20. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491-93 (2008). Nebraska
does not apply punitive damages under any circumstances. Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire only allow recovery of
punitive damage under certain limited circumstances prescribed by statute.
21. This essay focuses on the use of gross negligence in its traditional areas
of tort development: immunities, punitive damages, and contributory
negligence. Gross negligence is also applied to other areas of the law including
contractual indemnity and workers compensation; however, these applications
will not be addressed here.
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II. LOOKING BACK: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
The concept of varying degrees of negligence has its origin in
Roman law. 22 Under the Roman scheme, there were three levels of
negligence: culpa lata, gross negligence; culpa levis, ordinary
negligence; and culpa levissima, slight negligence. 23 Although
gross negligence in the common law and in Louisiana both trace
their roots back to this original Roman concept, the theory made its
way into each system through very different routes. 24
A. Bringing Gross Negligence into American Jurisprudence
Gross negligence made its way into American jurisprudence by
way of the English writ system 25 from which the modern American
common law developed. 26 Under the writ system, tort law
developed on a case-by-case basis, as the need arose. Gross
negligence entered the English common law in 1704 in Coggs v.
Bernard. 27 Chief Justice Hold of the Kings Bench saw the need to
establish varying degrees of fault in dealing with bailment cases.28
To establish this system, he looked to the Roman tradition and
adopted its concepts of gross negligence, ordinary negligence, and
slight negligence. 29
American jurisprudence adopted the Coggs approach in 1822
with Tracy v. Wood. 30 Justice Story adopted gross negligence in

22. Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross
Negligence or Willful Misconduct”, 71 LA. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (2011).
23. Id.
24. See W ILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA C IVIL LAW T REATISE :
T ORT LAW 2–3 (2d ed., West 2009); Martin, supra note 22, at 977–78.
25. On the writ system, see EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: READINGS AND
CASES 26 (4th ed., West 2004).
26. Id.
27. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B); 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
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Tracy as a means of limiting the liability for gratuitous bailees.31
Since Tracy, the American judiciary has developed gross
negligence in relation to three different areas of tort law: punitive
damages, contributory negligence, and immunity statutes. 32 Under
the modern common law approach, gross negligence can be used
to justify an award of punitive damages, to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery, and to limit the
liability of certain actors with legislative immunity statutes.
B. The Louisiana Perspective
Louisiana’s civilian tort theory traces its origins directly to
Roman law through the laws of France and the laws of Spain,
applicable during the colonial period. The civil law notion of
obligation is derived from Roman law, which defined an obligation
as a vinculum juris, or bond of law, which obliges a person to do or
to refrain from doing something. 33 The Roman law of delict was
based on a simple overarching principle: “A man must see that he
does not willfully invade another’s right, or in breach of a duty,
willfully or carelessly cause him pecuniary loss. If he does either
of these things, he is answerable in damages.” 34 It was under this
Roman theory of tort law that separate levels of negligence first
developed. 35
Roman law found its way into Louisiana through French and
Spanish laws. 36 Antoine Crozat was granted a charter to develop
Louisiana in the name of France in 1712. 37 The charter provided
that the Coutume de Paris, along with all Royal Ordinances and
31. Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (C.C.D.R.I. 1822).
32. See Martin, supra note 22, at 992-1014.
33. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 2.
34. Id. at 5 (this principle found its way into many modern civil codes,
including the Louisiana Civil Code).
35. Martin, supra note 21, at 977–978. See also, discussion supra Part
I.A (In Roman law, there were three levels of negligence: culpa lata (gross
negligence), culpa levis (ordinary negligence), and culpa levissima (slight
negligence)).
36. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 10-11.
37. Id. at 8.
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Edicts, would govern the territory. 38 This form of French law
remained in effect until 1769, when Louisiana came under Spanish
rule. 39 The transition from French to Spanish rule meant that, at
least theoretically, Roman law, as received in Spain and codified in
Las Siete Partidas, governed the Louisiana territory until 1808. 40
In 1808, the legislature of the Territory of Orleans tasked James
Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet with collecting and codifying the
civil laws of the Territory, as Spanish law had been maintained
after the Louisiana Purchase. 41 Moreau-Lislet and Brown produced
the Digest of 1808, which the Legislative Council adopted on
March 31, 1808. 42 There has been a great deal of debate over
whether the Digest of 1808 was based on the Code Napoléon of
France or Las Siete Partidas of Spain. 43 Regardless of which
source the Digest of 1808 more closely resembles, both the Code
Napoléon and Las Siete Partidas find their roots in the Roman
tradition.
Under modern civilian theory, legislation is the law and is to be
treated as the solemn will of the legislature. 44 Judicial opinion is
nothing more than the interpretation of the law. 45 However,
because the code articles governing delicts are very limited,
Louisiana courts have been forced to write the majority of tort law
under the guise of interpretation. 46 Louisiana courts have thus
developed the state’s modern tort law, including the concept of
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 7, 10.
41. Id. at 10-11.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2 (2010) (“Legislation is a solemn expression
of legislative will”).
45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2010) (“The sources of law are legislation
and custom”).
46. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (La. 1988) (“The
framers conceived of fault as a breach of a preexisting obligation, for which the
law orders reparation, when it causes damage to another, and they left it to the
court to determine in each case the existence of an anterior obligation which
would make an act constitute fault”).
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gross negligence. Like the common law, Louisiana adopted gross
negligence from the Roman law and then developed the concept
through jurisprudence, focusing on punitive damages, contributory
negligence, and immunity statutes, just as in the common law
states.
III. GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE COMMON LAW
After the adoption of gross negligence into American
jurisprudence in 1822, the judiciary began to develop the concept
in the context of punitive damages, contributory fault, and
immunity statutes. 47 Punitive damages are employed to punish
certain behavior just as immunities are employed by the legislature
to promote certain behavior. 48 On the one hand, a plaintiff is
allowed to recover punitive damages upon a showing of gross
negligence while on the other, legislatures use gross negligence as
a limit to the defense of immunity, allowing the plaintiff to recover
when establishing that the defendant has been grossly negligent.
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in the American
Common Law
The idea of punishment as a civil mechanism can be traced
back to a number of ancient legal systems, including the Twelve
Tables—the original codification of ancient Roman law. 49 The
English common law adopted the concept of extra damages to
punish reprehensible conduct in the 1763 case of Wilkes v. Wood. 50
In Wilkes, the court granted an award for “more than the injury
received” against the Secretary of State for conducting an unlawful

47. See Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
48. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (The
Supreme Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest in protecting
their citizens from extra blameworthy behavior and affirmed the use of punitive
damages to punish the actor and deter future conduct of a similar nature).
49. John W. deGravelles, J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive
Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010).
50. Id. at 581.
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search of the plaintiff’s papers. 51 Afterwards, the English courts
began to routinely grant awards in excess of a plaintiff’s actual
damages when the defendant’s actions merited punishment. 52
In 1784, punitive damages crossed the Atlantic and entered
American case law in Genay v. Norris. 53 Since the adoption of
punitive damages into American law, the Supreme Court has
evaluated the appropriate use of the concept. In BMW of North
America v. Gore, the Court observed that some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others. 54 The Court affirmed that states have a
legitimate interest in protecting their citizens from extraordinarily
blameworthy behavior by allowing punitive damages, which the
Justices reasoned would serve to punish the actor and function as a
deterrent of future behavior of a similar nature. 55 In a later
decision, the Court was forced to address exactly what type of
conduct was worthy of civil punishment. 56 The Court determined
that punitive damages should only be used to punish a defendant
who was guilty of outrageous conduct, and affirmed the traditional
notion that gross negligence was the threshold for punitive
damages liability. 57 Many states have chosen to follow the
Supreme Court’s example. 58 Nevertheless, the availability of
punitive damages varies on a state-by-state basis. 59 This being
said, most states will allow the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages upon a showing of gross negligence. 60 In fact, this
application has become so entrenched in the American judicial
51. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, (K.B.) 498.
52. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, (K.B.) 768-69.
53. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 410 (2009) (citing
Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7, 1784 WL 26 (C. P. and Gen. Sess. (1784)).
54. 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996).
55. See id. at 569.
56. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 492–94.
59. Id. at 494. (Nebraska does not apply punitive damages under any
circumstances. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire
only allow recovery of punitive damage under certain limited circumstances
prescribed by statute).
60. Martin, supra note 22, at 994.
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mind that the Seventh Circuit has speculated that the primary
function of gross negligence is to justify an award of punitive
damages. 61
Georgia and New York are representative of the common law
approach to punitive damages and gross negligence. 62 Georgia
employs a statutory regime that governs the application of gross
negligence and punitive damages, 63 while in contrast, punitive
damages in New York are governed exclusively by case law. 64 A
consideration of the application of gross negligence to punitive
damages in Georgia and New York is illustrative of the broader
common law approach.
1. Punitive Damages under Georgia Law
The availability of punitive damages in Georgia is governed by
statute. State law allows the recovery of punitive damages where
the plaintiff can establish that the defendant’s actions showed
“willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that
entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to consequences.” 65 Under Georgia law,
punitive damages are primarily used to deter similar conduct in the
future by punishing a guilty actor in the present. 66 If the court finds
a defendant to be merely negligent, then damages are limited to the
amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 67 Punitive damages

61. Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 (7th Cir. 1905).
62. Both Georgia and New York set the minimum threshold for punitive
damages at gross negligence.
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Kicklighter v. Nails by
Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. See Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1317 (1982).
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
66. WMH, Inc. v. Thomas, 398 S.E.2d 196, 198 (Ga. 1990) (the court
insisted that the primary goal of punitive damages is deterrence, and a jury
award which had the sole purpose of punishing wrongful behavior cannot be
upheld).
67. Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 193 S.E.2d 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972).
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are only recoverable when the defendant’s conduct is worthy of
deterrence. 68
Under this standard, a Georgia court awarded punitive damages
in Comcast Corporation et al. v. Warren. 69 The plaintiff in this
case sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident when the
defendant’s employees failed to properly warn of an obstruction
they had created in the roadway. 70 After coming to an immediate
stop to avoid the obstruction, Mr. Warren was struck in the rear by
another vehicle. 71 The jury awarded Mr. Warren $280,000 in
compensatory damages and $720,000 in punitive damages. 72 The
trial court subsequently reduced the award of punitive damages to
$250,000, to bring the award amount within the appropriate
statutory guidelines. 73 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered the scenario and determined that the employees of
Comcast had behaved “negligently, recklessly, wantonly, and with
a conscious disregard for the consequences” of their actions in
their failure to warn of the obstruction they had created. 74 If the
court had determined that the defendants were merely negligent,
the plaintiffs would have been limited to compensatory damages. 75
But, because the court concluded that the defendants were grossly
negligent, punitive damages were appropriate. 76
2. Punitive Damages under New York Law
In contrast to Georgia, punitive damages in New York are
governed primarily by case law. Under the New York standard,
punitive damages are to be employed to punish the defendant for
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
1972).
76.

Id.
650 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312–13.
Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 193 S.E.2d 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
Id.
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his conduct and to deter similar future behavior. 77 To sustain a
claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that his or her
damages were the result of “intentional or deliberate wrongdoing,
aggravating or outrageous circumstances, a fraudulent or evil
motive, or a conscious act that willfully and wantonly disregards
the rights of others.” 78 If the plaintiff can establish one of these
aggravating factors, punitive damages may be awarded. 79
Under this standard, the Supreme Court of New York’s Kings
County upheld an award of punitive damages in Hall v.
Consolidated Edison Corporation. 80 In Hall, Consolidated Edison
employees entered a building on a Friday afternoon under the
pretense of being elevator repairmen. 81 Once inside, the employees
shut off electrical service to the common hallways and elevators of
the apartment building, which held over 500 tenants. 82 The
plaintiff, attempting to care for elderly and bedridden patients,
slipped on wax drippings in a darkened stairway and sustained
injuries from a fall. 83 The jury returned a verdict of gross
negligence and awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$5,000,000. 84 On appeal the court upheld the lower court’s finding
of gross negligence and the award of punitive damages, but
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the jury. 85
3. A Final Look at Punitive Damages
In the end, punitive damages are only awarded when the
actions of the defendant go far beyond the pale of reasonable
conduct. In 2005, punitive damages were only pled in an estimated
77. Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
78. Don Buchwald & Assocs. v. Rich, 723 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
79. See Le Mistral, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817–18.
80. Hall v. Consol. Edison Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. 1980).
81. Id. at 842.
82. Id. at 838.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 838–39.
85. Id. at 842–43.
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twelve percent of state court trials nationwide, 86 and awarded in
only five percent of all cases where the plaintiff won. 87 As these
statistics indicate, courts reserve punitive damage awards for the
limited circumstances where punishment is merited and deterrence
is necessary. 88 Most states consider gross negligence as meriting
punishment. In the majority of common law states, just as in New
York and Georgia, grossly negligent behavior will give the
plaintiff an opportunity to pursue an award of punitive damages.
B. Contributory Negligence in the Common Law
A second historical application of gross negligence has been in
the realm of contributory negligence. 89 Under the theory of
contributory negligence, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
which contributes to his injuries, bars the plaintiff from recovery. 90
Many courts were dissatisfied with the traditional contributory
negligence rule, but were unable to abolish it without stepping into
the shoes of the legislature. 91 Instead, the courts developed gross
negligence as a means of overcoming contributory negligence as a
bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. 92 Courts concluded that wherever it
appeared that the plaintiff’s negligence was comparatively slight
and the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, the plaintiff
should not be denied recovery. 93
Recognizing the harsh nature of contributory negligence, most
states have moved toward some form of comparative fault. 94 Under
86. Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, U.S. Department of Justice,
Special Report: Punitive Damage Awards in State Courts, 2005 (March
2011), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo35184/pdasc05.pdf.
87. Id. at 4.
88. BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (U.S. 1996).
89. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002.
90. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975).
91. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002.
92. Comment, Negligence: Exceptions to the Rule that Contributory
Negligence Is a Defense: Gross Negligence, 17 CAL. L. REV . 65, 66 (1928).
93. Id.
94. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair,
Disabled World (August 13, 2010), www.disabledworld.com/news/america/nc
/negligence-laws.php (last visited Jul. 30, 2013).

2013]

FILLING THE GAPS

229

a pure comparative fault scheme, liability is apportioned according
to fault. 95 For example, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault and
the defendant only ten percent, the plaintiff is still entitled to
recover ten percent of his damages from the defendant. 96 In
contrast, under an ordinary comparative fault scheme, liability is
apportioned up to the point at which the plaintiff’s fault is greater
than or equal to that of the defendant’s. 97 Under an ordinary
comparative fault scheme, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his
or her damages up until the point at which he or she is forty-nine
percent at fault, and the defendant fifty-one percent at fault. 98 If it
reaches the point where the plaintiff is fifty percent or more at
fault, recovery is barred. 99 Thirteen states have a pure comparative
fault scheme and thirty-three states have chosen to follow an
ordinary comparative fault scheme. 100 Only four have chosen to
continue applying contributory negligence. 101
The decline of contributory negligence has lessened the need
for courts to use gross negligence as a means of awarding damages
despite a plaintiff’s negligence. However, in the few jurisdictions
that continue to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence,
gross negligence can still be used to circumvent a bar to recovery.
For example, under North Carolina law, contributory negligence
still serves as a bar to recovery and gross negligence is still used as
a means of overcoming it. 102
C. Immunity Statutes in the Common Law

95. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242–43 (Cal. 1975).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair,
supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. Yancey v. Lea, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C. 2001) (The court accepted
the jury’s finding that negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant
were a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and denied the plaintiff’s recovery on the
grounds of contributory fault).

230

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

A third significant source of development of gross negligence
has been its use in conjunction with immunity statutes. 103 Many
scholars believe the use of gross negligence to overcome immunity
statutes is best seen as an “escape route” that allows a court to
avoid the absurd results that could be reached with unqualified
immunity. 104 Professor Fredrick Schauer proposed that:
Legal systems must provide some escape route from the
occasional absurdity generated by literal application
because applying the literal meaning of a rule can at times
produce a result which is plainly silly, clearly at odds with
the purpose behind the regulation, or clearly inconsistent
with any conception of wise policy. 105
Using gross negligence in conjunction with immunity statutes
provides a heightened threshold of liability for a defendant;
however, it also allows courts the option of permitting the plaintiff
to recover when the defendant’s actions are of such a nature that to
deny damages would be absurd. 106
Traditionally, legislatures have granted broad immunity to
actors whose conduct is considered valuable to society. 107 These
statutes are enacted under the theory that, while the defendant may
be a wrongdoer, there is greater social utility derived from
protecting him than in making an injured plaintiff whole. 108
Therefore, when legislatures view an actor’s activity as beneficial
to society, they may wish to protect that actor by limiting his or her
liability in tort action. 109
Immunity statutes provide an affirmative defense to certain
tortious conduct. 110 Most states do not provide unqualified
immunity for privileged actors. 111 Rather, they raise the threshold
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Martin, supra note 22, at 1006.
Id. at 1007.
Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 525 (1988).
Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 1032.
Id.
Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
Id.
Id.
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of their liability from negligence to gross negligence. 112 Plaintiffs
have to prove that the otherwise-immune defendants were grossly
negligent for recovery to be available.
Although there is some variation from state to state, almost all
common law jurisdictions employ governmental immunity
statutes, automotive guest statutes, recreational activity statutes,
and Good Samaritan legislation. 113 The recreational land use
statute is one of the most common immunity statutes in effect. 114 It
encourages landowners to open their property for public
recreational use, free of charge, by limiting the owner’s liability for
accidents that occur on the property. 115
Georgia’s recreational land use law illustrates how common
law immunity statutes operate to promote the governmental goal of
encouraging certain behavior by limiting an actor’s liability for
injuries that may occur on the property. 116 Under Georgia law, a
land owner generally owes no duty to keep his or her property safe
for recreational users; 117 however, the owner will be liable for
injuries if he or she was grossly negligent in failing to warn or
guard against a dangerous condition, use, or activity. 118
A Georgia court addressed the state’s recreational use laws in
Spivey v. City of Baxley. 119 The plaintiff brought suit for injuries
sustained while attending a softball game at a field maintained by
the County Recreation Board. 120 Mrs. Spivey alleged that she fell
after stepping from a concrete slab covering a drainage ditch. 121
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See The University of Vermont, Recreational Use Statues,
http://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law/recreate/recreate.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
115. Id.
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-20 (LexisNexis 2011) (Georgia takes a
traditional, middle-of-the-road view of gross negligence. The way the state’s
legal regime employs the concept in punitive damages and immunity statutes is
representative of how other common law jurisdictions treat gross negligence.).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-22 (LexisNexis 2011).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-25 (LexisNexis 2011).
119. 437 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id.
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She maintained that her injuries were a result of the defendant’s
failure to correct a dangerous condition existing on the property.122
In answer to Mrs. Spivey’s claims, the defendant asserted its
immunity under Georgia’s recreational land use statute. 123
The court recognized that, under Georgia law, a defendant who
allows free access to the property can only be held liable if the
plaintiff established that the defendant’s actions showed a “willful
failure to guard or warn.” 124 The court stated that for the defendant
to be found grossly negligent, he or she must have knowledge that
a condition which posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm existed, that the condition was not apparent to those
using the property, and that the owner chose not to guard or warn
against the danger in disregard of the consequences. 125
The Spivey court considered that, while Georgia’s recreation
land use statute did not expressly include spectators at athletic
events, the purpose of the statute clearly encompassed this sort of
use; therefore, the recreational land use statute was applicable. 126
The court concluded that the defendant was not guilty of grossly
negligent conduct and could not be held liable. 127
As the Georgia land use statute illustrates, immunity statutes
operate as an affirmative defense by allowing a negligent plaintiff
to escape liability. Had a state immunity statute not covered the
landowner in Spivey, it would have been liable to the plaintiff for
negligently failing to warn of the obstruction. However, because
the immunity statute was in play, the landowner was able to plead
as a defense that, because he was not grossly negligent, he could
not be held liable.
Immunity statutes are employed by the legislature to encourage
certain behavior just as punitive damages are awarded to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 626.
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discourage certain behavior. Immunities raise the threshold of
liability from negligence to gross negligence. If an immunity
statute covers the defendant, he or she will escape liability if the
plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant was grossly
negligent. This applies in Louisiana in the same manner as in
common law states.
IV. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Like the common law, Louisiana’s law of gross negligence
traces its origins to the Roman legal system. 128 Similarly, the
framework of Louisiana’s gross negligence law was generally
developed in the context of punitive damages, contributory
negligence, and immunity statutes. 129 However, the end result
differs slightly from that of common law jurisdictions. Unlike
common law jurisdictions, Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail
the use of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages.
However, it is still very much alive within the state in the context
of immunities.
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in Louisiana
Prior to 1917, Louisiana took an approach to punitive damage
that was identical to that of common law jurisdictions. 130 Courts
allowed recovery upon a showing of gross negligence, even though
early versions of the Louisiana Civil Code contained no punitive
damages provisions. 131 Louisiana courts acknowledged the conflict
between the state’s civilian heritage, which did not recognize
punitive damages, and this approach. 132 In Dirmeyer v. O’Hern,
the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that punitive damages were

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See discussion, supra Part II.B.
Id.
deGravelles, supra note 49, at 584–85.
Id.
Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887).
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borrowed from the common law 133 and that Louisiana’s practice of
granting this form of recovery was against the long-standing rule in
civilian jurisdictions that the purpose of awarding damages was to
repair the harm sustained by the victim, not to punish the conduct
of the wrongdoer. 134 In 1917, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought
to rectify this discrepancy in Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana.135
The court held that pecuniary penalties intended to punish the
tortfeasor would no longer be recoverable in Louisiana unless
expressly allowed by statute. 136
As a result of the Vincent decision, modern Louisiana law only
allows recovery of punitive damages where expressly authorized
by statute. 137 The statutory basis for punitive damages can be
found in the Civil Code, which provides instances where
“exemplary” damages may be recoverable. 138 The code allows
recovery of exemplary damages for child pornography, intoxicated
driving, and criminal sexual activity occurring during childhood.139
Using the words “exemplary damages,” these Code articles allow
recovery of punitive damages upon a showing that the damages
were caused by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of others,” 140 or gross negligence. If a plaintiff’s claim does
not fall within one of these narrowly defined categories, punitive
damages are unavailable, regardless of the depravity of the
defendant’s conduct.

133. Id.
134. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 580.
135. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
136. See id. at 548.
137. See id. at 548-49.
138. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art.
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010) (The legislature set forth
three codal provisions outlining circumstances in which punitive or exemplary
damages may be awarded: 1) Article 2315.3, additional damages for child
pornography; 2) Article 2315.4, additional damages for intoxicated defendant;
and 3) Article 2315.7, liability for damages caused by criminal sexual activity
occurring when the victim was 17 years old or younger).
139. Id.
140. See id.
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In Mosing v. Domas, a Louisiana court addressed the purpose
of punitive damages in Louisiana: “[Punitive damages] . . . are
given to the plaintiff over and above full compensation for his
injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching the
defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from following
the defendant’s example.” 141
Following this line of reasoning, the Louisiana legislature
enacted a limited set of laws detailing under what circumstances
the defendant’s actions are sufficiently blameworthy to merit
punitive damages. 142 Each of Louisiana’s punitive damage
provisions makes a textual reference to gross negligence; however,
courts have moved away from requiring the plaintiff to make an
actual showing of gross negligence. 143 Instead, courts often
presume that the defendant was grossly negligent if the plaintiff
can establish certain facts and causation. 144
1. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4

141. Mosing v. Dumas, 798 So. 2d 1105, 1113 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 697 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1997)).
142. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315.7 (2010).
143. See Bourgeois v. State Farm, 562 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1990) (“Several courts have . . . indicated that a presumption of recklessness
can be made when the intoxication of the defendant is the cause in fact of the
accident”); Myres v. Nunsett, 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1987):
A number of other states take the position that operating a motor
vehicle on the public road after voluntary intoxication in and of itself
constitutes sufficient reckless disregard to warrant an award of
exemplary damages. Our codal article requires an additional showing
that the accident resulting in injury was caused by the voluntary
intoxication of a defendant;
McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (“[The
defendant] acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others by getting intoxicated and driving . . . . We find the evidence
preponderates that his intoxication was a cause in fact of the accident; therefore,
the exemplary damage award was proper”).
144. See Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1182 (a defendant’s gross negligence will
be presumed upon a showing that the defendant was intoxicated and that his
intoxication was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries).
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 allows a plaintiff to
recover punitive damages upon showing that his injuries were
caused by the defendant’s gross negligence in operating a vehicle
while intoxicated. 145 The text of the article requires that the
plaintiff prove the defendant was grossly negligent; however, in
Bourgeois v. State Farm, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit stated that
some Louisiana courts would presume recklessness upon a
showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s
intoxication. 146
After consideration of the statutory requirements of 2315.4, the
Bourgeois court broke the article down into the three elements that
a plaintiff must establish in order to recover punitive damages. 147
These elements are: 1) that the defendant was intoxicated or had a
“sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose normal control
of his mental and physical facilities;” 2) that the drinking was a
cause in fact of the accident; and 3) that the injuries were caused
by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others. 148 The court focused on the third element necessary for
recovery—proof that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
defendant’s grossly negligent conduct. 149 The court noted that
many Louisiana courts employ a presumption of gross negligence
if the intoxication of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries. 150 The court concluded that, while the Fourth
Circuit generally required a separate showing of wanton and
reckless disregard, most Louisiana courts would assume gross

145. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor
vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.
146. Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1179–80.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1180.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1182.
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negligence upon a showing that the defendant’s intoxication was to
blame for the plaintiff’s injuries. 151
Following Bourgeois, the circuit courts split on what a plaintiff
was required to prove to recover punitive damages under article
2315.4. 152 Some circuits maintained that a plaintiff was required to
establish not only that the defendant was intoxicated and his
intoxication was a cause in fact of his injuries, but also that the
injuries were caused by the defendant’s wanton and reckless
disregard for the safety of others. Other circuits believed that by
proving that the defendant was intoxicated and his intoxication was
the cause in fact of the injuries, the plaintiff had satisfied his
burden. By taking the latter approach, courts have removed the
burden on the plaintiff that required him to prove the defendant
was grossly negligent when seeking punitive damages. The award
of punitive damages is not truly predicated upon gross negligence
in circumstances where there is obviously voluntary intoxication.
2. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.7
The legislature enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.7 to
provide for damages suffered as a result of criminal sexual activity
occurring while the victim was a minor and for “related
matters.” 153 Article 2315.7 allows for an award of punitive
damages upon a showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused
by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety” of
the plaintiff through criminal sexual conduct, which occurred
while the plaintiff was seventeen years old or younger. 154

151. Id. at 1184.
152. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 595.
153. 1993 La. Acts no. 831.
154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
the person through criminal sexual activity which occurred when the
victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of whether the

238

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Louisiana state courts have had limited opportunity to interpret
and apply article 2315.7. However, a federal court in Louisiana
applied the article in Capdeboscq v. Francis. 155 In Capdeboscq, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had voluntarily posed topless for a
photo after the defendants assured them that they would not appear
in a Girls Gone Wild video. 156 The plaintiffs complained that, even
after they were assured they “had nothing to worry about,” they
were featured on the cover of Girls Gone Wild: Doggy Style. 157
The plaintiffs sought punitive damages under article 2315.7.158
The court, however, found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
basis upon which their claim could be predicated. 159 The court held
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to allege a violation of an
applicable criminal statute, there was no basis for recovery under
article 2315.7. 160 The Capdeboscq court’s brief analysis provides
little guidance on what constitutes gross negligence and grounds
for recovery under the article. 161 However, the court indicated that
violation of a criminal statute dealing with sexual misconduct was
necessary to allow a plaintiff to recover under article 2315.7. 162
If liability is predicated upon violation of a criminal statute,
then recklessness will likely be presumed upon a showing that the
defendant’s conduct violated the applicable criminal law. If this is
true, then the plaintiff will not be required to make a separate
showing of gross negligence to recover punitive damages.
3. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.3

defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts. The provisions of this
Article shall be applicable only to criminal sexual activity.
155. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A.03-0556, 2004 WL 463316 (E.D. La.
Mar. 10, 2004).
156. Id. at 1.
157. Id.
158. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A. 03-0556, 2003 WL 21418499 (E.D. La.
June 16, 2003).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 allows for recovery of
punitive damages if the plaintiff can establish that his injuries were
caused by the defendant’s “wanton and reckless disregard . . .
through an act of pornography involving juveniles as defined by
R.S. 18:81.1.” 163 The Louisiana legislature enacted article 2315.3
in 2009 to allow the recovery of punitive damages by victims of
child pornography, even if the person responsible for the damages
was never criminally prosecuted. 164 Louisiana courts have not yet
had occasion to apply article 2315.3. Because the courts have not
addressed punitive damages within the context of the child
pornography article, there is no indication of whether this article
will be interpreted to require a showing of gross negligence or if it
will be presumed upon a showing that the defendant violated the
state’s child pornography statute. 165 However, given the
construction of the article, it seems likely that to constitute wanton
or reckless conduct, the defendant’s actions must, at the very least,
violate the state’s juvenile pornography statute. 166
4. A Final Look at Louisiana’s Law on Gross Negligence and
Punitive Damages 167

163. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
the person through an act of pornography involving juveniles, as
defined by R.S. 14:81.1, regardless of whether the defendant was
prosecuted for his acts.
164. 2009 La. Acts no. 382.
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (2012).
166. See id.
167. Louisiana also employs the Louisiana’s Drug Dealer Liability Act,
which is the fourth and final punitive damages statute in use. The purpose of the
Louisiana Drug Dealer Liability Act is to provide a civil remedy for damages to
persons in a community injured by an individual’s use of illegal drugs by
establishing a cause of action against drug dealers for monetary, noneconomic,
and physical losses. The idea was to shift the cost of the damage caused by the
marketing of illegal drugs to those who profit from the market, while at the same
time deterring others from entering the market. The act allows certain categories
of persons, injured by an individual’s use of an illegal controlled substance, to
recover punitive damages. The statute allows for any persons injured as a result
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Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail the availability of
punitive damages under state law by restricting their availability to
circumstances in which they are specifically authorized by statute,
all of which require some form of criminal conduct. However, each
provision authorizing punitive damages predicates recovery upon a
finding that the defendant was grossly negligent. In many
instances, the courts have interpreted these articles in such a way
as to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of actually proving that the
defendant was grossly negligent, voluntary criminal conduct
presuming that the action was based on a wanton and reckless
disregard for the victim’s safety or interest. This creates a situation
similar to res ipsa loquitur where the court will presume
negligence even without conclusive proof where justified by the
circumstances. 168
B. Gross Negligence and Contributory Fault in Louisiana
Prior to 1980, Louisiana employed a contributory negligence
scheme 169 similar to that in effect in the common law. 170 Under
this standard, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff that was a
legally contributing factor to his injuries was sufficient to bar
recovery. 171 Louisiana adopted this system in Fleytas v.
Pontchartrain Railroad Co., before there was an organized body of
civilian doctrine on comparative fault. 172 In 1980, the legislature

of the individual user’s gross negligence to recover punitive damages. The
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their injuries
were caused by the use of illegal drugs; however, no further showing of gross
negligence is necessary for recovery. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.61
(2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.63 (2009); Kemp v. Metabolife Int’l.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17770 (E.D. La. 2003).
168. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 8.06.
169. See Dumas v. State, 828 So.2d 530, 532-33 (La. 2002).
170. Id. See also discussion supra, Part III.B (on the common law rule of
contributory fault as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery).
171. Dumas, 828 So. 2d at 533.
172. Id., citing Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 18 La. 339 (1841); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. 1985).
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amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 to replace contributory
negligence with a pure comparative fault scheme. 173 Article 2323
states that:
If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly
of his own negligence and partly of the fault of another
person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall
be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of
negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury,
death or loss. 174
The legislature chose to adopt a comparative standard to
mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine. 175
Rather than denying recovery outright if the plaintiff contributed to
his injuries at all, the legislature adopted a pure comparative fault
scheme that apportions liability in direct proportion to fault.176
Under this scheme, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault in
causing his or her injuries, he or she may still recover ten percent
of the damages, the portion sustained due to the defendant’s
fault. 177 When Louisiana shifted from a contributory negligence to
a comparative fault scheme, the application of the gross negligence
standard within this context was severally curtailed because
plaintiffs were no longer required to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery.
C. Gross Negligence and Immunities in Louisiana
Immunities represent the predominant use of gross negligence
in Louisiana. As in the common law, immunity statutes are
intended to protect certain actors from liability when the legislature
determines that their conduct is so beneficial to society that the
value of their actions outweighs other societal interests that dictate

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010).
Id.
See discussion supra, Part III.B.
See discussion supra, Part III.B.
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tortfeasors should compensate their victims. 178 Louisiana adopted
traditional immunity statutes including: governmental immunity;
automotive guest statutes; recreational activity statutes; and Good
Samaritan legislation. 179 However, Louisiana also has immunity
statutes that reflect its unique culture, including a statute limiting
the liability of Mardi Gras krewes. 180 In all, Louisiana has more
than forty immunity statutes that cover a wide range of actors and
generally raise the level of liability from negligence to gross
negligence. 181
In Louisiana, immunity statutes are an affirmative defense to
be pled by the actor after the tort has occurred. 182 If the actor’s
conduct is covered by the statute, he will escape liability where it
would otherwise be imposed. 183 Louisiana applies immunity
statutes in essentially the same fashion as common law
jurisdictions. 184 The distinction, if any, lies in the actors that
Louisiana chooses to protect and the number of immunities that
have been enacted. 185
The immunity for Mardi Gras krewes is unique to Louisiana. 186
Mardi Gras parades are an important part of Louisiana’s culture
and a major element of the state’s tourism industry. The legislature
recognized the potential liability facing parade participants and

178. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01; see also discussion supra, Part III.B.
179. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37.
180. Id; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011).
181. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37.
182. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra Part III.C (Common law jurisdictions employ
immunity statutes to protect actors whose conduct is seen as so beneficial to
society that the societal interest in protecting the actor is greater than the societal
interest in having a tortfeasor make his victim whole. Louisiana follows the
same approach. In both the common law and Louisiana, immunities represent an
affirmative defense that often raises the threshold of liability from negligence to
gross negligence and allows an actor to escape liability).
185. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37 (Louisiana has over 40
immunity statutes covering a span of actors from charities and money managers
to Mardi Gras krewes).
186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011).
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enacted Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2796, which limits the
liability of parade participants to gross negligence. 187
With this plethora of immunity statutes, gross negligence is
very much alive in Louisiana. It allows a plaintiff to override the
defense of immunity when proving the defendant’s gross
negligence.
V. COMPARING GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN LOUISIANA AND THE
COMMON LAW
Gross negligence can be used by plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages and, when necessary, to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery. It is also used in conjunction with
immunity statutes to limit the scope of the defense to cases of
simple negligence. 188 Louisiana makes a nominal use of gross
negligence in the context of punitive damages, 189 and continues to
employ the concept when dealing with immunities. 190
Louisiana and the common law diverge in the context of
punitive damages. The common law will generally allow recovery
of punitive damages in circumstances where the defendant was
grossly negligent. In Louisiana, if the actor is negligent, the
plaintiff will recover compensatory damages but nothing more, no
matter how egregious the actor’s behavior, unless one of the state’s
limited punitive damages provisions apply, requesting
recklessness, though gross negligence can be presumed as these are
situations of intentional criminal conduct. These divergent
applications can lead to dramatically different results.

187. Id.
188. See supra Part III.C.
189. See supra Part IV.A (Louisiana has limited punitive damage awards to
circumstances expressly outlined by the legislature through statute or code
article. These statutes, as interpreted by the Louisiana judiciary, generally do not
require a true showing of gross negligence. In many circumstances, the requisite
mindset can be presumed upon proof of causation).
190. See supra Part IV.C (discussion of Louisiana’s use of gross negligence
in conjunction with immunity statutes).
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Louisiana’s decision to change from the traditional common
law application of punitive damages was based largely on the
state’s civilian heritage. 191 Punitive damages were, and remain,
largely rejected by the civilian jurisdictions of continental
Europe. 192 The refusal by the German Supreme Court to enforce in
Germany an American court’s decision awarding a juvenile
$400,000 in punitive damages on the basis that it was against
public order is illustrative of the general European perspective. 193
Dr. Koziol discussed the general European distaste for punitive
damages in his 2008 article, Punitive Damages—A European
Perspective. 194 Dr. Koziol’s discussion illuminates a number of the
prevailing arguments against the award of punitive damages. 195
The primary concern is that the private law is neither geared
towards nor equipped to punish actors for their wrongdoing. 196
Rather than stretching private law beyond its intended bounds,
criminal law should be improved to meet any outstanding needs. 197
A number of American scholars have joined in the criticism of
punitive damages. 198 Consider Anthony Sebok’s attack of punitive
191. See, e.g., Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887) (Where the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the discrepancy between Louisiana’s
approach to the application of punitive damages and traditional Civilian theory);
Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana, 74 So. 541 (La. 1917) (where the Louisiana
Supreme Court made the decision to limit the award of punitive damages to
situations where they had been specifically authorized by statute); discussion
supra Part IV.
192. Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REV. 741, 751 (2008).
193. Id. at 742.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 751–58.
196. Id. at 751–52, 763 (Dr. Koziol argues that the private law fails at
adequately punishing and deterring blameworthy behavior because there is no
corresponding relationship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the
amount of recovery. He argues that punishing the defendant with punitive
damages allows a windfall for the plaintiff who has suffered no corresponding
injury. He goes on to say that, if the defendant is going to be held liable for
punitive damages, the only way to justify their award is to place the damages
that go beyond compensation into a public fund in such a way that they amount
more to a fine than extra compensatory damages).
197. Id.
198. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 957 (2007); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
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damages in his article, Punitive Damages: From Myth to
Theory. 199 Professor Sebok concedes that punitive damages must
have some deterrent effects, but argues that they fail as a
mechanism of efficient deterrence because research suggests that
juries produce awards that are neither certain nor likely to bear a
reasonable relationship to the amount of money that incentivizes
investment in appropriate safety measures. 200 Yet another scholar,
Dan B. Dobbs, argues that punitive damages are not subject to
accurate measurement and therefore not subject to effective
limits.201 Professor Dobbs goes on to discuss a number of other
criticisms. 202 In particular he argues that punishment should be
reserved for criminal law and that allowing punitive damages
could lead to an unfair application that may over-deter some
conduct while under-deterring other conduct. 203
While it is true there are a number of arguments against
punitive damages, they do serve an invaluable gap filling function
in American law. Reconsider the factual scenario from the
beginning of this article in which the seventy-seven year old man
was allowed to suffer from an extremely painful condition while
his caregivers took little to no action to alleviate his pain. 204 Under
the American legal regime, the caregivers’ actions fall outside the
scope of criminal law, thus the only available remedy is in tort.
Given the caregivers’ recognition of the condition, their failure to
treat the condition, and their choice to allow the condition to
progress to such a life-threatening level, it seems reasonable to

Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87
MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of
Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003); Dan B. Dobbs,
Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies,
40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1988).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 984.
201. Dobbs, supra note 198, at 834.
202. Id. at 837–39.
203. Id.
204. See supra Part I.
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conclude that the caregivers were grossly negligent. 205 Because the
actors were grossly negligent, the damages awarded to the patient
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. Under
the prevailing common law approach, the caregivers’ grossly
negligent actions would allow the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages. 206 Had this case been brought before a court in
Louisiana, no punitive damages would have been awarded because
the factual scenario is not expressly provided for by the legislature.
Under Louisiana law, the conduct would go undeterred and the
defendants would escape any form of punishment. 207
The caregivers’ behavior was extremely blameworthy. They
recognized that the patient was suffering from a minor bedsore that
could have been easily treated; but rather than following the proper
procedure to treat the condition, they allowed the bedsore to
progress to a serious, life threatening condition. 208 Is it right for
these actors to escape punishment simply because their conduct
falls through a gap between private and criminal law? Is this not
the type of behavior that a state has a legitimate interest in
deterring?
The flexibility afforded by allowing the award of punitive
damages upon a showing of gross negligence is what makes the
common law approach so appealing. Under the common law
system, punitive damages serve as a “gap-filler” that allows for the
punishment and deterrence of blameworthy behavior, without

205. Gross negligence is an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care. See supra Part I.
206. See id. This fact pattern was presented to a Texas Appellate Court in
Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz. 921 S.W.2d, 739–40 (Tex. App. 1996)
(the Texas court determined that the caregivers’ actions were grossly negligent
and upheld the trial court’s award of punitive damages).
207. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 7.02 (“Compensatory damages are
divided into two broad categories: special and general damages.” Special
damages are those that have a quantifiable value, general damages are those
which are speculative in nature and include pain and suffering, mental anguish,
and loss of enjoyment of life).
208. See Convalescent Services, 921 S.W.2d at 733.
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requiring the legislature to pass specific legislation covering every
conceivable scenario.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that punitive
damages are civil penalties intended to punish actors for
extraordinarily blameworthy behavior and deter similar actions in
the future, and that they are justified by a state’s legitimate interest
in protecting its citizenry from extraordinarily blameworthy
behavior. 209 The Louisiana legislature recognized the value of civil
punishment with its adoption of limited punitive damages statutes.
However, because the legislature must enact a statute specifically
authorizing punitive damages before they can be awarded, many
actors whose behavior should be punished will escape retribution
unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise.
The benefit of having punitive damages available to punish
grossly negligent conduct is that they provide an extra tool for
courts to employ when the circumstances merit punishment but fall
outside the scope of criminal law. Louisiana should enact
legislation allowing courts to grant punitive damages in case of
gross negligence, similar to most common law sister states. Doing
so places the responsibility of monitoring awards of punitive
damages in the hands of the state’s judiciary, who would be
responsible for gauging the blameworthiness of a defendant’s
behavior and making a determination of whether his conduct is
grossly negligent and merits punishment. Giving courts this ability
would allow for punishment as merited by the circumstances
without forcing the legislature to predict every possible scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
The common law applies a relatively balanced approach to its
application of gross negligence, both in the context of punitive
damages and immunities. Louisiana has essentially abandoned the
component of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages,
209. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
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but maintains its application in the context of immunities.
Louisiana does not allow punitive damages for a showing of gross
negligence unless specifically authorized by statute, Civil Code
provisions to this effect being limited to cases of intentional
criminal conduct. Louisiana’s approach to gross negligence and
punitive damages leaves a gap between criminal and private law.
By requiring the legislature to pre-legislate punitive damages
recovery, Louisiana has eliminated the flexibility that makes the
common law system so attractive. Allowing courts to impose
punishment for grossly negligent behavior fills the void left
between criminal law and private law. It allows the court to punish,
and thereby deter, egregious behavior as it arises, rather than
requiring the legislature to pass specific statutes governing every
sort of action. It is impossible for the legislature to preconceive
every blameworthy action before it occurs. The common law
approach of allowing the judiciary leeway to assess punitive
damages for grossly negligent behavior insures that blameworthy
behavior is subject to some form of punishment, even if it is
outside the scope of criminal law. Even European opponents to
punitive damages, including Dr. Koziol, have recognized that
European criminal law covers a broader swath of activity than the
American counterpart, 210 and therefore punitive damages may be
necessary to fill voids in the law.
Louisiana is a hybrid jurisdiction that employs a distinct
version of the civil law, like few other legal systems in the world.
This offers an opportunity to administer justice and punish grossly
negligent actors who are guilty of conduct that goes far beyond the
pale of reasonableness, while preventing the miscarriage of justice
associated with grossly disproportionate punitive damage awards.
The legislature could adopt a statutory scheme that allows the
judiciary more freedom in applying punitive damages for grossly
210. Koziol, supra note 192, at 760 (Dr. Koziol points out that, in many
situations, circumstances that would merit punitive damages under American
law are punishable by criminal law in many European systems).
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negligent actions, but which maintains a narrow enough scope to
prevent the miscarriage of justice associated with disproportionate
exemplary damage awards.

HORTON V. BROWNE, ILLUSTRATING CONFUSION
(LITERALLY) IN THE CIVIL CODE
Brian Flanagan ∗
I. BACKGOUND
In Horton v. Browne, 1 the plaintiffs, three siblings, sought
declaratory judgment recognizing them as owners of mineral
rights.
Initially, plaintiffs’ mother had full ownership of a 40 acre tract
in Red River Parish. In 1997, the mother executed a donation that
divided the land into three separate tracts, and gave each sibling
ownership of a particular tract. In the same donation, the mother
stated each sibling was to receive an undivided one third interest in
the minerals covering the entirety of the 40 acres. 2
In the following years, a series of transactions occurred. One
sibling was no longer involved after she sold her interest to another
sibling in 2002. In 2003, the remaining two siblings sold their
interest (collectively, the entirety of the 40 acres) to a third party,
reserving their mineral interests. 3 In 2004, the third party conveyed
her rights in the property (again, the surface of the 40 acres) to the
defendant, Donald O. Browne. In 2005, the siblings and Donald
Browne executed a mineral lease in favor of Pride Oil and Gas
Properties, Inc. 4 No wells were spud until 2010. 5
∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Special thanks to Professor Trahan for research suggestions and to
Professor Moréteau for support and editing.
1. Horton v. Browne, 47,253 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/12) 94 So. 3d 1034.
2. Id. at 1036. While the act of donation could have been more specific, it
arguably created a mineral servitude over the entirety of the 40 acres, and each
sibling received a one third interest in the mineral servitude. Id. Thus, each
sibling owned the surface of his particular tract, and a one third undivided
interest in the mineral servitude covering the entirety of the 40 acres.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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A dispute arose as to who owned the mineral rights at the time
the first well was spud in 2010. Defendant Donald Browne, the
owner of the surface, argued that the siblings’ mineral servitude
prescribed in 2007 for 10 years non-use, and therefore, he owned
the mineral rights. The plaintiffs contended that the original
donation by the mother failed to create a valid mineral servitude, or
alternatively, confusion occurred between their fractional interest
in the servitude and their rights in the surface. 6
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The trial court ruled that the mother’s donation in 1997 created
a single servitude, which prescribed in 2007. 7 The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 8
Article 66 of the Mineral Code provides, “[t]he owners of
several contiguous tracts of land may establish a single mineral
servitude in favor of one or more of them or of a third party.” 9
Plaintiffs argued that the article was inapplicable, as it refers to
“owners” and, at the time of the donation, the mother was the only
owner. The court of appeal, however, looked to the intent of the
mother, and determined that she intended to create a single mineral
servitude. 10 Further, the court found that “by agreeing to the terms
in the conveyance, each plaintiff intended to be subject to a
mineral servitude in favor of the others.” 11 The donations of the
surface and mineral rights were separate and distinct donations,
even though they were executed by means of the same
instrument. 12

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (1974).
Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1037.
Id.
Id.

2013]

HORTON V. BROWNE

253

As to the confusion argument, the court ruled that confusion
did not occur with regard to the mineral servitude. 13 Article 27(2)
of the Mineral Code states, “a mineral servitude is extinguished by
confusion.” 14 However, the Mineral Code does not have specific
articles regarding confusion of mineral servitudes. Thus the court
applied by analogy the Civil Code articles regarding predial
servitudes. 15 The court cited Civil Code article 765, which states
that a predial servitude is extinguished by confusion “when the
dominant estate and servient estates are acquired in their entirety
by the same person.” 16
Applying this article by analogy, the court found that because
the landowner did not acquire the entirety of the dominant estate,
but rather only a fractional interest, the servitude was not
extinguished by confusion. 17 This was so because the rights were
unequal between the two estates; as a landowner in full ownership,
one would have an independent right for the exploration of
minerals, but as a co-owner of a mineral servitude, consent by all
of the co-owners was required for mineral operations on the
property. 18 Accordingly, defendant Donald Browne was declared

13. Id.
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(2) (2000).
15. A similar question was presented in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, 441
So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The question was, “when a person has full
ownership of a contiguous tract and also a fractional mineral servitude in the
same land, are not the full ownership and servitude merged together and the
servitude extinguished by confusion?” The court in Allied Chemical Corp.
analogized former Civil Code article 805, an article on predial servitudes, which
required that the two estates be of equal quality for confusion to occur. The
court then found that full ownership and servitudes were not of equal quality,
and therefore confusion did not occur. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
(Title IV of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which formerly
contained art. 805 as cited by the court in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, was
revised, amended, and reenacted by Acts 1977, No. 514, effective January 1,
1978.)
16. In this case, the dominant estate would be the mineral servitude, and the
servient estate would be the surface servitude. Id.
17. The court also cited Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral
Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, in support of the outcome.
18. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
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the owner of the mineral rights to the 40 acres, as the mineral
servitude created in 1997 had prescribed for non-use in 2007.
III. COMMENTARY
The determination of when and to what extent confusion
occurs is nuanced. On confusion with respect to predial servitudes,
Professor Saul Litvinoff writes:
Confusion may take place only in part, as when the owner
of the dominant estate acquires only a part of the servient
estate the whole of which is burdened by the servitude, in
which case the servitude continues burdening the rest of the
servient estate if in doing so it affords any benefit to the
dominant estate. On the other hand, confusion does not take
place at all when the owner of the servient estate acquires a
part of the dominant estate, in which case the servitude
continues to exist in favor of the remaining part of the
dominant estate. 19
Horton illustrates this distinction by analogy to mineral
servitudes. Although each sibling owned the entirety of a particular
tract of land (the servient estate), the entirety of the mineral
servitude (the dominant estate) was not acquired by the same
person, as each sibling only had a fractional interest in the mineral
servitude. Therefore, based on analogy, the requirements of Civil
Code article 765 were not met, so confusion did not occur at all. 20
It is interesting to note that article 66 of the Mineral Code
provides an exception to this rule in that it allows owners of
several contiguous tracts of land to establish a single mineral
servitude in favor of one of them. 21 For example, if the three
siblings decided to create a mineral servitude in favor of one of the
19. SAUL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS 64142, (2d ed., West 2001) (footnotes omitted). See also ATHANASSIOS N.
YIANNOPOULOS, 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PREDIAL SERVITUDES 453
(West 1983).
20. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000). The rule of Civil Code article 765
is also codified in Mineral Code article 27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(2)
(2000).
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siblings, confusion would not extinguish the mineral servitude
burdening his particular tract, despite the fact that the dominant
estate and servient estate would be owned in their entirety by the
same person. 22
In a situation like the one in Horton, a challenge arises when
one of the landowners decides to sell but wants to reserve his
interest in the mineral rights. In this case, reserving the mineral
rights would only reserve the interest in the existing mineral
servitude. Of course, the prescription of non-use will accrue ten
years from the date it was created, not from the date of sale of the
land. 23 As a practical matter, the siblings could have partitioned the
mineral servitude. A partition would divide the servitude and result
in each sibling having full ownership of the land and mineral rights
in his particular tract. This would allow a sibling to create a new
mineral servitude from the date of sale of the land. Alternatively,
the siblings could have executed an acknowledgment of the
servitude, pursuant to Mineral Code article 54, which would have
extended the date of prescription for non-use. 24

22. See LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000) and LA. CIV. CODE art. 765.
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:28 (2000).
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:54 (2000).

PEÑA V. SIMEON, AND THE MEANING OF CONSENT
William Gaskins ∗
The Louisiana Civil Code states that contracts are formed by
consent established through offer and acceptance. But what exactly
is the consent that the offer and acceptance establish? This article
discusses the question with reference to Peña v. Simeon, 1 a
Louisiana case in which a woman with a poor understanding of
English is nonetheless held to have given her consent to an
English-language contract that she signed.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of Peña v. Simeon are as follows: plaintiff Rosa
Peña went to USAgencies to buy an automobile insurance policy
for Fausto Justo, with whom she lived, and who was also the father
of her two children. Neither Peña nor Fausto spoke English very
well. Although Peña stated at trial that the insurance policy was for
Justo, who was in fact the principal “Insured” in the policy
document, both Fausto and Peña were listed on the policy as
“Covered Persons” and “Operators,” and Peña signed her name on
both pages of the document. Peña also signed her initials (Fausto
did not) next to the waiver paragraph that stated: “I do not want
UMBI coverage,” where UMBI refers to Uninsured Motorist
Bodily Injury coverage, which would provide compensation if an
uninsured driver caused an accident with the insured party. After
procuring the policy, Peña got into a car wreck, and then sought to
invoke UMBI coverage on the policy; USAgencies replied that she
had waived UMBI coverage, and that it therefore owed no UMBI
payments to her. Peña sued for those payments based on several

∗ J.D., D.C.L., Louisiana State University Law Center (2013). He would
like to thank Olivier Moréteau, Jennifer Lane, and Daniel On for their help.
1. Peña v. Simeon, 11-1083 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So. 3d 547.
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theories, and lost in a trial court pre-trial summary judgment in
favor of the other party.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
In the appeal of the trial court’s summary judgment, Peña
essentially made two arguments: first, that she did not have
authority to reject the UMBI coverage; and second, that she could
not understand the contract because she did not have a very good
understanding of English. The court of appeal first treated the
question of whether someone with Peña’s relation to Fausto—
someone living with the principal “Insured,” and the mother of his
children, but not legally his wife—could waive all UMBI coverage
under an insurance policy. Louisiana has a strong public policy in
favor of finding UMBI coverage to exist even in doubtful cases. 2
However, citing a Louisiana law that says “any named insured in
the policy” can reject coverage, 3 and two cases that ruled a wife
could waive UMBI coverage on behalf of her husband, 4 the court
of appeal found that Peña had the right to waive UMBI coverage in
the insurance contract. As for the second issue, the court decided
that Peña’s weakness in the English language did not invalidate her
waiver of UMBI coverage for two reasons. First, the court
determined that there was no vice of consent, and thus Peña’s
consent to the waiver was not altered. Second, the court decided
that Peña sufficiently understood her rejection of the UMBI policy
because she knew the purpose of the visit to the insurer, because
she could read English well enough to recognize what the
insurance contract was, and because she signed the document.
Thus, the court found that she was bound by the waiver of UMBI
coverage.

2. Id. at 550.
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(a)(i) (2009).
4. Bonnette v. Robles, 740 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999); Tucker v.
Valentin, 807 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2001).
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III. COMMENTARY
The Court of Appeal’s decision as to whether someone of
Peña’s relationship to the principal insured and to the insurance
contract could validly waive UMBI coverage is straightforward
and needs no comment here. As for the second issue of the trial,
that concerning Peña’s understanding of the contract, there is more
reason for close inspection.
A. Vices of Consent
The court stated toward the end of its opinion that, “[Peña]
makes no claim of fraud, duress, or misconduct on the part of the
insurance agent.” 5 Here, the court seems to have had in mind the
vices of consent, which according to Louisiana Civil Code article
1948 are error, fraud, and duress. The court wrote explicitly that
there was no claim of the second two vices, fraud or duress, and in
fact it appears that neither vice existed in case. Misconduct seems
to fall under fraud or duress, but for whatever reason it is added to
the list. Oddly, there is no explicit mention of error. If the court
ignored the issue of error because Peña failed to plead it, this is
unfortunate for her. The Duong 6 case cited by the court decided
that, for purposes of an error analysis, “coverage for uninsured
motorist risk as statutorily provided is a ‘cause’ within the meaning
of La. C.C. art. 1949.” 7 Because error vitiates consent when the

5. Peña v. Simeon, 96 So. 3d at 552.
6. Duong v. Salas, 877 So. 2d 269.
7. Id. at 273. Duong did not state the exact reason for which coverage for
uninsured motorist risk is a cause, but the most likely reason is that it bears on
the nature of the law. Some potential ways in which error may concern cause are
listed in Louisiana Civil Code art. 1950:
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the contract,
or the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that
thing, or the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or any
other circumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good faith
have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.
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error concerns cause, 8 the Duong finding, that lack of UMBI
coverage is a cause, shows that Peña might have succeeded if she
had pled error. Perhaps if Peña had asserted the defense, the court
would have found that she too made an error as to cause when she
signed the UMBI waiver, although the fact that the court found her
mastery of English better than Duong’s makes it seem unlikely that
an error pleading would have yielded a different result from that
which she received. But even if the basis of a vice of consent did
exist, there is a more principal question, one that the court did not
directly discuss: did Peña consent to the contract in the first place?
To answer that question, consent must first be defined.
B. The Meaning of Consent
The Louisiana Civil Code says that, “A contract is formed
by the consent of the parties established through offer and
acceptance.” 9 Despite the importance of consent in the civil law of
contracts, the law refers to consent without ever defining it.
Louisiana Civil Code article 11 states that, “The words of a law
must be given their generally prevailing meaning.” What is the
generally prevailing meaning of consent? The obvious definition is
that consent means something like a manifestation of agreement;
and indeed, a reference to various dictionaries reveals that to be
so. 10 Similar definitions are “acquiescence,” “permission,”
“approval,” or “agreement” from Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, 11
with the latter three also given by Black’s Law Dictionary. 12
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1949: “Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a
cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause
was known or should have been known to the other party.”
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 9th ed.
2009); LE PETIT ROBERT 371 (Paul Robert ed., 1983); OXFORD LATIN
DICTIONARY 412 (P.G.W. Glare et al. eds., 1968); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 760-61 (Robert Burchfield ed., 2nd ed. 1991); WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION
312 (Joseph Friend et al. ed., 1960).
11. WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 312.
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 346.
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Likewise, the Petit Robert’s translation of French consentement as
“acquiescence,” “agreement,” or “acceptance,” 13 tends to show
that consent means something like an outward manifestation of
agreement. And indeed, the fact that the method of showing
consent—that is, offer and acceptance—is an external
manifestation is made clearer by the following sentence: “Unless
the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract,
offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action
or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of
consent.” 14 But there is also support for an opposite definition: that
consent is not an outward manifestation at all, but rather something
internal. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests consent may
mean “common feeling,” “sympathy,” or “accord.” 15 The CNRTL
French dictionary suggests for consentement something translating
to a “free act of thought,” 16 and the Oxford Latin Dictionary
suggests for consensus “concord” or “unanimity,” though also an
“agreement in action.” 17 From this subtle difference, it appears that
in its generally prevailing meaning, consent as outward
manifestation can be lexically separated from consent as an event
within the person who shows it, but that both meanings are present
in the common notion of consent.
From inward consent, a further distinction can be made. In
classical Latin, the verb sentire could mean both what we call “to
feel” and “to think.” Although it will seem odd to moderns,
Romans probably found there was no distinction to be needed
when they used the word, so that a translation of sentire sometimes
yields “to feel,” sometimes “to think”, and sometimes it is unclear

13. LE PETIT ROBERT, supra note 10, at 371.
14. Id.
15. 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 412.
16. CENTRE NATIONAL DE RESSOURCES TEXTUELLES ET LEXICALES,
http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/consentement: «Acte libre de la pensée» (Jul. 8,
2013).
17. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 10, 412.
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which is intended, or whether both meanings are present. 18 This is
vexing for the present purpose, as to feel oneself bound (which,
through reference to the word sententia may be better translated
here as a “will” or “desire” to be bound) 19 and to understand
exactly how one is bound are two very different things. It is here
that the word “unanimity” is a perfect translation of consent, 20 but
also an unhelpful one; for uni- corresponds to the idea of
togetherness like cum-, and animus and anima can mean either
mind or soul, just as sensus means either thought or feeling.
Altogether, if consent is to be taken with its full general meaning,
then it must be defined to include both a feeling or will to be
bound, and also an understanding of what one is bound to, for both
are included in the meaning of consent, just as the idea of external
manifestation is.
Can the different kinds of consent exist apart from one
another? It would seem that whenever an external manifestation of
consent is freely and intentionally (that is, not accidentally) given,
the person who consents must perform the external manifestation
as an effect of his internal feeling (here, “will” is a good substitute)
of consent. In other words, if the manifestation does not arise from
the will, nor is forced, nor is an accident, then how can it arise at
all? There must be some cause. But whereas consent of will is
necessary for a free and purposeful external manifestation of
consent, understanding can easily be shown not to be necessary for
it: one may sign a contract without reading it or otherwise learning
18. CLIVE STAPLES LEWIS, STUDIES IN WORDS 136-38 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1960).
19. See CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 769
(Oxford Univ. Press, reprint 1999); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 17 SUMMA
THEOLOGICAE 158-63 (Thomas Gilby O.P. ed. and English trans., 1970):
Although consent arises in the reason (and thus animals do not have consent),
consent is an appetitive power because it is an impulse to join oneself with an
object which can be felt when present. This appetitive power is the will
(voluntas). Thus the feeling element, the desire to move toward the object, may
be called will.
20. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 105-6 (Sir
Ernest Gowers ed., 2nd ed. 1965); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra
note 10, at 760-61; OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 412.
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of its terms. Thus, it appears to be a rule for the general meaning of
consent that where there is a free and purposeful external
manifestation of consent, the manifestation always arises from the
will; but understanding may or may not be present.
C. The Law of Consent and its Application to Peña
The law only explicitly requires the external manifestation
of consent, as seen in Civil Code article 1927, which speaks of
“offer,” “acceptance,” and various acceptable forms therefor. 21 If
the external manifestations of consent necessarily arise from the
internal will, then the law must also implicitly require that there be
consent of the will. As for consent in understanding, although the
Civil Code does not require it explicitly or even implicitly, the
Louisiana jurisprudence requires it. The Peña court states the
doctrine thus: “[i]t is well settled that a party who signs a written
instrument is presumed to know its contents.” 22 That is, if a party
gives an external manifestation of consent, then courts presume
that he also consents in understanding.
The reason for the presumption that consent in
understanding accompanies consent in manifestation is easy to see:
neither courts nor other people can see whether a party understands
a contract except by what he shows through his manifestations. If
one could not trust that another party’s manifestations of consent
were valid for a contract, then the formation of reliable contracts
would be impossible. But if there is only a presumption that
understanding accompanies the external manifestation, rather than
a strict rule that it does, then can the presumption in some
circumstances be overturned? And if so, when? The strong
language from some Louisiana jurisprudence makes it seem that
the presumption can never be overturned. Tweedel v. Brasseaux
states that, “The law of Louisiana is that one who signs an
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
22. Peña v. Simeon, 96 So. 3d at 552.
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instrument without reading it has no complaint.” 23 Aguillard v.
Auction Management Corp. likewise states that, “It is well settled
that a party who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its
contents and cannot avoid its obligations by contending that he did
not read it, that he did not understand it, or that the other party
failed to explain it to him.” 24 Again in Coleman v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc.:
Having signed this agreement, Mr. Coleman cannot seek to
avoid its obligations by contending that he did not read or
understand it. . . [T]he law does not compel people to read
or to inform themselves of the contents of instruments
which they may choose to sign, but, save in certain
exceptional cases, it holds them to the consequences. 25
The rule is strict; but there apparently are, according to
Coleman, unnamed exceptional situations. Tweedel also seems to
contradict itself by making an exception for rebuttal of the
presumption, saying that proof that a party was deceived can
overturn the presumption of understanding. 26
Probably a large majority of cases that involve
misunderstanding or mistake about a signed contract are cases of
error as a vice of consent. In the normal case, a party has consented
to enter a contract, but his understanding of some aspect of it is
deficient or wrong. If his lack of understanding is a designated
cause, 27 then the law regards the consent that he gave as vitiated
and made ineffective. But sometimes consent is more than merely
vitiated. Sometimes the parties are so far from agreeing with one
another that consent cannot be said to ever have existed at all, even
if the parties signed a contractual document. The problem in such a
situation is known in French doctrine as error obstacle, or error
resulting from an obstacle. Error obstacle is a radical
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. 1983).
Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp., 908 So. 2d 1 (La. 2005).
Coleman v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 6 So. 3d 184 (La. 2009).
Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d at 137.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950, supra note 7.
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misunderstanding as to the nature or the cause of a contract. Even
though the parties seemed in many ways to agree, there was in fact
no actual meeting of the minds. There was no agreement
whatsoever because the parties “did not actually want the same
thing. An essential condition to the formation of the contract is
missing: the common intent, the true mutual understanding.” 28 In
such a case, it would not make sense to say that consent has been
vitiated, for there never was any consent except in appearance. Or
we may say that there was an external manifestation of consent,
but neither understanding of the terms nor any will to be bound to
the terms as they were. Under error obstacle theory, external
consent by itself is not enough to overcome a complete lack of will
to be bound, so that the parties are simply not bound.
If, as in Peña, a party signs his name to a contractual
document, but does not—or for the most part does not—
understand the language in which the contract is written, then is he
bound to the contract by law? Such a party manifests his consent to
the contract when he signs the document, and his free and
purposeful manifestation shows that he consents in will, too. As for
his understanding, there are three main possibilities: first, that he
does not understand the contested terms as printed, but that he
gains understanding of them through a translation from some
source outside of the contract; second, that he does not understand
the contested contractual terms at all; and third, that he has a
partial understanding of the contractual terms at issue. The first
situation occurred in Rizzo v. Ward, 29 a case in which a native
speaker of Spanish with below average ability in English signed
the UMBI waiver in an English-language insurance contract, but
discussed the document with an insurance agent in Spanish. Rizzo
pleaded in court that his waiver of UMBI coverage was void
28. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 216 (9th ed.,
Dalloz 2005); trans. in e-mail from Olivier Moréteau, Professor, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, to author (April 24, 2013) (on file with author).
29. Rizzo v. Ward, 32 So. 3d 986 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010).
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because he did not understand the contract. But the court cited the
presumption that parties understand the contracts that they sign,
and found that, while inability to understand the language might by
itself overturn the presumption of understanding, the fact that the
insurance agent explained the contract in Spanish counterweighed
his difficulty with English, so that the presumption was upheld.
The second situation occurred in the Duong case, in which a
Vietnamese man who spoke almost no English rejected UMBI
coverage in an insurance contract. Here, the party visited the
insurance agent with a friend who spoke more English, but even
the friend’s English was very bad. The court ruled that Duong’s
inability to understand the language of the contract was sufficient
reason to invalidate the contract. 30 However, unlike Rizzo, the
court turned to vice of consent, and found that the party had
consented, but that his consent was vitiated by an error concerning
cause. Although the Duong analysis seems to have reached the
right conclusion (for the party indeed had almost no understanding
of the details of his insurance contract), it is unfortunate that the
court does not discuss the issue of whether or not there was full
consent in the first place. And the third situation, that in which the
party had some understanding of the language of the contract, is
the one at issue in Peña v. Simeon.
In the present case, Peña externally manifested her consent
when she signed her initials by the waiver of UMBI coverage in
the insurance contract. At the same time, she must have consented
in will to be bound to the provision. As for the understanding
aspect of consent, the court concluded that Peña understood the
waiver because she knew she was at the insurance office to buy
insurance with Fausto, because she could read English well enough
to understand that the document was an insurance contract, and
because Peña signed her initials to the waiver. The first two of
these reasons make at best only a weak argument that Peña
30. Duong v. Salas, 877 So. 2d at 273.
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understood the waiver. The fact that Peña was at the office for the
purpose of buying insurance seems likelier to make Peña think the
waiver clause would provide insurance coverage rather than take it
away, and Peña’s ability to recognize the document as an insurance
contract was probably helped by her knowledge of the purpose of
her visit. But, importantly, Peña signed her initials next to the
UMBI waiver, and this signature created the presumption that she
understood the clause. After weighing the evidence regarding her
comprehension of the English language, the court found that the
facts were not sufficient to reverse the presumption of
understanding, and held that Peña consented to the waiver of
UMBI coverage. Peña signed the waiver, of her free accord, and,
by the unrebutted legal presumption, she understood the waiver;
thus her consent was whole and valid.
Given the facts as the court took them, the result in Peña is
the right one: for the law must presume that parties understand
their contracts, and Peña offered little evidence to prove that she
did not understand hers. Perhaps Louisiana could do more to make
sure that people with a poor comprehension of English understand
their contracts, both for their own sakes, and for the sakes of those
who contract with them. However, it is difficult to think of a
solution that would prove helpful in more than a few cases. One
example of such a rule helping non-English-speakers is
California’s policy that requires people who conduct business
primarily in one of the five foreign languages most-used in
California to offer the other party a translation of some types of
contracts into the language in which the contract was negotiated. 31
Such a rule would help a party like the one in Rizzo, who pleaded
in court that he did not understand his English UMBI waiver even
though the insurance agent discussed the contract with him in his
native language. But the law would not help the parties in Peña or
in Duong because their insurance agents discussed their contracts
31. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1632 (2011).
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only in English, and easily may not have spoken the parties’ native
languages of Spanish and Vietnamese, respectively. Furthermore,
requiring provision of full translations of contracts would likely
make the cost of contracting prohibitive for many people, and
would likely lead to many problems arising from inaccurate
translations. It may be true that a law requiring foreign language
translation of some contracts would help some parties, but the first
step is for Louisiana courts to clarify their doctrine of the
difference between the vices of consent and a total lack of consent
due to error obstacle. Only in so doing can Louisiana courts set
straight this basic aspect of the rights and duties of contracting
parties, both in cases of linguistic inability and elsewhere.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consent is necessary for all contracts under Louisiana law;
but the law does not define consent, and its subtler intentions must
be taken from its generally prevailing meaning. Consent contains
both an external and an internal element, with the internal
comprising both an idea of feeling or will and of knowing or
understanding. The Louisiana courts presume that parties
understand their contracts when they have manifested consent
through their signatures. The presumption of understanding has
been overturned on grounds of error in a case in which a party
knew no English whatsoever; but it would be better for courts to
find in such cases that lack of understanding, supported by enough
evidence to overturn the presumption, prevents full consent in the
first place. In Peña, where the party understood some English, the
presumption that she understood the provision was rightly upheld.
But Louisiana courts have yet to make clear their doctrine on the
distinction between vices of consent and the full lack thereof, and
cases involving linguistic inability will remain on unsteady ground
until they do.

LEND ME AN EAR: GRADUAL OCCUPATIONAL HEARING
LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER THE THEORY OF CONTRA
NON VALENTEM IN MCCARTHY V. ENTERGY GULF
STATES, INC.
Leigh Hill ∗
The recent Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal case,
McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf Sates, Inc., addresses several issues
involved in situations where plaintiffs are injured in the course of
their employment, but are unaware of this injury and its
accumulation until many years, if not decades, later. 1 The Third
Circuit first addresses the issue of contra non valentem and how it
applies to this injury, gradual in nature. The third circuit further
discusses, though not in as great a detail, the questions of
contributory negligence and exclusivity of a remedy in Workers’
Compensation, both of which are found not to apply to this case.
I. BACKGROUND
While this litigation began with three original plaintiffs, only
two plaintiffs took part in this appeal: Alexander Valerie, Jr. and
Milton Pharr. 2 Valerie and Pharr were employed at the Nelson
Station Facility of Entergy/Gulf States (EGS) and undisputedly
suffered hearing loss between the time of their employment and
their respective retirements from EGS.3 Their hearing loss was
found to be caused by the noise levels generated at this facility and
∗ Candidate, J.D./D.C.L., 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to thank Professor Bill Crawford for his
patience and guidance throughout the writing process of this case note.
1. McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 2011-600 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/7/11), 82 So. 3d 336, writ denied, 84 So. 3d 553 (La. 2012).
2. Id. at 339; see Original Brief of Appellees Milton Pharr and Alexander
Valerie, McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 3d 336 (La. App. 3 Cir.),
No. 11-00600-LA, 2011 WL 2700135.
3. McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 3d at 342.
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EGS’s failure to provide adequate protection and information to
Valerie and Pharr. 4
Both men spent over three decades working at this facility.
Valerie’s employment with EGS lasted 34 years, from 1952 to
1986. 5 Pharr worked in these conditions for 36 years, from 1959 to
1995. 6 While EGS was aware of the relationship between
industrial noise levels and the possibility of hearing loss at the time
that the plaintiffs began working at the facility, evidence showed
that EGS failed to acknowledge this problem until the 1970s,
almost twenty years after Valerie and Pharr had already been
exposed to dangerous levels of noise. 7 But, even with EGS’s
acknowledgement of this danger, the use of hearing protection did
not become mandatory in the facility until about 1980. 8 This
mandatory policy was effectively useless, however, as it was never
enforced, nor were employees instructed on when, where, and how
protection should be used or why the protection was necessary. 9
EGS had Valerie and Pharr undergo multiple audiograms,
which revealed that both employees suffered significant hearing
loss. Valerie testified to having received a letter with this
information stating that EGS would address the issue to the
Corporate Occupational Health and Safety Group (COHS). 10
However, Valerie never heard anything from COHS. 11 It was not
until April 1999, when Mr. Valerie’s attorney arranged for him to
have an audiogram that Mr. Valerie actually became aware this
damage to his hearing. 12 Pharr testified to retaining copies of his

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 344, 346.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 344.

2013]

MCCARTHY V. ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC.

271

tests, but he did not think, nor was he told that, his hearing loss
was related to the noise generated at the facility. 13
Judge Clayton Davis of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court
(JDC) of Calcasieu Parish entered a judgment for plaintiffs, Mr.
Valerie and Mr. Pharr, on the grounds that prescription had
effectively been halted by the doctrine of contra non valentem;
there was no evidence that either plaintiff was contributorily
negligent for the hearing loss he suffered. Also, the court ruled that
the Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar recovery from the
employer in this case.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, in an opinion
authored by Judge Peters, affirmed the decision of the Fourteenth
Judicial District Court. The Third Circuit found that plaintiffs’
evidence sufficiently showed that damages had resulted from noise
levels generated in the Nelson Station Facility and that the
Fourteenth JDC had not abused its discretion in its findings or in
the award of general damages. The Third Circuit further affirmed
that neither employee was barred any recovery through
contributory negligence or by the Workers’ Compensation Act
exclusivity remedy. 14 Moreover, the doctrine of contra non
valentem suspended the running of prescription and plaintiffs’
claims were preserved and afforded remedy.

13. Id. at 346.
14. Generally, unintentional acts causing injury to an employee while in the
workplace is the basis for an employee’s exclusive remedy provided under the
Worker’s Compensation Act. Because of the nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, the
Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity did not bar plaintiffs from suing their
employer for damages that would also be covered or partially covered under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
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III. COMMENTARY
As with all lawsuits, the rules of prescription must be
adhered to and enforced so as not to prejudice a defendant and to
further judicial efficiency. Prescription begins to run once a
potential plaintiff knows or should have been aware of the
wrongful conduct, the damage this conduct caused, and the
causation between the damage and conduct. 15 The necessity of
awareness of a connection between the damage and conduct is the
crux of occupational disease cases. The question in these cases,
specifically those cases in which damage caused by certain
characteristics of a job site is gradual and diagnosis is likely to be
made years after a plaintiff’s first exposure, is when should a
plaintiff become aware that the exposure during employment
caused him damage? When a plaintiff becomes aware of damages
caused during employment, prescription begins to run. 16
In Broussard v. Union Pacific, the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal analyzed a test laid out by the Supreme
Court of the United States that provides great assistance with the
issue of prescription in occupational disease cases involving longterm hearing loss. 17 This analysis states:
A hearing loss not specifically related to an incident or
trauma has no identifiable moment of occurrence. Thus, no
cause of action can accrue with respect to a hearing loss
that develops over a substantial period of time until the
injury is fully evolved and an employee knows or should
have know of the conditions and its cause. The time
limitation for filing a cause of action for an occupational
disease does not start until the harmful consequences of the
employer’s negligence manifest themselves to the
employee to the extent that a diagnosis is possible of the
15. Original Brief of Appellees, supra note 2, at 3.
16. Id. at 5. (The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal found that the
running of prescription did not commence until the victim’s disease had been
diagnosed and the victim had realized the relationship between his diagnosis and
his working condition. See Broussard v. Union Pacific, 700 So. 2d 542 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1997)).
17. 700 So. 2d 542, 544.
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injury and its causal connection to the work environment. 18
Using this test developed by the Supreme Court, it seems clear
that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in deciding McCarthy,
diligently applied the principles of prescription and respected the
delicate nature these rules have when applied to cases involving
occupational disease. In McCarthy, plaintiffs Pharr and Valerie
were exposed to damaging amount of noise during a span of
approximately thirty-five years. During this time, each man’s
hearing was affected so gradually, albeit harmfully. Therefore, he
had no reason to believe that his hearing was deteriorating and did
not know the cause of this deterioration until it was diagnosed by a
physician. 19
That fact that a relationship between damage that has been
diagnosed or realized and the conduct that caused the damage
requires that the doctrine of contra non valentem non currit
praescriptio (contra non valentem) be applied in the McCarthy
case. This doctrine halts the running of prescription against a tort
victim who has not yet been able to bring a suit for reasons beyond
his personal will. 20 Contra non valentem should be used to suspend
prescription in the following circumstances:
(1) where there was some legal cause which prevented
courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting
on plaintiff’s actions, (2) where there was some condition
with a contract with the proceedings which prevented the
18. Id., citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). See Original Brief of
Appellees, supra note 2, at 5.
19. Original Brief By Appellees, supra note 2, at 7. (Mr. Pharr testified that
during his time with GSU he received no explanation of the importance of
wearing hearing protection. While Mr. Pharr did received periodic hearing tests,
the results of these tests were not explained to him by a GSU physician, nor was
he told to seek the assistance of a specialist. Mr. Valerie, who had a very limited
education, had also never been instructed on using hearing protection, nor had
he been informed of the harm associated with noise exposure. Further, Mr.
Valerie and his wife testified to having never received the results of his hearing
tests at their home).
20. LA. PRAC. CIV. PRETRIAL § 6:98 (2012 – 2013 ed.). See also Benjamin
West Janke & François-Xavier Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and
Louisiana: Revealing the Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV. 503
(2011).
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creditor from suing or acting, (3) where defendant himself
has done some act effectually to prevent plaintiff from
availing himself or his cause of action, and (4) where some
cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by
plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by
defendant. 21
Mr. Valerie and Mr. Pharr did not have knowledge and,
specifically as nonmedical professionals and because of EGS’s
failure to provide adequate information to their employees, had no
reason to know of the connection between the hazardous noise
conditions of the Nelson Station Facility and their diagnosis, which
took place decades after they began their careers at EGS. 22 The
Third Circuit points out prescription starts running “when plaintiff
has reasonable basis to pursue claim against specific defendant.”23
This Court further explains that it is sufficient for the inaction to be
reasonable in order to have the benefit of contra non valentem. 24
Until Mr. Valerie and Mr. Pharr had reasonable knowledge that the
damage they were suffering was connected to their employment
conditions, they had no reasonable knowledge or claim to bring in
court. While it may be difficult to understand that plaintiffs had no
knowledge of their hearing loss, as one would presumably
recognize that his hearing is deteriorating, the appellate court
emphasizes the fact that both plaintiffs are nonmedical
professionals who were continuously exposed to noise that very
gradually and very negatively affected each man’s hearing. The
trial court record supports this. 25

21. Id. at § 6:100.
22. See McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 2d at 343.
23. Id. at 344, citing Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So. 2d 420,
424 (La. 1987).
24. Id.
25. Original Brief of Appellees, supra note 2, at 7. (“Moreover, [Mr.
Valerie] did not even know he had a hearing loss until shortly before he filed a
lawsuit.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Occupational disease cases can present particularly
complex issues of prescription. When an injury has accrued almost
seamlessly throughout a span of years, determining a date of injury
can be next to impossible. To protect victims in these instances the
doctrine of contra non valentem acts to keep their claims alive so
that they will not be prohibited from seeking recovery when their
claims would have otherwise prescribed due to no fault of their
own. This is exactly the way the doctrine worked for Messrs. Pharr
and Valerie. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
determined that, because the evidence showed Pharr and Valerie
had no conclusive personal or medical knowledge of their hearing
loss until decades after their first exposure to dangerous levels of
noise, their claims were preserved by this doctrine. Prescription on
their claims would thus not begin until they obtained this
knowledge and understood the connection between their loss of
hearing and their work at the EGS facility.

DETERMINATION OF CHILD CUSTODY: “SHARED
CUSTODY V. JOINT CUSTODY” REFLECTED IN
BROUSSARD V. ROGERS
Aster Lee ∗
When a couple with children divorces, child custody and
support become significant. If the couple does not reach consensus
on those issues, they must bring them to a trial court to determine.
The recent case of Broussard v. Rogers 1 illustrates some of the
difficulties that arise in making awards for child support. This case
note will explore the standards considered by Louisiana trial courts
when determining whether custody is “shared” or “joint”—a
threshold question for the calculation of the amount of child
support owed. This determination, it will be shown, properly
focuses on the percentage of time spent by the children with each
of their divorced parents.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers married in 1997 and had
their first child in 2000. 2 In 2003, Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers
entered into a joint custody agreement (“Agreement”) and were
divorced thereafter. 3 The contents of the Agreement were as
follows: 1) The parties shared legal joint custody with alternating
one week periods; 2) The agreement did not designate either party

∗
J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law Center, 2013.
Special thanks to Prof. Melissa Lonegrass for wonderful assistance with
research, proofreading, and editing, to Prof. Olivier Moréteau and Jennifer Lane
for overall guidance, and to my husband Daniel Lee for his support and
suggestions.
1. Broussard v. Rogers, 54 So. 3d 826 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 828.
3. Id.
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as a custodial parent; and 3) The agreement did not mention
anything about the issue of child support. 4
Approximately five and half years after the divorce, Ms.
Broussard filed a Rule to Change Custody, requesting that the
court change the custody status of her child because the previous
agreement was no longer workable. 5 Specifically, she requested
that the court designate her as a custodial parent. 6 Ms. Broussard
also filed a Rule to Establish Child Support, requesting that the
court award support based on her status as the custodial parent. 7
The trial court granted both motions.8 With respect to custody, the
court allowed Mr. Rogers visitation every other weekend from the
end of the school day on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday, plus every
Tuesday and Thursday from the school day’s end until 8 p.m., plus
two unnamed days per week with overnight visitation. 9 Child
support was awarded in the amount of $225.00 per month based
upon the court’s determination that custody was “shared” under the
meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes [hereinafter L.R.S.] section
9:315.9 and its application of the corresponding calculation
schedule. Ms. Broussard appealed this decision, alleging that the
trial court erred in calculating child support based on the argument
that the trial court used the wrong schedule.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Broussard
focused on the issue of whether the custody of the child was shared
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. This visitation schedule is reflected in the court’s interim judgment. Id.
An interim judgment, or interlocutory judgment, is an intermediate judgment
that determines a preliminary or subordinate point or plea but does not make a
final determination in the case. A final judgment is a court's last action, which
settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except
for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney's fees) and enforcement of the
judgment. Judgment, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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custody under the meaning of L.R.S. 9:315.9 or joint custody
under L.R.S. 9:315.8. 10 The Louisiana Revised Statutes provide
differing methods for the calculation of child support depending
upon whether custody is “joint” or “shared” as defined by law.
According to L.R.S. 9:315.9, when custody is “shared,” each
parent has physical custody of the child for an approximately equal
amount of time. 11 In cases of shared custody, Schedule B is utilized
to calculate support. 12 For all other “joint” custody arrangements in
which custody is not “shared,” support is determined according to
Schedule A. However, there is no statutory guideline to determine
the issue of “an approximately equal amount of time.” 13 Louisiana
Revised Statute 9:315.9 does not bind the trial court to a threshold
percentage determined solely on the number of days spent with the
child. 14 Instead, the trial court has discretion in determining
whether a particular arrangement constitutes “shared custody,”
justifying the application of L.R.S. 9:315.9. 15
The trial court in Broussard held that the custody
agreement between Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers, which
provided Mr. Rogers every other weekend and 2 days a week
visitation, constituted “shared custody.” 16 On appeal, Ms.
Broussard argued that the trial court erred on this point based on
the calculation that Mr. Rogers had custody for only 42.85% of the

10. Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829. At first glance, the issue seems to be
related to the child support issue rather than child custody (Ms. Broussard
alleged that the trial court used the wrong schedule because the trial court used
Schedule B (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012)) instead of Schedule A (LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2004)). However, the real issue is the type of child
custody, because the court’s determination of which schedule to use ultimately
depends on the determination of which type of child custody the court
recognizes. (e.g., the court shall utilize Schedule A when the type of the child
custody is shared custody under L.R.S. 9:315.8.).
11. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012) (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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time, arguing that the Friday and Sunday visitations constituted
one-half day each. 17
The Court acknowledged that there is no definition of a “day”
for the purposes of custody in L.R.S. 9:315.8 and L.R.S. 9:315.9,
but noted that L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) provides that the court may
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of support, as
long as it consists at least 4 hours. 18 Although there is no statutory
basis to allow a court to use L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) in determining
the meaning of a “day” for the purposes of support, the majority of
the Court found that there is no provision to prohibit it, either. 19
Thus, based on its review of the trial court’s custody decree,
the Court did not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
finding of shared custody. 20 As long as the trial court’s ruling on
the determination of shared custody was correct, the hearing
officer’s use of Schedule B to calculate the child support was
appropriate.
III. COMMENTARY
The Court’s decision in Broussard can only be evaluated in
light of the history of Louisiana’s statutory scheme for child
support. Prior to the 1989 enactment of uniform guidelines for
determining child support awards, Louisiana, like many other
states, conferred wide judicial discretion to a trial court to
determine support on a case-by-case basis. 21 In order to curtail
potential divergent results among states and within a state due to
the provided judicial discretion, Congress aimed at creating more
uniform child support awards. 22 As a result of this effort, Congress
17. Id. at 829-830.
18. However, the trial court did not state that it used L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2)
in determining the custody. Id. at 830.
19. Id. at 830. (Note, however, that in the dissent, Judge Rothschild pointed
out that there is no provision to allow the trial court to use 9:315.8(E)(2) to
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of custody. Id. at 832.)
20. Id. at 830.
21. Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d 290, 294 (La. 2000).
22. Id. at 295.
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enacted the Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, which
required states to establish numeric guidelines to determine
appropriate amounts of child support. 23 However, the federal
legislation did not require that the state guidelines be binding, and
thus did not operate as a powerful enforcement mechanism for the
state judiciary. 24 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Family
Support Act of 1988, mandating that states establish presumptive
guidelines no later than October 13, 1989. 25 In response to 1988
legislation, the Louisiana legislature adopted presumptive
guidelines to establish or modify child support. 26 The purposes of
the Louisiana’s guidelines were: (i) to address the inconsistency in
the amounts of child support awards; and (ii) to solve the problem
of inadequate amounts of child support awards. 27
Since the federal law mandated that the guidelines be
presumptive, the presumption is rebuttable when the court finds the
application of the guidelines to the circumstances unjust or
inappropriate. 28 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot explicitly
provides a three-prong test for Louisiana trial courts if they are to
deviate from the uniform guideline. 29 First, the trial court must
determine whether the visitation by the non-domiciliary parent is
in fact extraordinary. 30 If a non-domiciliary father visits merely a

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 2001 La. Acts No. 1082, §1.
27. The underlying public policy as a foundation for the guidelines was the
best interest of the child. But more specifically, Louisiana’s guidelines use an
“income shares model” to determine and calculate the appropriate amount of
child support. The “income shares model” is founded upon the tenet that the
children should receive the same level of parental income that would have been
provided to them as if their parents had lived together with them. Thus this
approach focuses on the contribution by each parent in proportion to his or her
resources. In other words, Louisiana has established its standard to determine
the appropriate amount of support: the parent obligation to support their children
is conjoint upon the economic capability of the parent. Stogner v. Stogner, 739
So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999).
28. Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d at 296.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 299.
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few days more than typical visitation under the guideline, it will
usually not be considered extraordinary visitation warranting
deviation. 31 Second, the trial court must consider whether the extra
time spent with the non-domiciliary parent causes him or her to
bear a greater financial burden and consequently causes the
domiciliary parent to bear a lesser financial burden. 32 This
consideration closely conforms to the Louisiana legislature’s intent
in enacting L.R.S. 9:315.8. 33 Last, it seems that the Louisiana
Supreme Court wanted to provide a safe harbor by setting up
minimum requirements for the trial court’s discretion. 34 It requires
the trial court to determine that the application of the guidelines in
the particular circumstances under consideration would not be in
the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties,
thus emphasizing fundamental policy and equity in child custody
and support. 35 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot did not
intend to draw a bright line as to what constitutes mathematical
formula in determining shared custody, but it still warned the trial
court to deviate “only to the extent not assumed in the statute.” 36
Subsequent to Guillot, the Louisiana legislature codified the
requirements of Guillot in cases where physical custody of a nondomiciliary parent reaches extraordinary levels; in other words, in
cases of shared custody. 37 The newly-enacted L.R.S. 9:315.9
established the threshold percentage for shared custody at 49% for
cases where the “approximately same amount of time” was spent
with the non-domiciliary parent. 38
However, even when the children live with one parent for less
than 49% of their time, the status of shared custody is not
automatically denied. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2001).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9, cmt.(a) (2012).
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provided a long explanation about the circumstances in which the
trial court may deviate from the amount of child support provided
for by the guidelines. The Louisiana Supreme Court presumed that
the intention of the legislative branch in enacting child custody and
support laws was to achieve a consistent body of law. 39 In most
cases, it is in the child’s best interest to have regular contact with
both parents and to split the custody equally between the parents. 40
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished joint
custody and shared custody: in a joint custody scheme, a
domiciliary parent shares most of the time with the children, but he
or she should allow a typical amount of visitation based on the
guidelines conferred by statutes; and in a shared custody scheme,
the non-domiciliary parent spends a non-typical, or extraordinary,
amount of time with the children so that the amount reaches the
heightened level required by statute. On this point—of determining
whether the non-domiciliary parent spends as much time as the
domiciliary parent with the child—the trial court is offered ample
discretion to deviate from the guideline’s threshold percentage.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot confirmed this wide
discretion allowed to the trial court in such circumstances as
consistent with legislative intent. 41
Since Guillot and the promulgation of L.R.S. 9:315.9, courts
have wrestled with the threshold percentage and its exceptions, as
applied for characterizing custody as shared or joint. 42 For
example, in Lea v. Sanders, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that L.R.S. 9.319.9 requires 50%–50% (same) or
49%–51% (approximately same) as the “threshold” percentage for
shared custody. 43 The Lea court held that 43% was insufficient to
39. Guillot v. Mund, 756 So. 2d at 298.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 300.
42. Robert C. Lowe. Steps for calculating total support obligation—Shared
custody arrangement and child support under 2001, 2002, and 2003 legislation,
in 1 LA. PRAC. DIVORCE § 8:47 (West 2012 ed.)
43. Id. (citing Lea v. Sanders, 890 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004)).
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establish shared custody. 44 However, in the year following the Lea
decision, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
45.5%–54.5% sharing was sufficient to trigger Schedule B, which
was to be utilized for a shared custody situation. 45 There has not
been a Supreme Court case after Guillot on this issue. In Janney,
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals held that 45.3% of the
year was sufficient for shared custody, and this is the lowest
percentile for the recognition of shared custody before
Broussard. 46
In Broussard vs. Rogers, Ms. Broussard calculated that Mr.
Rogers had custody for 42.85% of the time. 47 This percentile was
far higher than the 37% which the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Guillot declined to categorize as shared custody, but still lower
than any Louisiana case acknowledging shared custody status.
Broussard v. Rogers thus expands the limitations of the shared
custody designation beyond the existing jurisprudence.
The majority’s justification for this rests on a calculation of
days spent by the child with Mr. Rogers based on L.R.S.
9:315.8(E)(2), which states that a day consists of at least 4 hours
for the purposes of support. As the dissent pointed out, there is no
legal support for the use of such a calculation—which was
supposed to be utilized in determining child support—to be used in
order to determine child custody. 48 The dissenting opinion in
Broussard has some legal merits since there is no statutory basis
for the trial court in Broussard to find that a “day” consists of 4 or
more hours for the purposes of custody. However, the majority’s
position, in a practical sense, provides a uniform measurement for
the counting of a “day” for both child custody and child support. If
44.
45.
2005)).
46.
2005)).
47.
48.

Id.
Id. (citing DeSoto v. DeSoto, 893 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
Id. (citing Janney v. Janney, 943 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
54 So. 3d at 830-31.
Id. at 832.
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there are two different methods of counting a “day” for custody
and support, there would be less legal consistency between them
and it might lead to a myriad of redundant arguments by attorneys
who attempt to count a “day” in the manner most advantageous to
their clients. In addition, the legislative intent is to provide wide
discretion to trial courts, so long as this does not severely erode the
uniformity of the guidelines conferred by the statutes. Generally,
the trial court is the best place to balance several pertinent factors
in determining whether, and how much, to deviate from the
guidelines, especially on the issue of measuring the time spent by
each parent with the child. As a result, this case is a good example
to show that a case-by-case approach provides better flexibility for
courts to find the most appropriate ways to achieve the best interest
of the child.

TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS LATER: DELANEY V. MCCOY
AND SUPPLEMENTAL PARTITIONS OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN LOUISIANA
Claire Murray *
Twenty-eight years after Mack McCoy’s divorce, his ex-wife,
Claudine McCoy Delaney, filed a supplemental petition for
partition of community property. 1 Ms. Delaney sought a pro rata
share of Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s supplemental partition
was not barred by res judicata because when an asset is omitted
from a community property settlement by mutual oversight, the
matter has not yet been adjudicated and is properly subject to
modification.
I. BACKGROUND
Mack Allen McCoy and Claudine Mason McCoy Delaney
married on November 16, 1973. On June 27, 1979, Mr. McCoy
filed a petition for separation. After termination of the community
property regime, Ms. Delaney filed a petition for settlement of the
parties’ community property. Ms. Delaney propounded
interrogatories to Mr. McCoy regarding the existence of a
retirement plan related to his employment at the Shreveport Fire
Department. He answered, “The parties have no vested interest in
any retirement plan.” 2

* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014) Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Special thanks to Prof. Elizabeth Carter for her
research suggestions, proofreading, and editing; to Prof. Olivier Moréteau for
support and editing.
1. Delaney v. McCoy, 47,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 93 So. 3d 845.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal heard this dispute twice. The 2012 opinion,
Delaney v. McCoy, 93 So. 3d 845, is the subject of this case note.
2. Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 847.
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Following a trial, the court entered a judgment partitioning the
community property. The judgment set forth which items of the
former community were to be partitioned in kind and which were
to be partitioned by licitation, yet the judgment made no mention
of retirement benefits.
Twenty-seven years later, Mr. McCoy retired from the fire
department. The following year, Ms. Delaney filed a supplemental
petition for partition of community property, alleging that the
retirement benefits that had accrued during the marriage had been
omitted from the prior community property partition. Mr. McCoy
filed exceptions of res judicata and no right and no cause of action.
The trial court denied the exceptions. Mr. McCoy then filed a
petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, the court granted Mr.
McCoy’s exception of res judicata, reasoning that the existence of
a settlement agreement itself indicated intent to settle all claims
that either party had or may have against the former community of
acquets and gains. 3
Ms. Delaney appealed the trial court decision granting Mr.
McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Because Mr. McCoy failed to
introduce critical documents into evidence, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal found he had not met his burden of proof. The
court remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing in June 2011. With all
the required documentation admitted into evidence, the trial court
again granted Mr. McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Ms. Delaney
again appealed.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s
action was not barred by res judicata. Because the retirement
benefits were never specifically mentioned in the community
3. See Delaney v. McCoy, 63 So. 3d 327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011) (the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this matter).
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property settlement, the partitioning of the asset had not been
formerly adjudicated. Accordingly, the issue was not barred by res
judicata. Ms. Delaney was entitled to file a supplementary petition
for partition of community property.
III. COMMENTARY
Under Louisiana’s community property regime, each spouse
owns a present, undivided one-half interest in the community
during its existence. 4 If a property right results from a spouse’s
employment during the existence of the community, then it is a
community asset and is subject to division upon dissolution of the
marriage. 5 When the community terminates, the employee’s
spouse is the owner of one-half of the amount attributable to the
pension or retirement benefit earned during the existence of the
community. 6
Upon termination of the community property regime, the
spouses, as co-owners, may extra-judicially partition the
community property, 7 or may seek judicial partition under the
aggregate theory. 8 Under this theory, the court allocates the
community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives
property of equal net value. 9 If the allocation results in an unequal
net distribution, the court will order payment of an equalizing sum
of money. 10 The Delaney parties partitioned their community
property voluntarily.
The question presented in Delaney concerns how to
appropriately treat a community property settlement agreement
that fails to mention retirement benefits correspondent to a portion
of time during the existence of the community property regime.
4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2012).
5. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2012).
6. Day v. Day, 858 So. 2d 483, 491 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003).
7. 16 KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE: MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 661 (3d ed., West 2007).
8. Id. at 688.
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(b) (2012).
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(d) (2012).
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Louisiana jurisprudence provides that, when an agreement does not
expressly address the employee spouse’s pension, the issue of
whether the agreement divests the other spouse of any community
property right to the pension depends on the intent of the parties.11
In order to determine the intent of the parties, the court will
examine the agreement and other evidence to see whether the nonemployee spouse appears to have intended to abandon any future
claims to the former community property. 12 The resolution of the
intent question determines the applicability of res judicata; if a
non-employee spouse did not intend to divest him or herself of a
right to the benefit, then the matter has not yet been adjudicated
and res judicata does not apply.
To ascertain the intent of the parties, the court will look for an
indication that the parties discussed the asset during the events
leading up to the drafting of the agreement. A lack of discussion
regarding the asset tends to indicate that the non-employee spouse
did not waive his or her right in the asset. In Robinson v. Robinson,
the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that supplementary
partitions like Ms. Delaney’s have been allowed where the spouses
had not discussed the pension or retirement benefits before
confecting their community property settlements. 13 In Robinson,
the parties’ partition settlement did not address the division of the
former husband’s pension plan. Moreover, both parties testified
that they did not discuss the benefits in the context of their
settlement. 14 The court found that, since the benefits were never
discussed, the former wife could not have intended to transfer her
right in the pension plan. 15
In Adams v. Adams, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held
that a community property settlement could not be declared null
11. Jennings v. Turner, 803 So. 2d 963, 965 (La. 2001); see LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2045 (2012).
12. See Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1105, 1120 (La. 2001).
13. Id. at 1119-21.
14. Id. at 1120.
15. Id.
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based on the erroneous omission of an asset neither party knew
they owned. 16 In that case, the parties were unaware that a parcel
of land was part of their community property. Accordingly, the
parties made no mention of the parcel in their community property
settlement. When the former wife tried to nullify the agreement on
the basis of error, the court found that the agreement reflected only
an intent to change their ownership interests as to the assets
listed. 17
The original trial court in Delaney found that the settlement
indicated an intent of the parties to settle all claims the parties may
have had or will have in the future relating to the former
community of acquets and gains. 18 The Second Circuit, in its
second Delaney opinion, adhered more strictly to the
jurisprudential rule: even when an original partition expressly
purports to be a full and final property settlement between the
spouses, courts have allowed supplemental partitions of omitted
assets when the facts and the intent of the parties warrant it. 19 The
court examined the record and found no evidence of a discussion
beyond Mr. McCoy’s answer that there was no “vested interest” in
retirement benefits. 20 The court explained that, when neither party
mentions retirement pay during negotiations and settlement, the
failure to include the retirement pay in the settlement is a “mere
omission” which can be amended by supplemental petition. 21
The law of res judicata has changed since the Delaney parties
entered into their settlement. The changes were substantive and the
court was required to apply the previous law. Under former
Louisiana Civil Code article 2286:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with
respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Adams v. Adams, 503 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (La. Ct. App.. 1987).
Adams, 503 So. 2d at 1056.
Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 848.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
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demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded
on the same cause of action; the demand must be between
the same parties, and formed by them against each other in
the same quality. 22
Because Mr. McCoy was the party urging the exception, he had
the burden of proving each essential element by a preponderance
of the evidence. The Second Circuit held that the “thing
demanded” was not the same. 23 Because the parties did not discuss
the benefits and Ms. Delaney did not expressly waive her right to
them, the court found there was no adjudication of the particular
asset at all. If any retirement benefits accrued during the marriage
of the parties, Ms. Delaney has remained a co-owner and is entitled
to a partition of the property.
Though Ms. Delaney did not move to supplement the
agreement until twenty-eight years after settlement, her right has
not prescribed. Under Louisiana law, items omitted from judicial
and extra-judicial partitions are always subject to supplementary
partition; the right never prescribes. 24 Under the successions
section of the Civil Code, the mere omission of a thing belonging
to the succession is not ground for rescission, but only for
supplementary partition. 25 By analogy, Louisiana courts have
incorporated the successions rule into the matrimonial regimes
context; when a plaintiff moves to file a supplementary petition of
a community asset omitted from the original community property
settlement through “mutual oversight,” 26 he or she is entitled to do
so and the right does not prescribe.
Though the Second Circuit’s decision is legally sound, whether
the decision is the right one is a more difficult determination.
Delaney illustrates a clash between two important societal

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 851.
Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1401 (2012).
Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d at 513.
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interests: the doctrine of res judicata and Louisiana’s commitment
to the community property regime.
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the re-litigation of claims
that have been processed to final judgment in an action between
the parties. 27 In part, the doctrine exists to ensure judicial
economy; 28 courts simply do not have the time or resources to hear
cases multiple times. Perhaps more importantly, res judicata
guarantees the finality of judgment. 29 In the Delaney case, it may
seem unfair that Ms. Delaney sought a share of Mr. McCoy’s
retirement benefits twenty-eight years after their separation, as res
judicata is meant to impart a sense of certainty after the resolution
of a legal dispute. But res judicata is not implicated when the
judgment is not indeed final, even when the parties believe it to be.
The facts in Delaney are unusual. Twenty-eight years had
passed before Ms. Delaney brought this action seeking her share of
Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. At first blush, the court’s
decision would seem to defy the policy goals underlying res
judicata: neither judicial economy nor fairness to Mr. McCoy
would be served by allowing Ms. Delaney’s action to proceed. But
the law is clear: a community property settlement, from which an
asset was inadvertently omitted, is subject to supplemental
partition at any time. On the facts of Delaney, however, the result
appears to be absurd.
Suppose a couple divorced after thirty years of marriage. Upon
divorce, the couple voluntarily partitioned their community
property. Due to a mutual oversight, the couple neglected to
account for a particular community asset. If one of the former
spouses realized his or her mistake just a year later, few would
argue that the holdings of Delaney and its progeny would produce

27. FRANK L. MARAIST, 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE – SPECIAL PROCEDURES 52 (West 2005).
28. Id. at n.8.
29. Id.
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an unfair result by allowing the spouse to supplement the
agreement.
Suppose the neglected asset were exceptionally valuable. Even
if the disadvantaged spouse did not realize the error until ten years
later, most would find that fairness would be better served if he or
she were allowed to supplement the agreement.
Consider a couple married for just two years prior to divorce. If
their community property settlement neglected to include an asset
of even nominal value, few would argue that the disadvantaged
spouse should not be able to supplement the agreement.
The facts in Delaney distract from how fair the law actually is.
Mr. McCoy and Ms. Delaney were married for less than six years,
she initiated her action twenty-eight years after they settled their
community property agreement, and the amount in question is
likely minimal. Though the law applied in this case produced an
unusual result, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the
law would be applied so as to adequately protect Louisiana’s
community property regime.

SHALL DOES NOT MEAN SHALL IN SHORT V. SHORT
Taheera Sabreen Randolph ∗
I. BACKGROUND
The case of Short v. Short 1 is the first reported decision
regarding an award of interim spousal support since the enactment
of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326 2 in 2009. The statute mandates
certain documentation be provided by both parties in a full
evidentiary hearing on the determination of income for spousal
support. 3 A key issue in the case was whether a claimant spouse
who fails to comply with the mandatory provisions in the statute,
as a consequence, fails to prove entitlement to interim spousal
support. 4
On remand from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
due to the district court’s lack of a full evidentiary hearing on the
matter in the first instance, 5 the district court determined that
Pamela Short was entitled to interim spousal support from her
husband, David Short, from the time Mr. Short left the family
home in April 2006 until the extinguishment of the obligation on
∗ J.D./D.C.L. Candidate, May 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth
R. Carter for her guidance throughout the writing of this case note.
1. Short v. Short, 11-1084 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So. 3d 552.
2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:326 (2013 supp.).
3. See ROBERT C. LOWE, 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE DIVORCE § 8:150 (2013
ed.). The author points out the new requirements concerning evidence of income
for spousal support apply to both interim and final spousal support.
4. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557. (A claimant has the burden of proving his or her
need to spousal support by proving a lack of sufficient income or the ability to
earn a sufficient income to maintain the standard of living comparable to that
enjoyed by the parties during their marriage.)
5. Short v. Short, 33 So. 3d 988, 995. The case was remanded because the
district court did not allow both parties to introduce certain evidence before
awarding interim spousal support. Although a district court has the discretion to
award interim spousal support, it has a statutory duty imposed by Louisiana
Civil Code art. 113 to consider the needs of the claimant spouse, the ability of
the other spouse to pay and the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the
marriage, which is accomplished by a full evidentiary hearing on the matter.
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March 27, 2008. 6 As evidence of her need, Ms. Short submitted
only a copy of an income and expense form that indicated her
expenses severely outweighed her income. However, she admitted
that the amounts were mere estimates, and also relied on
documentation submitted by Mr. Short regarding the family
expenses during the marriage. 7 During the evidentiary hearing, Mr.
Short argued that the court should consider Ms. Short’s entire
financial situation, which included additional income from
personal injury settlements and loans from her family. 8 The district
court disagreed with Mr. Short and stated that the amount of
interim spousal support is not to be reduced or offset using the
separate assets of either spouse because there is a statutory duty9
for each spouse to support each other during marriage. 10 Adopting
the figures submitted by Ms. Short on her income and expense
form as a means of calculating her net monthly income (although
unsupported by any documentation, as required under Louisiana
Revised Statute 9:326), the district court stated that the expenses
she enumerated were reasonable and not excessive. 11 The district
court ultimately held the amount of $44,968.71 as an appropriate
total for the relevant time period, asserting that Ms. Short proved
sufficient need for interim spousal support. 12

6. Id. The extinguishment of the obligation was due to the judicial
determination that Ms. Short’s admitted cohabitation with another man was
sufficient grounds to grant a divorce to Mr. Short.
7. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557.
8. Id. at 555. (In his brief to the appellate court, Mr. Short pointed to prior
jurisprudence that held that a claimant spouse’s entire financial circumstances
must be considered, including all sources of income from which the claimant’s
expenses can be met, in determining a claimant’s need for interim spousal
support.)
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 98.
10. Short, 96 So. 3d at 555.
11. Id. at 557.
12. Id.
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II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
On a subsequent appeal to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Mr.
Short’s foremost argument was that the district court erred in its
judgment because Ms. Short 13 failed to comply with mandates
prescribed in Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326 regarding evidence
required to be submitted to a court in order to correctly calculate
income in the determination of an award for interim spousal
support. 14 Ms. Short responded that her failure to comply with the
statute was due to her inability to earn the requisite amount of
income necessary to file a 2006 and 2007 tax return during their
separation and, furthermore, that at the time of their separation she
was a full-time stay-at-home mom. 15 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal upheld the district court’s award of interim spousal
support, despite Ms. Short’s failure to comply with the mandates in
the statute. 16 The court began its analysis with provisions from the
Louisiana Civil Code, noting that a trial court has significant
discretion 17 to award interim spousal support based on the needs of
the claimant, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the

13. Id. at 554. At the time of this appeal, Ms. Short reverted back to her
maiden name Marinovich which the court used throughout the opinion.
However, for the purposes of this analysis, the author will continue to use Ms.
Short out of mere convenience and for lack of confusion.
14. Id. at 556. In his original brief to the appellate court, Mr. Short
contended that the evidence required under the statute is for the purposes of
corroborating statements of income made to the court by each party. He
contended that Ms. Short did not meet the burden of proving her need because
she did not comply with the statute.
15. Id. at 558. Mr. Short noted in his original brief to the appellate court that
Ms. Short admitted in the evidentiary proceeding to being self-employed as a
calligrapher of wedding invitations and working at St. Tammany Parish Hospital
in 2007. He argued that Ms. Short should be required to produce paycheck stubs
from the hospital to corroborate her income and she should also be mandated to
produce the documentation required by the IRS used to determine if she owed
self-employment tax.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 556 (citing Lambert v. Lambert, 960 So.2d 921, 928 that the
standard of review is an abuse of discretion and the district court’s conclusion
will only be reversed if there is a reasonable factual basis in the record for doing
so and the finding in the record is clearly or manifestly erroneous.
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standard of living of both spouses during the marriage. 18 The court
reiterated that a spouse’s right to claim spousal support is grounded
in the statutorily imposed duty that spouses are to support each
other during marriage, 19 and that the definitive purpose behind a
judgment of interim spousal support is to assist the claimant in
maintaining the status quo and sustaining the lifestyle enjoyed by
both spouses during the marriage while the divorce litigation is
pending. 20
The court cited the pertinent portion of Louisiana Revised
Statute 9:326(A), outlining the mandates therein, yet apparently
accepting Ms. Short’s assertion that she was unable to produce tax
returns for 2006 and 2007 because she did not earn enough money
so as to require her to file. 21 The court subsequently upheld the
district court’s adoption of the estimated figures from Ms. Short’s
expense list, and did not address whether the separate assets of the
spouses should be assessed in order to reduce or offset any spousal
support judgment; nor did the court address the implications of the
failure on the part of Ms. Short to comply with the mandates in the
statute, even after she admitted to having been employed during
the time in which she was awarded interim spousal support. 22 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal ultimately found no abuse of
discretion in the judgment of the district court, and upheld the
award of interim spousal support. 23
III. COMMENTARY
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal adhered to the standard set
prior to enactment of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326, and
reinforced the notion that an abuse of discretion will only be found
if the record supports the trial court’s conclusions about the means
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 113.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 98.
Short, 96 So. 3d at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 558.
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of the payor spouse and his ability to pay. 24 Besides quoting the
statute it its opinion, the appellate court made no mention
regarding how its enactment impacts any analysis of the needs of
the claimant generally or its impact on Ms. Short’s claim in
particular. Thus, the legal analysis in Short v. Short did not fully
take into account the implications of the newly enacted evidentiary
standards in the statute in determining interim spousal support.
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326(A) lays out, in clear and
unambiguous language, 25 the documentation that is required to be
produced by each party as evidence of income in a court
proceeding on the determination of spousal support. The statute
expressly states that both parties “shall provide to the court a
verified income statement showing gross income and adjusted
gross income, together with documentation of current and past
earnings” and provides examples of what constitutes suitable
documentation. 26 The statute uses the word “shall” a total of four
times in the pertinent part of subsection A, and mandates that each
party in an evidentiary hearing for spousal support provide the
court with a verified income statement showing gross and adjusted
gross income along with documentation of current and past
earnings. 27 The statute also stipulates that both parties shall submit
their “most recent federal tax return.” 28 There is no time restriction
or constraint in the language of this requirement which leads to the
reasonable conclusion that Ms. Short had a statutory duty to
24. See, e.g., Derouen v. Derouen, 893 So.2d 981, 984 (stating there is no
abuse of discretion “if the record supports the trial court's conclusions about the
means of the payor spouse and his or her ability to pay,” and also establishing
that any award of interim spousal support requires a finding that the expenses
claimed are reasonable); Lambert, 960 So.2d at 928 (citing Derouen).
25. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9: “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature” (emphasis added).
26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:326(A) (2013 supp.): “Suitable documentation
of current earnings shall include but not be limited to pay stubs or employer
statements” (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:326(A) (2013 supp.) (emphasis added).
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produce her most recent tax return, which was in 2005, to serve as
verification of income from her employment as a part-time nurse
until August of that year. 29 Nowhere in the statute does it state that
a party is not required to produce his or her most recent tax return
simply due to a status of voluntary or involuntary unemployment at
the time of separation. 30 Moreover, on its face, it appears Ms.
Short was statutorily required to produce paycheck stubs from her
employment with St. Tammany Parish Hospital during 2007, in
addition to any documentation she provided to the Internal
Revenue Service regarding her income from her business as a
calligrapher of wedding invitations. 31
Commentary on the statute provides insight into how a court
may interpret the mandatory provisions, and points out the fact that
the language in Subsection A is almost identical to the language in
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2(A), which lays out the
evidentiary requirements for calculating child support obligations;
the latter statute was amended by the same act that enacted
Revised Statute 9:326. 32 An appellate court placed in the Fifth
Circuit’s position should inquire into the intent behind the
Louisiana legislature’s enactment of a spousal support statute with
language almost identical to that of the child support determination
statute. Furthermore, an inquiry into case precedent that determines
what happens to a claim for child support when the evidentiary
requirements under the child support statute are not adhered to
might also help interpret and apply the spousal support statute.
29. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557.
30. Ms. Short argued she could not produce any verification of income
because at the time of separation she had been unemployed for several months
due to her role as a full-time stay at home mother. Short, 96 So.3d at 558.
31. Mr. Short noted in his reply brief to the appellate court that Ms. Short
admitted to being employed and consequently should have been required to
provide a copy of her 1099 form from St. Tammany Parish Hospital along with
any paycheck stubs to corroborate her income. He also noted she did not
produce any financial documentation from her own business in the form of tax
documents, business expenses, receipts, customer checks, etc.
32. 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 378 (WEST); See also LA. CIV. CODE art.
13 (laws on the same subject matter should be interpreted in pari materia).
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Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2(A) requires each party to
provide the identical documentation now required under Louisiana
Revised Statute 9:326.33 Therefore, any case precedent interpreting
the child support evidentiary obligations prior to 2009 are relevant
for the interpretation of the statutory language currently in effect.
In Drury v. Drury, 34 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated a judgment signed by a district court directing a spouse to
pay child support because the record was devoid of the supporting
documentation required by Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2. The
court made reference to the essential nature of documentation in
calculating child support payment obligations, even in the interim
setting, and to the fact that judgments for child support cannot be
based on contingencies. 35 Moreover, the court recognized the
inherent requirement of equity in determining child support
obligations achieved only through the examination of the complete
financial status of both parties, 36 which is directly relevant to Mr.
Short’s argument regarding the failure of the district court to take
into account the entirety of Ms. Short’s economic situation and
sources of income. The First Circuit in Drury held that due to the
district court’s failure in requiring the parties to submit the
documentation clearly set out under the statute, the district court
could not properly apply the appropriate guidelines under the law
and its judgment could not be affirmed. 37
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN §9:315.2(A) (2013 supp.):
Each party shall provide to the court a verified income statement
showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together with
documentation of current and past earnings. . . . Suitable documentation
of current earnings shall include but not be limited to pay stubs or
employer statements. The documentation shall include a copy of the
party's most recent federal tax return. A copy of the statement and
documentation shall be provided to the other party. (emphasis added)
The amendment to this statute in 2009 did not change this pertinent language in
the calculation of basic child support obligations and simply aligned the
language with that of La. R.S. 9:326(A).
34. 835 So. 2d 533, 539 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2002).
35. Id. at 538-39.
36. Id. at 539.
37. Id. “In the instant case, both parties failed to submit verified statements
as to their respective incomes, documentation of current and past earnings,
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In Harris v. Harris, 38 a husband appealed the amount of child
support awarded to his wife based on the incorrect calculation of
his monthly income, which was a combination of his employment
wages and the rent he received from some of his properties. His
monthly employment income was calculated based on pay records
supplied by his employer and his monthly rental income was
calculated based on a spreadsheet Mr. Harris prepared himself. 39
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal immediately noted
that “neither party complied with the mandatory requirement . . .
that they submit a copy of their most recent tax return” 40 and held
that the record contained insufficient evidence in order to
determine what the rental income should be and the case was
remanded for recalculation of Mr. Harris’ monthly rental income. 41
The language under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326(A) for the
determination of interim spousal support calls for the exact
documentation that was required in Drury and Harris in the
context of child support. Without submission of the requisite
documentation, the district court’s judgment in Drury could not be
upheld, nor could the calculation of monthly rental income be
upheld in Harris. There is no reason to set a different standard for
the evidence required to calculate a party’s income in spousal
support determinations when the language of Louisiana Revised
Statute 9:3269(A) is clear, unambiguous and precisely mimics the
language for the required documentation under the child support
statute. Thus, perhaps the intent of the legislature was to make
spousal support determinations more equitable to both parties. It
accomplished this by placing a fixed and mandatory evidentiary

copies of their most recent tax returns, as well as other evidence mandated by
La. R.S. 9:315.2”.
38. 976 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 348.
40. Id. at 351.
41. Id. The court upheld the calculation of his monthly employment income
because the documentation used to make the calculation were pay records
provided by his employer.
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standard on the claimant’s burden to show need, in addition to the
payor spouse's ability to pay, which constituted the exclusive focus
in the past. The author is of the opinion that “shall” should mean
“shall” in Short v. Short.

PETRIE V. MICHETTI, AND THE INDELIBLE NATURE OF
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
Morgan Romero ∗
Donations inter vivos are subject to a special set of rules in the
Louisiana Civil Code, in addition to the law of conventional
obligations. 1 The grounds for revocation of donations have been
the subject of extensive debate among Louisiana courts, civil law
scholars, and attorneys. As this note will demonstrate through the
lens of Petrie v. Michetti, 2 a recent case decided by the Louisiana
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Louisiana law makes donations inter
vivos irrevocable save exceptional circumstances where the law
provides grounds for nullification in order to prevent obstructions
that meddle with the free agency of the donation, and revocation
on account of ingratitude. 3 This case note considers the vices of
duress and undue influence and revocation for ingratitude, and
discusses how the jurisprudence has resolved these difficult issues
when presented with challenging factual circumstances. 4
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Maxine Rearick (Ms. Rearick) filed suit 5 to revoke a
donation of immovable property she had made to her daughter,
∗ J.D./D.C.L Candidate (May, 2014) Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Melissa
Lonegrass for her valuable insight and guidance throughout the writing of this
case note.
1. Donations are governed by the provisions of Title II of Book III,
whereas conventional obligations are addressed in Title IV.
2. Petrie v. Michetti, 10-122 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2011), 59 So. 3d 430.
3. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
4. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1478 (nullification due to fraud and duress),
1479 (nullification due to undue influence), and 1556 (revocation for the
donee’s ingratitude).
5. “Maxine Rearick died on May 21, 2010, during the course of the
litigation. On August 26, 2010, Patricia Rearick Petrie, Joanne Rearick
Belflower, and Linda Rearick Tillman, Ms. Rearick's daughters, were
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Dixie Rearick Michetti (Ms. Michetti). Ms. Michetti was Ms.
Rearick’s principal caregiver for five years. During this time, she
lived with her mother on the property which was made the object
of the donation.
Several arguments transpired between Ms. Michetti and her
sisters. One such argument caused Ms. Michetti to leave Ms.
Rearick’s home for several weeks. Ms. Michetti told Ms. Rearick
that “she would move out of the Cedar Avenue property if her
mother did not donate the property to her because she could not
afford to be a caregiver without assurances that she would not be
forced to leave.” 6 At trial, Ms. Rearick testified that she donated
the property to Ms. Michetti because “she felt sorry for her.” 7
The evidence presented at trial revealed the tension in the
relationships between mother and daughter, although the source of
the discord was disputed. Ms. Rearick claimed that Ms. Michetti
kicked a stool that her feet were resting on, placed a blood pressure
monitor on her stomach against her will, and regulated her
visitors. 8 Ms. Rearick also contended that Ms. Michetti threatened
to place her in a nursing home absent the donation.
One of the sisters accused Ms. Michetti of raising her voice at
Ms. Rearick. Ms. Michetti acknowledged that she sometimes had
to speak loudly so that her mother could hear her. One of the
sisters admitted calling Elderly Protective Services with
complaints on nearly forty occasions. The Elderly Protective
Services representative found that the allegations of abuse were
“unsubstantiated.” 9 Another one of Ms. Rearick’s daughters said
that she never witnessed Ms. Michetti mistreat her mother.
However, she admitted that she was angry when she learned of the

substituted as parties appellants in the litigation.” Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at
432, n.1.
6. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 433.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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donation to her sister, and a fiery message that she left on her
mother’s answering machine reflecting her resentment was played
at trial.
Ms. Rearick later admitted that for five years Ms. Michetti
“applied for and picked up all her medicines, was a constant
companion, sometimes cooked meals, bought groceries, helped her
getting dressed, performed various household tasks, and took her
to all of her hospital and doctor appointments.” 10 The attorney who
effected the donation testified that she observed no indications of
duress. She stated that Ms. Rearick contemplated making the
donation to Ms. Michetti multiple times during the few years
preceding the act of donation. Ms. Rearick’s physician testified
that he recalled no indications of abuse in the twenty-five years he
had administered care to Ms. Rearick and that from Ms. Michetti,
he had “seen only care and concern for [Ms. Rearick’s] well-being
and comfort.” 11 He described Ms. Rearick’s family relationships as
“strained.” 12 Michetti’s son-in-law also testified as to an absence
of ill-treatment.
Ms. Rearick claimed that her consent to the donation was a
product of duress, rendering it a nullity and, in the alternative, that
the court should revoke the donation due to her daughter’s
ingratitude. The trial court denied Ms. Rearick’s petition, holding
that she failed to prove duress and that she failed to prove that Ms.
Michetti had been guilty of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous
injuries. 13
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court,
finding the donation valid after a de novo review of the duress
claim and applying the manifest error, or clearly wrong standard,
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id. at 440.
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to the revocation for ingratitude claim. 14 The court also mentioned
the vice of undue influence, but dismissed it finding it was not
present. 15
As to the claim of duress, the court applied the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard. 16 Based on the facts and testimony
that the court deemed credible, the court concluded that the
evidence was insufficient for a finding of duress. 17 The court based
its holding on Louisiana Civil Code article 1959. 18
The court recognized that Ms. Rearick relied “heavily on her
testimony to the effect that Ms. Michetti threatened to place her in
a nursing home if she did not donate the property to her.” 19
However, the court noted that Ms. Rearick also testified that she
made the donation because she felt sorry for Ms. Michetti. 20 With
respect to the nursing home allegation, which Ms. Michetti denied,
the court held that there was no evidence that the donation was a
product of the threat. 21 Ms. Michetti argued that her comment
about having to move out if the property was not donated to her,
since she needed guarantees that she would not be forced out of
Ms. Rearick’s home, contemplated a lawful act. 22 The court
concluded that the nursing home allegation, even if proved,
constituted a lawful act and thus could not be grounds for
nullification due to duress. 23
With regard to plaintiff’s claim for revocation on account of
ingratitude, the court held that the plaintiff had not carried her
burden of proof. The court determined that the facts of the case, the
lack of proof regarding Ms. Rearick’s accusations, and the trial
14. Id. at 439. (The trial court, in error, applied the Code articles on undue
influence to the duress issue).
15. Id.
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1478.
18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959.
19. Petrie, 59 So. 3d at 438.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 439.
23. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1962.
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testimony supported a finding that “Ms. Michetti’s actions did not
rise to the level of cruel treatment and grievous injury under La.
C.C. art. 1557.” 24
III. COMMENTARY
Louisiana’s strong policy to enforce parties’ contractual
obligations is manifest in this case. In the exceptional cases where
fraud, duress, undue influence, or the ingratitude of the donee can
be proven by heightened evidentiary standards, the law provides
access to the safeguards of nullification and revocation. Cases that
involve challenging the validity of donations inter vivos are factintensive and largely a matter of degree. These cases are especially
difficult to resolve since the evidence is often purely
circumstantial. The Petrie case reflects the courts’ robust
reluctance to interfere with facially valid donations and
demonstrates the difficulty of surmounting such high evidentiary
standards.
A. Duress
The Petrie court relied primarily on Louisiana Civil Code
Article 1959, finding no evidence creating “a reasonable fear of
unjust or considerable injury to [Ms. Rearick’s] person, property,
or reputation.” 25 The courts found no evidence of “threats of
imprisonment or great physical injury or death,” nor were such
allegations made. 26 The only purported threats were Ms. Michetti’s
ultimatum to her mother about moving out and the comment about
placing her in a nursing home. Moreover, the court found no causal
connection between the supposed threat and the donation. Since
consent to the act of donation is vitiated by duress, the duress has
to have influenced the act. Ms. Rearick did not seem to be deprived
24. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 440, 441; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959.
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959 cmt.(b) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(Rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
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of her liberty such that she was forced to submit to the donation.
Finally, while Ms. Rearick suffered mild dementia, there was no
evidence suggesting, nor did anyone argue, lack of capacity. 27 The
evidence as a whole tended to reveal Ms. Rearick’s unimpeded
donative intent.
The court also based its decision on the notion that threatening
to do a lawful act cannot constitute legal duress. 28 Moving out of a
home and placing an older woman in a nursing home are both
lawful acts. The court held that the alleged nursing home threat
was entirely lawful. 29 The Petrie court analogized the facts of the
instant case to those of Guerin v. Guerin. 30 In that case, the court
held that a husband’s threat to leave his wife if she refused to sign
an act of sale was “patently insufficient” to prove duress that
would vitiate the wife’s consent. 31 The court similarly found that
Ms. Michetti’s ultimatum fell short of duress. 32
Duress is very difficult to prove. Ms. Rearick failed to establish
that the donation was procured by duress by clear and convincing
evidence. 33 However, if the court had characterized Ms. Rearick’s
donation as a remunerative donation, given in return for past
services rendered, the evidentiary standard would have been
merely a preponderance of the evidence. 34 This is worth noting
since the attorney who prepared the donation testified that Ms.
Rearick told her that she wanted to donate the property because
Ms. Michetti had been her caregiver for so long. 35 However, the
court deemed the donation gratuitous based on its findings
regarding what prompted Ms. Rearick to make the donation. 36
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See, e.g., Rose v. Johnson, 940 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2006).
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1962.
Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439.
Id. at 438.
Guerin v. Guerin, 49 So. 2d 1053 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984).
Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 438.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1527.
Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 434.
KATHYRN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS §8.13 (West 2009) (stating that if “gratitude and
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B. Revocation on Account of Ingratitude
In holding that the plaintiff failed to prove Ms. Michetti’s
ingratitude, the court relied on Louisiana Civil Code articles 1556
and 1557. According to those provisions, two cases permit
revocation of a donation inter vivos for the donee’s ingratitude:
“[i]f the donee has attempted to take the life of the donor; or [i]f he
has been guilty towards him of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous
injuries.” 37 As to what constitutes the latter ground, Louisiana case
law is sparse. 38 Relying predominantly on the writings of French
writers Aubry and Rau, courts generally state that “injuries include
any act naturally offensive to the donor.” 39
In Porter v. Porter, for example, the Second Circuit upheld a
donation where actions of the donees, including purposefully
crashing into the donor’s vehicle, were provoked by the donor and
were therefore justified defensive measures. 40 As Porter
demonstrates, the context of the actions is important. For example,
Ms. Michetti hid Ms. Rearick’s medication, but the doctor said this
was reasonable to ensure that Ms. Rearick did not exceed the
proper dosage. Also, Ms. Michetti spoke in a loud tone to her
mother because she had trouble hearing.
Other cases illustrate that acts of ingratitude are often quite
severe. In Erikson v. Feller, the Third Circuit revoked a donation
of immovable property for ingratitude where the donee, grandson
of the donor, accused the donor of molesting his child. 41 The
grandson’s molestation allegation was unsubstantiated. Moreover,

love” rather than a desire to pay back influenced the donor, the donation should
be deemed gratuitous and thus the rules for donations inter vivos apply.) It
seems that the Petrie court adopted this view.
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557.
38. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 440 (citing Salassi v. Salassi, 08-510
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2009) 13 So. 3d 670, 673).
39. Id. (citing 4 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS §708
(La. State Law Institute Trans. Vol. 3, 1965)).
40. Porter v. Porter, 821 So. 2d 663 (La. App 2 Cir. 2002).
41. Erikson v. Feller, 889 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2004).
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the grandson tried to evict his grandfather from the property over
which the grandfather retained a usufruct. Similarly, in Sanders v.
Sanders, the Second Circuit revoked a donation for ingratitude
when the donee son told his father, the donor, that he wished his
parents would die, wrote a letter slandering his parents, and
renounced his father. 42 Given the very limited circumstances in
which Louisiana courts will revoke donations for the donee’s
ingratitude, the evidence in Petrie was simply inadequate. 43
C. Undue Influence and the Civil Law
Louisiana Civil Code article 1479 states:
A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared
null upon proof that it is the product of influence by the
donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the
donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other
person for the volition of the donor. 44
Imported from the common law in 1991, the law of undue
influence is fairly new in Louisiana. As a result, the scope of the
doctrine and its place in Louisiana law is unclear. What is
intriguing about Petrie v. Michetti is that the court dismissed undue
influence very quickly. Ms. Rearick oddly did not plead it in her
petition. In fact, “Ms. Rearick admitted that she ‘was not
attempting to prove that she had lost her volition to [Ms. Michetti],
but rather that she was indeed aware at the time of the donation
that she was being coerced into the action.’” 45
Ms. Rearick’s reluctance to plead undue influence may be
related to the fact that few such claims have been successful. The
42. Sanders v. Sanders, 768 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000).
43. See also Perry v. Perry, 507 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987) (revoking
a donation by parents in favor of son after son had his parents’ property seized
to satisfy a debt that they owed him, causing his parents much distress); Haydel
v. Haydel, 2008-0245 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/08), 2008 WL 4763503 (revoking
donations from a husband to a wife who, inter alia, questioned his masculinity,
harassed him, called the police on him, and told him she did not love him;
finding that these actions constituted cruel treatment and grievous injury).
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479.
45. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439.
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difficulty in defining the scope of undue influence is partially due
to its inherent subjectivity. 46 Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code
article 1479, cited frequently by the courts, describes undue
influence as being “of such a nature that it destroys the free agency
of the donor.” 47 Moreover, “mere advice or persuasion, or kindness
and assistance, should not constitute influence that would destroy
the free agency of a donor and substitute someone else’s volition
for his own.” 48 The evidence characteristic of undue influence
cases is predominantly circumstantial.
One of the few Louisiana cases holding a donation invalid due
to undue influence is Succession of Sidney Lounsberry. 49 In that
case, Sidney Lounsberry died, leaving everything to a son who
lived with him. The sons left with nothing sought to nullify the
will, arguing that the son who inherited the estate exercised undue
influence over their father, who was suffering from mental
problems. The court held in favor of the plaintiff brothers, finding
undue influence, and revoked the will. 50 The court found that the
son named in the will preyed upon his father’s weaknesses and
encouraged his father’s irrational frustrations against his brothers.
In Petrie, the facts do not reveal a hindrance on Ms. Rearick’s
free agency. Especially in light of the attorney’s testimony and
bolstered by the physician’s testimony, Ms. Rearick exhibited clear
donative intent. Furthermore, Ms. Michetti is “a natural object of
[Ms. Rearick’s] bounty” as the daughter who took care of her for
years, and there is no evidence that Ms. Michetti caused her
mother to harbor bitterness against her sisters. 51

46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479, cmt.(b).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Succession of Sidney Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2002).
50. Id.
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479, cmt.(b); See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue
Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 41, 58 (2008-2009) (“the catalyst and strength of all undue influence
cases is the perceived ‘unnaturalness’ of the testamentary disposition”); Cf.
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Since the law of undue influence does not have its roots in the
civil law and it is a rather new import, the courts delineate the
meaning of the doctrine in practice. The Petrie court stated in dicta
that it would not have found undue influence had it been properly
raised. 52 Nevertheless, since undue influence is a relative nullity
and it was not pleaded, there was no opportunity for analysis, and
thus clarification of the doctrine, in this case.

Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d at 409 (revoking a donation finding that the donee
exacerbated resentment on the part of his father (donor) against his brothers).
52. Petrie v. Michetti, 59 So. 3d at 439.

AN OVERVIEW OF ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBLEASES OF
MINERAL LEASES AND THE MOST-FAVORED NATION
CLAUSE: HOOVER TREE FARM, L.L.C. V. GOODRICH
PETROLEUM COMPANY, L.L.C.
Marion Peter Roy, III *
Oil and Gas lessees have long assigned and subleased all or
part of their interests in those leases to third parties. While much
early Louisiana jurisprudence in the area centered merely on
identifying the language that distinguishes assignments from
subleases, and on analyzing the legal effects of that difference, the
importance of correctly assessing the relationship either between
lessee and assignee or between lessee and sublessee takes on an
even more significant meaning when examining the issue through
the lens of an existing so-called “most-favored nation clause”
(hereinafter “MFN clause”) in the original oil and gas lease. In the
fervent rush to secure leasehold acreage in a profitable shale “play”
(such as the Haynesville shale of North Louisiana, the area at issue
in this case), many exploration and production (hereinafter E&P)
companies eventually pay exponentially more both in per-acre
bonus amounts and royalty percentage amounts in lease
conveyances than did the original E&P company party to the lease
as a lessee. Usually, this common form of speculation creates no
additional payments owed to the lessor. However, as it will be seen
in the coming discussion of Hoover Tree Farm v. Goodrich
Petroleum, 1 a lease containing an MFN clause serves to place
liability in solido both on the original lessee and the transferee,
obliging them together to compensate the lessor the amount in
* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014), Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Special Thanks to Prof. Olivier Moréteau for support
and suggestions and to Daniel On for editing.
1. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 46,153
(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/23/11), 63 So. 3d 159.
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difference between the price of the original lease and that of the
partial assignment, both in per-acre bonus and royalty percentage
payments, if in fact the transfer at issue is deemed to be an
assignment rather than a sublease, or if the two lessees may be
deemed to be “co-owners” of the lease.
I. BACKGROUND
Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. (“Hoover”) leased 317 acres of land
in Caddo Parish to Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C.
(“Goodrich”) in 2008, for whom Petroleo Properties, L.L.C.
(“Petroleo”) acted as a broker in negotiating the lease. The final
negotiated terms of the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease 2 granted
Hoover a 25% royalty and a $1,000 per acre lease bonus. 3 After
early revisions of the MFN clause by Hoover’s attorney, its final
version, and the source of this case’s litigation, provides as
follows:
Lessee and Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., which
joins herein, each guarantee that no lessor of either Lessee
or Goodrich Petroleum or their successors and assigns shall
receive a higher royalty and/or bonus than the Lessor under
this Lease. Should any lessor receive such higher bonus
and/or royalty, the Lessor under this Lease shall receive
from Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C. the difference
between the higher bonus and the bonus paid to Lessor at
the inception of this Lease, and the difference between the
higher royalty and the royalty paid to Lessor under this
Lease. This clause will remain in effect separately with
respect to each Section covered by this Lease, and with
respect to each such Section, this clause will remain in full
force and effect until the end of the Primary Term of this
Lease. This clause covers every lease which may be made
by Lessee, Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., Sendero
2. Id. at 161-62.
3. While the lease initially listed Petroleo, L.L.C. as the Lessee, paragraph
27 of the Lease clearly provides that Goodrich is to be deemed the original
Lessee since it was always Petroleo’s intent as broker to assign the lease to
Goodrich. On May 7, 2008, Petroleo assigned to Goodrich “all of the Assignor’s
right, title and interest” in and to the lease. See Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162, n.4.
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Resources Incorporated and/or Caddo Resources LP, as
Lessee, and their respective successors and assigns, in any
section in any of the following townships and ranges in
Caddo Parish, Louisiana: (19N–16W), (19N–15W), (18N–
16W), and (18N–15W). 4
On June 6, 2008, Goodrich and Chesapeake Louisiana, LP
(“Chesapeake”) executed an “Assignment, Conveyance, and Bill
of Sale,” in which Goodrich “Granted, Sold, Assigned, Conveyed,
and Delivered” to Chesapeake an undivided 50% interest in the
Hoover lease and other leases to all depths below the “Cotton
Valley Formation.” The transfer did not contain any forms of
payment that resembled an overriding royalty for Goodrich. 5 Soon
after this agreement, Chesapeake acquired other oil and gas leases
(“third party leases”) in the area within the established bounds of
the Hoover lease’s MFN clause for a counter-performance of
$25,000 per acre bonus payments and a 30% lease royalty. Hoover
then filed suit against Petroleo, Goodrich, and Chesapeake,
asserting these third party leases triggered application of the MFN
clause in its own lease. Hoover contended that, because
Chesapeake was an “assign” of Goodrich and entered into other
mineral leases in the range covered by the lease’s MFN clause, it
(Hoover) is owed the difference between the bonus and royalty it
received initially and the amount of bonus and royalty Chesapeake
paid for the third party leases. Hoover’s September 28, 2009
Motion for Summary Judgment sought $7,608,000 (317 acres x
$24,000) and a 30% royalty. In response, Chesapeake’s and
Goodrich’s opposing summary judgments asserted the transfer
between them was a sublease rather than an assignment, thereby
not triggering the MFN clause. In the alternative, Chesapeake also
contended that even if the clause would be deemed to come into
effect, that Goodrich alone would be liable for breach of the
clause. 6
4. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162.
5. Id. at 162.
6. Id. at 163-64.
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The trial court, after receiving the arguments from all
parties, granted Hoover’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding
that the transfer between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an
assignment and that the MFN clause’s application would be
allowed because of Chesapeake’s third party lease acquisitions.
The court thus increased the Hoover royalty to 30%, denied
Goodrich’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted
Chesapeake’s summary judgment, holding that Goodrich was the
only party accountable for the higher bonus under the Hoover
lease’s MFN clause. Hoover and Goodrich both appealed
following the judgment; Hoover also sought to hold Chesapeake
liable along with Goodrich for the $7.6 million judgment in its
favor. 7
II. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, amended
the lower court’s judgment, affirming in part and reversing in part,
holding that Chesapeake was obligated in solido with Goodrich to
satisfy the higher bonus payment under the most-favored nation
clause, 8 and that the transfer executed between Chesapeake and
Goodrich was an assignment rather than a sublease. 9 Despite the
court’s recognition of the fact that the case’s primary issue is the
interpretation of the MFN clause, it nevertheless first addresses the
issue of the in solido obligation of both Goodrich and Chesapeake
7. Id. at 164.
8. See the block quotation supra for the exact terms of the most-favored
nation clause at issue in this case. While there are many available published
attempts to precisely define MFN clauses as they are modernly used, the exact
definition depends upon the circumstances in which they are employed and the
type of obligations they modify. A basic MFN clause definition is as follows: “a
contractual agreement between a buyer and a seller that the price paid by the
buyer will be at least as low as the price paid by other buyers who purchase the
same commodities from the seller.” Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of
Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts between Health Care Providers and
Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863, 864 (1991). In the instant case, the MFN clause
provides that the lessor will receive the highest prices paid by other lessees
within a strictly defined geographic area of mineral exploration.
9. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 181.
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(with regards to their having to pay the $7.6 million). After briefly
but clearly noting that mineral leases are real rights governed by
Louisiana’s Mineral Code, 10 the court states that Article 128 11
provides that the assignees or sublessees acquire the rights and
powers of the original lessee to the extent conveyed by the partial
assignment or sublease. Noting the lower court’s inconsistency in
holding that Goodrich alone was liable under the judgment, but
also somehow holding that both Goodrich and Chesapeake would
be jointly affected by the lease’s royalty obligation increasing for
30%, the appellate court rejected the notion that Goodrich is solely
liable for the payment of the $7.6 million judgment to Hoover. The
court thus held that since Article 128 makes clear that both
Goodrich and Chesapeake are co-owners of the lease’s operational
rights, that both companies are therefore liable for payment to
Hoover. 12
Regarding the appeal’s principal issue (whether the transfer
between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an assignment or
sublease), the court provides a thorough jurisprudential history of
the long-litigated difference between the two forms of lease
conveyances, starting with a basic examination of the importance
of a contract’s interpretation being clear and unambiguous, if
possible. 13 Eventually, the court outlines the Civil Code’s
definitions for successors and assigns, concluding that within the
meaning of Civil Code article 3506, 14 Chesapeake was an assign of
Goodrich; however, since the transaction involved a mineral lease,
the court further examines the unique law and Louisiana
jurisprudence surrounding subleases and assignments as they
pertain to mineral leases. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court
has decided many cases on the issue, the most important cases, and
10.
11.
(2012).
12.
13.
14.

See, generally, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31 (2012).
Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 163. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:128
Hoover, 63 So .3d at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506.
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the two which this court considers the most,15 are Roberson v.
Pioneer Gas Co 16 and Smith v. Sun Oil. 17 Noting the
inconsistencies in jurisprudence because of a lack of the code’s
guidance on the issue, the court holds that the “lease upon a lease”
concept as first presented in Sun Oil became relaxed and
broadened to mean that the sublease test became “any retained
measure”—that is, for a sublease to exist, the transferor has to
retain a “measure,” now commonly called an “override,” of the
original lease. Importantly, the court states in dicta in footnote 20
that “we have not uncovered a Louisiana decision where a tenant
conveyed an undivided interest in his lease and became faced with
the claim that a sublease had occurred.” 18 The court again
reiterates that in all prior cases involving the transfer of an
undivided interest in a mineral lease, such as what happened
between Goodrich and Chesapeake, courts have not found the
transfers to be subleases. 19 Thus, despite both Chesapeake’s and
Goodrich’s claims that their transfer was a sublease, the court
holds that “we cannot find that the Transfer from Goodrich to
Chesapeake was a sublease, causing them to be in a
sublessor/sublessee relationship.” 20
However, after this thorough legal and jurisprudential
framework of the assignment vs. sublease realm, the court seems to
shift entirely to a separate (if related) legal topic—co-ownership.
Ultimately, despite definitively declaring the transfer as an
assignment, the court declares “the relationship between Goodrich
and Chesapeake after the transfer falls squarely within the
Louisiana Law of co-ownership.” 21 Therefore, the assignment of
the leasehold rights to Chesapeake made it responsible directly to
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 175-76.
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931).
Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379 (La. 1928).
Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 179.
Id.
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the original lessor, Hoover. 22 In the final analysis, the court’s
holding seems to hinge more on the finding that Chesapeake and
Goodrich were co-owners of the lease, rather than on the finding
that Chesapeake was an assignee instead of a sublessee after the
transfer. Both findings, however, are clearly stated in the reasons
given by the court. 23
III. COMMENTARY
This brief commentary will argue that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals made the correct holding regarding both the MFN
clause issue and the assignment/sublease issue present in Hoover
Tree Farm v. Goodrich Petroleum Company, but that it was
unnecessary, superfluous, and confusing for the court to cite the
law of co-ownership at the end of its discussion in support of its
holding. Put simply, the court arrived at the correct holding after it
accurately concluded that, since Chesapeake was a partial assignee
in the lease transfer, Chesapeake along with Goodrich were liable
to Hoover—the court should have concluded the opinion following
assignment/sublease analysis instead of proceeding to discuss coownership as well. While some of the points of this commentary’s
straightforward argument are perhaps touched upon in the court’s
discussion, the argument infra attempts to lay out a simpler, more
direct means of getting to the same, correct holding(s) as did the
court in its opinion.
Article 114 of the Mineral Code provides that “a mineral lease
is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore for
and produce minerals.” 24 While the Mineral Code makes
abundantly clear that the mineral lease is notably different than
most other contracts in that it creates a real right (rather than a

22. Id. at 180.
23. Id.
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114 (2012) (emphasis added).
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personal obligation), 25 a mineral lease is nevertheless a legally
effective agreement between parties, regulating rights and
obligations like any other personal contract. 26 Accordingly, the
interpretation of mineral leases operates exactly like that of any
other contract: the words used in the lease are to be given their
prevailing meaning (unless they are words of art or technical), 27
and no further interpretation should be made in search of the
parties’ intent if the lease’s words are “clear, explicit, and lead to
no absurd consequences.” 28 In this case, the disputed clause in the
original lease between Hoover and Goodrich, and the initial reason
for the litigation, is its most-favored nation clause. The first
sentence of the MFN clause clearly and unambiguously states that
Goodrich “guarantee[s] that no lessor or lessee of either entity or
their successors and assigns shall receive a higher royalty and/or
bonus than the Lessor under this Lease.” 29 The concluding
sentence provides clearly and unambiguously that the clause
covers every lease within a specified geographic range made by
Goodrich and their respective successors and assigns. 30 If,
therefore, in conjunction with the language from the abovementioned civil code articles discussing contract language
interpretation, the terms in this MFN clause can be given their
prevailing meaning, no further interpretation of the clause is
necessary if that interpretation does not lead to absurd
consequences. Here, then, if Chesapeake can be deemed an
“assign” of Goodrich, the MFN is therefore triggered, and
Chesapeake as an assign would be liable for payment along with
Goodrich for that guarantee of the difference of bonus and royalty
amounts to the lessor, Hoover.
25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2012). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:18 (2012).
26. See, generally, Stephenson v Petrohawk Properties, L.P., 37 So. 3d 1145
(La. App. Ct. 2d 2010); Winnon v Davis 759 So. 2d 321 (La. App. Ct. 2d 2000).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047 (2012).
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (2012).
29. Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 162 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
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Determining whether Chesapeake is a partial assignee, and
therefore liable in solido with Goodrich, or a sublessee, and
therefore not liable, involves a slightly more complex and involved
analysis than that of the interpretation of the language of the MFN
clause. However, it quickly becomes clear after reading the
Mineral Code, relevant jurisprudence, 31 and secondary sources 32
that it is highly unlikely that this transfer between Goodrich and
Chesapeake would make the latter a sublessee rather than an
assignee. In the law of mineral leases in Louisiana, a unifying trait
present in subleases, and not in assignments, is the presence of a
reservation of an interest of some kind by the original lessee; an
assignment of a lease, however, is generally viewed merely as a
kind of sale of all or part of the lease. 33 The distinction is wellestablished through several decades of the development of
Louisiana oil and gas law 34 and is clearly laid out in this excerpt
from Leslie Moses’ 1940 law review article on the matter:
There is a difference under the Louisiana law between an
assignment and a sublease of an oil and gas lease. An
assignment is the conveying of all or a part of the entire
lease for the whole of the unexpired term. The assignee
secures the same interest that his assignor had at the time of
31. Mire v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 285 F. Supp. 885, 890 (W.D. La. 1968):
There is a sharp distinction between an assignment of a lease and a
sublease, recognized in the jurisprudence. In the case of a sublease a
new and, in a sense, separate contractual relationship of lease exists
between the original lessee and the sublessee. There can be no actions
on the contract between the original lessor and the sublessee because
there is no privity between them; there are two contracts, the original
lease and the sublease, only the original lessee is a party to both…
Where there is an assignment of the lease…the assignee is liable to the
original lessor for the obligations of the original lessee which he has
assumed completely. To sublease is to lease in whole or in part the
thing of which one is the lessee, with reservation of an interest in it by
the original lessee, or sublessor; while to assign a lease is to sell it
(emphasis added).
32. See generally Leslie Moses, The Distinction between a Sublease and an
Assignment of a Mineral Lease in Louisiana, 18 TEX. L. REV. 159 (1940).
33. See the emphasized portion of the quotation, supra note 31.
34. See Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 91 So. 2d 762 (La. 1956); see also
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931); Smith v. Sun Oil
Company, 116 So. 379 (La. 1928).
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the assignment. Any instrument transferring less than this,
or a part of lessee's rights or obligations under the original
lease, is a sublease.
In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary a sublease, or an underlease,
is defined as: “An alienation by a tenant of a part of his
lease, reserving to himself a reversion; it differs from an
assignment which is a transfer of all the tenant's interest in
the lease. And even a conveyance of the whole estate by the
lessee, reserving to himself the rent, with a power of
reentry for nonpayment, was held to be not an assignment
but an underlease.” 35
In the instant case, the transfer between Goodrich and
Chesapeake was an assignment, rather than a sublease, because the
terms of the transfer were such that Chesapeake received “an
undivided 50% interest in the Lease . . . as to all depths below the
Cotton Valley formation. The Transfer contained no provisions for
payment to Goodrich in the nature of an overriding royalty.” 36
Nothing about this transfer mirrors the mechanisms of a sublease,
or an “underlease” (to use the original civilian term), since
Goodrich reserved no interest or overriding royalty, as made clear
in the court’s observation quoted immediately above. Rather, this
is an assignment in which the conveyance is of “all or a part of the
entire lease for the whole of the unexpired term” 37—in this partial
assignment, the lessee transferred all the rights associated with half
of the lease’s interest. Indeed, the assignee (Chesapeake) has
secured “the same interest that his assignor had at the time of the
assignment.” 38
Thus, Chesapeake, as an assignee rather than sublessee,
should be held liable in solido with Goodrich for both the $7.6
million judgment and the higher royalty amount. The MFN clause,
read clearly and unambiguously as the language in any mineral
lease should be, was triggered when Goodrich executed the 50%
partial assignment to Chesapeake. According to Mineral Code
35.
36.
37.
38.

Moses, supra note 32, at 159-60 (citations omitted).
Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162.
Moses, supra note 32, at 159.
Id.
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Article 128, the partial assignee (Chesapeake) is directly
responsible to the lessor (Hoover). The Second Circuit thus
correctly held that Hoover shall recover from both Goodrich and
Chesapeake. The opinion, however, could have ended after the
court’s conclusion that Chesapeake is an assignee. By adding at the
end of its analysis that Chesapeake and Goodrich were co-owners
of the lease, and therefore liable in solido for that reason as well,
the Court is opening another can of worms: though the Mineral
Code provides that mineral rights are real rights, can one “own”
these rights, and therefore be co-owner of them? It is good news
that the case could be solved without answering to this tricky
question.

HILLMAN V. ANDRUS: THE GHOST OF CIVIL POSSESSION
Ross E. Tuminello*
This case presents unresolved issues in Louisiana property law
with respect to acquisitive prescription and possession of
immovables. Particularly, Hillman requires consideration of the
relationship, or lack thereof, between the doctrine of civil
possession and the vice of discontinuity. Although undecided
definitively by Louisiana courts, the issue has largely been a
subject of academic discussion among French and Louisiana
commentators. This case note seeks to identify the solution used by
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Hillman as well as
two other possible solutions that have gained academic support.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves a property dispute over the ownership of a
.94 acre tract of land. 1 The parties were record owners of two
contiguous tracts. 2 The plaintiff purchased the northern tract in
2007. 3 The act of sale specifically described the .94 acre tract as
one of three tracts being conveyed. 4 The act of sale also identified
the property as being located in Evangeline Parish and referenced a
survey map annexed thereto. 5

* Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Paul M.
Hebert Law Center (2013); B.S., E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana
State University (2009). I send many thanks to Alexandru-Daniel On for his
help in addressing these complex property law issues. I would also like to thank
Camille Meehan and Professor Olivier Moréteau for their translation of French
legal sources.
1. Hillman v. Andrus, 2011-5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/4/11), 63 So. 3d 1164.
2. Id. at 1166.
3. Id. at 1165.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1172.
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The defendants purchased the southern tract in 1977. 6 The act
of sale conveyed 2.07 acres of land located in St. Landry Parish. 7
The document included a list of calls and specifically provided that
“said property being bounded now or formerly as follows: North
by Bayou DeCannes.” 8
Sometime later, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were
encroaching on the .94 acre tract of land. 9 He filed the action to
have the boundary between the two tracts designated as the line
dividing Evangeline Parish and St. Landry Parish. 10 The
defendants reconvened asserting ownership of the .94 acre tract by
title or alternatively by thirty-year acquisitive prescription. 11 The
parties agreed that Bayou DeCannes was rerouted to the north from
its original location some time prior to the defendant’s
acquisition. 12 To prove possession, the defendants claimed that
they had maintained the property for thirty years and that their
children had periodically used the land for recreational purposes.13
However, the record also indicated that in 1981 the defendants
moved away from their property for six years. 14 During this time,
other individuals lived in the defendants’ home but never entered
the disputed .94 acre tract. 15
6. In 1994, the defendant purchased an adjacent tract increasing his
ownership to four acres. The act of sale similarly described the property as lying
within St. Landry Parish and being bound on the north by Bayou DeCannes. A
list of calls was likewise provided.
7. Id. at 1166.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The line dividing the two parishes is also the former centerline of
Bayou DeCannes.
11. Id. at 1167.
12. Id. at 1166-67. The disputed .94 acre tract was that piece of land bound
on the south by the former channel of the bayou and on the north by the current
channel.
13. Id. at 1170.
14. Id. at 1171.
15. Id. The Court did not explore the relationship between these individuals
and the defendants. However, the language of the opinion appears to treat them
as precarious possessors. The only mention of these individuals was that “no
evidence existed regarding the extent these individuals may have ‘possessed’ the
property during that period.” In any event, they were likewise treated as if they
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II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The trial court sustained the defendants’ exception of
prescription for two reasons. 16 First, the trial court determined that
the defendants had acquired ownership of the .94 acre tract by
thirty year acquisitive prescription. 17 Second, the trial court
concluded that the defendants were entitled to a presumption of
ownership by virtue of having possessed the tract in excess of one
year free from vice. 18 For these reasons, the trial court declared the
defendants to be owners of the .94 acre tract and dismissed the
plaintiff’s suit. 19
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
determination of acquisitive prescription, concluding that the
defendants’ possession 20 had been tainted by discontinuity. 21 The
Court’s decision rested firmly on the fact that the defendants had
left their home for six years. 22 Critically, the majority found that
the defendants’ “lack of evidence regarding this period of time”
precluded a finding of continuous possession for thirty years. 23
The Court then addressed the plaintiff’s demand to fix the
boundary and the defendants’ alternative argument of ownership
by title. The Court held that the plaintiff’s title “very clearly
includes the disputed property.” 24 In support of that conclusion, the

never stepped foot on the disputed tract. Thus, they remained within the
defendants’ record boundaries. For that reason, precarious possession analysis
and eviction analysis are made irrelevant in the context of possessing the
disputed tract. See id. at 1171.
16. Id. at 1167-68.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1168.
19. Id. at 1169. The trial court’s acquisitive prescription determination
rendered it unnecessary to address defendant’s alternative argument of
ownership by title.
20. In fact, the Court questioned whether the defendants ever engaged in
acts sufficient to support corporeal possession, but simply assumed it as fact for
the sake of analysis and discussion. Id. at 1170.
21. Id. at 1170.
22. Id. at 1171.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1172.
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Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s deed of acquisition referenced
a survey naming the .94 tract as one of three tracts being sold and
showing the southern border as the old centerline of Bayou
DeCannes. 25 The Court also pointed to the deficiency of evidence
presented by the defendants to prove that the disputed tract was
included within his call list measurements or that his northern
border fell within Evangeline Parish. 26 However, the Court
declined to “fix” 27 the boundary. 28 Rather, the Court simply
recognized that the plaintiff’s title, which designated the southern
boundary as the old centerline of Bayou DeCannes, was superior to
the defendants’ title. 29
III. COMMENTARY
The troubling feature of this opinion is the Court’s
determination that possession was not continuous during the
defendants’ six-year absence without any discussion of civil
possession. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 provides that
possession must be continuous. Possession is discontinuous when
it is not exercised at regular intervals, and possession that is
discontinuous has no legal effect. 30 However, Louisiana Civil
Code article 3431 instructs that “once acquired, possession is
retained by the intent to possess as owner [animus domini] even if
the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.” 31 Further, the intent
to retain possession is presumed unless there is clear proof of a
contrary intention. 32
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1172-73.
27. After considering the evidence, including the testimony and exhibits of
a surveyor or other expert appointed by the court or by a party, the court shall
render judgment fixing the boundary between the contiguous lands in
accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties. LA. C.C.P. Art.
3693.
28. Id. at 1173.
29. Id.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435 and 3436.
31. Emphasis added.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432.
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As stated in the introductory remarks, legal commentators have
identified at least three possible solutions to resolve the apparent
tension between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. The
first solution is the traditional French view, which treats the
doctrine of civil possession and the vice of discontinuity as two
wholly distinct and separate concepts. This is the solution that the
court in Hillman appeared to use. The second solution, supported
by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, recognizes a relationship
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity whereby a
possessors’ animus, sufficient to support civil possession, is
affected by subsequent acts of corporeal possession or a lack
thereof. The third solution is the modern French view, which also
recognizes a relationship between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. Under this view, civil possession requires acts of
corpus by a precarious possessor in the actual owner or possessor’s
absence.
A. The Traditional French View
Although the Third Circuit in Hillman did not expressly
identify the position underlying their judgment, the reasoning
seems to align with the traditional French view. Under that theory,
as explained by Planiol:
Possession exists just as soon as its two essential elements,
the corpus and the animus are united. It, however, can be
affected by certain vices that make it useless, principally
for the bringing of possessory actions and for the
acquisition of ownership by prescription. These two effects,
which are the principal advantages of possession, are
attached solely to a possession free of vices (or defects). A
vice of possession is therefore a certain state of affairs
which, without destroying possession, makes it juridically
valueless. 33

33. MARCEL PLANIOL. 1 PLANIOL CIVIL LAW TREATISE (PART 2) 346-47
(West 1939).
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Thus, according to Planiol, the acquisition and maintenance of
possession, whether it be by corporeal, civil, or constructive
possession, is a matter wholly independent from the determination
of whether such possession can result in ownership by acquisitive
prescription. In that sense, it may very well be that a party satisfies
the requirements of civil possession. However, for purposes of
acquisitive prescription, that civil possession remains subject to the
ordinary vices of possession—namely, discontinuity.
Broadly speaking, the traditional French view posits that no
relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. Subsequent gaps between acts of corpus sufficient to
trigger the vice of discontinuity will not then destroy a civil
possession. Rather, those gaps simply preclude the possibility of
having civil possession blossom into ownership by prescription.
This appears to be the view adopted by the court in Hillman, and
under those facts, the result would appear correct. However, one
would be apt to question whether the Louisiana Civil Code
supports the traditional French view. Under Louisiana Civil Code
article 3476, the possessor must have corporeal possession, 34 or
civil possession preceded by corporeal possession, to acquire a
thing by prescription. Thus, the Civil Code seems to suggest that
some relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
B. Professor Yiannopoulos’ View
Professor Yiannopoulos’ view promotes a logical relationship
between the doctrine of civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. 35 Again, it is important to note that civil possession
is the retention of possession solely by the intent to possess as
owner. 36 That intent is presumed in the absence of a clear proof of
34. Corporeal possession is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention,
or enjoyment over a thing. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3425.
35. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 528 (1991).
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3431.
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a contrary intention. 37 On the other hand, possession must be
continuous for purposes of acquisitive prescription, 38 and
discontinuous possession has no legal effect. 39 Referring to these
principles, Professor Yiannopoulos observes that:
There is an apparent conflict between the notion of civil
possession and the requirement that possession be
continuous. . . . Properly understood, the two sets of
provisions are fully reconcilable. In the first place,
continuity of possession is more significant in cases
involving the issue of whether possession has been
acquired rather than retained. Second, depending on the
nature of the property, long intervals in the exercise of
possession may constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of retention of possession. 40
There are three main ideas to take away from Professor
Yiannopoulos’ commentary. First, he recognizes a relationship
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. His view is
phrased in terms of the affirmative requirement of continuity under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3476. This notion reflects the
reciprocal paradigm of possession attributes within the Louisiana
Civil Code. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 affirmatively
requires that possession be continuous for purposes of acquisitive
prescription. Conversely, Louisiana Civil Code article 3435
provides that discontinuous possession, possession not exercised at
regular intervals, has no legal effect.
Following this idea, he recognizes that long intervals in the
exercise of corpus may be used to prove that the possessor no
longer has the requisite animus sufficient to support civil
possession. 41 As a result, civil possession would cease altogether
under Louisiana Civil Code article 3433, which provides that
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435.
40. Yiannopoulos, supra note 35, at 550.
41. It should be noted that this view does not purport to require corpus to
sustain civil possession, but, rather, that corporeal acts are simply used as proof
of the existence or lack thereof of animus.
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possession is lost upon a corresponding loss of animus. This is
precisely the relationship that the Louisiana Civil Code seems to
suggest when evaluating civil possession sufficient to support
acquisitive prescription.
Third, his observations can be understood as altering the
continuity standard between the successive acts of corpus required
to obtain corporeal possession and the successive acts of corpus
required to retain possession through civil possession. Stated
simply, the continuity standard is relaxed once the possessor has
acquired corporeal possession and is subsequently attempting to
lean on civil possession. Thus, under Yiannopoulos’ view, the
primary issue is how lengthy the gaps in between successive acts
of corpus can be in order to support civil possession. The issue
does not lend itself to any black letter rule of law largely due to the
fact-sensitive nature of possession disputes. 42 Nevertheless, there
is some guidance.
Article 3444 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that
the presumption of intent to retain possession existed no longer
than ten years without “actual possession.” 43 However, this article
was subsequently repealed by the legislature, and the Civil Code
continues to lack any express limitation on the length of civil
possession. The reason for removing former article 3444 is
unclear, but one might speculate that it was intended to
accommodate current Louisiana Civil Code article 3433. Tracking
the language of article 3433, 44 Professor Yiannopoulos explains
when civil possession is lost:
With respect to corporeal things, civil possession is
presumed to exist and to last until possession is abandoned
or the possessor is evicted by another person. Like
ownership, which cannot be lost by non-use, possession
42. Rathborne v. Hale, 667 So. 2d 1197, 1201.
43. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432. Corporeal possession is likely
the intended equivalent of “actual possession.”
44. Possession is lost when the possessor manifests his intention to abandon
it or when he is evicted by another by force or usurpation. LA. CIV. CODE art.
3433.
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continues for an indeterminate period of time as civil
possession. However, civil possession may be affected by
the vice of discontinuity (abandonment). Possession may be
maintained by the intent to have the thing as one’s own for
as long as the thing remains materially at the disposal of the
possessor (eviction). 45
Thus, civil possession is extinguished as a consequence of
either: (1) abandonment, 46 or the loss of animus as affected by the
vice of discontinuity or (2) eviction. The concept of abandonment
and Yiannopoulos’ view that animus can be destroyed by long
intervals in the exercise of possession are consistent with the idea
of civil possession from the Civil Code. “Abandonment is
predicated on a manifestation of the intent to abandon, which may
be established in light of objective criteria.” That objective criteria
includes whether the possessor has exercised sufficient acts of
possession on the land as determined by the very nature of the land
in question.
“The nature of the land or the use to which it is destined
governs the possession necessary to support prescription.” 47 That
is to say that the nature of the land or the use to which it is destined
may provide insight into what a “regular interval” is under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3436, 48 such that possession does not
become discontinuous. Under Yiannopoulos’ view, the regular
intervals between successive acts of corpus necessary to “retain”
possession may be longer than those intervals required in order to
“acquire” possession.

45. Yiannopoulos, supra note 43, at 528.
46. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3433.
47. McDaniel v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc., 560 So. 2d 676, 680 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Landry,
558 So.2d 242, 244 (La. 1990).
48. “Possession is…discontinuous when it is not exercised at regular
intervals…” LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3436.
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C. Modern French View
In France, a school of thought emerged suggesting that, in
addition to the intent to possess as owner, possession always
requires corpus. The physical presence may be accomplished by
the original possessor or through a precarious possessor. 49 In case
of precarious possession, the original possessor retains possession
through his intent to possess as owner in addition to the precarious
possessor’s actual physical presence. This does not mean that
possession is exercised without corpus. Corpus is exercised by
someone else. Modern French doctrine has made a very subtle
distinction between possession solo animo, and discontinuous
possession:
One may legitimately believe that the one who possesses
by his sole intent, animo solo, cannot exert possession in a
continuous manner, that is to say in all occasions and at all
moments where it should be continuous. One may also say
that possession solo animo comes close to discontinuous
possession. As a matter of fact, it seems that the rule of solo
animo possession acknowledges that possession may be
kept even in the absence of acts of possession. This may be
true, but only in the absence of discontinuity, namely in
those instances where the owner, once in possession, would
not have normally accomplished acts of possession, due to
the nature of the premises and their prevailing use....
[I]ntermittent acts do not exclude continuity, provided they
do not result in a discrepancy that goes against the idea of
possession, and if they are covered by anterior or
subsequent acts of possession. 50
Although the argument could be made under the language of
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431, it is unlikely that the modern
French view could find support in light of the judicial
interpretation given to article 3431. It is worth noting, once again,
49. By “precarious possession” I mean the exercise of possession over a
thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor (LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3437).
50. Jamel Djoudi, Possession, at no. 49, published in 9 RÉPERTOIRE DE
DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2012) (citations omitted).
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that Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 expressly provides that
“Once acquired, possession is retained by the intent to possess as
owner even if the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.” Also,
the Louisiana Civil Code expressly allows that acquisitive
prescription run in favor of a civil possessor who previously held
corporeal possession. 51
Louisiana Civil Code article 3429 provides that “possession
may be exercised by the possessor or by another who holds the
thing for him and in his name. Thus a lessor possesses through his
lessee.” However, nowhere in the code or the cases interpreting
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 is it required that precarious
possession support civil possession (solo animo). In fact, quite the
contrary is indicated throughout. Comment (c) Louisiana Civil
Code article 3431 is instructive and provides that:
Civil possession is the retention of the possession of a thing
merely by virtue of the intent to own it, as when a person,
without intending to abandon possession ceases to reside in
a house or on the land which he previously occupied or
when a person ceases to exercise physical control over a
movable without intending to abandon possession. 52
Further, acts sufficient to support civil possession are those
such as payment of taxes or the execution of juridical acts affecting
the thing, such as a lease. Moreover, vestiges of works, such as the
ruins of a house, may signify civil possession. These activities
require no actual presence on the land by anyone and appear to
indicate that the modern French view is quite different to the
requirements under the Louisiana Civil Code.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, in Hillman, the court’s apparent use of
the traditional French view had a compelling and arguably
prejudicial effect on the litigation. Generally, the party pleading
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476.
52. Emphasis added.
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acquisitive prescription bears the burden of proving all essential
facts. 53 Indeed, in Hillman the court based its judgment on a lack
of evidence presented by the defendants proving corporeal
possession during their six-year absence. Had the civil possession
articles been employed, the defendants would have only needed to
prove that they had acquired possession of the disputed tract. As a
result, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving a contrary
intention by clear proof—a much more burdensome standard than
a preponderance. Unfortunately for the defendants in Hillman, they
were left carrying the burden of proof at trial, affording the
plaintiff a substantial litigious advantage.

53. See Hooper v. Hooper, 941 So. 2d 726.
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The distinctive character of Québec’s civil law does not need to
be demonstrated once again. Its unique chronotope, 1 its
recodification, and its lifelong vie commune with the common law 2
are all factors that have been brilliantly examined 3 and will be
taken for granted in this text. What is at stake—and surely all of
these unique factors will be brought out during this study—is
simply the peculiar nature of one of its institutions: partnership.
Québec’s partnership has, without a doubt, a certain je ne sais
quoi that might be of interest to others struggling with this juridical
notion and its effects. Indeed, the histories of partnership in the
* PhD student, Université Laval; Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS
Doctoral Scholar; Wainwright Junior Fellow, McGill University; Researcher,
Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law; Member of the
Barreau du Québec. I would like to thank Olivier Moréteau for his invitation, his
patience and constructive comments. I am also grateful to all of my colleagues at
the Crépeau Centre, especially to Natasha Perri for her invaluable assistance.
1. This term is used by the language philosopher, Mikhail Bakhtin, to
express the way time and space are inscribed in language. See Mikhail Bakhtin,
Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC
IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 84 (University of Texas Press 1981).
2. For an analysis of this proximity and a take on “société distincte”
understood as a distinctive society, see Patrice Garant, Code civil du Québec,
Code de procédure civile et société distincte, 37 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 141
(1996).
3. John E.C. Brierley, The Renewal of Québec’s Distinct Legal Culture:
The New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L. J. 484 (1992).
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civil law as well as in the common law have revealed a fascinating
ambivalence about the nature of the institution, an institution that,
even if it can be said to have existed forever, never found its
grounding and still oscillates between legal personality, a modality
of ownership and a mere contractual relationship.
In Québec, the legislature was thought, until recently, to have
taken a stance. After ambiguity remained under the Civil Code of
Lower Canada, 4 and after it was recommended that partnerships
should be granted legal personality, 5 it was clearly stated that a
partnership is not a legal person under the current Civil Code of
Québec. 6 Indeed, the Civil Code of Québec defines partnership, in
French “société,” as a contract akin to what is understood as a
partnership elsewhere in Canada. In doing so, the presumption
seemed clear: the importance was placed on the relationship
between the partners who, together, were the owners of the
combined property held in some joint undivided manner and thus
were solidarily liable for its debts.
Yet, recent developments have shed new light on this
presumption: in Ferme CGR enr, senc., 7 the Québec Court of
Appeal held that it was not necessary for the partners of a Québec
general partnership to be placed in bankruptcy for the partnership
itself to go bankrupt. Analyzing partnership as a distinct and
autonomous patrimony, the Court modified—or at least bespoke—
the presumed ownership structure of partnerships in Québec,
making it difficult to contend, with any certainty, that partners are
the owners of the combined property and thus personally
responsible for its debts.

4. See Québec (ville de) c Compagnie d’immeubles Allard ltée [1996]
R.J.Q. 1566.
5. Civil Code Revision Office, Committee on the Contract of Partnership,
Report on the Contract of Partnership, XXIV, (1974). See
http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/ccro for further reference.
6. See art. 2186 and 2188 Civil Code of Québec [hereinafter CCQ].
7. Ferme CGR enr., s.e.n.c. (Syndic de) 2010 Q.C.C.A. 719.
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Thus, the question now is very simple: who owns a Québec
partnership? 8 This question is important. At stake is not only the
juridical nature of partnership in Québec, but also what is
understood as personality, patrimony and, ultimately, civil liability
in this mixed jurisdiction. One must recall that personality has lost
its primacy in Québec as the possibility of patrimony by
appropriation has come into force. Indeed, by choosing patrimony
by appropriation as the vehicle to recast the trust in the Civil Code
of Québec, 9 the legislature has not only changed the framework of
the trust as understood in the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it
literally changed the overall juridical plan: patrimonial rights today
have two means of being in the Civil Code of Québec: they either
belong to persons, or they are appropriated to a purpose. 10 This
transformation is fundamental, and has the power of transforming
old stories into completely new ones. In our case, the prospect of
patrimony by appropriation has clearly created a new angle within
the old debate about partnership: the question is not only if a
partnership has a distinct legal personality from its partners; now a
partnership can be understood as not having legal personality, yet
as having a distinct patrimony containing rights and obligations of
its own. 11
The questions then become: What is a distinct patrimony? Is it
the same thing as a patrimony by appropriation? Is it the right
vehicle for civil law partnerships? What distinguishes patrimony
from legal personality? Can there be liability without personality
or even without patrimony? Why are we having so much trouble
defining such an old institution? What is really at stake here?

8. Martin Boodman, Who owns a Québec partnership?, 5 BUSINESS LAW
QUARTERLY—MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT (November 29, 2010), available at
www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5201.
9. See Title 6, “Certain patrimonies by appropriation,” art. 1256 et seq.
CCQ.
10. Article 915 CCQ.
11. Ferme CGR , supra note 7, para. 70.
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This text has two principal aims: first, to give an overview of
the debate concerning the nature of general partnerships in
Québec; second, to use this debate in order to better understand the
key concepts at play and their role in Québec’s civilian
imagination today.
The text will unfold in four parts. I will first examine the roots
of the notion and its iteration in the common and civil law. I will
then turn to Québec and give a brief overview of the debate
surrounding the nature of partnership since its first codification. At
that point, I will examine the law in force today, and its
jurisprudential interpretation, which understands partnership as a
distinct and autonomous patrimony, in order to finally go back to
the basics and to examine what a partnership is in Québec and
what makes Québec law so distinctive.
I. SOCIETAS, PARTNERSHIPS & SOCIÉTÉS
Partnerships have been around. Roman law knew this form of
organization which grew out of the need—should we say universal
need—to bring resources together to achieve a certain goal. The
nature of the Roman societas is still under scrutiny today. Some
scholars think about it in terms of civil status, others in pure
contractual form. 12 Both ways have repercussions for our
understanding of the institution today, because both are about the
capacity bestowed upon a partner in regard to the collective
property, in regard to the other partners and in regard to third
parties.
The contractual nature of the societas seems to be agreed upon
for common law as well as for civil law. 13 Here is a recent
description of the Roman institution:
12. David Daube, Societas as Consensual Contract, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 381
(1936-1938).
13. On the shift from status to contract see HENRY MAINE, THE ANCIENT
LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS
RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (John Murray, 1861).
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Roman partnership was a contract based on the agreement
of two or more parties who cooperated to reach a common
aim. Partners contributed all their goods, money or labour
to the company. They brought to the partnership single
goods or specific activities and they sought a profit, in
proportions which could vary from one partner to another.
According to Gaius:
3.148: Societatem coire solemus aut totorum bonorum aut
unius negotii, veluti mancipiorum emendorum aut
vendendorum. Partnership usually covers either all the
partners' wordly [sic] wealth or else a single business, for
instance, buying and selling slaves.
The share of profits and losses among partners is “inside”
the contract and it arises from the obligations among the
partners themselves, regulated by the actio pro socio, a civil
action based on bona fides. However the partnership was
“personale,” that is among people. The personal nature of
the partnership obligations are evidenced by the fact that a
partner could not convey—either by a contract inter vivos
(among living people) nor mortis causa (by hereditary
succession)—his membership to other people without all
the partners' consent. In that case a “new” partnership
would arise, both substantially and legally. . . . 14
The law of societas, as described here, organized the relations
of the partners amongst themselves. The contract was intuitu
personae and if a partner disappeared, the partnership collapsed.15
Partnership was a membership, a relationship, a way of being with
one another regulated by a contract.
The common law today still understands partnership as a mere
relationship: “Partnership is the relation that subsists between
persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit.”16
14. Salvo Randazzo, The Nature of Partnership in Roman Law, 9 AUSTL. J.
LEGAL. HIST. 119, 120 (2005).
15. RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA PERSONNALITÉ JURIDIQUE - HISTOIRE ET
THÉORIES 47 (2d ed., Rousseau 1922), available at http://droit.wester.ouisse.
free.fr/pages/brocantes/saleilles_personnes/sal_pers_1_S.htm.
16. See s. 2, Partnerships Act, RSO 1990, c P.5. In Canada, statutory
regulation of partnerships falls under provincial jurisdiction and the Partnership
Acts in the common law provinces are essentially an adaptation of the United
Kingdom’s 1890 Partnership Act. Although reforms and law commissions have
taken place in the United States and United Kingdom, Canada still understands
partnership as an aggregate of persons.
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What distinguishes societas from common law partnership today is
mainly this idea of business. Presently, partnership is understood
as a commercial enterprise and its first aim is profit. Yet, and this
is where a big part of the confusion stems from, when we read,
hear, and think of a partnership, we do not think of a relationship, a
way of being with one another, we think of the firm, the actual
business. Thus, when we talk about the partnership property, it
seems as if the partnership is a distinct entity able to hold property.
This is misleading. A partnership is not a distinct and autonomous
entity as a corporation is. When we talk about a partnership, we
must consider all the partners. They carry out the business. They
own the partnership property, which is typically held in common.
They are personally liable. We should not say “the partnership
property” but always “the property held in partnership” or “the
property appropriated to the firm,” “the business.” Partnership is a
way of being, not a being. Partnership in the common law is an
aggregate of partners; 17 it is not a legal person.
In the civil law, in France more precisely, the distinctions
between a société and a legal person, between a way of being and a
being, have been blurred. 18 The story of the French muddling is
worth revealing. It pertains to the way civil law understands
collective interests and the legal capacity conferred upon a group
of persons. And, it has to do, yet again, with the power of
metonymic language: the linguistic reification of the partnership—
société de personnes—as an entity able to hold property and be
liable on its own, has had an enormous influence on French, and
thus Québec, legal minds throughout the years.

17. The debate in the common law over entity or aggregate status of
partnership is not new. See, e.g., Joseph H. Drake, Partnership Entity and
Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for Definition, 15 MICH. L. REV. 609
(1917).
18. Not true for all civil law jurisdictions, see TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION
HENRI CAPITANT, LES GROUPEMENTS ET LES ORGANISMES SANS PERSONNALITÉ
JURIDIQUE (vol. 21, Dalloz 1974).
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The distinction between a société and a legal person was
relatively clear until the 19th century. The société resembled the
common law partnership taking its roots, as the word itself
denotes, in the societas. It was thus a relationship, an aggregation
of persons, like the one previously mentioned. It had no legal
personality, no patrimony, no legal capacity of its own. If one
partner disappeared, the relationship disappeared. The individuals,
together, were owners, debtors and beneficiaries. The life of their
association depended upon them. It was a mere contractual
agreement, a purely private matter, a way of being together for a
particular purpose.
Legal persons were not so private. They required state
intervention and they took shape around the roman idea of
universitas. A universitas, a notion that developed slightly later in
the Roman imagination, had, contrary to a societas, something akin
to legal capacity. With universitas, the idea was to create an entity
that could endure, an autonomous body—corps—independent
from its actual members, who could change and even be reduced to
one. Thus, a corporation, as opposed to a partnership, had legal
personality, held property personally and thus was personally
liable for its own debts. 19 A corporation was a being.
Until the French revolution, the dichotomy in France between
partnership and corporation was clear, as it was in other
jurisdictions like England and Germany. General partnerships had
no legal capacity and took the shape of a kind of collective
ownership organized around a contractual private agreement

19. It was mainly around the idea of universitas that the notion of legal
person—personne morale—started taking shape. Raymond Saleilles, the French
specialist on the topic of legal personality, described universitas in the following
way: “L’Universitas . . . apparait comme un sujet de droit se détachant
désormais de la personnalité des individus qui en sont les parties composites.”
See SALEILLES, supra note 15, at 78, 87, 89, 90.
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between the partners. 20 Corporations, on the other hand, were legal
persons and could only arise by royal assent. 21
However, following the enactment of the French Civil Code, a
bizarre phenomenon 22 was observed in France: legal personality
was granted to partnerships while other forms of aggregation,
which had previously had legal personality, for example
foundations, were deprived of it. 23 This shift occurred first for
commercial partnerships in the Commercial Code, and was
promptly followed by a decision by the Cour de cassation which
declared that civil partnerships had legal personality and,
consequently, their own patrimony. 24 One of the grounds for
granting legal personality to partnerships is worth mentioning
because it was primarily textual: according to the court, since the
Code often referred to partnerships as debtors or creditors, this
indicated that the legislature wanted implicitly to grant personality
to partnerships. This is important, as a long debate concerning the
source of legal personality had animated the law at the time. There
were two schools of thought: the fiction theory, according to which
legal personality was only granted expressly by law to entities; and
the realist theory, according to which legal personality existed only
under certain conditions, as if there was a natural right to legal
personality. Here both schools of thought wanted to seize the
ruling as an application of their understanding of what ought to be.
20. Id. at 297.
21. The state wanted to have a say or, more precisely, a hold on these
fictional persons which, because of their capacity, accumulated wealth and
became a threat. On the history of legal personality see Madeleine CantinCumyn, La personne morale dans le droit privé de la province de Québec, in
CONTEMPORARY LAW, DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 44-59 (Institute of Comparative
Law, McGill University, Yvon Blais 1992).
22. These are the words of SALEILLES, supra note 15, at 300.
23. Maitland described the paradox: “Recent writers have noticed it as a
paradox that the State saw no harm in the selfish people who wanted dividends,
while it had an intense dread of the comparatively unselfish people who would
combine with some religious, charitable, literary, scientific, artistic purpose in
view.” FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 67
(Cambridge University Press 2003).
24. Cass. Req., 23 February 1891, D.P. 1891, I. 337.
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Yet, it seems that what happened was more something in between:
an implicit attribution of legal personality by the legislator.
Partnership was understood to be a legal person simply because of
the hesitant language of the Code.
Today the French law is clear: partnerships in France are, once
registered, legal persons by law. The fiction theory prevailed: 25
French sociétés are beings.
II. PARTNERSHIPS IN QUÉBEC
The ambivalent nature of the Québec partnership stems from
its ambiguous relationship with both the common law and French
civil law as well as from its own particular history of codification
and recodification. 26
The story is as follows: Under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, a general partnership was a contract, 27 but it was
understood by the majority of Québec scholars 28 and judges 29 as a
25. It was only in 1978 that this was truly clarified in the French Civil Code,
which states that a partnership has legal personality once it has been registered:
see art. 1842 of the French Civil Code, amended by Law no. 78-9 of January 4,
1978.
26. For a good overview of the story of the new Québec code, see the welldocumented, if a bit arrogant, text of Pierre Legrand, Bureaucrats at Play: The
New Québec Civil Code, 10 BRIT. J. OF CAN. STUD. 52 (1995).
27. Article 1830 Civil Code of Lower Canada: “It is essential to the contract
of partnership that it should be for the common profit of the partners, each of
whom must contribute to it property, credit, skill, or industry.” (“Il est de
l'essence du contrat de société qu'elle soit pour le bénéfice commun des associés
et que chacun d'eux y contribue en y apportant des biens, son crédit, son
habileté ou son industrie”).
28. PIERRE-BASILE MIGNAULT, 8 LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 186 (Wilson &
Lafleur 1909); ANTONIO PERRAULT, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 433 (A.
Lévesque ed., 1936); HERVÉ ROCH & RODOLPHE PARÉ, 13 TRAITÉ DE DROIT
CIVIL DU QUÉBEC 339 (Wilson & Lafleur 1957); NICOLE L'HEUREUX, PRÉCIS DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL DU QUÉBEC 162 (2d ed., PUL 1975); J. Smith, La
personnalité morale des groupements non constitués en corporation, 81 R. DU
N. 457, 462 (1979); ALBERT BOHÉMIER & PIERRE P. CÔTÉ, 2 DROIT
COMMERCIAL GÉNÉRAL 20 (3d ed., Thémis 1986); Charlaine Bouchard, La
réforme du droit des sociétés: l'exemple de la personnalité morale, 34 C. DE D.
349, 374-75 (1993). Contra, see Yves Caron, Les associations et les
groupements dépourvus de personnalité juridique en droit civil et
commercial québécois, in T RAVAUX DE L 'ASSOCIATION H ENRI C APITANT ,
supra note 18, at 181; J. Smith, La personnalité morale des groupements
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legal person or an “imperfect legal person.” 30 It was only in 1996,
two years after the coming into force of the new Civil Code of
Québec, that the Québec Court of Appeal clarified the notion
found in the Civil Code of Lower Canada, although it was already
outdated by this time. In Allard, the Court, for the first time, stated
clearly that a general partnership under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada was not a legal person and, consequently, that it could not
have a personal patrimony: “. . . la société civile ne constitue pas
une personne juridique distincte de ses membres, et . . . , même si
la société peut paraître posséder certains des attributs de la
personnalité juridique, elle ne jouit pas de la propriété d'un
patrimoine distinct de celui de ses associés.” 31
What is paradoxical here is that this 1996 judgment came about
after extensive debates on the nature of partnership had already
been settled by the legislature in the new Civil Code of Québec. As
mentioned in the introduction, the Civil Code Revision Office had
at the time recommended giving legal personality to partnerships
in Québec. 32 Yet, the legislature rejected this proposal and kept the
notion as a contract and a private matter regulated by the Civil
Code. In the Civil Code of Québec, partnership is placed among
the nominate contracts and is now defined along these lines:
“Article 2186. A contract of partnership is a contract by which the

non constitués en corporation, 81 R. DU N. 457 (1978-79); J. Smith, Le
contrat de société en droit québécois, 83 R. DU N. 123 (1979-80).
29. See, e.g., the following judgments : Crépeau c. Boisvert (1898), 13 C.S.
405 (C. de R.); Wemyss c. Poulin (1934), 57 B.R. 514; Garneau c. Drapeau
(1939), 77 C.S. 350; Gareau c. Laboissière, [1949] C.S. 41; Reindolph c.
Harrison Bros. Ltd., [1949] R.L. 137 (C.S.); Noël c. Petites soeurs franciscaines
de Marie, [1967] C.S. 1; Sous-ministre du revenu du Québec c. Jobin, [1971]
C.S. 565; Caisse populaire Pontmain c. Couture, [1983] C.P. 149; Somec Inc. c.
P.G. du Québec (4 juin 1987), Québec 200-09-000496-858, J.E. 87-667 (C.A.);
Lalumière c. Moquin (24 avril 1995), Montréal 500-09-001726-934, J.E. 95-909
(C.A.); Menuiserie Denla Inc. c. Condo Jonquière Inc., J.E. 96-225 (C.A.).
30. For a good example of this last idea, see G. Demers, Considérations
sur la société commerciale et sur la rédaction du contrat de société, C.P.
DU N. 75 (1971).
31. Supra note 4.
32. Supra note 5.
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parties, in a spirit of cooperation, agree to carry on an activity,
including the operation of an enterprise, to contribute thereto by
combining property, knowledge or activities and to share any
resulting pecuniary profits.” 33
This 1991 definition keeps the two essential characteristics
established in article 1830 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada—
common profit and common contribution—and simply adds the
infamous affectio societatis. The new partnership is thus not so
new. 34 In reality, if partnerships under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada took on forms that are today forgotten—the distinction
between civil and commercial partnerships or between universal
and particular partnerships were not carried over—their very
nature is the same: a contract between partners.
In fact, the legislature, to make sure that there was no
confusion around this idea, specified this time around that only
partnerships that were joint-stock companies were legal persons,
implying that all the other types were evidently not: “Article 2188.
Partnerships are either general partnerships, limited partnerships or
undeclared partnerships. Partnerships may also be joint-stock
companies, in which case they are legal persons.” 35
33. Article 2186 QCC: “Le contrat de société est celui par lequel les parties
conviennent, dans un esprit de collaboration, d'exercer une activité, incluant
celle d'exploiter une entreprise, d'y contribuer par la mise en commun de biens,
de connaissances ou d'activités et de partager entre elles les bénéfices
pécuniaires qui en résultent.”
34. See MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE, 2 COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA
JUSTICE—LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC, UN MOUVEMENT DE SOCIÉTÉ (Les
Publications du Québec 1993), under art. 2186.
35. Article 2188 QCC (La société est en nom collectif, en commandite ou en
participation. Elle peut être aussi par actions; dans ce cas, elle est une personne
morale). The phrasing of the provision is worth emphasising, as it clearly states
that in some cases partnerships may be corporations and thus have legal
personality, and this is exactly why the distinction between the two has been
blurred or is at least ambivalent in contemporary Québec civil law. According to
the last sentence of this article, a partnership can—in some cases—be a legal
person. Yet, the reasoning behind its calling a joint stock company a partnership
may not be obvious to all. What is actually going on here is a bit strange and is
mainly rooted in the French text and in successive civil law and common law
translations over the years. As previously noted, in the French language and in
civil law of the French tradition, the word “société” has multiple legal meanings
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This was not an unmotivated provision. The commentaries of
the Minister of Justice at the time are clear:
. . . having failed to establish the subtle and difficult
distinction between “full-fledged” and “unfledged”
juridical personalities, between complete and incomplete
legal personality, the previous law was instead maintained.
Furthermore, the assignment of juridical personality to
partnerships would not provide any real benefits. Instead, it
would risk creating a disparity in treatment for Québec
partnerships when compared to partnerships founded
elsewhere in North America, which do not possess juridical
personality. This is in addition to the potential tax

and does not only mean “contract of partnership.” A société can have legal
personality. So, in France, writing “une société peut être une personne morale”
would not be wrong. In common law Canada, even if the distinction between
partnership and corporation is still well established, the word société has been
used in a very strange manner. For example, in the federal Business Corporation
Act, the term “corporation” was translated by the French term “compagnie,”
rather than by the French term “corporation,” and then, for reasons that seem to
be purely linguistic, the term “sociétés commerciales” (to resemble the language
of Québec law under the Civil Code of Lower Canada [hereinafter CCLC]). Yet,
if we look at article 1864 CCLC, we can see that “société commerciale,” in
English “commercial partnership,” had multiple meanings ranging from general
partnership to “société par actions” (joint-stock companies). Under the CCLC,
the word société thus embraced both entities encompassed by the terms
“corporation” and “partnership,” as if they both meant the same thing in the eyes
of the law. Translating “corporations” in Canada with “société
commerciales” might have felt more French, but it was legally a bit amphigoric,
if not perverse! A joint-stock company was a commercial partnership but not all
commercial partnerships were corporations! The use of the same word in French
in Québec and at the federal level introduced difficulty with respect to the
distinctions between the nature of the two institutions. Today, in
both Québec and at the federal level, the Business Corporations Acts are: Loi
canadienne sur les sociétés par actions L.R. (1985), ch. C-44, art. 1; 1994, ch.
24, art. 1(F) and Loi sur les sociétés par action S.Q., ch. S-31.1. Even if we are
clearly not talking in these cases about a société de personnes (a partnership),
the use of the word société is misleading. Someone somewhere forgot the
origins of the word and idea (societas) and incorporated (no pun intended) it
bizarrely into the law. With this looseness in the use of language, it is no wonder
that partnerships in Québec can be understood as having legal personality of
some kind: lost in this translation is the distinction between partnerships and
corporations, between a mere contractual agreement and legal personality. On
the difficulties encountered with the word corporation and the story of its
multiple translations (in French) in Canada, see Antoni Dandonneau, La
francisation à l’aveuglette du droit des ‘corporations,’ 13 R.J.T. 89 (1978), and
André Lavérière, Le droit des companies, 49 R. DU B. 851 (1989).
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consequences of such an assignment. 36
It was decided to keep partnership as a mere contractual
agreement for two mains reasons: first as a matter of continuity
with the old law; second, partnership elsewhere in North America
did not have legal personality.
Reading these provisions and commentary, the issue seems
settled: a general partnership in Québec today is a mere contract
and its regime can be found, like other nominate contracts, in Book
V of the Code. Yet, instead of settling the controversy, the Allard
judgment 37 only sparked a new discussion: since that judgment
was argued under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it did not
resolve question under the Civil Code of Québec. A new debate
followed, taking the text of the new Code, and pushing the
question of the nature of partnerships a step further.
Between 1996 and today, the number of articles that have been
written on this matter has been fascinating, each of them taking a
different stance. In fact, in Québec scholarship, it seems that
almost every issue concerning the nature of partnerships and the
personal liability of the partners has been argued: some argued for
legal personality, 38 others for mere indivision, 39 some for a new

36. (Translated by the author) COMMENTAIRE DU MINISTRE, supra note 34,
under art. 2188:
. . . à défaut d'établir une difficile et subtile distinction entre la grande
et la petite personnalité juridique, entre la personnalité morale
complète et incomplète, a-t-on préféré maintenir ici le droit antérieur.
D'ailleurs, l'attribution de la personnalité juridique aux sociétés ne
comportait pas d'avantages réels particuliers, mais risquait, par
contre, de créer une disparité de traitement par rapport aux sociétés
constituées ailleurs en Amérique du Nord, qui ne sont pas dotées de la
personnalité juridique, sans compter les incidences fiscales possibles
d'une telle attribution.
37. Supra note 4.
38. Ruth Goldwater, La société civile est-elle une personne morale?, 34
THÉMIS 91 (1960), and also Charlaine Bouchard, La réforme du droit des
sociétés : l'exemple de la personnalité morale, 34 C. DE D., at. 349-394 (1993).
39. Charlaine Bouchard & Lucie Laflamme, La dérive de l’indivision vers
la société: quand l’indivision se conjugue avec la société, 30 R.D.U.S. 317, 333
(2000).
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modality of ownership, 40 others for the long-forgotten collective
ownership. 41 The idea of distinct patrimony occupies a big share of
the landscape, 42 the new Code giving way to the new idea of
patrimony by appropriation. 43 What is fascinating is that the judges
seemed to be as indecisive as the scholars: some affirmed the
obvious lack of legal personality of partnerships under the Civil
Code of Québec, 44 while others hung on to the notion of indivision,
which was at the heart of the issue in Allard. 45 Other judges clearly
preferred the dissenting opinion in Allard 46 and reaffirmed the
legal personality of some partnerships. 47 Others, feeling that
something else was occurring, supported the idea that, in fact, a
distinct patrimony had been created. 48 In Laval (City of) v.
Polyclinique médicale de Fabreville, a 2007 case, the bench, which
40. Donald A. Riendeau, La « société » en droit québécois, R. DU B. 127
(2003).
41. Générosa Bras Miranda, La propriété collective. Est-ce grave, docteur?
– Réflexions à partir d’une relecture de l’arrêt Allard, 63 R. DU B. 29 (2003).
42. Michael Wilhelmson, The Nature of the Québec Partnership: Moral
Person, Organized Indivision or Autonomous Patrimony?, R.D. MCGILL 995
(1992).
43. Louise-Hélène Richard, L’autonomie patrimoniale de la société : le
patrimoine d’affectation, une avenue possible?, in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION
PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, CONGRÈS ANNUEL DU BARREAU DU
QUÉBEC 149 (Éditions Yvon Blais 2002).
44. Lévesque c. Mutuelle-vie des fonctionnaires du Québec, [1996] R.J.Q.
1701; Caisse populaire Laurier c. 2959-6673 Québec Inc., C.S. Québec, no 20005-004938-960, 28 novembre 1996; Gingras c. Prud'homme, [1997] R.J.Q. 664;
Charron c. Drolet, J.E. 2005-916 (C.A.).
45. Gingras c. Prud'homme, [1997] R.J.Q. 664, 675; 9137-1096 Québec
Inc. c. Ville de Montréal, C.Q. Montreal, 2006 Q.C.C.Q. 5136.
46. See Justice Biron’s dissent in Allard, supra note 4:
Je ne puis me convaincre que dans les articles du Code civil du BasCanada où le législateur parle des biens de la société, des choses
appartenant à la société, des immeubles de la société, ‘the property of
the partnership,’ il ne donne pas aux mots et aux expressions leur sens
habituel. Je suis donc d'avis qu'une société peut être propriétaire de
biens.
47. 2964-7922 Québec Inc. (Syndic de), J.E. 99-15 (C.S.); Société en nom
collectif Vausko c. Ameublement et décoration Côté-Sud (St.-Denis) Inc., J.E.
99-2330 (C.S.); Groupe Kotler et al c. L'inspecteur général des institutions
financières, J.E. 2002-1429 (C.Q.); Dufour c. Savard, [1995] R.L. 327 (C.Q.).
48. Servomation International and Company Limited (Syndic de), J.E. 98203 (C.S.) (société en commandite); voir aussi Corporation des maîtres
électriciens du Québec c. Jodoin Électrique Inc. J.E. 2000-548 (C.S.); DuvalHesler c. Lalande, J.E. 97-8 (C.Q.).
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included Justice Brossard (who had written for the majority in
Allard) went as far as to say: “A limited partnership, like any other
partnership, has its own patrimony which, as long as it is sufficient,
is distinct from the patrimony of the persons who founded it.
Therefore, the limited partnership is its own entity, without being a
legal person within the meaning of the Act.” 49
This is the approach that seems to have been taken in the latest
judgment of interest, Ferme CGR. 50
III. THE JUDGMENT
The facts are quite simple. In July 2009, the Bank of Montreal
gave notice to Ferme CGR that it intended to enforce its securities
under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 51 The trustee in
bankruptcy presented the partnership’s documents but the Official
Receiver refused to file the assignment on the ground that a
partnership may not assign its property in bankruptcy if its partners
do not do so as well. According to him, since partnerships were not
granted legal personality under the Civil Code of Québec, all
partners, as owners of the partnership’s property, were required to
assign their own property for the assignment to take place. He
grounded his position on the legal nature of partnerships in Québec
as well as on common law commentary and case law. 52 One must
keep in mind that bankruptcy is a federal matter. In this
49. (Translated by the author) Laval (Ville de) c. Polyclinique médicale
Fabreville, sec., 2007 Q.C.C.A. 426 (CanLII) at para. 24: “Une société en
commandite, comme toute autre société, a un patrimoine propre qui, tant qu'il
est suffisant, est distinct de celui des personnes dont elle est constituée; elle jouit
alors d'une entité propre, sans pour autant être une personne morale au sens de
la Loi.”
50. Supra note 7.
51. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act R.S.C. (1985), c. B-3 [hereinafter BIA].
52. E.g.: “An assignment executed by all the members of a partnership
carries with it all the assets of the partnership as well as the separate assets of the
partners.” Taylor v. Leveys (1922), 2 C.B.R. 390 (Ont. S.C.); Cohen v. Mahlin, 8
C.B.R. 23, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 162, 22 Alta. L.R. 487, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 577
(C.A.).” LLOYD W, HOULDEN, GEOFFREY B. MORAWETZ, & JANIS P. SARRA,
THE 2010 ANNOTATED BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT 199 (Thomson
Carswell 2010), D§51(5) and D§72(2)(b).
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perspective, the officials administering the bankruptcy system
naturally favour an approach that aligns the approach in Québec
with that taken in the common law provinces.
The case appeared initially before a Superior Court judge. In a
very brief judgment, the judge acknowledged the problem, first
noting that the BIA did assimilate a general partnership to a person
in its definitional provisions, then observing that the case law
supported arguments on both sides. At that point, he concluded that
the remedy was in the creditors’ hands according to the BIA and
the Civil Code of Québec, and thus that the Official Receiver had
to respect their choice to pursue only the partnership.
The case was subsequently heard at the Québec Court of
Appeal. There, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy took over the
position first argued by his Official Receiver: a general partnership
does not have legal personality or, he added, a distinct patrimony.
Consequently, it cannot assign its property without assigning that
of its partners, to pursue the partnership is to pursue its partners.
The solvency test set out in the BIA is a collective one. Again, the
Superintendent‘s position was largely based on common law
commentary and case law as well as on the very nature of
partnership under the Civil Code of Québec. The trustee in
bankruptcy, for his part, dismissed the case law submitted by the
Superintendent as long repealed and, more importantly for us, as
inconsistent with the legal attributes given to general partnership in
the Civil Code of Québec. He argued that the Superintendent is
confusing “the notion of legal personality with the objectives of the
BIA, that is, with the orderly liquidation of a patrimony for the
benefit of the creditors." 53 What was at stake, according to him,

53. Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 15. (The translation of the judgment
used in this article is based on an unofficial English translation prepared by the
Société québécoise d'information juridique (SOQUIJ) which is an entity of the
Department of Justice of Québec. It is available at http://soquij.qc.ca/fr/servicesaux-citoyens/english-translation).
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was the liquidation of an “organized patrimony”, 54 regardless of
whether or not it possessed legal personality.
Thus, the debate at the level of the Court of Appeal shifted
slightly: the idea of the liquidation of an “organized patrimony”,
that is the liquidation of a personal patrimony or some other kind
of patrimony, was introduced, leaving aside the idea of ownership
and liability.
I will not perform an in-depth review of all the arguments
analyzed by the Court, as I want to focus on on the “patrimony’
issue.” To state the opinion briefly, Justice Rochon, writing for the
Court, endorsed the trustee’s point of view: the case law and
commentaries given by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy relied on
old statutes and ignored recent legislation, the most important one
for the case at bar being the Civil Code of Québec. 55 According to
Justice Rochon, the legal nature of a general partnership has
changed with the coming into force of the new Code.
Justice Rochon had no intention of reopening the Court’s
holding in Allard under the old Code. He had no intention of
dismissing the fact that the absence of legal personality has been
codified in the Civil Code of Québec at article 2188. But,
according to him, the stakes have now shifted: with the inclusion
of the patrimony by appropriation, or what he calls the objective
theory of patrimony, 56 in the Civil Code, the paradigm has
changed: “While providing that every person has a patrimony, the
CCQ acknowledges that a patrimony may be appropriated to a
purpose (articles 2 and 915 CCQ)." 57
Hence, a partnership would be, in fact, a separate entity with a
separate patrimony, albeit bereft of legal personality. According to
Justice Rochon, because the language of article 2199 of the Civil
Code acknowledges that the contribution of the partners to the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. para. 15.
Id. para. 41.
Id. para. 66.
Id. para. 66 (footnotes omitted).
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partnership occurs through a property transfer from the partners to
the partnership, there cannot be any doubt that partnerships have
their own patrimonies: “It would be impossible,” he underlines,
“not to acknowledge the clearly expressed legislative will to create,
through that property transfer, a patrimony that is appropriated
exclusively to the partnership.” 58 Recall the rhetorical argument
given by the Cour de cassation when it turned the société into a
legal person. Though not explicitly, the legislature must have
wanted to implicitly give a distinct patrimony to partnerships.
But Justice Rochon went further. Since the patrimony created
by the contribution will only be used in the interest of the
partnership (article 2208 CCQ) and managed under its rules
(article 2212 CCQ), he seems to see an analogy with trusts,
although this is never explicitly stated. 59 This implicit analogy
leads him to concluding something that, to orthodox civilians,
seems almost impossible: “there does not seem to be anything to
prevent a general partnership, which does not possess a legal
personality, from taking on obligations or answering to them
regarding its property.” 60 According to Justice Rochon, a
partnership is not only a distinct entity; it can also be a debtor,
although it does not have legal personality.
General partnerships are thus, according to him, rights-andduties-bearing units, 61 which have no legal personality. The
question of the holder, or holders in the case of a partnership, of
the rights and duties does not seem to perturb the judge. And he
has an explanation: the new paradigm of the Code, this “objective
theory of patrimony” newly inserted. The idea of a patrimony
without a holder seems to be an integral part of his imagination.
58. (Translated by the author). Id. para. 68.
59. Rochon, J.A. cites Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, La fiducie, un nouveau
sujet de droit?, in MÉLANGES ERNEST CAPARROS 129-143 (J. Beaulne ed.,
Wilson & Lafleur 2002). Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 70, n.40.
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. To use an expression taken from Maitland in STATE, TRUST AND
CORPORATION, supra note 23, at 68.
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In fact, to anchor his reasoning, he uses the exact language
used by the legislature when discussing patrimonies by
appropriation: “The partnership's property thus forms an
autonomous patrimony made up of each partner's contribution that
is distinct from the patrimony of its partners.” 62 A patrimony that
is distinct and autonomous; those are the exact words that we find
in article 1261 of the Civil Code of Québec concerning the nature
of the trust, the archetype of the patrimony by appropriation in the
Code. Yet again, the analogy with trusts is never explicitly made.
Justice Rochon, before concluding his reasoning on the
autonomous nature of partnership, underlined that the legislature
gave partnership in the new code the power to sue and be sued in a
civil action under its own name (article 2225 CCQ), which
expresses yet again its autonomous nature. He goes even further: to
ground his conclusion, he reiterates that his conclusion finds its
basis in the language of the Code itself: article 2221, which sets
out the way property should be discussed by the creditors, blatantly
uses the expression “the property of the partnership”—“les biens
de la société.” The inference is therefore clear: the legislature
wanted partnerships to have a patrimony of their own without
having legal personality.
Justice Rochon concludes: All these provisions acknowledge
that a general partnership has an autonomous, distinct and
organized patrimony independent from its partners. Consequently,
it can be liquidated on its own according to the BIA. He dismissed
the appeal.
IV. LE NON-DIT: THE BASIC JURAL CONCEPTS AT PLAY
The power of this judgment lies in what it has left unsaid. The
issue was one of bankruptcy, yet the very nature of a general
partnership was at play and indeed the judge set aside a complete
part of his judgment to discuss the problem, analyzing the legal
62. Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 68.
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nature of partnership and giving it a new ground. But, by doing so,
Justice Rochon performed a magnificent dance: never did he
explicitly say what it means for a partnership to be a distinct and
autonomous patrimony and thus be able to have rights and duties,
even if it does not possess legal personality. Never did he truly
invoke trusts and patrimonies by appropriation, even if we
understand that that is where he finds his justification. He did
mention the new paradigm, the idea that according to articles 2 and
915 of the Civil Code of Québec, the Code now recognizes an
objective theory of patrimony; but what does that mean? He did
mention, albeit in a footnote, a text about trusts—La fiducie,
nouveau sujet de droit, as an analogy (those are his words) to
understand how an autonomous patrimony could have rights and
duties. 63 But where does that lead us? Are analogies sufficient to
create a new kind of debtor? Are analogies sufficient to set aside
how the liability of the partners and the ownership structure of
partnership have been until now understood? To come back to the
questions posed in the introduction, what really is a distinct and
autonomous patrimony? Is it, in the case at bar, the same thing as a
patrimony by appropriation? Are partnerships trusts? What is a
partnership in Québec law? To answer these questions, not only
must we look at the basic notions at play, but also the actual
regimes set out by the legislature. Only after understanding what it
might mean to call a partnership a distinct and autonomous
patrimony can we understand the consequences of this
nomenclature and assess its value.
As mentioned before, the only place where we find the words
“distinct and autonomous patrimony” in the Code is in article 1260
CCQ concerning the trust. The story of the Québec trust is quite
particular and has been the object of much scholarly work, its own
juridical nature still being questioned. 64 In reality, trusts and
63. Supra note 59.
64. See Sylvio Normand & Jacques Gosselin, La fiducie du Code civil : un
sujet d’affrontement dans la communauté juridique québécoise, 31 C. DE D. 681.
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partnerships share many similarities with respect to their history,
their relationship with the common law and their juridical
attributes. The question is: do they share the same juridical
mechanisms in the Civil Code of Québec today?
Fundamentally a common law institution, the trust has had a
difficult relationship with the civil law. If we can find it today in
many civilian jurisdictions, it is not without distorting both the law
and the institution.65 In Québec, the close relationship with the
common law called for the trust’s insertion quite early on, and it
has been part of the civil code since 1889. 66 Yet under the Civil
Code of Lower Canada, the law of trusts was not without pitfalls—
the ownership structure of the trust was understood to be sui
generis, as the trustee had ownership for someone else’s benefit.
With the recodification came a strong desire for modifications and
this is where things become interesting: the committee in charge of
studying how to reform the trust proposed giving it legal
personality. According to some, this was the only way the trust
could find its way into the civil law without disturbing the
prevalent order of things, namely the dominant understanding of
person, property and obligation, or the dominant understanding of
subjective rights. 67 Yet, like partnership, this way of understanding
trust was too much in opposition to its common law counterpart:
calling a trust a corporation simply did not get the approval of the
practice. Thus, at its final stage, a look toward the modern

(1990); see also Yaëll Emerich, La fiducie civiliste : modalité ou intermède de la
propriété?, in THE WORLDS OF TRUST /LA FIDUCIE DANS TOUS SES ÉTATS
(Lionel Smith dir., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2013).
65. For a good account see RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST. TRUST IN THE CIVIL
LAW (Lionel Smith ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
66. On the origins of trust in Québec, see Madeleine Cantin Cumyn,
L'origine de la fiducie québécoise, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS PAR SES COLLÈGUES
DE MCGILL À PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU /MÉLANGES PRESENTED BY MCGILL
COLLEAGUES TO PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU 199 (Éditions Yvon Blais 1997).
67. See Yves Caron, The Trust in Québec, 25 R. D. MCGILL 421 (19791980).
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understanding of patrimony prevailed and an all-new institution
was created: trust as a patrimony by appropriation.
But what is a patrimony by appropriation? No definition is
given in the code. Only a few clues are provided: “Article 1261.
The trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust,
constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct
from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of
them has any real right (emphasis added).” 68 An autonomous and
distinct patrimony; the words ring a bell. Yet here, the autonomy is
inscribed in the law and circumscribed: in a Québec trust, no one
owns the property held in trust, none of the people implicated in its
raison d’être—the settlor, the trustee or the beneficiary—have any
real, or for that matter, personal rights in the trust patrimony. The
nature of the belonging and the longing lies elsewhere. The trust in
Québec is neither a being nor a way of being with one another; it is
a new mode of being. Patrimony by appropriation is a new
modality of patrimony.
The notion of patrimony is at the very heart of the problem.
The term, obviously part of the courts’ and legal actors’
imagination, and today part of the Civil Code of Québec, 69 does
not, however, know any legal definition and no general consensus
has been reached concerning its juridical nature. 70 In fact,
according to the Minister’s comments on the Civil Code, the
theoretical questions emanating from the notion were simply too
grand to even try to express them in a mere definition. 71
68. Article 1261 QCC (Le patrimoine fiduciaire, formé des biens transférés
en fiducie, constitue un patrimoine d'affectation autonome et distinct de celui du
constituant, du fiduciaire ou du bénéficiaire, sur lequel aucun d'entre eux n'a de
droit réel).
69. We now find the notion 67 times in the CCQ. More importantly, it is
introduced at art. 2 which states that every person has a patrimony.
70. See Christopher B. Gray, Patrimony, 22 C. DE D. 81 (1981).
71. According to the minister:
It did not seem useful to define the notion of patrimony; in previous
law, the absence of such a definition did not cause difficulties.
Furthermore, the notion of patrimony constitutes a complex reality,
which is difficult to express in a simple definition that would need to
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The juridical notion of patrimony, which knows no equivalent
in the common law, is, contrary to popular belief, a very recent
doctrinal creation elaborated in the 19th century in Germany and
France. Understood as a legal universality, that is an aggregate of
property and debts understood as forming a whole, 72 it knows two
main schools of thoughts. The first one, called the classical or
subjective theory was elaborated by Charles Aubry and CharlesFrédéric Rau, in their Cours de droit civil français d’après la
méthode de Zachariæ. 73 Inspired by German doctrinal work, the
authors developed the theory in order to explain certain matters in
the French Civil Code at the time, mainly issues in succession and
the common pledge of creditors. For Aubry and Rau, patrimony is
intimately bound to the juridical notion of the person. It is a legal
universality charged with the performance of a person’s
obligations. It is both container (the juridical capacity of a person
to hold legal rights) and content (its rights and obligations, present
and future). Essentially the term patrimony in the classical theory
is used to describe the organization of subjective rights (personal,
real and intellectual) and personal liability. This subjective
organization has three fundamental outcomes: 1) every person,
physical or legal, has a patrimony; 2) every person has only one
indivisible patrimony; and 3) a patrimony cannot exist without a
person, physical or legal, as its holder.

respond to all kinds of theoretical questions.(“Il n'a pas semblé utile de
définir la notion de patrimoine; l'absence d'une telle définition dans le
droit antérieur n'a pas soulevé de difficultés, et, par ailleurs, cette
notion constitue une réalité complexe, difficile à exprimer dans une
définition simple qui répondrait à toutes les questions théoriques.”)
(Translated by the author).
In COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE, supra note 34, under art. 2.
72. See F. ALLARD ET AL., PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS—PROPERTY (Éditions Yvon Blais 2012), under “legal universality.”
73. For an English translation and commentary, see N. Kasirer, Translating
Part of France’s Legal Heritage: Aubry and Rau on the Patrimoine, 38 R.G.D.
453, 459 (2008).
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In the civilian imagination, this understanding of patrimony has
had an unexpected fate and some believe that is it impossible to
think in a civilian manner without this classical notion, 74 the
subjective theory of patrimony embodying the trinitarian
architecture of civil codes: Persons-Property-Obligations. 75
The second school of thought, again understanding patrimony
as a legal universality, is the objective or, what has been called in
opposition to the classical theory, the modern theory of patrimony.
Emanating from Germany at the same time as the classical theory
while fundamental questions were being debated around the ideas
of moral personality, and of giving a fictional person the same
rights as a real person, this theory stems from the proposal that it is
possible to imagine patrimonies, which are legal universalities,
without personality or at least as not having personality as its main
structuring feature. 76 According to this theory, that which assures
the coherence of an aggregate of rights and duties is not a person
but the purpose for which it was created. 77 The purpose, not the
person, delimits the container.
There are two different ways of envisioning the creation and
the nature of purpose patrimonies: division and appropriation. The
distinction between the two modes of delimitating rights and duties
74. This doctrinal creation has been understood to be one of the most
important theories of the civilian imagination. See on this matter F. Zenati, Mise
en perspective et perspectives de la théorie du patrimoine, R.T.D.CIV. 667
(2003); F. Cohet-Cordey, Valeur explicative de la théorie du patrimoine en droit
positif français, 95 R.T.D.CIV. 819 (1996); and R. Sève, Détermination
philosophique d’une théorie juridique : La théorie du patrimoine d’Aubry et
Rau, 24 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 247 (1979).
75. Eric Reiter, Rethinking Civil-Law Taxonomy: Persons, Things and the
Problem of Domat’s Monster, 1 J. CIV. L. STUD. 189 (2008).
76. For a good account of the theory, see L. MICHOUD, 1 LA THÉORIE DE LA
PERSONNALITÉ MORALE ET SON APPLICATION EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 38 et seq. (2d
ed., L.G.D.J. 1924). See also F. Bellivier, Brinz et la réception de sa théorie du
patrimoine en France, in OLIVIER BEAUD & PATRICK WACHSMANN (DIR.), LA
SCIENCE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAISE ET LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE ALLEMANDE DE 1870 À
1918, at 165 (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg 1997).
77. Pierre Charbonneau, Les patrimoines d’affectation : vers un nouveau
paradigme en droit québécois du patrimoine, 85 R. DU N. 491, 509 (1982-1983).
See also DAVID HIEZ, ÉTUDE CRITIQUE DE LA NOTION DE PATRIMOINE EN DROIT
PRIVÉ ACTUEL 22 et seq. (L.G.D.J. 2003).
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is very important and frequently neglected, division and
appropriation being too often understood as interchangeable, both
being, to the eyes of some, simply purpose patrimonies emanating
from the objective theory. 78 The distinction is, however, of high
importance, and elaborating the differences between division and
appropriation to a purpose might help us answer many questions
left unresolved in the judgment and the Code.
Division of patrimony is a mode of organization that we find in
many sites in the civil law: for example, property exempt from
seizure, 79 property under estate administration, 80 substitutions,81
and the family patrimony82 are all types of divisions. When a
patrimony is divided, the holder’s legal rights are subject to a
different regime of use, enjoyment and distribution. According to
this understanding of purpose patrimonies, a person can hold many
patrimonies, or what have been called small patrimonies or special
patrimonies, and each patrimony is the common pledge of its own
creditors. 83 Even if it questions the indivisible quality of
patrimonies championed by Aubry and Rau in the classical
theory—a person can have many patrimonies—this way of
understanding purpose patrimonies has long been accepted in
positive law as it does not question the vital link that exists
between subjective rights and persons. With division, a person is
still always the holder of rights and the debtor of obligations
divided. The rights divided are only submitted to a different
regime. It is simply as if the person held many containers, each
having their own purpose and creditors within a big container.
78. This text of the French author Pierre Berlioz is a good example of the
confusion: L’affectation au cœur du patrimoine, R.T.D. CIV. 635 (2011).
79. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Reconceiving the Symbols of Property:
Universalities, Interests and other Heresies, 39 R.D. MCGILL 761, 778 et seq.
(1994).
80. Article 625 CCQ and Art. 780 CCQ.
81. Article 1223 CCQ.
82. Article 414 CCQ et seq.
83. In Québec for instance, art. 2645 CCQ, which codifies the common
pledge of creditors, clearly states that the performance of an obligation will not
affect property that is the object of a division.
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What is more, the line between the special patrimony and the
personal patrimony is often permeable, the person holding the
different sets of rights being ultimately responsible for all the debts
he created. 84
At the other extreme of the objective theory, we find
patrimonies without holders, what the Germans call the
Zweckvermögen, literally “purpose patrimony,” what the Civil
Code of Québec has called patrimonies by appropriation. 85 Here
the patrimony is completely autonomous and distinct from one
emanating from personality. The rights, appropriated to a purpose,
do not have any titularies. 86 This way of understanding patrimonies
is quite controversial, 87 as it breaks from the classical theory of
patrimony and more fundamentally the classical understanding of
subjective rights. Rights in this instance do not have titularies but
mere administrators whose prerogatives have been stripped to mere
powers 88 and who are never personally liable for the debts of the
patrimony. With this way of understanding purpose
patrimonies, “un bien peut non seulement appartenir à quelqu'un,
mais aussi appartenir à quelque chose, à un but .” 89 Property
cannot only belong to someone, it can belong to something. The
patrimony continues to be a legal universality where property and
debt respond to each other; yet, no one has title to it. Patrimonies
by appropriation are rights-and-duties-bearing units with no legal
personality, no titularies. Both the nature of the container and the
content here have shifted.

84. See, e.g., art. 1233 CCQ concerning substitution.
85. Article 1256 et seq.
86. For a defense of the possibility, see K. H. Neumayer, Les droits sans
sujet, 12 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 342 (1960).
87. Some defended it. See LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA
LOI POSITIVE (1901, reedited by Dalloz in 2003); and G. PLASTARA, LA NOTION
JURIDIQUE DE PATRIMOINE (A. Rousseau 1903).
88. On the notion of powers, see Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Le pouvoir
juridique, 52 R. D. MCGILL 215 (2007).
89. LÉON MICHOUD, 1 LA THÉORIE DE LA PERSONNALITÉ MORALE 39 (2d
ed., L.G.D.J. 1924).
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If divisions can be found in most civilian jurisdictions as
exceptions to the general rule calling for indivisibility, patrimonies
without holders do not share the same fate. The implications of this
understanding of purpose patrimonies are far-reaching, and most
civilian jurisdictions do not even fathom its possibility. In fact, to
this day, only the province of Québec and the Czech Republic90
have included this vision of purpose patrimonies in their law. And,
in the Civil Code of Québec, until the judgment at hand, it was
thought that there was only one type of patrimony by
appropriation, and that was the trust. 91
To fully understand what is meant in the judgment by
autonomous and distinct patrimony, we must turn to the title
dedicated to trusts in the book on property, which the legislature
paradoxically called “Certain patrimonies by appropriation.” Only
after understanding which elements are fundamental to the
constitution of a trust and how it is that property without titularies
can still be the object of rights when in trust despite the fact that no
one holds any rights in it, can we assess Justice Rochon’s new
grounding for partnerships in Québec.
A trust is the result of multiple explicit juridical operations:
first the appropriation of property to a purpose; second the transfer
of that property from the patrimony of the settlor to a new
patrimony that he creates for that purpose; third, the acceptance by
a trustee of his administrative mission. 92 The acceptance by the
trustee of his mission is very important as it is his acceptance that
divests the settlor from his property and secures the beneficiaries’
interest. The trust always has to have an independent and
90. The Czech Civil Code (Act 89/2012 Coll.), which will come into force
on January 1st, 2014, introduces a new institution into Czech private law—the
"trust fund" (in Czech, svěřenský fond). See sections 1448 to 1474 of the Czech
Code.
91. Under the heading of “Certain patrimonies by appropriation” we find
the trust and the foundation. However, foundation can either take the form of a
legal person or a trust (article 1257 CCQ). As such, trust is the only actual
patrimony by appropriation under this title in the Civil Code of Québec.
92. We find the constitutive element of trust set out in articles 1260, 1264
and 1265 CCQ.
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disinterested third party as trustee holding the property. 93
Otherwise, the property is literally paralyzed.
In reality, the trustee’s role in the legal scheme set up by the
legislature is fundamental. It is because of him that the property in
trust is not understood to be without owner and thus remains the
object of rights throughout the duration of the trust. 94 According to
article 1278 CCQ, the trustee has control and exclusive
administration of the trust patrimony. Although holding the trust
property, the trustee does not have any rights in it. He is vested
with mere powers. Powers, contrary to subjective rights, can be
understood as legal prerogatives exercised in a disinterested
manner. It is through his disinterested powers that he exercises the
rights pertaining to the trust patrimony. He is, according to the
code, an administrator of the property of others charged with full
administration, which means the regime and legal obligations set
forth by the legislature in the title called “administration of the
property of others” apply to him. 95 However, contrary to other
administrators of the property of others, 96 the trustee is not an
administrator of the property of another person. He has no “real”
debtor, as no one owns the trust property and the trust is not a legal
person. He is not an agent or a mandatary acting on behalf of or
representing someone else. He has a function that gives him
powers and imposes upon him some legal duties that he has to
fulfill, namely to pursue the appropriation given to the trust
property. Since no one is his creditor, measures of supervision and
control over his administrative acts are set by the legislature: the
settlor, his heirs, the beneficiaries or any other interested party can
take action against the trustee to compel him to act according to the
trust deed and the law. 97 But these supervisors are acting as
93. Article 1275 CCQ.
94. Article 911 CCQ.
95. See art. 1299 and seq. CCQ.
96. Think about tutors, curators, or mandataries.
97. Art 1287 et seq. and the title on “Administration of property of others,”
art. 1299 et seq.
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outsiders, albeit interested outsiders, looking over the acts of the
disinterested trustee. The trustee has legal obligations towards
them imposed by the regime but no personal obligations. His
personal patrimony is only engaged if he commits a fault that
affects them personally in his administration.
The trustee thus holds two very distinct patrimonies, one
personal and the other appropriated to a purpose, which carries on
like a personal patrimony that has no owner, only a disinterested
administrator. The trustee accordingly has two capacities in law, a
personal capacity which gives him subjective rights and personal
obligations; and an administrative capacity as a trustee which gives
him powers and duties and only commits the purpose patrimony.
As Justice Rochon duly pointed out, this duplicity of holding
rights is now inscribed in the law in articles 2 and 915 CCQ: in the
Civil Code of Québec patrimonies can be appropriated to a purpose
and rights can be either subjective rights, i.e. a legal prerogative
that the holder exercises in his own interest, or a legal prerogative
without a titulary which is exercised by a disinterested
administrator entrusted for that purpose. 98 The legislator did insert
the objective theory of patrimony in the code.
V. BACK TO PARTNERSHIP
Now that we have a better idea of what is meant in the Civil
Code of Québec by distinct and autonomous patrimony, a more
profound analysis of the contract of partnership becomes possible.
Are partnerships really distinct and autonomous patrimonies? Or to
ask the question differently and in light of what was just explained:
is it possible that the rights in a partnership are legal prerogatives
without titularies exercised by disinterested administrators? Can
we call partners of a general partnership disinterested
administrators in the regime currently set forth in the Civil Code of
98. F. ALLARD ET AL., PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS - PROPERTY, supra note 72, under “right.”
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Québec? Can combining property, knowledge or activities and
sharing any resulting pecuniary profits be enough to constitute a
patrimony by appropriation?
Well, the answer to all these questions is simply no. A
partnership is not and cannot be a patrimony by appropriation. And
the reason is simple: the partners, acting for the partnership, are
interested actors and keep subjective rights in the property held in
partnership from its constitution to its dissolution. If a patrimony is
created, it cannot be one that is organized around the idea of rights
without titularies administered by a disinterested third party. As
such, it cannot be a distinct and autonomous patrimony. Yet this
does not mean that partnership cannot be another kind of purpose
patrimony.
A partnership in the Civil Code of Québec should be
understood as a simple aggregate of partners. It is a contract; a set
of obligations between the partners themselves and between the
partners and third parties. To create the partnership, their
collaboration, the partners combine some of their property creating
a specific aggregate of property that is subject to a different regime
of use, enjoyment and distribution. Each partner continues to be
the owner of the property he contributed to the collaborative
enterprise, yet this property is now charged with a destination and
a specific purpose: the partnership. 99 As such, in each partner’s
personal patrimony, there is a special patrimony—a divided
patrimony, which is devoted to the partnership. All these special
patrimonies, combined, form the partnership’s patrimony.
Partnership is thus a universality of property appropriated to a
purpose, but which has several owners, several titularies. 100
To make it work, each partner is understood to be the
mandatary of the other when it comes to any act performed in the
99. Article 2208 CCQ.
100. Never is the partnership without titulary, though it can now be in the
hand of only one partner (does that even make linguistic sense?!) for a specific
amount of time. See art. 2332 CCQ.
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course of the partnership’s business. 101 Here, there is no distinct
supervisory scheme established by the legislature, because the
supervision of each partner's actions is simply made by the other
partners, the mandators or principals, whose patrimonies are
engaged in the acts of the others partners. They are all personally
implicated in their mutual enterprise. Being a partner does not
entail acting in a disinterested manner. On the contrary, partners
are acting in their own personal interest, their own interest now
being linked to the interests of their partners. As such, they will
together suffer the joys and the pains of their association:
“participation to the profits entails obligations to share the
losses.” 102
All that being said, it is impossible to understand, or even
compare partners with trustees; partnerships with patrimony by
appropriation? Partners in this scheme are at the same time settlors,
trustees, and beneficiaries. They are never disinterested, never
independent, and never a third party. In law, there may not even be
a stipulation excluding a partner from participating in collective
decisions, 103 or excluding him from the profits made. There may
not even be a stipulation that releases him from the obligation to
share the losses. 104 Of course, the management of the partnership
(i.e. the business the partners decided to pursue) can be given to a
third party. 105 Yet the constitution of the partnership does not
depend on this possibility, the partners being the only essential
actors to this scheme.
Ultimately, partnerships are mere personal relationships
between partners. It is a mere contract, as its place in the code and
its definitional provision provide. If there is the creation of a
special purpose patrimony, the nature of this patrimony is quite
particular and should not be understood as a patrimony by
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Article 2219 CCQ.
Article 2201 CCQ.
Article 2216 CCQ.
Article 2203 CCQ.
Article 2213 CCQ et seq.
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appropriation, i.e. a distinct and autonomous patrimony that knows
no titulary and implies an independent administrator acting
unselfishly through powers. Partners hold the rights they have
appropriated to the partnership. As holders of the rights, partners
are solidarily liable for obligations contracted for the purpose of
the partnership. Yet, and this is what confounds the interpreters
and judges: according to article 2221 CCQ, the creditors must first
discuss the property that was duly destined to the partnership; then,
they have access to the personal patrimony of each of the partners,
but only after their own personal creditors are paid. The legislator
here created a particular scheme of distribution of assets. The
assets appropriated to the partnership make divided patrimonies in
the personal patrimony of each partner. The combination of these
divided patrimonies form the partnership patrimony. The
partnership patrimony is an open aggregate of property and
liability, which permits creditors to access, if needed and as a last
recourse, the multiple owners' personal patrimonies.
As such, the partnership looks as if it has a distinct patrimony,
but one that cannot be said to be without holders or autonomous.
The partners are, as they should be, ultimately liable.
VI. THE QUIET REVOLUTION OF LEGAL IMAGINATION
In the judgment, Justice Rochon stated that partnerships are
autonomous patrimonies distinct from that of the partners, taking
on obligations and using the partnership’s “personless” property to
respond to them. According to him, this understanding was
possible because the legislature introduced the objective theory of
patrimony, which entails the creation of purpose patrimonies
independent from legal subjects in the new Civil Code. Because
the language of the Code was ambiguous when it came to
understanding whether partnership meant an aggregate of persons
or an aggregate of property, and because this property was
appropriated to a specific purpose, he did not see any objection in
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depersonalizing partnerships and making the partners ultimately
not liable for the losses and debts they engendered. A partnership,
as an aggregate of property appropriated to a purpose, albeit not
having a legal personality, can, according to him, assign its
property.
Yet, looking at the real nature of a patrimony by appropriation
as inscribed in the Civil Code of Québec and how it is possible for
rights without titularies to still be objects of rights during the
duration of their appropriation, understanding partnership as a
patrimony by appropriation distinct from that of the partners seems
a bit strange. How can the partners not have rights in the
partnership? How can they be disinterested? Is not the whole
purpose of the enterprise to join with others and make an interested
profit?
Depersonalizing partnership is indeed not obvious. If it worked
for trusts, it is because the role of the trustee is quite specific and
framed in a very particular manner. The trust is a patrimony by
appropriation according to the Code. Partnership is nothing but a
relationship. It is a contract. A contract cannot assign property.
Relationships cannot go bankrupt. Persons can.
Introducing the objective theory of patrimony in the Civil Code
is one thing. Seeing patrimonies without holders every time there
is property appropriated to a purpose is another. If the idea is now
part of the legal imagination of Québec‘s jurist, its nature and
mechanisms are not yet assimilated. The idea of property without a
holder is revolutionary and has the power of permitting the
protection of anything valuable without personalizing it. However,
for the idea to work, it is fundamental that we understand the
apparatus behind it, which entails a disinterested actor holding the
rights and the impossibility of that actor ever being personally
liable for the obligations emanating from his mission. If his
personal patrimony is solicited by law, then even if there is an
appropriation to a purpose, what is at stake is not a patrimony by
appropriation but a simple division of patrimony. Both are purpose

372

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

patrimonies, yet both reside on two fundamentally different
regimes, subjective rights and rights appropriated to a purpose.
Forgetting this distinction can engender complicated
consequences, in this case permitting partners to ultimately not be
fully liable for the losses stemming from their collaboration.
Codified civil law stands on the absolute precision of its
language and concepts. When a new concept comes into force—a
new concept that in this case is using a term that is so fundamental
that it is taken for granted: patrimony—it is important to come
back to the basics and understand what is really at play.
Partnership in Québec was a good opportunity to revisit the three
basic notions upon which our law is built: person, property and
obligations. As I hope I have shown, one cannot be understood
without the others. Changing or, in this case, adding a new concept
of property in the Code, based on disinterested management and
not personal benefit, is a major change in our understanding of
what a right is, and most importantly in what law is supposed to
protect. Appropriating rights to a purpose is nothing new, and in
this sense the judge was right: a partnership is a special purpose.
But depersonalizing rights is a whole other phenomenon that
should not be taken lightly. Patrimony by appropriation changes
the whole premise of what we understand as fundamental to our
law and accounts for the distinctiveness of Québec civil law and
society.
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comparative law, I was not surprised when my American
colleagues asked me numerous questions about Russian law.
However,
the
main
question—to
which
legal
family/system/tradition does Russia belong—is not an easy one to
answer. The problem is that, even after the fall of the Soviet Union
and substantial reforms to Russian law, comparativists (both
Russian and Western) are indecisive about placing Russia within
the legal tradition of civil law and continue to consider it as a legal
tradition sui generis. In my opinion, this approach is the result of
the power of historical tradition. The expulsion of the Soviet Union
from civilian legal tradition was done in 1950-1960s by Pierre
Arminjon, Boris Nolde and Martin Wolff in their Traité de droit
comparé, 1 on one side, and by René David in his Les grands
systèmes de droit contemporains: (droit comparé), 2 on the other. I
will not go into the details of why the scholars decided to classify
Soviet law as a separate legal system, but the main points for
distinction were divergent economic and political orientations,
dissimilar social values, differences in property, labour, and
contract law. Briefly, scholars were looking more for
dissimilarities than similarities between Russian and Western law
and, definitely, found enough of them to put Russia outside civilian
legal tradition. This attitude of looking at how Russian law is
different from civilian systems continues to persist today.
In this article, by presenting a survey of the history of civil law
codification in Russia, with a special emphasis on property law as
the most peculiar part of Russian law, I will try to show that, first,
Russia (even in Soviet times) has always belonged to civilian legal
tradition. It is obvious that the country was directed by divergent
1. PIERRE ARMINJON ET AL., 1 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ 47 (Pichon &
Durand-Auzias, Paris 1951).
2. RENÉ DAVID , LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS:
(DROIT COMPARÉ) (Dalloz, Paris 1964). In English translation RENÉ DAVID &
JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (The Free Press, CollierMacmillan, London 1968).
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social and political values and had its own hierarchy of economic
preferences. However, the techniques to promote these values and
preferences by law were purely civilian. Throughout its history,
Russian law has not created a single legal institution that would be
incompatible with fundamental principles of the civil law tradition.
Second, with the course of time, Russian civil law became more
and more civilian and closer to other civil law countries, with the
Civil Code of 1994-2006 being the culmination of the process. I
hope that my examination of four Russian civil codes will provide
persuasive arguments for both statements.
II. THE CIVIL LAWS OF 1835: THE BEGINNING OF MODERN CIVIL
LAW IN RUSSIA
The formation of the modern Russian legal system can be
attributed to an all-encompassing codification that was realized in
the Russian Empire in the 1830s. Prior to the codification, the
social life of the country was regulated by numerous legal sources
that embodied local customary law as well as concepts and rules
borrowed from Byzantium and Germanic law. The striking feature
of the Russian legal system, which distinguishes it from those of
most European countries, is that it has never known a direct
reception of Roman law. 3
The Russian codification of the 1830s fits into the European
codification movement of the 18th and early 19th centuries,
influenced by the Enlightenment. At that time, either a total
codification of the whole scope of law or a codification of its
separate branches was undertaken in Bavaria (the Criminal Code
of 1751, the Code of Civil Procedure of 1753 and the Civil Code of
1756), Prussia (Allgemeines Landrecht für die preussischen
Staaten of 1794, hereinafter ALR), Austria (Allgemeines
3. MIKHAIL M. SPERANSKY, PRÉCIS DES NOTIONS HISTORIQUES SUR LA
FORMATION DU CORPS DES LOIS RUSSES TIRÉ DES ACTES AUTHENTIQUES DÉPOSÉS
DANS LES ARCHIVES DE LA 2E SECTION DE LA CHANCELLERIE PARTICULIÈRE DE S.
M. L'EMPEREUR (Imprimerie de Mme. veuve Pluchart et fils, Saint-Pétersbourg
1833).
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bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für die gesammten deutschen Erbländer
der Oesterreichischen Monarchie of 1811, hereinafter ABGB) and
France (Code civil des Français of 1804). 4 In Russia, the first
codification projects were already started at the beginning of the
18th century, but were completed only in 1835, when the Digest of
the Laws of the Russian Empire 5—a set of fifteen volumes with
60,000 articles—entered into force. 6 The civil law was codified in
the tenth volume of the Digest of Laws, which was entitled Civil
Laws (Zakony Grazhdanskie) and consisted of four books: 1)
Family Rights and Obligations; 2) On the Procedure of Acquisition
and Preservation of Real Rights in General; 3) On the Procedure of
Acquisition and Preservation of Real Rights in Particular; 4)
Contractual Obligations.
The terminology of the second and the third book is not
consistent: they both regulate real rights and modes of their
acquisition. The second book, “On the Procedure of Acquisition
and Preservation of Real Rights in General,” covers classification
of property, various real rights, legal capacity to acquire real rights
and general provisions on acquisition of property. The third book,
“On the Procedure of Acquisition and Preservation of Real Rights
in Particular,” regulated the transfer of ownership by donation,
succession, sale, and exchange.
The sources used by the drafters of the Civil Laws, along with
Russian law, were Prussian (ALR 1794), Austrian (ABGB 1810),
and French (Code civil 1804). Although scholars usually

4. OLIVIA F. ROBINSON ET AL, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: SOURCES AND
INSTITUTIONS, 246-60 (2d ed., Butterworths, London 1994).
5. Or in other translations: Corpus Juris of the Russian Empire or the
Collection of Imperial Laws.
6. For the history of the Digest of the Laws of the Russian Empire, see
MIKHAIL M. SPERANSKY, supra note 3; Tatiana Borisova, Russian National
Legal Tradition: Svod versus Ulozhenie in Nineteenth-century Russia, 33 REV.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 295-341 (2008); and Tatiana Borisova, The Digest of Laws
of the Russian Empire: The Phenomenon of Autocratic Legality, 30 L. & HIST.
REV. 901-25 (2012).
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emphasize the influence of the French Code, 7 the less numerous
borrowings from the Prussian Code were also rather important. For
example, the famous Russian definition of ownership as a triad of
three faculties (to use, to possess and to dispose of property) that
has survived Imperial and Soviet Russia, and which serves a
fundamental notion of contemporary property law, first appeared
in the Civil Laws, and was a calque from the Prussian definition.
The Russian Code defines ownership in paragraph 1, article 430 of
the Civil Laws as “the power exclusively and independently of
another to possess, to use and to dispose of the property in a
manner established by civil laws, in perpetuity and hereditarily.” 8
The Prussian ALR stipulates that “full ownership includes the right
to possess a thing, to use it and to dispose of it in a similar way
(Zum vollen Eigenthume gehört das Recht, die Sache zu besitzen,
zu gebrauchen, und sich derselben zu begeben).” 9 The key feature
that likens the Prussian and the Russian definition is the inclusion
of possession as one of the rights inherent to ownership. Other
European codes of the time do not include possession in the list of
the faculties belonging to the owner.
Overall, the Civil Laws were a whimsical blend of modern and
medieval legal principles and institutions. On the one hand, the
Russian law adopted such progressive principles as an absolute,
exclusive and perpetual right of ownership; protection of
intellectual property; recognition of divorce, as well as freedom of
contract and of testamentary disposition of property. Another merit
of the Digest of Laws is that it established a system for Russian
law and made it clear and accessible. Boris Nolde justly affirmed
that “in no country the law was so substantially transformed as in
7. Maksim Vinaver, K voprosu ob istochnikakh X toma Svoda zakonov, 10
ZHURNAL MINISTERSTVA IUSTITSII 1-68 (1895).
8. Translation by VLADIMIR GSOVSKI in his 1 SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 556 (Univ. of
Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor 1949). I will also use this author’s translation
of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation of 1922 in this article.
9. Section 9, tit. VII ALR, http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/ALR1
fuerdiepreussischenStaaten1794teil1.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
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Russia in 1835: all legal life in all its smallest details, was
suddenly regulated by a unified legislation that replaced
innumerable statutes, decrees, and judgments which had been
governing the country before then.” 10 On the other hand, the Civil
Laws preserved such institutions as: a limitation of certain social
groups’ legal capacity (e.g., Jews, married women, and natural
children); limited commerce of some property (such as entailed
estates); a system of majorat for some property, preservation of
serfdom and, as a result of this, a distinction between populated
and unpopulated lands, as well as interpretation of peasants as
things accessory to lands; 11 and other obsolete rules and
institutions.
In general, the Civil Laws were not a real codification in the
sense of a substantial legal reform but a mere consolidation of
existing law. They were criticized by the leading legal scholars for
desuetude, gaps, and contradictions. 12
Moreover, before the second half of the 19th century not all the
population of the Empire could enjoy the provisions of the Digest
of Laws. Due to the existence of serfdom, about 35% of the
population (who were serfs), 13 were excluded from the application
of the official Russian law. The country had to wait until the
accession of the emperor Alexander II (“the liberator”) who was
able to fulfill the difficult task of the emancipation of compatriots
from serfdom. 14 However, the peasants were emancipated without
10. PIERRE ARMINJON ET AL., 3 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ 235 (Pichon &
Durand-Auzias, Paris 1951).
11. Similar to the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana of 1825, which
considered slaves as immovables by the operation of law (art. 462).
12. KONSTANTIN D. KAVELIN, RUSSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE ULOZHENIE, 1-2
(St. Petersburg 1882); EVGUENY V. VAS'KOVSKY, UCHEBNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO
PRAVA. VYP. I. VVEDENIE I OBSHAYA CHAST' 38 (St. Petersburg 1894); PYOTR P.
TZITOVICH P.P. KURS RUSSKOGO GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA. TOM I. UCHENIE OB
ISTOCHNIKAH PRAVA. VYPUSK 1, 22-23 (Odessa 1878).
13. ALEXANDER G. TROINITZKY, KREPOSTNOYE NASELENIE ROSSII PO 10-Y
NARODNOI PEREPISI 26-27 (V typografii Karla Wulfa, St. Petersburg 1861).
14. For more details on the reforms, see ROSSIISKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO X
- XX VEKOV: V 9-TI TOMAKH. T. 7. DOKUMENTY KREST'YANSKOI REFORMY.
(Oleg I. Chistyakov ed.,Yuridicheskaya literature, Moscow 1989) and
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land. The price for redemption was too high; the majority of
peasants could not afford to become landowners. Such a palliative
solution of the agrarian question was one of the most important
factors that led to the Socialist Revolution of 1917. However, in
the years 1861-1864, as a result of liberal reforms, former serfs
were granted full legal capacity and became subjects of law,
including civil law. Although the legal status of different social
groups was still different and it was too early to talk about full
legal equality of all the subjects of the Russian monarch (the
principle of the equality of all citizens was introduced by the 1917
bourgeois revolution), at least they became free and legally capable
(with the exception of the already-mentioned limitations of the
legal capacity of certain groups of the population).
The time that followed the Great Reforms could be justly
described as the golden age of Russian legal science, including
civil law studies. Russian scholars were highly-educated (typically
not only in Russia, but in Europe as well), multilingual, and
integrated into the European community of legal scholars. Such
Russian legal scholars as Leon Petrażycki, Maxim Kovalevsky,
Paul Vinogradoff, Georges Gurvitch, Fyodor Martens, Nicholas
Timashev, and Pitirim Sorokin have substantially enriched
international legal science.
Changes in the social life of the country, as well as the
development of legal studies, necessitated legal reforms, including
revision of the Civil Laws. A new Civil Code (Grazhdanskoye
Ulozhenie) was drafted by 1905. At that time, the law reform was
inseparably connected to the necessity of reception of foreign laws.
The Codification Commission relied on the German and the
French codifications as models (especially in the law of property,
obligations, and succession) and doctrinal sources, both Russian

ROSSIISKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO X - XX VEKOV: V 9-TI TOMAKH. T. 8.
SUDEBNAYA REFORMA (Oleg I. Chistyakov ed.,Yuridicheskaya literature,
Moscow 1991).
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and European. 15 The new Civil Code would have introduced new
orientations for economic and social development if the Bolshevik
revolution had not interrupted the social development of the state.
III. THE CIVIL CODE OF 1923: A CODE FOR TRANSITION FROM
CAPITALIST TO SOCIALIST SOCIETY
A. Drafting the Civil Code
The Socialist Revolution of 1917 opened a new period in the
history of Russian civil law. Initially the Bolsheviks kept the legal
principle introduced by the bourgeois revolution of February 1917:
the equality of political and civil rights of all the people, regardless
of their sex, class, race or religion.
One of the first decrees of the Soviet state, On Land (1917),
abrogated the private ownership of land, subsoil, waters, and
forests. 16 The title of another decree, On Abrogation of
Successions (1918), speaks for itself. It was aimed at complete
extermination of one of the sources of private ownership. For the
same reason donations were abrogated, too. 17
Revolutionary law (if it could be called law) engendered a new
mode of acquisition of ownership: nationalization. This mode of
acquisition exists in capitalist countries, too, but the socialist
nationalization has two fundamental distinctions. First, it is
realized without any indemnification. Second, the new owner is
free from all the obligations of the former: from all the charges, all
the debts, and all the dismemberments. 18
In general, the civil law during the first years of Soviet power
remained faithful to Lenin’s slogan, “We recognize nothing
15. For more details on the drafting of the Civil Code, see VLADIMIR A.
SLYSHYENKOV, PROEKT GRAZHDANSKOGO ULOZHENIYA 1905 G. I EGO MESTO V
ISTORII RUSSKOGO PRAVA (Moskva 2003).
16. Decret “O zemle”, 1 SOBRANIE UZAKONENIY RSFSR 3 (1917).
17. Decret “Ob otmene nasledovaniya”, 34 SOBRANIE UZAKONENIY RSFSR
456 (1918).
18. For more details on the stages of nationalization in Soviet Russia, see
PIERRE ARMINJON ET AL., 3 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 10, at 24650.
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private, for us in the economy everything is public, but not
private.” 19 That is why some Soviet jurists proposed to adopt a
Code of Economic Laws or a Code of Social Legislation instead of
a Civil Code. However, the profound economic crisis of the time
showed the necessity of private investments, including foreign
capital. The policy of reconstruction of the social economy, known
as the New Economic Policy introduced by Lenin in 1921, would
never have been successful if it had not been supported by the
restoration of the security of juridical acts: that is to say, the
restoration of civil law.
That is why and how the first Soviet Civil Code was adopted in
December 1922 and entered into force on January 1, 1923. 20 It was
the first time in Russian history that the expression “Civil Code”
(“Grazhdansky codex”) had been used. 21 The 1905 project of civil
law codification bore a title of “Ulozheniye”, which is an original
Russian term for “code” and had been used in Russia since 1649,
the year when the famous Sobornoye Ulozheniye was enacted. It
was exactly this term that was chosen for the translation of
Prussian, Austrian, German and Swiss codes in Imperial Russia,
although the term “code” (“codex” in Russian) had always been
used for the French codification. Thus, the Bolshevik codification
established a new tradition to name collections of laws with a Latin
word, “codex.”

19. Vladimir I. Lenin, O zadachakh Narkomyusta v usloviyakh novoi
ekonomicheskoi politiki: Pis'mo D. I. Kurskomu, in VLADIMIR I. LENIN, POLNOE
SOBRANIE SOCHINENIY 389 (Moscow 1964).
20. For the history of the creation of the 1922 Code, see TATYANA E.
NOVITZKAYA, GRAZHDANSKY KODEKS RSFSR 1922 GODA. ISTORYA
SOZDAINYA. OBSHAYA KHARAKTERISTIKA. TEXT. PRILOZHENIYA (Zertzalo-V,
Moscow, 2002). In the Russian legal tradition, codes are dated by the year of
their adoption and not by the date of their entrance into force, as in Western
European countries. Thus, Russian and some European scholars talk about the
1922 Civil Code. However, I will follow the Western tradition and call it the
1923 Civil Code.
21. However, the very first Soviet Code (“codex”) was the Code of Laws on
the Acts of Civil Status, Marital, and Family and Tutorship law adopted in
October 1918. The Civil Code of 1923 was the first civil code.
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The sources of the 1923 Civil Code are the Draft of the Civil
Code (“Ulozhenie”) of the Russian Empire as revised by 1913, the
German, the Swiss and the French civil codes (however, the
Germanic codes were more popular than the French).
Although European scholars criticized the Code for its
technical imperfections, 22 we should not forget that the Code was
hastily drafted in just three months—an amount of time
unprecedented for the codifications of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Moreover, it was a Civil Code created for an unprecedented
political, economic, social, and cultural setting. Finally, in the first
years of the new regime, Soviet jurists adhered to the Marxist idea
of the state and of the law’s inherently temporary character, and
their inevitable withering away in the Communist future. The legal
profession was perceived as archaic and transient, and law in
general, as a means of social regulation, did not enjoy great
importance in this period. 23 The Civil Code was initially drafted as
an interim Code, but was fated to regulate the life of the Russian
people more than forty years. However, given the lack of time and
the novelty of the tasks confronting the Soviet codifiers, the first
Code of the Soviet State was not all that imperfect, and contained
the potential to become a basis for the Civil Code of 1964. The
Code was replicated in the Civil Codes of the Ukrainian (1923),
Byelorussian (1923), Georgian (1923), Azerbaijan (1923), and
Armenian (1924) Republics. It was also applied directly in Uzbek
(1924) and Turkmen (1926) Republics, as well as in Lithuania,

22. Édouard Lambert, La place des codes russes dans la jurisprudence
comparative, in LES CODES DE LA RUSSIE SOVIÉTIQUE 1-46 (Marcel Giard
Libraire-Éditeur, Paris 1925); Heinrich Freund, L’avenir du droit civil dans
l’Union Soviétique, in 3 INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT COMPARÉ 363, 365
(Recueil Sirey, Paris 1938).
23. On the development of the Soviet legal theory in the first years of Soviet
power, see SERGEY S. ALEKSEEV, FILOSOFIYA PRAVA 148–182 (Izdatelskaya
groupa Infra M. Norma, Moskva 1998), and VLADIK S. NERSESSIANTS
FILOSOFIYA PRAVA 163–311 (Izdatelskaya groupa Infra M. Norma, Moskva
1997).
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Latvia and Estonia from 1940 until the adoption of the Republics’
civil codes in the 1960s. 24
B. Main Features of the 1923 Civil Code
First, the Soviet legislature completely broke with the prerevolutionary legal system, prohibiting an interpretation of the
Code according to the “laws of overthrown governments and the
decisions of pre-revolutionary courts” (article 6 of the Decree of
the Russian Central Executive Committee, On Enactment of the
Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic of October
31st, 1922). 25 Article 2 of the same decree prohibits bringing
actions concerning civil law issues that occurred before the 7th of
November, 1917.
Second, the Civil Code does not cover family relations and
relations between an employer and employees, since the Soviet law
established a new legal trend. It proclaimed that henceforth these
relations would be regulated by separate codes: the Code of Laws
on the Acts of Civil Status, Marital, Family and Tutorship law
(1918) and the Labour Code (1918). From that time, the legal
regimes of land and forests were regulated by the Land Code
(1922) and the Forestry Code (1923). This tradition of distributing
the legal material belonging to private law (totally or partially)
among various codes has been preserved in Russia to this day.
Third, the Code of 1923 was permeated with the idea of the
supremacy of the State in civil law relations. This principle can be
perceived from the following examples: 1) The creation of a
private legal person requires state authorization, not just
registration (art. 15); 2) Also, the Code does not recognize general
legal capacity of legal persons; they have only special capacity,
meaning that they have to act in conformity with the goals, fixed in
24. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, 2 SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR
BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 4-5 (Univ. of Michigan Law School,
Ann Arbor 1949).
25. Id. at 10.
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their founding documents; otherwise, the state would liquidate
such a legal person (art.18); 3) A natural or a legal person may
participate in international trade only with permission from the
State (art. 17); 4) Pledged property first covers the debts of a
debtor to the State (such as taxes, fees, and salary of the debtor’s
employees) in preference to the claims of the pledgee (art. 101); 5)
The Civil Code recognizes a possibility to rescind a contract for
lesion if the aggrieved party is the State, and it was the only case of
lesion admitted by the Code. The Soviet judicial protection of the
interests of the State went even further than that. For instance, in
contractual obligations, the jurisprudence insisted on the specific
performance of the contract, if one of the parties was the State. It
means that the obligor could not just indemnify the obligee; he had
to perform the obligation even if he suffered a loss himself (for
example, if his creditor had failed to perform his obligation).
From these rules one general trend can be perceived: a
substantial “publicization” of the Soviet private law, a trend which
was preserved in the Civil Code of 1964. Thus, the prioritized legal
status of the Soviet State in private relations prevents me from
agreeing with the statement of a German scholar, Heinrich Freund,
that “the Civil Code was a code of economic liberalism and not a
code of a Socialist economy.” 26 Although in many points the Code
of 1923 was similar to a classical liberal civil code, it nonetheless
incorporated substantial deviations from the principles of equality
of all persons and types of property, of free circulation of property
and the freedom of contract—all of which is incompatible with
economic liberalism.
However, the Civil Code of 1923 was more liberal than the
revolutionary law since it restored successions and donations,
which were abrogated by the revolutionary decrees. However, both
institutions were rather limited. The Code specified the maximum
amount of property that could be inherited or donated. Property
26. Heinrich Freund, supra note 22, at 367.
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could be inherited by the surviving spouse and descendants to the
second degree. A typically-socialist innovation is that the
legislature recognized as heirs persons who were dependent on the
deceased person. The two subsequent Russian civil codes kept this
rule.
C. Property Law
As for property law, the Code of 1923 abrogates the distinction
between movables and immovables, justifying this step by the fact
that the private ownership on land is abrogated (art. 21). The Code
of 1923 recognizes only three real rights: ownership, pledge (this
is, probably, the influence of Germanic legal tradition which
recognizes pledge as a real right) and a right of construction
(which is a kind of superficies as a special mode of ownership).
The right of construction was not an invention of the Soviet
legislature; it was introduced into Russian law in 1912, 27 and was
probably drafted on the basis of the BGB’s Erbbaurecht
(hereditary right of construction).
In spite of the fact that it is a socialist code, it recognizes
private ownership even on enterprises. The Code provides the
following definition of ownership: “Within the limits laid down by
law, the owner has the right to possess, to use and to dispose of
ownership” (art. 58). As Vladimir Gsovski justly pointed out,
general provisions of the Soviet Code on ownership “might have
been included in a civil code of any capitalist country” 28 and that
“a non-Soviet jurist would look in vain for a new concept of
ownership in the Soviet Civil Code.” 29 However, the commerce of
housing under the 1923 Code is limited. No one may have more

27. See MIKHAIL I. MITILINO, PRAVO ZASTROIKI. OPYT CIVILISTICHESKOGO
ISSLEDOVANIYA INSTITUTA (Kiev 1914).
28. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI in 1 SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND
THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 556 (1948).
29. Id. at 558.
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than one accommodation; a family may alienate only one
accommodation every three years.
While keeping private ownership, the legislature, however,
pays more attention to the socialist ownership—namely, State
property. Property in abeyance is presumed to be State property
(art. 68) as well as discovered treasure (the finder receives only
recompense equal to one fourth of the treasure’s value). According
to Boris Nolde, attribution of the ownership of the found treasure is
a restoration of the feudal legal tradition. 30
The Soviet Code follows the Roman law rule that distinguishes
between a good and a bad faith possessor. As a general rule,
according to the Code of 1923, the owner may revendicate his
property from a good faith possessor only if the property was lost
or stolen. 31 However, a state enterprise may revendicate its
property from a good faith possessor under any circumstance (art.
60). The State is able to make restitution of its property from any
possessor. The Supreme Court of the RSFSR, in its ruling of 1925,
even outstripped this rule, creating a presumption of State
ownership. In case of litigation, the property was presumed to be
owned by the State and it was the other party who had to prove the
contrary, regardless of who was plaintiff or defendant. 32
Thus, the Soviet legislature deliberately proclaimed inequality
of property and owners and priority of the socialist ownership.

30. PIERRE ARMINJON ET AL., 3 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 10,
at 315.
31. At the same time, the possession of a non-owner was not protected from
infringement, probably due to the fact that the number of real rights in the Soviet
Code was very restricted. Similarly, the Soviet civil law does not contain special
provisions on possession as factual relationship, probably because the Civil
Code did not recognize usucapion (acquisitive prescription or adverse
possession) as a mode of acquisition of ownership (PIERRE ARMINJON ET AL., 3
TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 10, at 320).
32. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, supra note 24, at 76.
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D. Further Developments
The main trend of the development of the Soviet civil law in
the years 1930-1950s, which culminated in the Civil Code of 1964,
is the reinforcement of State ownership and the weakening of
private ownership.
It should be pointed out that there was no special law that
would have abrogated private ownership. However, with the
advent of Stalin, a forced collectivization of agriculture,
industrialization of the country, and reinforcement of the state
economy naturally resulted in the weakening of the private
initiative and gradual disappearance of private enterprises. As
Professor Ioffe puts it, “. . . [P]rivate ownership was eradicated
without reference to any legal provision. On the contrary, legal
provisions addressed to private activity became dead letter
formally, not abolished but actually eliminated from application in
practice as a result of the liquidation of private ownership.” 33 The
Constitution of the USSR of 1936 knows only two forms of
ownership: socialist and personal. Private ownership had
disappeared in the thirteen years following the enactment of the
first Soviet Civil Code.
Moreover, “Stalin’s Constitution” demonstrated a trend to
centralization of the civil law, depriving Soviet socialist Republics
of their rights to adopt civil codes and transferring this right to the
all-union legislature (representing all of the republics). Between
1946 and 1952, three drafts of the Civil Code of the USSR were
elaborated; however the all-union Civil Code remained a stillborn
project.
Between the two codifications—that of 1923 and the Civil
Code of 1964—there were numerous doctrinal attempts to split
civil law (the set of provisions which regulated proprietary
relations and connected to them personal relations) into two
33. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW THINKING IN THE
USSR 45 (Giuffrè, Milano 1989).
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branches: civil law and economic law. The latter was considered as
a branch of law that would regulate the patrimonial rights and
obligations of Socialist enterprises in their relations with other
Socialist enterprises or with the Soviet State, while the civil law
would exclusively regulate private relations of physical persons
with other physical persons or of physical persons with Soviet
legal entities. Once again, this was far from being a Soviet
invention. According to Heinrich Freund, the concept of economic
law was borrowed from interwar Germany, where it was called
Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (economic-administrative law) and at
that time consisted of set of provisions applicable to an enterprise
when it was subject to the regulatory intervention of the State. 34
However, the attempt to split the civil law into two branches was
unsuccessful, which clearly demonstrates that Soviet legal scholars
and politicians preferred to develop Russian civil law as a classical
united civil law.
IV. THE CIVIL CODE OF 1964: A CODE OF A SOCIALIST
SOCIETY
A. General Features
The development of the country after World War II was
marked by a substantial economic upswing, and by significant
social reforms which required new civil legislation. Although,
under Khrushchev’s rule, the 1936 Constitution was changed to
restore the prerogative to adopt civil codes to the Soviet Republics,
it also entitled the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to adopt the
Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation, which had to serve as
a framework for the Republics’ civil codes. 35 These Fundamental
Principles were adopted in 1961. They also served as the basis for
the new Civil Code of RSFSR of 1964.

34. Heinrich Freund, supra note 22, at 367.
35. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, supra note 33, at 67.
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What differentiated this Code from all the other Russian Civil
Codes is that it was not influenced by European civil codes. The
major sources of the 1964 Code are the Civil Code of 1923 and
Soviet legal doctrine.
This Code follows the tradition of confusion of private and
public law. It opens with a preamble that resembles more a
political declaration or constitutional provision. The preamble
proclaims that the Soviet Union “has achieved a total and definite
victory of socialism and has entered into the period of extensive
construction of the communist society.” Creating such quasiconstitutional provisions, the preamble describes the objectives of
this phase of communism, the socialist economy, and its future.
According to the preamble, “the purpose of Soviet civil laws is to
contribute to solving problems of the construction of communism.”
It is worth noting that the Civil Code of 1923 was not as
impregnated with ideology. Two explanations for this phenomenon
are possible. First, the Code of 1964 was adopted between two
USSR Constitutions, that of 1936 and of 1977. The Stalin
Constitution was already outdated, while “Brezhnev’s
Constitution” (of 1977) had not yet been drafted. In such a
situation, the legislature introduced some constitutional legal
provisions into the Civil Code. Second, such provisions show a
substantial evolution in the understanding of the social function of
the civil law. If in the 1920s, the civil law was perceived as a
“narrow horizon of bourgeois law,” 36 which would disappear in a
communist society, then in the 1960s, the civil law was already
considered as a means that contributed to construction of the
communist society.
In comparison to the Civil Code of 1923, the Code of 1964 is
better structured, demonstrates better legislative technique,
contains books on intellectual property and international private
law, and recognizes a more complicated system of obligations. In
36. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, supra note 28, at 576.
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general, the Code of 1964 regulates almost the same relations and
by the same means as “capitalist” codes.
B. Property Law
The demarcation line between the Soviet Code and civil codes
of Western countries lies in property law. The Civil Code of 1964
recognizes only one real right: the right of ownership. It
distinguishes only two types of ownership: socialist ownership and
personal ownership. Apart from the rights of socialist enterprises
over their property, the Code of 1964, unlike the Code of 1922,
does not recognize limited real rights. 37 According to E. Sukhanov,
“this category was omitted because the State’s right to land was
effectively exclusive and did not allow for the existence of other
real rights, including servitudes.” 38
The first paragraph of article 94, which is devoted to state
property, contains an obvious tautology: “The Soviet State is the
only owner of all property of the State.” However, in my opinion,
this phrase was coined deliberately: such a wording suppresses all
the attempts to qualify rights of the socialist enterprises on their
property as a right of ownership. The second paragraph of the
article defines precisely the real right of Socialist enterprises over
their property: “The property of the State assigned to state
enterprises is under the operational administration of these
enterprises. They exercise the right of possession, enjoyment and
disposition over this property in the limits fixed by law, as well as

37. In various legal traditions real rights lesser than the right of ownership
bear different names. In Roman law they were called jura in re aliena. In
modern French law and legal systems of French origin they are considered as
dismemberments of ownership; in Scotland they are called subordinate real
rights. I have chosen the Germanic title “limited real rights” because in property
law the Russian legal tradition is closer to Germanic law than to any other
western legal tradition.
38. Yevgeny Sukhanov, The Concept of Ownership in Current Russian
Law, VI JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL. UNIVERISTY OF TARTU LAW REVIEW 104
(2001).
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in accordance with objectives of their activities, with the tasks
fixed by plans and with the destination of the property.”
The legal nature of this operational administration engendered
heated discussions among the Soviet civilians. Perhaps the creation
of such a real right is the most remarkable contribution of Soviet
jurists to legal science. This right was not an invention of the 1964
Civil Code. As a matter of fact, this right already existed from the
introduction of the New Economic Policy (1921) and was
recognized by Soviet legal doctrine; however, it was not included
into the Civil Code. Because of that, the character of proprietary
rights of Soviet enterprises was already a subject matter for
scholarly debates in the 1920s.
According to the theory suggested by B.S. Martynov, the
relations between the State and enterprises are similar to both
Roman law fiducia and to common law trust. The same scholar
also used the medieval theory of divided ownership to explain the
distribution of proprietary rights between the State and enterprises,
and attributed dominium directum to the State and dominium utile
to enterprises. 39 However, this scholar’s theory ignores substantial
differences between such legal constructions as fiducia, divided
ownership, and trust. The fiduciary is not the owner, while trust
and divided ownership imply that several persons are owners and
the ownership is split between them (although the division of
ownership is realized differently in feudally-divided ownership and
the common law trust).
Later, in order to avoid any possible references to the theory of
divided ownership, Soviet scholars started to insist that the true
civil law owner of the property was the State, while the right of
enterprises over their property was not a civil law right and could
not be classified by using traditional concepts of property. That is
how a new real right—the right of operative administration—that

39. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, supra note 33, at 211-12.
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combined administrative and civil law components appeared. 40
However, by the mid-1960s, the doctrine of the Soviet civil law
already considered the right of operative administration as a civil
law real right, a kind of limited real right. Although an enterprise
exercises all the rights of an owner (possession, enjoyment, and
disposition), the State reserves the right of juridical accession (or
what is called in the French doctrine l’arrière-droit or in Québec
doctrine vis attractiva) of the property and this characteristic is
decisive for the determination of a real owner, which is the State.
The Civil Code of 1964 proclaims that personal ownership is
derived from socialist ownership and constitutes a means to satisfy
the needs of the citizens. Unlike the 1923 Civil Code, the Code of
1964 does not contain provisions on private ownership. It knows
only two types of ownership: socialist and personal, the latter
being a substitute for private ownership. Only a natural person can
own it and the property may not be used for producing income
which does not stem from labour (art. 105). The law specifies that
the personal property of a citizen may not consist of more than one
house with maximum dimension of sixty square meters (art. 106).
If, by means of donation or succession, a citizen gets another
house, he may, at his own choice, keep one and sell the other
within one year. If he does not sell it, the local administration
would organize a forced sale. And if there is no buyer, the State
acquires ownership of the house in question (art. 107). The
ownership of a citizen therefore depends on a fortuity: if there is a
buyer, the owner enjoys his right; if there is no buyer, the State
deprives the person of his property.
To make things short, by its legal nature the personal
ownership of the Soviets is nothing but a private ownership, a
limited private ownership, an amputated private ownership. It is
limited by its holders: only natural persons are entitled to it. It is
confined to certain objects with definite dimensions. Finally, it is
40. OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, supra note 33, at 215-21.
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appropriated to a particular purpose: to satisfy material and
spiritual needs of the owner (thinking about this, I cannot help
seeing
a
parallel
with
Québec’s
patrimony
by
appropriation/patrimoine d’affectation). Nonetheless, in spite if all
these restrictions, it is a private property that gives to its owner all
the rights of possession, enjoinment, and disposition of property.
This right is also protected by all of the means of private
ownership known to civilian legal systems (a true revendicatory
action/actio rei vindicatio and negatory action/actio negatoria).
Vladimir Gsovski is correct in his statement that, “the Soviet law
of property shows also how inescapable private ownership,
although in a small dose, is, even in a socialist State.” 41
V. THE CIVIL CODE OF 1994-2006: A CODE FOR A MARKET
ECONOMY AND A LIBERAL SOCIETY
A. Drafting the 1994-2006 Civil Code
The predominance of socialist ownership and the degeneration
of private ownership engendered negative trends in the Russian
economy and society, and by the end of the 1980s, the inefficiency
of the socialist economy was indisputable. The Gorbachev
government implemented perestroika: an unprecedented series of
political and economic reforms.
The Laws On Ownership in the USSR 42 and On Ownership in
the RSFSR 43 of 1990 opened a new age in the history of Russian
civil law. These laws re-established private ownership (although
only the second one openly uses the expression “private
ownership”) and proclaimed the equality of all forms of ownership
and all owners.

41. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, supra note 24, at 576.
42. Zakon SSSR “O sobstvennosti v SSSR,” 11 VEDOMOSTI SOVETA
NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR 164 (1990).
43. Zakon RSFSR “O sobstvennosti v RSFSR,” 30 VEDOMOSTI SOVETA
NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV RSFSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR 416 (1990).
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Another document that gives a new direction to Russian civil
law is the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), the first
constitution that has a direct application. It proclaims that the right
of private ownership is an inalienable right belonging to everyone
from the day of birth and protected by the law (art. 35). The third
part of article 35 repeats almost verbatim article 545 of the French
Civil Code: “No one may be deprived of his property otherwise
than by a court decision. Expropriation of property for public
utility may be carried out only and in consideration of a just and
prior indemnity.” This is the first time that such a provision was
introduced into Russian legislation. The following constitutional
rule sounds as a repercussion of the revolutionary legislation: “The
right of succession is guaranteed.”
Profound and rapid social reforms that were undertaken in
Russia in the early 1990s required the adoption of a new Civil
Code as soon as possible. That is why the new Russian Civil Code
was adopted in several installments: the first part in 1994, the
second in 1995, the third in 2001, and the fourth in 2006. Thus,
now the Russian civil law is fully codified, and has even entered a
stage of decodification.
The sources of the new Code are the Civil Code of the RSFSR
of 1964, the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the
USSR of 1991, 44 classical civil codes (German, Swiss, French, and
Italian), two of the newer codes (of Québec and of the
Netherlands), the Draft of the Civil Code of the Russian Empire of
1913, and international private law (e.g., Vienna Convention on
International Sale of Goods).
B. Main Features
The new Russian Code is founded on liberal values: free
enterprise, sanctity of private property, freedom and sanctity of
44. This legislation never entered into force in the USSR itself, but became
a source of Russian civil law in 1992.
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contract, recognition of five degrees of heirs (compared to only
two degrees in the Code of 1964), and equality of the State and
other persons in private relations. 45 Briefly, the philosophy of the
Civil Code is the 19th century principle of laissez faire, laissez
passer. The Code does not feature any noticeable socialization of
property or contract law that departs from the civil law of Western
countries in the 20th century.
One may also notice that the new Civil Code demonstrates very
good legislative technique. It contains an impressive theoretical
part. Everywhere in the Code there are general provisions. The
book on the law of intellectual property reflects the latest results of
scientific and technological progress.
One of the hallmarks of the new Code is that it proclaims its
own supremacy over all the other civil legislation, which
distinguishes it from contemporary European Civil Codes and
makes it kindred to the Civil Code of Québec of 1994. 46 Article 3
of the Russian Code stipulates that civil legislation consists of the
Civil Code and other federal laws adopted in accordance with it, of
presidential decrees, and of governmental regulations. However,
presidential decrees and governmental regulations must be in
compliance with the Civil Code and other federal laws, and may
not contradict them. Thus, article 3 creates a hierarchy of
legislative sources of civil law, the Civil Code being the vertex of
the pyramid. The aim of the third article is to prevent the executive
power (mainly the President) from legislating arbitrarily in the
field of civil law, i.e., to establish a separation of powers. The
authors of the Civil Code had a good reason for introduction of
such a provision.
45. For the history of the Civil Code and its fundamental principles, see
Alexandre Scaggion, La Codification du droit russe (2002) (Doctoral thesis,
Paris I) (on file with Atelier national de reproduction des thèses).
46. The preliminary disposition of Québec Civil Code reads: “The Civil
Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or
object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication.
In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other
laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.”
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In the early 1990s, the decrees of President Yeltzin drastically
changed Russian civil law. On the one hand, the executive power
can change law faster than the legislature, and this was what the
country needed at that time for efficient, speedy economic and
political reforms. On the other hand, the executive power could
sign a decree that would never be passed by the parliament.
Thus, on December 24, 1993, President Yeltzin signed a decree
“On Fiduciary Property (the Trust)” that was an instance of direct
intrusion of the common law into the Russian legal system. 47
Article 3 of the decree stipulated that “while establishing the trust,
the settlor transfers for a certain time property and real rights that
belong to him on the right of ownership to the trustee, who is
obliged to exercise his right of ownership exclusively in the
interest of the beneficiary and in accordance with this decree, with
the contract establishing the trust, and with the legislation of the
Russian Federation.” 48 What is also unusual is that this decree
entered into force at the moment of its signing. Although the
decree created a general institution of trust, allowing any physical
or legal person to become a settlor, a beneficiary or a trustee, the
provisions of the decree applied only to state-owned shares of
stock-companies created as a result of privatization of state
enterprises before the entrance into force of a new Civil Code (art.
21).
That decree outraged the Russian legal community, which
thought it to be a specimen of juridical ignorance, disrespectful of
national legal tradition, and introducing “absolutely alien AngloAmerican approaches.” 49 Struggling against common law trust,
Russian civilians insisted on the fact that Russia belonged to the
continental legal tradition, which does not know trust, and for this
47. On the history of the law of trusts in Russia, see Elspeth Christie Reid,
The Law of Trusts in Russia, 24 REVIEW OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN
LAW 43-56 (1998).
48. Decree “On Fiduciary Property (the Trust),” 1 SOBRANIE AKTOV
PREZIDENTA I PRAVITEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATZII 6 (1994).
49. Yevgeny Sukhanov, supra note 38, at 106.
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reason the institution was absolutely foreign to Russian legal
system. This construction was also criticized as a way to
misappropriate State property at the time of privatization. 50 On
November 30th, 1994, the same president signed into law the first
part of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. Paragraph four of
article 209 of the Code clearly eliminated trust from the Russian
legal system and moved the fiduciary administration of property
(as the institution is now called) into the law of obligations (i.e.,
among personal rights). Article 209 paragraph 4 of the Code reads
“An owner may transfer his property for fiduciary administration
to another person (fiduciary administrator). The transfer of
property for fiduciary administration does not entail the transfer of
the right of ownership to the fiduciary administrator who is
obliged to administer the property in the interests of the owner or a
third person designated by the owner” (emphasis added). Finally,
on December 22nd, 1995, the president signed into law the second
book of the Civil Code, which categorizes the fiduciary
administration of property as a contractual obligation (chapter 53)
and reproduces the provision of article 209 that “the transfer of
property in fiduciary administration does not entail the transfer of
the right of ownership to the fiduciary administrator” (article 1012
paragraph 1). The story of Russian trust law, thus, explains why
the drafters of the Civil Code wanted to securely establish the
priority of the Code over other sources of civil legislation and
prevent excessive legislative action from the executive power.

50. Viktor A. Dozortsev, Doveritel'noe upravlenie imushestvom, in
GRAZHDANSKY CODEX ROSSIISKOI FEDERATZII. CHAST’ VTORAYA. TEKST,
KOMMENTARII, ALFAVITNO-PREDMETNYI UKAZATEL’ 527-49, 531 (Oksana V.
Kozyr et al. eds., Mezhdunarodny centr finansovo-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya,
Moscow 1996).
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C. Property law
During the recent recodification, the most profound and most
important changes were made in the field of property law. 51 The
new Code has almost 200 (197) articles on property law, compared
to just 66 articles on the same subject in the Civil Code of 1964.
Besides this quantitative change, the new Code proclaims a new
approach to property law. Unlike previous socialist codes, the new
Russian Code follows a new system of exposition of provisions on
property law. In the past, the legislature organized the articles on
property law according to the types of ownership; now the
emphasis is made on the acquisition, extinction and protection of
ownership.
The gist of the reform of property law in Russia, as well as in
other post-socialist countries, was to reject the idea of state
ownership as the principal and dominating type of ownership, and
to rehabilitate private ownership in its fullness. 52
Unlike the Code of 1964, the new Code recognizes not only
ownership, but limited real rights as well, revitalizing property law
in Russia. Apart from the right of ownership, article 216 of the
Code recognizes such real rights as: the right of lifetime inheritable
possession of a land plot; the right of permanent (in perpetuity) use
of a land plot; predial servitudes; the right of economic
management, and the right of economic administration (the two
last rights originate in the Soviet right of operational
administration). Such real rights as pledge and the right of
51. For more details on property law in the new Civil Code, see David
Lametti, Rights of Private Property in the Civil Code of the Russian Federation
and in the Civil Code of Québec, 30 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 29-47 (2005);
Oksana M. Kozyr, The Legal Treatment of Immovables Under the Civil Code of
the Russian Federation, 44 MCGILL L. J. 327-56 (1998-1999); Evgueny A.
Sukhanov, The Right of Ownership in the Contemporary Civil Law of Russia, 44
MCGILL L. J. 301-26 (1998-1999).
52. Vladimir A. Toumanov, Évolution du droit de propriété dans les
anciens pays socialistes, in ACTUALITÉS DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ DANS LES PAYS
D'EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE ET EN CHINE : [ACTES DU] COLLOQUE, 6
DÉCEMBRE 1996, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL DE PARIS 15 (Société de législation
comparée, Paris 1997).
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retention are also sometimes recognized by Russian doctrine as
limited real rights, although in the Code they are placed in the
book on obligations. The striking feature of Russian property law
is that, apart from pledge and the right of retention (if they could
be recognized as real rights), the objects of all limited real rights
are exclusively immovables. 53
This enumeration is not exhaustive; these are only examples of
limited real rights, and the wording of the article presupposes that
one may create innominate real rights. Theoretically, Russia does
not have a numerus clausus of real rights, although most scholars
insist that it exists in Russian property law.
Although the new Civil Code recognizes usucapion
(acquisitive prescription or adverse possession) as a mode of
acquisition of both movable and immovable property, it definitely
lacks a developed set of provisions concerning possession as a
protected factual relationship that could ripen into ownership. 54
Another part of Russian civil law with a lot of innovation after
recodification is intellectual property law. In this field, we have a
code with more than 300 articles (even more than on property law),
and all possible objects of intellectual activities are protected by
the fourth part of the Civil Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of codification of the civil law in Russia
demonstrates that all Russian civil codes were based on the civilian
legal tradition and quite often borrowed provisions from other
European civil codes. It goes without saying that Russian civil law
has always had its peculiarities resulting from differences in
economy, politics and lifestyle. However, the unique features of
53. Yevgeny Sukhanov, supra note 38, at 104.
54. For the critique of the absence of provisions on possession, see Denis
Tallon, Le point de vue d’un expert étranger pour la codification du Code civil
en Russie, in ACTUALITÉS DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ DANS LES PAYS D'EUROPE CENTRALE
ET ORIENTALE ET EN CHINE 24 (Société de législation comparée, Paris 1997).
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Russian civil law are not deviations from the civilian tradition, and
could be compared to local variations in many countries belonging
to the civil law or Romano-Germanic tradition. The new Civil
Code of 1994-2006 makes a particular and substantial effort to
make Russian civil law compatible with the civil law of its
European counterparts.
In summary, in the field of civil law, Russian society now has a
very good and promising regulator. The lawyers and legal scholars
have already intelligently commented upon, interpreted and
annotated the Civil Code, and it contains a good regulative
potential. However, the implementation of the Code into the
everyday life of society is still a problem to be solved. The
legislative power has fulfilled its task perfectly. Now it is the turn
of the judiciary, the bar, and the notaries public to make the Civil
Code a civil law in action.
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B. Delimitation of the Concept of “Communication to the
Public” of the Work; ECJ Judgment of 21 October 2010:
Padawan S.L. v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de
España ................................................................................ 438
This Chronicle covers recent legislative developments in Spain
for the period 2010-2012.
I. APPLICATION OF LAWS: MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Because it also concerns the law of the United States of
America, reference should be made to the entry into force on
February 1, 2010 1 of the Agreement 2 related to the application of
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters between
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. 3
This new agreement increases the possibilities to exchange
financial information between the two States in the context of a
criminal investigation.
Also, article 16 bis 1(a) of the Treaty sets forth the obligation
of the Requested State to ascertain if the banks located in its
territory possess information about the existence of bank accounts
whose holder is a natural or juridical person 4 suspected or charged
with a criminal offense. The Requested State shall not deny the
request for assistance on the grounds of bank secrecy.
The Agreement also includes a provision that joint
investigative teams may be established between the two States
(article 16 ter) for the purpose of taking testimony, expert opinion
or any other investigative activities. The measures taken by the
1. Published in B.O.E. n. 22, Jan. 26, 2010.
2. In fact, it is an instrument that executes particularly for each of the
Member States of the European Union, a broader agreement concluded between
the European Union and the United States (see Art. 3.2(a) of the Agreement on
Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of
America, signed on June 25, 2003); 2003 O.J. (L181) 27, 34.
3. The treaty was signed on November 20, 1990.
4. The Treaty uses the term “legal person.”
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members of the joint investigative team may be executed directly
in any of the States without the other State having to submit a
request for mutual legal assistance (article 16 ter, 4).
II. LAW OF PERSONS
In the area of the Law of Persons, three new developments took
place. The first two exemplify the legislators’ effort to adapt to the
changes resulting from the new options—often driven by medical
and scientific progress—promoting the individual freedom to
decide one’s own sexual orientation (and even gender designation),
and consequently, in deciding the composition of one’s own
family.
A. Ratification by Spain of the International Convention on the
Recognition of Decisions Recording a Sex Reassignment
Regarding sexual orientation, on July 16, 2011, 5 Spain ratified
the Convention 6 on the recognition of decisions recording a sex
reassignment. This Convention, drafted by a European
Intergovernmental Agency, 7 is a multilateral agreement that sets
forth the mutual recognition between the signatory States of
judicial or administrative decisions recording a person’s sex
reassignment that have occurred in a Contracting State. The sex
reassignment affecting the citizen or resident in a Contracting State
shall be recognized in the other Contracting States if two
conditions are met:
1. A physical alteration (i.e., by means of surgery) of the
person concerned has been made; and

5. B.O.E. n. 36, Feb. 11, 2011.
6. Convention of September 12, 2000.
7. The International Commission on Civil Status is based in Strasbourg,
France. It was founded on September 29-30, 1948 in the post-war context of the
time. It is intended to facilitate the cooperation between States for the mutual
recognition of vital records (including, among others, birth, marriage, divorce or
death certificates) or any other official documents indicating the civil status of
persons.
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2. That the physical alteration shall be officially recognized in
the Contracting State through the recordation of the judicial or
administrative decision recognizing a person’s sex reassignment in
the Civil Status Registry.
B. The New Provisions Concerning Registration in the Civil
Registry of the Filiation of Children Born Abroad by Means of
Surrogate or Substitute Motherhood
The second legal development includes the question of the socalled “surrogate” or “substitute motherhood”. 8 In Spain, surrogate
motherhood agreements are still legally prohibited (Article 10.1,
Law on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques). 9 Thus, when
the birth of a human being results from this form of pregnancy,
only the gestating woman will be recognized as the mother, never
the woman who, alone or coupled with her partner, agrees to the
surrogacy. 10 Even if the contracting party is a male, the legislation
does not allow the possibility of considering him the father.
Notwithstanding, neither courts nor administrative authorities
in Spain have been able to turn their backs to the situation of
children born abroad by surrogacy, in cases where a Spanish
citizen has entered into a surrogate motherhood contract in a State
where legislation permits this kind of contract. The problem might
arise when, once the child is born in the State where the contract
was entered into, the Spanish person or couple who executed the
contract intend to register the child as his or theirs 11 in the Civil
Registry of Spain (Civil Registry).

8. The common colloquialism used is “rent-a-mother” or “rent-a-womb”.
9. Law 14/2006 of May 26, related to assisted human reproduction
techniques. Art. 10.1 prescribes: “The contract wherein it is agreed that the
pregnancy, with or without payment, will be carried by a woman who gives up
the maternal filiation in favor of the other party or a third party shall be null and
void.” B.O.E. n. 126, May 27, 2006.
10. Art. 10.2, Law 14/2006, supra note 9: “The filiation of children born by
surrogacy shall be determined by birth.”
11. In many cases, the child born by surrogacy is, indeed, a biological child
of the contracting parties because the gestating mother has been fertilized with
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This practice has increased notably since the Spanish Civil
Code was amended in 2005 to allow and recognize same-sex
marriage. 12 Since then, many male same-sex couples who can only
achieve paternity by contracting with a surrogate mother and
fertilizing her with sperm or by any human reproductive material
of either of them, have been denied—by both the Civil Registry
and the courts—their attempts to establish the paternity of the child
born by surrogate motherhood. 13
An administrative provision recently enacted has attempted to
remedy this situation. It is a provision made by the General
Directorate for Registries and Notaries on October 5, 2010
concerning “the registration regime of the filiation of children born
by surrogacy.” The Directorate General of Registers is a branch of
the Ministry of Justice, serving as the hierarchical superior of the
Spanish notaries and registers. Because it is a non-judicial
administrative body, its decisions on the validity of the acts
recorded in the Spanish registers 14 have no judicial or normative
value; they simply contain expert or doctrinal value and
consequently are merely advisory.
These provisions, otherwise, are binding for the Spanish
Registers because they are public officers of this agency.
Therefore, in the exercise of this function, the Directorate General,
with the purpose to preserve the best interest of children born
abroad by means of surrogate motherhood, has recognized that, in

gametes or reproductive cells of the man or the woman, or of the male or female
same-sex couple who contracted the surrogacy.
12. The recognition of same sex marriage in Spain is established in Law
13/2005of July 1, which amended the Civil Code with respect to the right to
marry; B.O.E. n. 157, Jul. 2, 2005.
13. An example of judicial decision rejecting such registration is the
judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 15 of Valencia, September 15, 2010;
Juz. Prim. n. 15 de Valencia, s. n. 193/2010.
14. The Directorate General of Registers safeguards the legality of issues
relating to civil status, which are recorded in the Civil Registry, as well as the
validity of the acts of disposition or agreements over immovable property, which
are recorded in the Land Registry.
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certain circumstances, those children can be entered in the Civil
Registry as children of male applicants. 15 Two conditions must be
met:
The first condition is formal. It requires that the filiation of the
child born be accredited by a foreign judgment following
exequatur proceedings 16 in Spain. In any case, an administrative
decision or medical certificate produced abroad will not be
sufficient to obtain recognition in Spain.
The second condition is substantive. It requires the verification
by the Spanish Register, by way of the examination of the
documentation submitted by the applicants, that the rights of both
the child and the surrogate mother have been sufficiently
guaranteed. In particular, it should be verified that the surrogate
mother has the ability and natural capacity to understand and
voluntarily renounce her maternity, and that the renunciation is
made in the absence of any vice of consent (error, fraud or duress).
C. The New Civil Registry Act
Finally, the third development in the area of the Law of
Persons is the enactment of the new Civil Registry Law in July 21,
2011. 17 Its entry into force will be delayed until 2014 due to the
importance of the changes introduced by the law. 18 The Civil
Registry is the public record of acts affecting the civil status and,
accordingly, the legal capacity of a person to exercise rights. The
reform, undertaken for the reasons indicated below, includes a
15. Or persons, irrespective of their sex, who contracted surrogacy abroad.
16. The European Commission of Justice provides this definition of
exequatur: a concept specific to private international law referring to the
decision by a court authorizing the enforcement in that country of a judgment,
arbitral award, authentic instrument or court settlement given abroad. Available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/glossary/exequatur_en.htm (last visited on June 13,
2013).
17. Civil Registry Act, Law 20/2011, B.O.E. n. 175, Jul. 22, 2011.
18. This law replaces the prior Civil Registry Law [hereinafter CRL] of
June 8, 1957 (B.O.E. n. 15, Jun. 10, 1957). However, most likely because it
introduces significant changes, its entry into force is postponed until July 22,
2014 (so ordered by the 10th Final Disposition of the new law, supra note 17).
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modification of the Spanish Civil Code concerning the acquisition
of legal personality. 19
This important legislative reform is justified for several
reasons, which primarily have to do with the internal organization
of the Registry and the system of information management
contained therein.
Prior to this revision, the Civil Registry was a unitary body
with several Registry offices distributed throughout the Spanish
territories. Each office had custody of the books containing the
records of the essential facts affecting the life of a person. The
criterion for classification of the registry information was not by
individuals or persons, but rather by the legally relevant fact: there
was a registry for birth, another for marriage, a third registry for
death, and another for tutorship and legal representation. In
addition, the registrar or person responsible for each office of the
Civil Registry was a member of the judiciary (the “Civil Registry
Judge”).
1. The first reason for this reform was the conversion of the
former Registry maintained in books into a data retrieval system or
electronic record, which will act as a database. In turn, this system
allows administrative decentralization: citizens may apply for
recordation of registerable facts affecting them at any Registry
office and not only, as it was until the reform, at the office in the
location where the fact occurred (e.g., place of birth). Despite this
new decentralized organization, the unity of performance is
guaranteed in all the offices, both by decisions and instructions
issued by the aforementioned Directorate General of Registers 20
and by the possibility to appeal decisions made by the officials of
the Registry offices to the Directorate General. 21
19. Art. 30, Spanish Civil Code [Código Civil, hereinafter C.C.].
20. As mentioned in the previous paragraph B, the Directorate General of
Registers operates under the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the
most important legal records of Spain (The Civil Registry and the Land
Registry).
21. Art. 85 CRL, supra note 17.
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2. The second change affects the very officials who are in
charge of the Registry offices. Previously, the official in charge of
each Registry office was a judge. In order to clearly separate the
judicial function and the purely administrative function of the
Registry, this task is now assigned to officials of the Civil Service,
although they must have a law degree. 22 Notwithstanding,
registration activity ultimately remains under judicial control
because the decisions of the Directorate General of the Registers
may be challenged by any interested party in civil court. 23
3. The main change introduced by the 2011 legislative reform
affects systematic management, or the systematization, of Registry
information. Fundamentally, it is intended that the Registry will
become a historical or personal record for each Spanish citizen. To
do this, the hitherto existing classification system based upon the
fact (consisting of all births, marriages, deaths, tutorships or other
forms of legal representation that were grouped in the same book)
is replaced by a classification of persons or individuals, so that all
the facts affecting their civil status 24 will be grouped in the section
or individual Registry25 that is assigned to each person within the
General Registry.
4. Finally, the greater importance ascribed by the new Civil
Registry Law to the person or individual has resulted in two
changes of material or substantive law:
a. The first change is the reform of article 30, Civil Code of
Spain, concerning the commencement of legal personality, or
recognition of the natural person, as a subject of law. 26 Until now,
our Civil Code maintained the Romanist rule that birth alone does
not determine the legal personality or juridical recognition of being
22. Second Additional Disposition CRL, supra note 17.
23. Art. 87 CRL, supra note 17.
24. Starting with the first registration, which is the act of birth.
25. Articles 6 & 44.3 CRL, supra note 17.
26. The amendment of the Civil Code is provided by the 3rd Final
Disposition CRL, supra note 17. Despite the fact that this law will not enter into
force until 2014, the amendment of Art. 30 of the Spanish Civil Code has
immediate effect.
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born as a person. In addition to the act of birth, one additional
requirement was that the newborn would be recognized as having
legal capacity and, accordingly, the capacity to have rights and
duties, if the child survived at least twenty-four hours after
separation from the mother’s womb.
From now on, the recognition of the juridical personality of the
individual is simultaneous to his birth, since the new article 30 of
the Civil Code states that “legal personality is acquired from the
moment the child is born alive, after complete separation from the
mother’s womb.” 27
b. In the second place, and with the same purpose of
strengthening the rights of the newborn child, the new Civil
Registry Law of 2011 has abolished the right, previously
recognized to the mother, of “disavowal” or denial of her maternity
by a unilateral declaration recorded in the Registry, without
contesting the filiation in court. 28 The only requirement for
extrajudicial action to deny maternity was for the mother to make
the declaration at a time very close to the birth and registration. 29
As mentioned above, such unilateral right has been repealed in
the new Registry Law of 2011, which thereby recognizes a
27. This is because it was necessary for the newborn to survive at least
twenty-four hours from the time that the umbilical cord was cut. This
requirement was intended to prevent important juridical effects, such as the
devolution of succession rights from one family line in favor of another, caused
by the birth of children with little chance of survival.
28. Such a unilateral right of the mother was the counterpart of the
possibility that the birth registration could take place without her participation
since anyone who has certain knowledge of the birth is urged to report it to the
Registry (art. 42 CRL, 1957, supra note 18). Moreover, it is mandatory for the
doctor and other healthcare personnel attending the birth to report it to the
Registry (art. 44 CRL, 1957).
29. The alleged mother shall make the declaration of disavowal or denial of
maternity within 15 days following the notification from the Registrar informing
her of the registration of maternity. See art. 47.3 CRL, 1957, supra note 18:
[t]he reference of this filiation can be suppressed by a judicial decision
or by disavowal of the person who appears as the mother formalized
before the Registrar, which shall be entered in the margin of the birth
certificate. This disavowal cannot be made beyond 15 days of that
notification. . . .
As above-mentioned, the prior act, which shall be in effect until 2014 (see supra
note 18), was enacted on June 8, 1957.
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previous jurisprudential rule. 30 Under this previous judicial
interpretation, article 47.3 of the 1957 Civil Registry Law was
unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable, because the
registration (and thus official recognition) of filiation depended
exclusively on the will of the mother, to the detriment of the
newborn child. Conversely, upon the entry into force of the new
2011 Civil Registry Law, the only way to cancel the registration of
maternity will be by way of court judgment, which the alleged
mother can only get by demonstrating to the courts (with proof and
with guarantees for the rights of the newborn child inherent to the
judicial process) that maternity was falsely attributed to her.
III. FAMILY LAW
In the area of Family law, the main legislative development has
been the entry into force on January 1, 2011 of Law 25/2010 of
July 29, 2010, promulgating Book II of the Catalonia Civil Code
(Codi Civil de Catalunya), 31 related to Persons and the Family.
A. Spain as a Multi-legislative State, with Coexisting Territorial
Civil Law Systems
Catalonia, like the Basque country, Aragon, Navarre, the
Balearic Islands and Galicia, is one of the regions or autonomous
communities of Spain that has its own civil law, embodied in a
civil code, which applies to the exclusion of the Spanish Civil
Code within the Catalan territory. 32 Spain is, therefore, a multi30. This line of case law originates from the Supreme Court Judgment of
Sept. 21, 1999, T.S., s. n. 776/1999.
31. The Civil Code of Catalonia is being promulgated in stages. The first
Act or Preliminary Act was enacted in 2002 (Law 29/2002 C.C. CAT., Dec. 30,
2002). At this time, the code is almost complete. Only Book VI, related to
Obligations and Contracts, is missing and still in progress. The full text of the
Civil
Code
of
Catalonia
is
available
in
Spanish
at
http://civil.udg.es/normacivil/cat/CCC/ES/Index.htm (last visited May 5, 2013).
32. Art. 111-3.1 & 111-5 C.C. CAT. These provisions of the Civil Code of
Catalonia show that, with respect to those civil matters over which the Catalan
legislature has authority and which have been regulated by it, the law applicable
in the territory of Catalonia is Catalan civil law. The Spanish Civil Code (1889)
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legislative State in which a plurality of territorial civil laws exists.
However, there are certain civil matters which are governed by a
uniform civil law, since they are reserved to the legislative
authority of the State and, accordingly, forbidden to the territorial
legislative powers. Relevant provisions are found in article 149.1,
rule 8, of the Spanish Constitution (Constitución Española). 33
B. The New Book II, Of Persons and Family, the Civil Code of
Catalonia: Its Regulation of Matrimonial Regimes
With regards to family law, the Constitution grants to the State
of Spain the exclusive power to legislate on the form of the
marriage celebration and the capacity to marry. Therefore,
although it aims at the complete regulation of family law, 34 Book

is, in turn, applicable to those territories of the State which do not have their
own civil law. In addition, in certain civil matters (referred to in art. 13.1 C.C.),
it is the common or uniform code that is applicable in of all the territories of the
State, including those who have a special civil law.
33. Art. 149.1 of the Constitución Española [hereinafter C.E.] establishes
those matters which can only be regulated by the State of Spain, and
accordingly, those which are forbidden to the legislative authority of the
autonomous communities or regions of Spain. Thus, matters not included in this
list may be regulated by an autonomous or regional legislature. Although art.
149.1, rule 8, C.E. also reserves to the State “civil legislation”, that same rule
recognizes the legislative power of certain Spanish regions for the
“conservation, modification, and development” of their own civil law. Even so,
art. 149.1, rule 8, C.E. provides that certain matters are also exclusively reserved
to the legislative authority of the State and may not, therefore, be included in the
territorial or regional civil laws. Among those civil matters reserved to the State,
art. 149.1, rule 8, C.E. includes the “grounds of contractual obligations,” a
limitation that has been much discussed by the State as well as by the regional
powers before the Spanish Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court (for
instance, in judgment 71/1982, Nov. 30, 1982) stated that with this limit the
intent is to preserve the unity of the market within Spanish territory. This limit
would play, therefore, a similar role as the commerce clause (U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8) which, in the United States Constitution, limits the competence of States in
matters of private law.
34. In addition, the Civil Code of Catalonia strives toward regulation
adapted to new models of family (for example, single-parent families), as
established by art. 231-1, which, significantly, bears the heading “the
heterogeneity in the family.” According to this provision, “The family enjoys
legal protection provided by law, protecting without discrimination family
relationships arising from marriage or stable cohabitation in couples, and
families formed by a single parent with his/her descendants.”
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II of the Civil Code of Catalonia must be enacted without those
matters upon which the Catalan Legislature is forbidden to take
legislative action.
One of the issues that, in Catalonia, has its own regulation
distinct from the Spanish Civil Law relates to “matrimonial
agreements”, which are contracts between spouses or between
persons who will contract a future marriage in order to regulate the
economic regime of the marriage.
Although there were obstacles to grant matrimonial agreements
in Spanish law until 1975 (until that date the Spanish Civil Code
prevented the execution of post-nuptial agreements, because of
possible psychological influence of the husband over the wife), 35
in Catalonia, vast autonomy has always existed to grant
matrimonial agreements, allowing them both prior to and after the
celebration of the marriage. Moreover, the content of the
agreements has been and continues to be very broad. In Catalonia,
beyond the choice of the economic regime, these agreements have
been intended to articulate everything related to the whole regime
applicable to the community of family life. Thus, as detailed
below, matrimonial agreements are not unitary transactions, but
rather a group of transactions (i.e., a set of multiple transactions
and statements).
The primary, but not the only, purpose of the matrimonial
agreement is to determine the “matrimonial economic regime,”
which can either be of separate property or of community property;
only the latter creates the existence of common marital property. In
Catalonia, in the absence of a consensus between the contracting
parties or spouses in the agreement, the matrimonial economic
regime is that of separate property, as provided by law. 36 However,

35. As reflected in the Statement of Purpose (§ IV) of Law 14/1975 of May
2, which amended the Spanish Civil Code to eliminate restrictions on a married
woman’s legal capacity; B.O.E. n. 107, May 5, 1975.
36. Art. 231-10.2 C.C. CAT. On the contrary, in Spanish law, in the absence
of a regime chosen by the parties themselves in the matrimonial agreement, the
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the agreement on the economic regime is not the only content of
the matrimonial agreement. On the contrary, it is common that the
contracting parties (the persons who intend to contract marriage, if
the agreement is pre-nuptial), or the spouses (in a post-nuptial
agreement or an agreement concluded after the marriage
ceremony), may waive that part of the agreement and maintain the
regime of separate property already provided by law, since that is
the one best in keeping with the current social reality (the full
integration of women into the labor market and, accordingly, of
their economic autonomy).
Thus, in Catalonia, the agreements tend to be designed to
mitigate the effects of the separation of property, permitting a
certain connection between the personal patrimonies of both
spouses. The principal means for achieving this has been by
mutual donations which, for reason of marriage or future marriage,
the contracting parties or spouses make, either between themselves
or in favor of their—usually—future descendants. For the same
nuptial reasons, donations may also be made by third parties
(usually, the relatives of one or either of the contracting parties or
spouses) to the contracting couple or their future descendants.
Indeed, at times the object of these donations is not only specific
property, but is, rather, a universality: applied to all or part of the
patrimony of the donor, who, at the time of the donation,
irrevocably institutes as heir the son or daughter who marries
and/or his or her future descendants. In the latter case, we are
dealing with the heretament or successoral contract 37 which up to

matrimonial property regime shall be one of community property, which
involves the creation of a common patrimony of the spouses (art. 1316 C.C.).
37. Indeed, the heretament or typical successoral contract in Catalan civil
law requires kinship between the contracting parties (art. 431-2, C.C. CAT.).
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this point was necessary to include in the instrument of the
matrimonial agreement. 38
Aside from that specific type of heretament or successoral
contract, the remarkable thing is that, by the fact they are included
in the instrument of matrimonial agreement, donations for reason
of marriage are more binding than ordinary donations. They are
non-revocable on a variety of causes that ordinarily 39 make it
permissible for the donor to revoke them unilaterally (e.g., by the
subsequent birth of a child) after donation. Rather, donations
contained in the matrimonial agreement are revocable only on a
single ground: the failure by the donor to perform a charge
stipulated in the act of donation to the benefit of the doneespouse. 40 The reason for this provision is the legal assumption that
these kinds of donations are not strictly gratuitous or exclusively
intended to benefit the donee. On the contrary, the law assumes
that all donations contained in the instrument of matrimonial
agreement have been made correspondingly or in recognition of
the attributions made in turn by one contracting party or their
family to the benefit of the other contracting party or their
relatives. They are, therefore, mutual and reciprocal attributions. It
is precisely that quasi-onerous or reciprocal character peculiar to
donations in the marital agreement that determines the restriction
of the unilateral power to revoke or leave them without effect.
Another provision related to this rule is article 231-23,
concerning the modifications of the marital agreement. When, in
addition to the contracting parties, third parties (i.e., relatives who
make donations on behalf of the spouses or their descendants) have
participated in the marital agreement, the agreement may only be
amended with the participation of all persons involved in its initial
formation. The only declaration in the agreement which does not
38. Currently, the Catalan Civil Code allows the heretament to be recorded
in a deed or notarized document that is not a matrimonial agreement (art. 431-7
C.C. CAT.).
39. Art. 531-15 C.C. CAT.
40. Art. 231-25 C.C. CAT.
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require unanimous modification is the agreement on the choice of
the economic regime: the spouses are free during the marriage to
modify the economic regime established at the time of the
marriage contract. However, since the amendment can be used to
defraud the rights of creditors of either spouse, 41 such modification
shall be enforced against them only from the date of its publication
in the Civil Registry. 42
As mentioned above, the content of the matrimonial agreement
is not limited to setting up the economic regime of marriage, but,
because it may be comprehensive, it may be used to regulate
various issues raised by the community of marital life. Although,
traditionally, the content of the agreement has been eminently
patrimonial or economic, current regulation does not preclude the
inclusion of strictly personal marital or family issues. 43
Furthermore, it seems that the current Catalan Civil Law is even
favorable to such a possibility, given its purpose to provide nonjudicial means to solve family conflicts, attempting to resolve them
within the family’s own sphere by the agreement of the parties
themselves. 44 Therefore, there could also be a place in the
agreement for stipulations of a personal nature, such as marital
agreements relating to the exercise of parental authority, 45 the

41. For instance, matrimonial creditors might be disappointed in a reduced
guarantee (the patrimony of the debtor), if the original matrimonial regime of
community property is replaced by a separate property regime.
42. Art. 231-23.2 C.C. CAT. In addition, modification of the matrimonial
agreement must be recorded in the Registry of Commerce if either of the
spouses is a merchant or employer, as well as in the Land Registry, if one or
both are the owner of immovable property.
43. Note that art. 231-19.1 C.C. CAT. allows including in the matrimonial
agreement all lawful pacts that the contracting parties consider pertinent.
44. As established by art. 233-6 C.C. CAT., which includes family
mediation in the case of marital crisis and, therefore, invites spouses at any stage
of the proceedings to try to resolve their differences through consensus guided
and managed by a professional mediator.
45. Art.236-9 C.C. CAT. allows, during cohabitation, the parents, whether
married or not, to agree on different approaches to the exercise of parental
authority, such as the exercise by only one of them with the consent of the other.
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recognition of a non-marital child of either spouse, 46 or the
husband's consent that, during his life, and even after his death, his
wife can receive assistive (or in vitro) insemination using his
reproductive material.
Despite the potential scope of the content of the agreements, an
impassable restriction is imposed on them legally, which is the
respect for the equal rights and duties between the spouses. The
application of such a restriction raises two issues:
First, it is necessary to provide the restriction with a new
meaning. Originally, this restriction intended to prevent
discrimination on grounds of sex (particularly, discrimination
against women) within the marriage. However, since in 2005, 47
when same-sex marriage became legal in Spain, the goal of
equality between spouses must apply to both heterosexual and
homosexual marital unions. Therefore, it is no longer intended to
prevent only discrimination due to sex, but also on any other
grounds of discrimination that, in a same-sex marriage, might arise
from a certain diversification of roles.
Second, it is questionable whether the indicated restriction
permits the contracting parties or spouses to make an unequal
distribution of marital rights and duties. Despite the abovementioned restriction, a myriad of specific rules of family law in
Catalonia give rise to the possibility that an asymmetrical or
unequal distribution of rights and duties agreed upon by the
spouses themselves is legally supported. 48
46. In fact, art. 231-26(a) already includes that kind of recognition as
possible content of the matrimonial agreement.
47. Pursuant to Law 13/2005 of July 1, related to the right to marry, supra
note 12.
48. Thus, for instance, reference should be made to art. 236-9 C.C. CAT.,
empowering parents to unevenly distribute between them functions inherent to
parental authority, which may even include an agreement that such power will
be exercised by one of the parents. In addition, spouses are allowed to confer on
only one of them the management and disposition of common property (art.
569-30). Also, in the case of dissolution of the matrimonial regime, the unequal
distribution of earnings or common property is allowed in the agreement (art.
232-15 – 232-38.1). Finally, without intending to be exhaustive, it should be
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Now, given the strict requirement of reciprocity prevailing in
the content of marital agreements, 49 in order for that kind of
agreement to be considered valid and effective, it should be
verified that every disadvantage or individual renunciation has in
return some other advantage or gained superiority for the spouse
who assumes the disadvantage. Thus, this strict requirement of
reciprocity shall be understood as synonymous with balance, and
not as rigorously symmetrical or quantitatively equal. Furthermore,
any kind of confusion or communication between the personal and
patrimonial spheres should be prevented. For instance, a
renunciation to exercise paternal authority made in exchange for a
price or a patrimonial right should not be accepted.
Under the terms and within the above-mentioned limits, nuptial
or matrimonial agreements bearing unequal content should then be
accepted. Because, since 1975, 50 marriage no longer affects the
legal capacity of the spouses, legislation, at the present stage of
legal development, should have abandoned excessively protective
attitudes, and should be limited to ensure that those entering into
nuptial agreements do so under conditions of free will and
informed consent. To this effect, according to Catalan
jurisprudence, the ordinary rules to eradicate the vices of consent
are sufficient. 51

noted that even those rules which in the event of matrimonial crisis aim to
protect the most disadvantaged spouse, a waiver or agreement to the contrary is
permitted. For a more detailed analysis, please see Juana Marco Molina, Los
capítulos matrimoniales in 4 TRATADO DE DERECHO DE LA FAMILIA 181-212
(M. Yzquierdo& M. Cuena eds., Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2011).
49. Art. 231-20.3 C.C. CAT.: “The agreements [in anticipation of marital
rupture] of exclusion or limitation of rights should have a reciprocal basis and
clearly define the rights that are limited or waived.”
50. Since Law 14/1975, supra note 35, which reformed the Spanish Civil
Code to remove previous restrictions on a married woman’s legal capacity.
51. In this regard, the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia
of July 19, 2004, is particularly significant. The mentioned judgment recognized
the validity of certain agreements in anticipation of marital rupture in which the
wife renounced the use of marital home in favor of her husband. Pursuant to this
decision (see the judgment’s 4th legal basis) such matrimonial agreement should
be complied with because “it is an agreement between adults with full capacity
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Finally, it should be noted that one of the most innovative
features found in the matrimonial agreements are those agreements
between the contracting parties or spouses in anticipation of a
marital rupture. 52 The Catalan Civil Code not only supports these
agreements, which in Catalonia are binding on the contracting
parties without court approval or endorsement, 53 but also deals
with the rules related to their formation and effectiveness, having
been greatly influenced by American law; in particular, by the
principles formulated by the American Law Institute relating to
marital rupture. 54
For instance, a rule such as article 231-20.1 is derived from
American law, which provides that the agreements in anticipation
of marital rupture are only valid if they have been agreed upon at
least 30 days prior to the celebration of the marriage. This rule,
based on American jurisprudence, 55 is an expression of legal
protection of the contracting parties when matrimonial agreements
are entered into too close to the date of the wedding, since it may

. . . [wherein] the parties cannot be detached . . . since that agreement binds
them, as it is the case with any contract.” It was sufficient to use the rules on
vices of consent to verify that the spouse at a patrimonial disadvantage signed
the agreement of their own free will and with informed consent; T.S.J. Cataluña,
s. n. 23/2004.
52. According to art. 231-20.1 C.C. CAT., it can be included either in the
notarized instrument of matrimonial agreement or in a notarized document
independent and disassociated from the matrimonial agreement.
53. In contrast, the Spanish Civil Code only confers efficacy to matrimonial
agreements regulating the effects of separation, divorce, and annulment of
marriage after they have been reviewed and signed by the judge, before whom
these cases of matrimonial crisis are presented (art. 90.2 C.C.).
The difference between the Catalan and the Spanish regulation is certainly due
to the above-mentioned purpose of the Catalan Civil Code to provide nonjudicial solutions for family conflicts and promote as much as possible a
resolution by agreement between the parties concerned. Even so, there are
certain matters for which the Civil Code of Catalonia maintains judicial control.
Therefore, art. 233-5.3 C.C. CAT., subjects to judicial review the agreement on
the custody of and relationship with the child, as well as regarding the child
support that should be provided to them after the marital rupture, in order to
verify if these agreements are in accordance with the best interest of the child.
54. AMER. LAW INST. (ALI), PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
55. See id. at 966.
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increase the risk of intimidation where one of the parties threatens
not to marry the other party if the latter does not endorse the
proposed prenuptial agreement.
Unlike the remaining provisions of the agreements, which, if
prenuptial, enter into force on the date of the marriage, 56 the
agreements in anticipation of rupture only become binding when
and if the regulated situation occurs—that being the rupture of the
marriage. It may be that, when the rupture occurs, such agreements
are no longer suitable to adequately address an unforeseen
subsequent event and circumstances very different from those that
surrounded the agreement. For that reason, the Civil Code of
Catalonia permits the injured spouse to challenge it by showing
that an unforeseeable and unpredictable change occurred regarding
circumstances relevant at the time the agreement was made. 57
Even without naming it as such, article 231-20.5 brings into
family matters an institution as strictly patrimonial as the rebus sic
stantibus, typical of synallagmatic or bilateral contracts, which
impose reciprocal benefits to the contracting parties. This is
because, like in the donations discussed previously, the marital
agreements, and in particular those in anticipation of rupture58
contained in the marital agreements, tend to be linked by strong
ties of interdependence or reciprocity thus justifying the
application of that clause. Accordingly, the promise, renunciation,
or attribution that is carried out by one of the parties in favor of the
other can be maintained only if the circumstances at the time of the
execution of the agreement continue to support the continuous
justification of the reciprocal promise or concession made by the
other party.
Despite the aforementioned influence of the passage of time
and the consequent change of circumstances to the effectiveness of
the agreements in anticipation of rupture, it is necessary to
56. Art. 231-19.2 C.C. CAT.
57. Art. 231-20.5 C.C. CAT.
58. Art. 231-20.3 C.C. CAT.
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emphasize that the agreements that were formed after the marital
rupture has occurred are weaker than those formed before the
marital rupture, despite the fact that they are more recent; thus, it is
recognized that each one of the spouses has the right to unilaterally
withdraw from them. 59 Indeed, underlying the rule is the legal
recognition that post-rupture agreements are usually made in a
moment of particular emotional distress.
IV. CONTRACT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
Regarding the law of contract and the law of property rights,
the main legislative developments have been directly related to the
financial crisis that Spain has faced since 2008, particularly by the
most economically vulnerable strata of society. During this period,
hundreds of thousands of people, 60 most of them unemployed,61
have been evicted from their homes because they found it
impossible to fulfill the contracted obligations assumed in order to
finance the acquisition of immovable property.
The financial crisis created an urgent imperative for public
intervention, 62 which was necessarily translated into the adoption
59. Precisely, such unilateral right to withdraw exists when the spouse who
wants to exercise it signed the agreement without independent legal counsel
(Art. 233-5.2 C.C. CAT.).
60. According to Reuters, an estimated 400,000 properties have been
repossessed between 2008 and 2012; www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/usspain-evictions-idUSBRE8AE10A20121115 (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
61. According to estimates made by the government itself, the number of
unemployed people in Spain for the first quarter of 2012 hovers around 23% of
the labor force, reaching almost 50% for those age 25 and younger. Moreover,
such as is recognized in one of the legal provisions that I discuss later, this
situation of unemployment very often affects all members of the family, as thus
recognized by art. 3.1(a) of Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 of March 9, concerning
urgent measures for the protection of mortgagors without resources; B.O.E. n.
60, Mar. 10, 2012).
62. The regulation itself is motivated by this state of affairs, recognizing
without reservation the seriousness of the situation. Thus, for instance, the
penultimate paragraph of Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 , supra note 61, states that:
The adoption of the measures referred to in this Royal Decree-Law is
essential in order to protect a social group in a situation of special
vulnerability in the economic context generated by the crisis. The
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of laws. In Spain, unlike in common law countries, the legal
system does not allow courts to create a law without statutory
support. 63 Judicial attempts to remedy this situation by
interpretation, even forcibly, have been ultimately proven to be
insufficient in the current legal framework, as well as dangerous to
the legal security and the necessary social confidence that
contractual obligations will be performed: pacta sunt servanda
(“agreements must be kept”).
When analyzing the legal measures taken, it is therefore
essential to take into account the socio-economic context
mentioned above. The same context of urgency and necessity also
justifies the fact that the main measures have been taken, not by
Spanish Parliament (Las Cortes Generales), but directly by the
Executive Branch, which for reasons of extraordinary urgency and
necessity, may issue regulatory provisions which have the force of
law: the decree-law. 64 After its promulgation by the Executive
Branch, it must be ratified by the Parliament, 65 which has to
determine whether the actual circumstances existing at that time
justified such extraordinary provisions.
A. Contract Law: Labor Reform
In the area of contract law, the most significant measure was
the “labor reform”, undertaken by Royal Decree-Law 3/2012 of

effects of unemployment on Spanish families and their social situation
have produced damage for which government intervention cannot be
further delayed. . . .
63. In Spain, the judges are not bound by precedent (our system does not
recognize the principle of stare decisis), but, as stated in art. 117.1 C.E., judges
are bound solely by legislation (imperio de la ley). The jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court is not, therefore, a source of law or legal norm under Spanish
law, but only has persuasive interpretative value (art. 1.6 C.C.) and is a guide for
probable future determination, but is neither certain nor immutable for future
litigation.
64. Art. 86 C.E.
65. The ratification, which must be made within 30 days of the
promulgation of the decree-law, falls within the authority of the Congreso de los
Diputados, which is the lower House in the Spanish Parliament.
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February 10, 66 containing urgent measures for the reform of the
labor market. This provision, which first and foremost seeks to
combat unemployment, introduces flexible modifications aimed at
regulating the employment contract in order to encourage small
and medium-sized companies to hire workers.
This flexibility was undoubtedly necessary, since the rigidity of
the labor law framework has been identified as one of the main
reasons for the high rate of unemployment in Spain. This is
because Spanish labor law (primarily contained in “The Workers’
Statute”) 67 is still very attached to the achievements of the labor
movement in the beginning of the 20th century and is, therefore,
extremely protective of the rights of workers, often to the
detriment of the employer, who desires the ability to adapt in order
to serve the financial needs of the company.
Hence, the above-mentioned legislative reform provides
flexibility and acceleration of the possible renegotiation of
individual employment contracts, especially concerning the causes
and consequences of dismissal, even to the detriment of collective
agreements (i.e., contracts between a trade union and the group of
companies in a certain sector of economic activity), which so far
have predetermined the conditions that could be agreed upon
individually between workers and companies in that sector.
The most notable changes caused by the Royal Decree-Law
3/2012 with regard to the previous legal framework are as follows:
1. First, as a main instrument for flexibility in hiring, and at the
same time for the promotion of employment, it creates a new form
of employment contract of indefinite duration that can only be used
by companies with fewer than fifty workers. 68 This category of
66. Royal Decree-Law 3/2012, B.O.E. n. 36, Feb. 11, 2012.
67. Royal Decree-Law 1/1995 of March 24, approving the consolidated
Workers’ Statute [Estatuto de los Trabajadores, hereinafter E.T.], B.O.E. n. 75,
Mar. 29, 1995.
68. It is taken into account that small and medium-sized enterprises (called
“PYMES”—pequeñas y medianas empresas), which represent the majority of
Spanish production, suffer the consequences of the economic crisis with greater
intensity.
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companies is allowed to hire workers for an indefinite time by
subjecting them to a trial period longer than the ordinary trial
period. While the ordinary trial period is six months, 69 in this new
type of contract, in the favor of small enterprises, the probationary
period is extended to one year. 70 Within that period, both the
employee and the company may unilaterally terminate the contract
without justification or cause, or payment of additional
compensation for termination. Additionally, the companies are
entitled to tax incentives when workers are under the age of thirty
or unemployed persons registered at the Employment Office.
2. Second, the new legislation brings two new substantial
changes with regards to dismissal:
a. The first change consists of a broader consideration of the
possible causes of dismissal, especially the “objective dismissal”,
which is founded on “economic, technical, organizational or
production causes.” At the same time, this also applies to collective
dismissals, which must impact at least 10% of the workers in the
company. 71
Particularly significant is the dismissal on economic causes or
based on the performance of the company. It is deemed that those
“economic causes” 72 are present where the performance of the
company shows a negative economic situation, in cases such as
current losses and anticipated losses or a persistent decrease in
their level of income or sales. In this regard, two aspects should be
stressed: First, based on the intention to facilitate the ability of the
company to act in such circumstances, even though there is still ex
post judicial review to determine the veracity of such
circumstances, the company is exempt from obtaining approval
from the administrative authority, which, until now, had to

69. Art. 14 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66.
70. Art. 4 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66.
71. Art. 18, para. 2 & 3, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending Arts. 51
& 52 E.T., supra note 67.
72. Art. 51 E.T., supra note 67.
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authorize this type of dismissal. 73Second, although the formulation
of the reasons for dismissal does not vary substantially from the
previous legislation, the previous references to the reasonableness
and the prospects for success of the measure are eliminated from
the provision 74 in order to ensure that the courts will look at only
the existence of the cause and refrain from making judgments
relating to the management of the business, as they had done on
previous occasions.
Another modification related to those mentioned above—
whose effectiveness has yet to be proven is that in counterpart to
the broad and flexible causes for dismissal, the provision at the
same time prevents dismissal by granting greater freedom to the
companies to unilaterally modify the conditions of work. 75 Thus,
for instance, they are allowed to modify essential contractual terms
such as the wage amount, distribution of working hours,
geographic relocation and even functional reallocation of
workers. 76 Moreover, such unilateral modifications are also
allowed without prior administrative authorization. Above all, the
company may also make changes contrary to conditions previously
set in the collective agreement applicable to the sector to which the
company belongs. 77
b. The second change consists in trying to reduce the economic
cost of dismissal for companies, also known as “low-cost
dismissal.” 78 Thus, for contracts concluded after the Royal DecreeLaw entered into force, in the case of individual dismissal (when it
73. Art. 13 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending Art. 47 E.T., supra
note 67.
74. Art. 51.1 E.T., supra note 67.
75. Arts. 8 & 12 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, which reorganized arts. 22,
39 & 41 E.T., supra note 67.
76. That functional reallocation or unilateral power exercised by the
company to change the functions or tasks of the worker includes even the
possibility to assign to him or her lower-skilled functions than those
corresponding to the professional group to which the worker belongs.
77. Art. 14, para.1, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending art. 82.3 E.T.,
supra note 67.
78. In Spanish, “abaratamiento”, a term used in social media.
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is unfair or unjustified), the current severance payment of fortyfive days’ salary per year of service is replaced by a severance
payment of thirty-three days’ salary per year of service, to be paid
in installments over a maximum period of twenty-four months. 79 In
contrast, with collective dismissal on economic or any other
objective cause, the severance payment will be, as a general rule,
of twenty days’ salary per year of service, and may be paid in a
maximum of twelve monthly installments. 80
3. Lastly, the labor reform emphasizes the importance, as
mentioned above, to ensure that individual employment contracts,
as well as specific collective agreements of each company, prevail
over sectorial or professional agreements between Trade Unions
and employers of a particular sector. The legislature presents this
measure as an attempt to further “conventional decentralization in
order to facilitate the negotiation of working conditions at the
closest, most appropriate level to the actual circumstances of the
company and its employees.” 81 Naturally, from the unions’ point
of view, these kinds of measures are seen as an attack on the
bargaining power of the labor representatives, to the detriment of
the requisite bargaining power of the workers themselves.
In any case, the main changes in this area have basically been
as follows:
a. It is possible to modify or revise a sectorial collective
agreement during its period of performance, thus changing the
agreement’s previous stability until the next negotiation. Now,
however, article 86.1 E.T. 82 allows either party (employees’
representatives or employers’ representatives) to push for its
renegotiation.

79. Art. 18, para.7, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 56.1 E.T.,
supra note 67.
80. Art. 53.1(b) E.T., supra note 67.
81. As per the Statement of Purpose, para. IV, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note
66.
82. Modified by art. 14, para. 5, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66.
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b. Second, the survival of the collective agreement is
abolished; until now the law provided that, after the maximum
time allowed to negotiate has expired without reaching an
agreement, the collective agreement remains in force indefinitely.
Now, however, two years after the denunciation of the collective
agreement by either party, without having reached a new
agreement or being issued an arbitral award, the denounced
agreement would no longer be valid. 83
c. Finally, in order to facilitate the decentralization of
collective bargaining already mentioned above, 84 it is established,
for the first time, that the company agreement takes precedence
over the sectorial collective agreement, 85 providing the company
the flexibility to adapt working conditions to economic and
organizational needs, as well as to the changing market situation.
B. Property Rights Law: “Giving in Payment” or Allowance for
Alternative Satisfaction 86 Granted to the Debtor Who Loses His
House in a Foreclosure Proceeding
One of the most-debated issues of 2011 is the so-called “giving
in payment,” 87 meaning that the debtor who gave his immovable
property (usually his own house) to the creditor as a mortgage can
be released from the obligation (or obligations resulting from the
mortgage loan contracted for the acquisition of that property) if the
mortgage property is adjudicated to the mortgage creditor. Such an
adjudication takes place when, in the course of the foreclosure
proceeding, the sale by public auction of the object of the
guarantee is not completed due to a lack of bidders or interested
83. Art. 14, para. 6, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 86.3
E.T., supra note 67.
84. As mentioned both in the previous paragraph 2 and at the beginning of
this paragraph 3.
85. Art. 14, para. 3, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 84.2
E.T., supra note 67.
86. In Spanish, “la facultad solutoria alternativa.”
87. As we shall see, the use of the term “giving in payment” (dación en
pago) in the context of this reform is technically inaccurate.
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persons. 88 In this event, according to Spanish Procedural Law, 89
the creditor may request the court to adjudicate the mortgaged
property to him.
Such adjudication does not extinguish the obligation or
obligations secured by the mortgage. Instead, according to Spanish
law, the creditor may continue to claim from the debtor the portion
of the debt that is not satisfied (i.e., remains unpaid) after the sale
of the adjudicated immovable property. This means that since the
foreclosure does not alter the unlimited personal liability of the
debtor, 90 the creditor may continue to try to collect the amount due
(the unsatisfied debt) from the debtor’s remaining assets. 91
Thus, it has become a widespread and socially criticized
practice that, after the adjudication of the property at a price that
may be well-below the appraised value of the mortgaged property
assigned by the creditor and stated in the mortgage contract, 92 the
creditor (usually a bank) then gets an additional benefit by
transferring the property to a third party while still claiming the
amount of the outstanding debt from the debtor, who is typically an
unemployed person who has lost his house precisely because of the
lack of income needed to satisfy the obligations arising from the
mortgage loan taken in order to purchase the property.

88. Very often, auctions of immovables are deserted due to rampant falling
prices in the Spanish real estate market, which, on the one hand, has been
overwhelmed by the excessive construction activity of the previous two decades,
and, on the other hand, by a lack of liquidity because of the general situation of
indebtedness of individuals and companies.
89. Law 1/2000 of January 7, the Law of Civil Procedure (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil), referred to as L.E.C., B.O.E. n. 7, Jan. 8, 2000.
90. The Mortgage Law [Ley Hipotecaria, hereinafter L.H.], consolidated
pursuant to the Decree of February 8, 1946. Art. 105 L.H. states that “The
mortgage . . . will not alter the unlimited personal liability of the debtor provided
in art. 1911 of the Civil Code.” B.O.E. n. 58, Feb. 27, 1946.
91. According to art. 1911 C.C., “the debtor is liable for the performance of
his obligations with all his property, present and future.”
92. The mortgage contract has to be formalized in an authentic act or
instrument before a notary in order for this right to be created or exist (art. 1875
C.C.).
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This situation, although protected by the law in force, 93 has not
only raised widespread social criticism for being incomprehensible
to common citizens, but has also led to attempts to put an end to
the problem by way of certain judicial decisions from lower courts.
Thus, decisions such as those of the Court of First Instance of
Lleida, December 29, 2011; of the Provincial Court of Girona,
September 16, 2011; and above all, of the Provincial Court of
Navarra, December 17, 2010 (which has had the greatest social
impact), describe the conduct of the banks as “abuse of rights,” “an
anti-social exercise,” or “an excess of authority” 94 regarding the
rights derived from the mortgage. 95 Consequently, the courts deny
the right of the creditor bank to pursue the collection of the
outstanding amount of the mortgage on the remaining assets of the
mortgagor. 96 These cited decisions reinforce the line of argument
93. In the already-cited art. 105 L.H. and art. 1911 C.C.
94. Article 7.2 C.C.
95. Indeed, art. 7.2. C.C. prohibits abuse of rights, antisocial exercise or
excess of authority as follows:
The law does not support abuse of rights or antisocial exercise thereof.
Any act or omission which, as a result of the author’s intention, its
purpose or the circumstances in which it is performed manifestly
exceeds the normal limits to exercise a right, with damage to a third
party, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the
adoption of judicial or administrative measures preventing persistence
in such abuse.
96. As stated in the resolution of the Court of First Instance No. 5 of Lleida,
December 29, 2011, ejecución hipotecaria 1895/2009 (which corresponds with
other judicial decisions referred to in the text):
. . . [W]e must not forget that when the Bank granted the loan, it valued
the property or estate at €219,242.55, and now intends to incorporate it
into their assets for a value of €109,621.28, and to continue the
enforcement process on the other assets of the debtors . . . la doctrina
de los actos propios (compare with the doctrine of estoppel) applies
here. If the bank, the dominant party in the contract of adhesion with
the borrower, appraised the mortgaged property at a certain amount, it
cannot then, if it does not want to contravene the above-mentioned
doctrine, which has been repeatedly applied by jurisprudence,
incorporate as its own the auctioned property without giving it the
value that [the creditor bank] itself set. One of the foundations of this
jurisprudential trend is the application of art. 7 of the Civil Code . . .
because it is understood that the incorporation of this patrimonial asset
at a lower value to which the party has acknowledged, and intends to
continue the enforcement process, presumes an abuse of rights by the
creditor . . . and allows an unjust enrichment of the Bank. Because the
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that judgments should reflect the current economic and social
reality, since, in effect, pursuant to article 3.1 of the Spanish Civil
Code, “The law will be interpreted . . . according to the social
reality at the time they should be applied. . . .”
Indeed, in view of the current economic situation of the
country, judgments such as that the aforementioned Court of
Lleida state that:
[T]he 2011 economic outlook has nothing to do with the
economic outlook of 2006, 2007 and 2008 when the crisis
was still emerging. Nowadays, the Spanish economy, as
well as the world economy, suffers a deep economic crisis
and for this reason, surely, the property adjudicated to the
bank . . . now has a market value below the price agreed in
the mortgage loan, but is it fair that the debtor suffers all
the consequences of this fall? Would it not be fairer that the
financial institutions also bear part of this decline?
Economists are unanimous in considering that the real
estate value losses have been caused by the financial
institutions themselves with their mismanagement of the
financial system. Hence, if the laws should be interpreted
according to the reality at the time when they are applied
(article 3 of the Spanish Civil Code) . . . [it] is not
acceptable that the stronger party in the mortgage loan
contract obtains an unjustified benefit with the further
execution at the expense of the debtor as a consequence of
applying the legal rules which aim to obtain
reimbursement, not enrichment, of the creditor. . . . 97
However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 98 rejects that
judicial approach because it holds that if the foreclosure
proceeding has been followed according to the legal procedure, 99 it

purpose of foreclosure is to obtain for the creditor, with the auction of
the property, the collection of the outstanding debt, but not to obtain an
unjust benefit such as that when the mortgaged property is acquired at a
lower price than the value fixed by the parties . . . and continue the
enforcement process on the other assets of the debtors.
97. The resolution of the Court of First Instance No. 5 of Lleida, December
29, 2011, ejecución hipotecaria 1895/2009.
98. In particular, the judgment of the Supreme Court of February 16, 2006,
in its 5th legal basis; T.S., s. n. 128/2006.
99. Art. 131 L.H.
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does not constitute an abuse of rights by the mortgagee to exercise
the rights conferred by law in order to obtain admissible economic
benefits in those transactions. In addition, the Court holds that
preventing the mortgagee from exercising those rights would
undermine the general confidence in the performance of
contractual obligations.
Moreover, even the Constitutional Court, in its Decision
113/2011 of August 17, 2011, censured such a judicial approach,
holding that those judges, critical of the use of the rules for
foreclosure proceedings, exceed their interpretative role and force
the existing legal framework, which, in a system of law such as
that of Spain, can only be modified by the legislature, as the
Constitutional Court also noted.
Perhaps that is the reason why the legislature itself100
eventually decided to intervene in order to try to remedy, or at least
alleviate, the severity of the above-mentioned social-economic
situation. The measures taken are twofold:
1. First, the Royal Decree-Law 8/2011 of July 1, 101 concerning
measures in support of mortgagors, which introduces two
provisions:
a. The aforementioned Law of Civil Procedure (L.E.C.) is
modified to ensure that in foreclosure proceedings for default of
payment, the debtor receives an adequate price for the immovable
property that allows him to minimize the remaining debt. This
way, in modifying article 671 L.E.C., it is anticipated that the
adjudication to the creditor of a mortgaged property as a result of a
foreclosure proceeding will never be at a price of less than 60% of
its appraised value.
b. The threshold or legal limit of that which is exempt from
seizure is raised. Usually, the general minimum value of what is
100. In fact, the executive branch itself uses its exceptional power to
proclaim Decree-Laws, which, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, have the
rank of law even though these decrees are issued by the executive power.
101. B.O.E. n. 161, Jul. 7, 2011.
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unseizable for any debtor coincides with the minimum wage. 102
Then, for mortgagors who have lost their habitual place of
residence, this Royal Decree-Law raises the legal limit up to 150%
of the minimum wage, and an additional 30% for each member of
their family who does not receive income exceeding this minimum
wage. 103
2. Subsequently, the Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 of March 9,
concerning urgent measures for the protection of mortgagors
without resources, seeks to curtail the social problem of evictions
of people who have lost their housing in a foreclosure proceeding
by means of establishing a voluntary system of mortgage debt
renegotiation. This system consists in the introduction of a “Code
of Good Practice,” 104 which can be voluntarily adopted 105 by
financial institutions (banks and other savings institutions). It is
not, therefore, an imperative measure, but merely a voluntary
measure or soft law. Even so, the executive branch is confident that
the majority of banks will adhere to the “Code,” both for reasons
of professional prestige (the government would publish a list of
participating institutions), 106 and, above all, to gain a competitive
position in the market.
The measure is not created for the benefit of any mortgagor,
but rather to favor those who, in accordance with the guidelines
established by the Royal Decree-Law, can be considered
particularly vulnerable, due to the suffering of extraordinary
difficulty, to satisfy the payment of their mortgage obligations. 107
Article 3.1 of the Royal Decree-Law considers the debtor of a loan
secured with a mortgage on his habitual place of residence to be in

102. In May 2013, the minimum wage was €645 per month;
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/05/31/inenglish/1370013481_405760.html.
103. Art. 1, R.D.-L. 8/2001, supra note 101.
104. The content of the Code of Good Practice is established in the Annex of
R.D.-L. 6/2012; B.O.E. n. 60, Mar. 10, 2012.
105. Art. 5, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104.
106. Art. 5.3, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104.
107. Art. 1, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104.
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such a vulnerable situation when all the following circumstances
are met:
a. That all members of the family unit 108 lack income derived
from work or economic activities.
b. That the mortgage payment 109 is greater than 60% of the net
income received by all the members of the family unit.
c. That all the members of the family unit lack sufficient
property rights or any other property to satisfy the debt.
d. That the credit or loan is secured with a mortgage on the
only house owned by the debtor, and has been granted for its
acquisition.
Hence, mortgagors who establish (by means of the
documentation indicated in article 3.1) that they are in such a
situation may request the following from the lending bank:
1. First, a novation or modification of the contract 110 leading to
a restructuring of the mortgage debt that makes its performance
viable by the debtor in the medium and long term. It is necessary
that the restructuring plan include 111 a four-year grace period on
the repayment of the capital, an extension of the loan repayment
term of up to 40 years, and a reduction in the rate of interest
applicable, which, during the grace period, will be determined
according to the Euribor index + 0.25%.
2. After applying these conditions, even if the mortgagor is
able to pay, he may ask the lending institution for a remission or
reduction of the capital to be repaid, which, at the choice of the
108. Persons considered as belonging to the family, in addition to the debtor,
are his or her spouse or partner registered as such in a public register, and the
children who reside in the house, regardless of their age (art. 3.1(a), R.D.-L.
6/2012, supra note 104).
109. This is the debt resulting from the mortgage loan, which requires
periodic payments (e.g., monthly payments).
110. In fact, it is not a single contract, but two connected or related contracts:
a contract of loan whose repayment is guaranteed with a mortgage on
immovable property, and the contract establishing the mortgage, which is a real
right. Typically, both contracts are formalized in the same instrument (a deed
before a notary public); thus, it would include both the loan contract and the
contract that establishes or creates the mortgage.
111. See para. 1(b) Code of Good Practice, supra note 104.
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institution, can be 25% of the outstanding capital, or the amount
paid in interest to that point, or a part of the value of the
adjudication of the house.
3. Finally, if the mortgagor does not accept these new
conditions, he may unilaterally impose on the creditor bank the
“giving in payment,” whereby the mortgagor demands that the
bank accept the transfer of the mortgaged property in payment of
the outstanding debt, which will then totally and definitely
extinguish the obligation. 112 Despite the fact that both the media as
well as the general public call this option “giving in payment,”
technically it is only giving in payment if the debt is extinguished
by transferring an object that is different from the one which is
owed, 113 and occurs by agreement between the creditor and the
debtor, simultaneously upon payment or performance. 114 Since in
this case, where no agreement exists, it is the debtor who
unilaterally imposes the asset offered as satisfaction or payment to
a performance (the transfer of the dwelling) different from the one
which is due (the repayment of the loaned capital and interest), it is
technically more accurate to refer to “unilateral allowance for
satisfaction” provided by law to the debtor.
Despite this kind of “giving” or transfer of ownership of the
dwelling to the creditor bank, the debtor can request to remain
therein as a tenant for a period of two years, paying as annual
rental 3% of the total debt at the moment the giving in payment
occurs. 115 An additional protective measure to the mortgagor who
loses ownership of his house is that he may unilaterally impose a
rental relationship upon his former creditor and new owner of the
dwelling.
In a recent judgment of March 14, 2013, the European Court of
Justice declared that Spanish legislation does not conform to
112. Paragraph 3, Code of Good Practice, supra note 104.
113. Or, more generally, through the completion of an act or performance
different from that which was initially due.
114. Art. 1153 C.C.
115. Paragraph 3(c), Code of Good Practice, supra note 104.
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European Union consumer protection law. 116 It violates Directive
93/13/EC of April 5, 1993, to the extent that it does not allow the
debtor, in the course of mortgage enforcement proceedings, to
argue that some clauses of the mortgage loan are unfair contract
terms and have this question judicially determined before
enforcement proceedings are concluded. The debtor may later on
obtain compensation if the terms are found unfair by the court
having jurisdiction to do so, but this court cannot stay the
enforcement proceedings. To comply with the aforementioned
European judgment, the Kingdom of Spain has enacted the Law
1/2013, of May 14, 2013, amending both the Mortgage Law and
the Law of Civil Procedure.
V. EUROPEAN UNION LAW: THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Because Spain has been one of the Member States of the
European Union since 1985, it is necessary to include in this
assessment the major developments related to the implementation
of European private law. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has
consistently stated, 117 European Union (EU) law does not
constitute international law for the Member States of the EU, but,
at least in certain aspects, the EU legal system can be considered
part of the domestic law of the Member States. In particular, EU
directives make the integration of the EU legal system into
domestic law possible. The directives are provisions that only
acquire normative or binding value when a Member State of the
Union implements or transposes them into its domestic law,
usually through the promulgation of legislation that incorporates
the content of the directive. 118
116. Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v.Catalunyacaixa, 2013 O. J. (C141) 5.
117. Since the judgment of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal
Constitucional) 165/1994, May 26, 1994.
118. Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the
consolidated version, consequent to the Treaty of Lisbon of December 13, 2007)
leaves to the Member States the choice of the means of incorporating the
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One of the subjects of private law that the European legislature
has attempted to harmonize or provide a uniform regulation within
the European Common Market is intellectual property, which
raises several conflicts between holders of protected rights
(particularly, authors or creators) and the users who are,
substantially, those who exploit protected works by making them
available to the public, but also private users. There are, indeed,
certain private uses of protected works, such as private copying,
which, because of their volume, also cause significant damage or
loss of benefit to the authors.
The European legislature has changed its approach to dealing
with these kinds of conflicts, as reflected by the first set of
directives adopted in the 1990s. 119 At first, the European Union
opted to reinforce the rights of users against the creators, and even
went so far as to impose on the authors specific uses of their
works, such as the transmission by cable, in a system of
agreements very close to that of the common law system of
mandatory licensing. 120 However, since the beginning of the last
decade, a change of legislative policy is taking place because the
authorities of the EU have realized that the European market of
cultural production can achieve competitiveness only by
strengthening the rights of the creator against those of a distributor
or exploiter.

directive into their own domestic law. The Spanish legislature opted to
incorporate the main directives on matters of private law (e.g., relating to
consumer contracts) through provisions with the rank of law and not through
mere administrative provisions.
119. Concerning EU policy in the area of intellectual property law at that
time and the directives reflecting it, see Juana Marco Molina, J., El derecho de
autor frente a la sociedad de la información, 2 REVISTA JUR. DE CAT. 367
(1997).
120. See art. 9, Directive 93/83/EC on the coordination of certain rules
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite
broadcasting and cable retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L248) 20-21.
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That change of legislative policy in the area of intellectual
property, in part due to the “Bangemann Report,” 121 resulted in
directive 2001/29/EC, May 22, 2001, on the harmonization of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society. Despite the conflicts arising from its application, its firm
and definite position to strengthen the rights of the creator against
the users of the works facilitates the task of the courts. Some recent
judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as well as some
Spanish judicial decisions, reflect this position.
A. The Question of Fair Compensation for Private Copying; ECJ
Judgment of June 16, 2011: Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus
Supplies Deutschland GmbH
The aforementioned judgment resolves the dispute raised by a
Dutch copyright management organization for a collective of
authors (Stichting de Thuiskopie) brought against a German
company (Opus Supplies) which sold, via the internet, blank media
that targeted consumers in the Netherlands. Opus Supplies did not
pay the private copying levy in either Holland or Germany, as
provided for in article 5.2(b), directive 2001/29. The judgment
ordered Opus Supplies to pay Stichting de Thuislopie for the loss
of earnings due to the Dutch authors, for reason of non-payment of
that levy.
The recognition of the right to receive fair compensation needs
to be justified because the copying or reproduction of protected
works by a person for private (and non-profit) use is “free use” or
does not require authorization from the right-holder of the work. 122
121. It was a study conducted by a group of experts led by Martin
Bangemann, who was EU Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Information and
Telecommunications Technologies during the 1990s. This report was submitted
to the European Council on May 26, 1994.
122. Art. 5.2(b) Directive 2001/29/EC (2001 O.J. (L167) 16) authorizes
Member States to exempt from the authorization of the author the
“reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for
ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial.” Making use of that
authority recognized by European Union law to the Member States, Art. 31.2,
Spanish Intellectual Property Law (R.D.-L. 1/1996 of April 12) excludes the
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This is because, from the inception of intellectual property
protection, it has been considered that the protection of the
author’s rights should stop at the doorstep of those who use the
work. 123 Nevertheless, because modern audio, visual, and above
all, digital reproduction media enable these kinds of copies to be
easily made, private copying has acquired over time an
uncontrolled and massive nature which, as the judgment
recognizes, causes serious economic damage to the authors.
In response to this situation, European legislation recognizes
that the right of the author (and also of some other holders of
intellectual property, such as interpreters) to fair compensation is
based on the estimated damage caused. From the viewpoint of both
creditor and debtor, the author’s economic right to the work has
certain special characteristics:
1. From the creditor’s point of view, despite the right to which
the author is entitled, he cannot claim it or receive it individually;
rather, he may only act through one of the copyright management
organizations (or “collecting societies”), 124 such as that appearing
in the above-mentioned judgment. After the fair compensation is
paid, the organization distributes it among its members according
to its own rules. This is because those revenues are not considered
the fee paid or compensation for the individually authorized use of
the work, but rather as global compensation for free use or
unauthorized use (“fair use”) and, accordingly, for the loss of
earnings due to the collective authors who are members of the
organization.
2. But, from the point of view of the person bound to perform
an obligation (the debtor), there are greater particularities

reproductions of works made for private use which are already available to the
public from the need to obtain the authorization of the author; B.O.E. n. 97, Apr.
22, 1996.
123. Josef Kohler explains this limitation in these terms (JOSEF KOHLER,
URHEBERRECHT AN SCHRIFTWERKEN UND VERLAGSRECHT 181 (1981).
124. In Spanish, “entidades de gestión.”
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regarding these rights. As recognized in the judgment, given the
practical difficulty to identify the plurality of anonymous private
users (who make copies for personal or private use) of protected
works, the laws have selected—within the long chain of
intermediaries between the creator and the final user of the work—
certain persons who directly or indirectly facilitate access to the
work. In this case, both the Dutch legislature and, until very
recently, 125 the Spanish legislature determined that manufacturers
and importers of equipment, media and devices which enable
digital, visual or audio reproduction of protected works are liable
to pay fair compensation.
Considering that Opus Supplies possessed such equipment and
media (in addition to making them available to private persons 126
or providing them a reproduction service), the ECJ declared it
liable to pay fair compensation for private copying to the Dutch
authors associated with Stichting de Thuiskopie, despite the fact
that Opus Supplies is not established in Netherlands.
B. Delimitation of the Concept of “Communication to the Public”
of the Work; ECJ Judgment of 21 October 2010: Padawan S.L. v.
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España
This second judgment, also raised in a lawsuit brought by a
copyright management organization (in this case, the Sociedad
General de Autores y Editores de España, or SGAE) addressed the

125. Until now, art. 25 of the Spanish Intellectual Property Law imposed a
copyright levy for private copying on the manufacturers of the reproduction
equipment above-mentioned in the text. However, the 10th Additional
Disposition, R.D.-L. 20/2011 of Dec. 30, on urgent budget, tax, and financial
deficit correction measures, abolished this system and provides that the
beneficiaries of fair compensation would be compensated from the Spanish
national budget; B.O.E. n. 315, Dec. 31, 2011.
126. Without needing such copies to actually be made, since, as pointed out
by another ECJ judgment (that of October 21, 2010, in case C-467/08, Padawan
S.L. v. SGAE), “the fact that that equipment or devices are able to make copies
is sufficient in itself to justify the application of the private copying levy,
provided that the equipment or devices have been made available to natural
persons as private users.”
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question of fair compensation for private copying and was resolved
in the same manner as in the precedent judgment.
Another issue (widely discussed both before and after the
Directive 2001/29/EC) that was addressed collaterally by this
decision 127 is related to whether the “on-demand” 128 or “peer-topeer” (“p2p”) communication (i.e., one that only takes place upon
individual request by each private user, and accordingly makes the
work available at the place and time requested by the individual
user) should be considered as public or private communication or
use of the work. The typical intermediary in this form of access to
works protected by intellectual property law is either a audiovisual
media company (e.g., cable television channel), or a hospitality
establishment, such as a hotel or restaurant, that, in connection
with the main service or accommodation provided to its customers,
facilitates as an additional service potential access to protected
musical or audiovisual works for their enjoyment.
However, a difficulty arose regarding this form of
dissemination of the work with regard to the concept of “public
communication” (which includes all the forms of intangible
dissemination, e.g., those who make the work accessible to the
public without prior distribution of copies of the same) during the
preparation of Directive 2001/29/EC. The difficulty was in
maintaining the public nature of the communication with respect to
interactive or “on-demand” communication: first, because this
127. Indeed, such a debate took place prior to Directive 2001/29/EC and was
resolved, for instance, in France. There, it resulted in a judgment contrary to the
approach adopted later by the directive and the above-mentioned jurisprudence
of the ECJ. In two lawsuits brought by S.A.C.E.M. (Société des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, a copyright management organization in
France) against two hotel companies (Hôtel Lutetia and Hôtel Le printemps), the
Cour de Cassation held that the defendant hotel companies had not committed
an act of public communication subject to copyright, for having made available
to the public works protected by intellectual property law in a private place, such
as the hotel rooms. Cass., 1re Civ., Nov. 23, 1971, no. 70-12523.
128. Art. 1.2, Directive 98/48/EC of July 20, 1998, amending Directive
98/34/EC, which establishes the rules relating to the information society
services, defines the notion of interactive communication or “à la carte” in
similar terms; 1998 O.J. (L217) 21.
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form of dissemination involves an individualized access to the
work, which makes it difficult for the law to include it within the
acts of exploitation contained in the exclusive power of the
author; 129 and second, because such access may occur in places,
such as a hotel room, that are supposedly private.
Nevertheless, article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC opted to
include individualized or “on-demand” communication within the
broader notion of “public communication”, thereby of allowing for
the purpose of collective enjoyment, and not just private
enjoyment, of the work. This makes the activity another one of the
operating activities that should be authorized by the author, and
one for which he should receive remuneration.
Hence, the 2010 judgment mentioned above correctly applied
the directive when, according to a 2006 judgment of the ECJ, it
stated that “the right of communication to the public covers
making the works available to the public in such a way that they
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them.” 130
Several reasons justify this decision:
First, we should take into account that a room in a hotel is not
strictly private, since a number of people who are not related by
personal ties may separately access it in a consecutive manner.
Therefore, even though it is not a public place, it is a place
accessible to the public. 131
129. Indeed, only activities of collective use of the work, or making the work
available to the public constitute acts of exploitation covered by intellectual
property law. See JUANA MARCO MOLINA, LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN LA
LEGISLACIÓN ESPAÑOLA 215 (Marcial Pons 1995).
130. The ECJ judgment of October 21, 2010 explicitly adopted the approach
established in legal basis no. 58 of the ECJ judgment of July 13, 2006 in case C306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael
Hoteles, S.A. The dispute originated from a claim for compensation for the
exploitation of rights brought by SGAE, a copyright management organization,
against a hotel company that offered to its customers additional cable television
and music services, which allowed them the enjoyment of works protected by
intellectual property law.
131. So it is also considered in the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in
their legal basis nos. 48, 49, 53 and 54.
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Second, it is not inherent to the activity of public
communication that the disseminated work is received or enjoyed
simultaneously by a plurality of persons to whom access is
facilitated. Such simultaneity is exclusive to the traditional forms
of communication such as stage productions. However, with
technological advances allowing the work to be recorded or
captured and be disseminated at a different time or place, the
simultaneity of reception is no longer a necessary characteristic of
the activities of communication. Consequently, the legal definition
of this form of exploitation does not require simultaneous
reception. 132 As recognized by the above-mentioned jurisprudence,
what is crucial is the potentiality, not the effectiveness, of the
communication or making of the work available to the public. 133
Those who perform such collecting activities through
intermediate devices (i.e., cable, speakers or similar devices, as
well as individual receivers that are made available to third parties)
are not mere receivers of the work, but are instead making an
autonomous act of communication to the public, which requires
new authorization from the author, since, through their
intervention, they expanded the originally-intended scope of the
communication previously authorized. 134
132. It is referred to in Spanish Intellectual Property Law (R.D.-L. 1/1996,
supra note 122), in which Art. 20.1 provides:
Communication to the public means any act whereby a number of
persons can have access to the work without prior distribution of copies
to each of those persons.
Communication shall not be considered public when it takes place in a
strictly domestic environment that is not integrated or connected to a
distribution network of any kind.
133. So declares the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in which legal
basis no. 43 states: “[I]t is not decisive . . . that customers who have not
switched on the television have not actually had access to the works.”
134. Indeed, the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, considers it so (see
its legal basis numbers 41 and 42):
. . . [I]f reception is for a larger audience . . . a new section of the
receiving public hears or sees the work and the communication of the
program . . . no longer constitutes simple reception of the program itself
but is an independent act through which the broadcast work is
communicated to a new public. . . . [S]uch public reception falls within
the scope of the author's exclusive authorization right;” and, “The
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Finally, it should be taken into account that this new act of
communication of protected works provides its agents with a profit
or benefit at the expense of the author. Indeed, despite the fact that
such activities frequently do not involve direct income, since, as in
the case of hospitality establishments, they do not receive from the
public an initial compensation (such as an entry fee), the public
communication of the work constitutes an indirect source of
income. This is because such activities either allow the
communicator to apply a surcharge to the price of the main service
performed (e.g., a surcharge for the hotel room equipped with
devices permitting such individualized or “on-demand”
communication) or, at least, because it provides the communicator
with a patrimonial benefit derived from the potential increase in
the number of his customers due to the fact that this form of
communication is facilitated. 135
Thus, given that the very existence of intellectual property
rights is justified by the objective of giving a share to the author
from all of the earnings that his work or creation is able to produce,
it seems necessary that this type of use might also be remunerated,
in the same way that the acts of direct and simultaneous
communication to the public are remunerated. This is, ultimately,

clientele of a hotel forms such a new public [since the] transmission of
the broadcast work to that clientele using television sets is not just a
technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original
broadcast. . . . On the contrary, the hotel is the organization which
intervenes . . . to give access to the protected work to its customers.
135. As recognized in the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in its legal
basis no. 44:
. . . [T]he action by the hotel by which it gives access to the broadcast
work to its customers must be considered an additional service
performed with the aim of obtaining some benefit. It cannot be disputed
that the provision of that service has an influence on the hotel’s
standing and, therefore, on the price of rooms. Therefore, even taking
the view, as does the Commission of the European Communities, that
the pursuit of profit is not a necessary condition for the existence of a
communication to the public, it is in any event established that the
communication is of a profit-making nature . . . .
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what the judgments of the ECJ herein commented intend to
recognize to the creators.

